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Battle of Waterloo

These troops appeared to be withdrawing and Zieten, fearing that his own troops would be caught up in a general retreat, was starting to move away from Wellington's flank and towards the Prussian main body near Plancenoit. Zieten had also received a direct order from Blücher to support Bülow, which Zieten obeyed, starting to march to Bülow's aid. Müffling saw this movement away and persuaded Zieten to support Wellington's left flank. Müffling warned Zieten that "The battle is lost if the corps does not keep on the move and immediately support the English army." Zieten resumed his march to support Wellington directly, and the arrival of his troops allowed Wellington to reinforce his crumbling centre by moving cavalry from his left. The French were expecting Grouchy to march to their support from Wavre, and when Prussian I Corps (Zieten's) appeared at Waterloo instead of Grouchy, "the shock of disillusionment shattered French morale" and "the sight of Zieten's arrival caused turmoil to rage in Napoleon's army". I Corps proceeded to attack the French troops before Papelotte and by 19:30 the French position was bent into a rough horseshoe shape. The ends of the line were now based on Hougoumont on the left, Plancenoit on the right, and the centre on La Haie. Durutte had taken the positions of La Haie and Papelotte in a series of attacks, but now retreated behind Smohain without opposing the Prussian 24th Regiment (Laurens') as it retook both. The 24th advanced against the new French position, was repulsed, and returned to the attack supported by Silesian Schützen (riflemen) and the F/1st Landwehr. The French initially fell back before the renewed assault, but now began seriously to contest ground, attempting to regain Smohain and hold on to the ridgeline and the last few houses of Papelotte. The Prussian 24th Regiment linked up with a Highlander battalion on its far right and along with the 13th Landwehr Regiment and cavalry support threw the French out of these positions. Further attacks by the 13th Landwehr and the 15th Brigade drove the French from Frichermont. Durutte's division, finding itself about to be charged by massed squadrons of Zieten's I Corps cavalry reserve, retreated from the battlefield. The rest of d'Erlon's I Corps also broke and fled in panic, while to the west the French Middle Guard were assaulting Wellington's centre. The Prussian I Corps then advanced towards the Brussels road, the only line of retreat available to the French. Attack of the Imperial Guard: Meanwhile, with Wellington's centre exposed by the fall of La Haye Sainte and the Plancenoit front temporarily stabilised, Napoleon committed his last reserve, the hitherto-undefeated Imperial Guard infantry. This attack, mounted at around 19:30, was intended to break through Wellington's centre and roll up his line away from the Prussians. Although it is one of the most celebrated passages of arms in military history, it had been unclear which units actually participated. It appears that it was mounted by five battalions of the Middle Guard, and not by the grenadiers or chasseurs of the Old Guard. Three Old Guard battalions did move forward and formed the attack's second line, though they remained in reserve and did not directly assault the Anglo-allied line. ... I saw four regiments of the middle guard, conducted by the Emperor, arriving. With these troops, he wished to renew the attack, and penetrate the centre of the enemy. He ordered me to lead them on; generals, officers and soldiers all displayed the greatest intrepidity; but this body of troops was too weak to resist, for a long time, the forces opposed to it by the enemy, and it was soon necessary to renounce the hope which this attack had, for a few moments, inspired. Napoleon himself oversaw the initial deployment of the Middle and Old Guard. The Middle Guard formed in battalion squares, each about 550 men strong, with the 1st/3rd Grenadiers, led by Generals Friant and Poret de Morvan, on the right along the road, to their left and rear was General Harlet leading the square of the 4th Grenadiers, then the 1st/3rd Chasseurs under General Michel, next the 2nd/3rd Chasseurs and finally the large single square of two battalions of 800 soldiers of the 4th Chasseurs led by General Henrion. Two batteries of Imperial Guard Horse Artillery accompanied them with sections of two guns between the squares. Each square was led by a general and Marshal Ney, mounted on his 5th horse of the day, led the advance. Behind them, in reserve, were the three battalions of the Old Guard, right to left 1st/2nd Grenadiers, 2nd/2nd Chasseurs and 1st/2nd Chasseurs. Napoleon left Ney to conduct the assault; however, Ney led the Middle Guard on an oblique towards the Anglo-allied centre right instead of attacking straight up the centre. Napoleon sent Ney's senior ADC Colonel Crabbé to order Ney to adjust, but Crabbé was unable to get there in time. Other troops rallied to support the advance of the Guard. On the left infantry from Reille's corps that was not engaged with Hougoumont and cavalry advanced. On the right all the now rallied elements of D'Érlon's corps once again ascended the ridge and engaged the Anglo-allied line. French artillery also moved forward in support; Duchand's battery, in particular, inflicting losses on Colin Halkett's brigade. Halkett's front line, consisting of the 30th Foot and 73rd, traded fire with the 1st/3rd and 4th Grenadiers but they were driven back in confusion into the 33rd and 69th regiments, Halket was shot in the face and seriously wounded and the whole brigade having been ordered to pull back, retreated in a mob. Other Anglo-allied troops began to give way as well. A counterattack by the Nassauers and the remains of Kielmansegge's brigade from the Anglo-allied second line, led by the Prince of Orange, was also thrown back and the Prince of Orange was seriously wounded. The survivors of Halkett's brigade were reformed, and engaged the French in a firefight. I saw the Garde Impériale advancing while the English troops were leaving the plateau en masse and moving in the direction of Waterloo; the battle seemed lost... The Dutch divisional commander Chassé, on his own initiative, decided at this critical moment to advance with his relatively fresh Dutch division. Chassé first ordered his artillery forward; led by a battery of Dutch horse-artillery commanded by Captain Krahmer de Bichin. The battery opened a destructive fire into the 1st/3rd Grenadiers' flank. This still did not stop the Guard's advance, so Chassé, who was affectionately called "Generaal Bajonet" by his soldiers, ordered his first brigade, commanded by Colonel Hendrik Detmers, to charge the outnumbered French with the bayonet. As the Guard wavered Chassé galloped among his men and found Captain De Haan with a few soldiers of the 19th Militia, whom he ordered into a flank attack. According to Chassé: [De Haan] jumped over the hedge, reformed the line of about fifty men and the murderous fire he inflicted caused death and confusion among the enemy's lines. He took advantage of their confusion and advanced with the bayonet against them. I had the unspeakable joy to witness 300 Cuirassiers run away from 50 Dutchmen. The French grenadiers then faltered and broke. The 4th Grenadiers, seeing their comrades retreat and having suffered heavy casualties themselves, now wheeled right about and retired. To the left of the 4th Grenadiers were the two squares of the 1st/ and 2nd/3rd Chasseurs who angled further to the west and had suffered more from artillery fire than the grenadiers. But as their advance mounted the ridge they found it apparently abandoned and covered with dead. Suddenly 1,500 British Foot Guards under Peregrine Maitland, who had been lying down to protect themselves from the French artillery, rose and devastated them with point-blank volleys. The chasseurs deployed to answer the fire, but some 300 fell from the first volley, including Colonel Mallet and General Michel, and both battalion commanders. A bayonet charge by the Foot Guards then broke the leaderless squares, which fell back onto the following column. The 4th Chasseurs battalion, 800 strong, now came up onto the exposed battalions of British Foot Guards, who lost all cohesion and dashed back up the slope as a disorganized crowd with the chasseurs in pursuit. At the crest the chasseurs came upon the battery that had caused severe casualties on the 1st and 2nd/3rd Chasseurs. They opened fire and swept away the gunners.

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Battle of Waterloo

Suddenly 1,500 British Foot Guards under Peregrine Maitland, who had been lying down to protect themselves from the French artillery, rose and devastated them with point-blank volleys. The chasseurs deployed to answer the fire, but some 300 fell from the first volley, including Colonel Mallet and General Michel, and both battalion commanders. A bayonet charge by the Foot Guards then broke the leaderless squares, which fell back onto the following column. The 4th Chasseurs battalion, 800 strong, now came up onto the exposed battalions of British Foot Guards, who lost all cohesion and dashed back up the slope as a disorganized crowd with the chasseurs in pursuit. At the crest the chasseurs came upon the battery that had caused severe casualties on the 1st and 2nd/3rd Chasseurs. They opened fire and swept away the gunners. The left flank of their square now came under fire from a heavy formation of British skirmishers, which the chasseurs drove back. But the skirmishers were replaced by the 52nd Light Infantry (2nd Division), led by John Colborne, which wheeled in line onto the chasseurs' flank and poured a devastating fire into them. The chasseurs returned a very sharp fire which killed or wounded some 150 men of the 52nd. The 52nd then charged, and under this onslaught, the chasseurs broke. The last of the Guard retreated headlong. A ripple of panic passed through the French lines as the astounding news spread: "La Garde recule. Sauve qui peut!" ("The Guard is retreating. Every man for himself!") Wellington now stood up in Copenhagen's stirrups and waved his hat in the air to signal a general advance. His army rushed forward from the lines and threw themselves upon the retreating French. The surviving Imperial Guard rallied on their three reserve battalions (some sources say four) just south of La Haye Sainte for a last stand. A charge from Adam's Brigade and the Hanoverian Landwehr Osnabrück Battalion, plus Vivian's and Vandeleur's relatively fresh cavalry brigades to their right, threw them into confusion. Those left in semi-cohesive units retreated towards La Belle Alliance. It was during this retreat that some of the Guards were invited to surrender, eliciting the famous, if apocryphal, retort "La Garde meurt, elle ne se rend pas!" ("The Guard dies, it does not surrender!"). Prussian capture of Plancenoit: At about the same time, the Prussian 5th, 14th, and 16th Brigades were starting to push through Plancenoit, in the third assault of the day. The church was by now on fire, while its graveyard—the French centre of resistance—had corpses strewn about "as if by a whirlwind". Five Guard battalions were deployed in support of the Young Guard, virtually all of which was now committed to the defence, along with remnants of Lobau's corps. The key to the Plancenoit position proved to be the Chantelet woods to the south. Pirch's II Corps had arrived with two brigades and reinforced the attack of IV Corps, advancing through the woods. The 25th Regiment's musketeer battalions threw the 1/2e Grenadiers (Old Guard) out of the Chantelet woods, outflanking Plancenoit and forcing a retreat. The Old Guard retreated in good order until they met the mass of troops retreating in panic, and became part of that rout. The Prussian IV Corps advanced beyond Plancenoit to find masses of French retreating in disorder from British pursuit. The Prussians were unable to fire for fear of hitting Wellington's units. This was the fifth and final time that Plancenoit changed hands. French forces not retreating with the Guard were surrounded in their positions and eliminated, neither side asking for nor offering quarter. The French Young Guard Division reported 96 per cent casualties, and two-thirds of Lobau's Corps ceased to exist. Despite their great courage and stamina, the French Guards fighting in the village began to show signs of wavering. The church was already on fire with columns of red flame coming out of the windows, aisles and doors. In the village itself—still the scene of bitter house-to-house fighting—everything was burning, adding to the confusion. However, once Major von Witzleben's manoeuvre was accomplished and the French Guards saw their flank and rear threatened, they began to withdraw. The Guard Chasseurs under General Pelet formed the rearguard. The remnants of the Guard left in a great rush, leaving large masses of artillery, equipment and ammunition wagons in the wake of their retreat. The evacuation of Plancenoit led to the loss of the position that was to be used to cover the withdrawal of the French Army to Charleroi. The Guard fell back from Plancenoit in the direction of Maison du Roi and Caillou. Unlike other parts of the battlefield, there were no cries of "Sauve qui peut!" here. Instead, the cry "Sauvons nos aigles!" ("Let's save our eagles!") could be heard. French disintegration: The French right, left, and centre had all now failed. The last cohesive French force consisted of two battalions of the Old Guard stationed around La Belle Alliance; they had been so placed to act as a final reserve and to protect Napoleon in the event of a French retreat. He hoped to rally the French army behind them, but as retreat turned into rout, they too were forced to withdraw, one on either side of La Belle Alliance, in square as protection against Coalition cavalry. Until persuaded that the battle was lost and he should leave, Napoleon commanded the square to the left of the inn. Adam's Brigade charged and forced back this square, while the Prussians engaged the other. As dusk fell, both squares withdrew in relatively good order, but the French artillery and everything else fell into the hands of the Prussian and Anglo-allied armies. The retreating Guards were surrounded by thousands of fleeing, broken French troops. Coalition cavalry harried the fugitives until about 23:00, with Gneisenau pursuing them as far as Genappe before ordering a halt. There, Napoleon's abandoned carriage was captured, still containing an annotated copy of Machiavelli's The Prince, and diamonds left behind in the rush to escape. These diamonds became part of King Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia's crown jewels; one Major Keller of the F/15th received the Pour le Mérite with oak leaves for the feat. By this time 78 guns and 2,000 prisoners had also been taken, including more generals. There remained to us still four squares of the Old Guard to protect the retreat. These brave grenadiers, the choice of the army, forced successively to retire, yielded ground foot by foot, till, overwhelmed by numbers, they were almost entirely annihilated. From that moment, a retrograde movement was declared, and the army formed nothing but a confused mass. There was not, however, a total rout, nor the cry of sauve qui peut, as has been calumniously stated in the bulletin. In the middle of the position occupied by the French army, and exactly upon the height, is a farm [sic], called La Belle Alliance. The march of all the Prussian columns was directed towards this farm, which was visible from every side. It was there that Napoleon was during the battle; it was thence that he gave his orders, that he flattered himself with the hopes of victory; and it was there that his ruin was decided. There, too, it was that, by happy chance, Field Marshal Blücher and Lord Wellington met in the dark, and mutually saluted each other as victors. Other sources agree that the meeting of the commanders took place near La Belle Alliance, with this occurring at around 21:00. Aftermath: Waterloo cost Wellington around 17,000 dead or wounded, and Blücher some 7,000 (810 of which were suffered by just one unit: the 18th Regiment, which served in Bülow's 15th Brigade, had fought at both Frichermont and Plancenoit, and won 33 Iron Crosses). Napoleon's losses were 24,000 to 26,000 killed or wounded, including 6,000 to 7,000 captured with an additional 15,000 deserting subsequent to the battle and over the following days. 22 June. This morning I went to visit the field of battle, which is a little beyond the village of Waterloo, on the plateau of Mont-Saint-Jean; but on arrival there the sight was too horrible to behold. I felt sick in the stomach and was obliged to return. The multitude of carcasses, the heaps of wounded men with mangled limbs unable to move, and perishing from not having their wounds dressed or from hunger, as the Allies were, of course, obliged to take their surgeons and waggons with them, formed a spectacle I shall never forget. The wounded, both of the Allies and the French, remain in an equally deplorable state.

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Battle of Waterloo

Napoleon's losses were 24,000 to 26,000 killed or wounded, including 6,000 to 7,000 captured with an additional 15,000 deserting subsequent to the battle and over the following days. 22 June. This morning I went to visit the field of battle, which is a little beyond the village of Waterloo, on the plateau of Mont-Saint-Jean; but on arrival there the sight was too horrible to behold. I felt sick in the stomach and was obliged to return. The multitude of carcasses, the heaps of wounded men with mangled limbs unable to move, and perishing from not having their wounds dressed or from hunger, as the Allies were, of course, obliged to take their surgeons and waggons with them, formed a spectacle I shall never forget. The wounded, both of the Allies and the French, remain in an equally deplorable state. At 10:30 on 19 June, General Grouchy, still following his orders, defeated General Thielemann at Wavre and withdrew in good order—though at the cost of 33,000 French troops that never reached the Waterloo battlefield. Wellington sent his official dispatch describing the battle to England on 19 June 1815; it arrived in London on 21 June 1815 and was published as a London Gazette Extraordinary on 22 June. Wellington, Blücher and other Coalition forces advanced upon Paris. After his troops fell back, Napoleon fled to Paris following his defeat, arriving at 5:30 am on 21 June. Napoleon wrote to his brother and regent in Paris, Joseph, believing that he could still raise an army to fight back the Anglo-Prussian forces. Napoleon believed he could rally French supporters to his cause and call upon conscripts to hold off invading forces until General Grouchy's army could reinforce him in Paris. However, following defeat at Waterloo, Napoleon's support from the French public and his own army waned, including by General Ney, who believed that Paris would fall if Napoleon remained in power. Napoleon's brother Lucien and Marshal Louis-Nicolas Davout advised him to continue fighting, dissolve the Chamber of Deputies from Louis XVIII's constitutional government, and for Napoleon to rule France as a military dictator, which Napoleon had been under the guise of Emperor of the French from 1804 until 1814. To circumvent Napoleon overthrowing the Chamber of Deputies and a possible French Civil War, the Chamber of Deputies voted to become permanent on 21 June after persuasion from Lafayette. On 22 June, Napoleon wished to abdicate in favour of his son, Napoleon II, after realizing that he lacked military, public, and governmental support for his claim to continue to rule France. Napoleon's proposal for the instatement of his son was swiftly rejected by the legislature. Napoleon announced his second abdication on 24 June 1815. In the final skirmish of the Napoleonic Wars, Marshal Davout, Napoleon's minister of war, was defeated by Blücher at Issy on 3 July 1815. Allegedly, Napoleon tried to escape to North America, but the Royal Navy was blockading French ports to forestall such a move. He finally surrendered to Captain Frederick Maitland of HMS Bellerophon on 15 July. There was a campaign against French fortresses that still held out; Longwy capitulated on 13 September 1815, the last to do so. Louis XVIII was restored to the throne of France and Napoleon was exiled to Saint Helena, where he died in 1821. The Treaty of Paris was signed on 20 November 1815. Royal Highness, – Exposed to the factions which divide my country, and to the enmity of the great Powers of Europe, I have terminated my political career; and I come, like Themistocles, to throw myself upon the hospitality (m'asseoir sur le foyer) of the British people. I claim from your Royal Highness the protections of the laws, and throw myself upon the most powerful, the most constant, and the most generous of my enemies. Peregrine Maitland's 1st Foot Guards, who had defeated the Chasseurs of the Middle Guard, were mistakenly thought to have defeated the Grenadiers of the Old Guard. They were thus awarded the title of Grenadier Guards in recognition of their feat and adopted bearskins in the style of the Grenadiers. Britain's Household Cavalry likewise adopted the cuirass in 1821 in recognition of their success against their armoured French counterparts. The effectiveness of the lance was noted by all participants and this weapon subsequently became more widespread throughout Europe; the British converted their first light cavalry regiment to lancers in 1816, their uniforms, of Polish origin, were based on those of the Imperial Guard lancers. Teeth of tens of thousands of dead soldiers were removed by surviving troops, locals or even scavengers who had travelled there from Britain, then used for making denture replacements in Britain and elsewhere. The so-called "Waterloo teeth" were in demand because they came from relatively healthy young men. Despite the efforts of scavengers both human and otherwise, human remains could still be seen at Waterloo a year after the battle. Analysis: Historical importance: Waterloo proved a decisive battle in more than one sense. Each generation in Europe up to the outbreak of the First World War looked back at Waterloo as the turning point that dictated the course of subsequent world history, seeing it in retrospect as the event that ushered in the Concert of Europe, an era characterised by relative peace, material prosperity and technological progress. The battle definitively ended the series of wars that had convulsed Europe—and involved other regions of the world—since the French Revolution of the early 1790s. It also ended the First French Empire and the political and military career of Napoleon Bonaparte, one of the greatest commanders and statesmen in history. There followed almost four decades of international peace in Europe. No further major international conflict occurred until the Crimean War of 1853–1856. Changes to the configuration of European states, as refashioned in the aftermath of Waterloo, included the formation of the Holy Alliance of reactionary governments intent on repressing revolutionary and democratic ideas, and the reshaping of the former Holy Roman Empire into a German Confederation increasingly marked by the political dominance of Prussia. The bicentenary of Waterloo prompted renewed attention to the geopolitical and economic legacy of the battle and to the century of relative transatlantic peace which followed. Views on the reasons for Napoleon's defeat: General Antoine-Henri, Baron Jomini, one of the leading military writers on the Napoleonic art of war, had a number of theories to explain Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo. In my opinion, four principal causes led to this disaster: The first, and most influential, was the arrival, skilfully combined, of Blücher, and the false movement that favoured this arrival; the second, was the admirable firmness of the British infantry, joined to the sang-froid and aplomb of its chiefs; the third, was the horrible weather, that had softened the ground, and rendered the offensive movements so toilsome, and retarded till one o'clock the attack that should have been made in the morning; the fourth, was the inconceivable formation of the first corps, in masses very much too deep for the first grand attack. The Prussian soldier, historian, and theorist Carl von Clausewitz, who as a young colonel had served as chief-of-staff to Thielmann's Prussian III Corps during the Waterloo campaign, expressed the following opinion: Bonaparte and the authors who support him have always attempted to portray the great catastrophes that befell him as the result of chance. They seek to make their readers believe that through his great wisdom and extraordinary energy the whole project had already moved forward with the greatest confidence, that complete success was but a hair's breadth away, when treachery, accident, or even fate, as they sometimes call it, ruined everything. He and his supporters do not want to admit that huge mistakes, sheer recklessness, and, above all, overreaching ambition that exceeded all realistic possibilities, were the true causes. Wellington wrote in his dispatch to London: I should not do justice to my own feelings, or to Marshal Blücher and the Prussian army, if I did not attribute the successful result of this arduous day to the cordial and timely assistance I received from them. The operation of General Bülow upon the enemy's flank was a most decisive one; and, even if I had not found myself in a situation to make the attack which produced the final result, it would have forced the enemy to retire if his attacks should have failed, and would have prevented him from taking advantage of them if they should unfortunately have succeeded In his famous study of the Campaign of 1815, the Prussian Clausewitz does not agree with Wellington on this assessment. Indeed, he claims that if Bonaparte had attacked in the morning, the battle would probably have been decided by the time the Prussians arrived, and an attack by Blücher, while not impossible or useless, would have been much less certain of success. Parkinson (2000) adds: "Neither army beat Napoleon alone.

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Battle of Waterloo

The operation of General Bülow upon the enemy's flank was a most decisive one; and, even if I had not found myself in a situation to make the attack which produced the final result, it would have forced the enemy to retire if his attacks should have failed, and would have prevented him from taking advantage of them if they should unfortunately have succeeded In his famous study of the Campaign of 1815, the Prussian Clausewitz does not agree with Wellington on this assessment. Indeed, he claims that if Bonaparte had attacked in the morning, the battle would probably have been decided by the time the Prussians arrived, and an attack by Blücher, while not impossible or useless, would have been much less certain of success. Parkinson (2000) adds: "Neither army beat Napoleon alone. But whatever the part played by Prussian troops in the actual moment when the Imperial Guard was repulsed, it is difficult to see how Wellington could have staved off defeat, when his centre had been almost shattered, his reserves were almost all committed, the French right remained unmolested and the Imperial Guard intact. ... Blücher may not have been totally responsible for victory over Napoleon, but he deserved full credit for preventing a British defeat". Steele (2014) writes: "Blücher's arrival not only diverted vital reinforcements, but also forced Napoleon to accelerate his effort against Wellington. The tide of battle had been turned by the hard-driving Blücher. As his Prussians pushed in Napoleon's flank, Wellington was able to shift to the offensive". It has also been noted that Wellington's maps of the battlefield were based on a recent reconnaissance and therefore more up to date than those used by Napoleon, who had to rely on Ferraris-Capitaine maps of 1794. Legacy: The battlefield today: Landmarks: Some portions of the terrain on the battlefield have been altered from their 1815 appearance. Tourism began the day after the battle, with Captain Mercer noting that on 19 June "a carriage drove on the ground from Brussels, the inmates of which, alighting, proceeded to examine the field". In 1820, the Netherlands' King William I ordered the construction of a monument. The Lion's Mound, a giant artificial hill, was constructed here using 300,000 cubic metres (390,000 cu yd) of earth taken from the ridge at the centre of the British line, effectively removing the southern bank of Wellington's sunken road. Every one is aware that the variously inclined undulations of the plains, where the engagement between Napoleon and Wellington took place, are no longer what they were on 18 June 1815. By taking from this mournful field the wherewithal to make a monument to it, its real relief has been taken away, and history, disconcerted, no longer finds her bearings there. It has been disfigured for the sake of glorifying it. Wellington, when he beheld Waterloo once more, two years later, exclaimed, "They have altered my field of battle!" Where the great pyramid of earth, surmounted by the lion, rises to-day, there was a hillock which descended in an easy slope towards the Nivelles road, but which was almost an escarpment on the side of the highway to Genappe. The elevation of this escarpment can still be measured by the height of the two knolls of the two great sepulchres which enclose the road from Genappe to Brussels: one, the English tomb, is on the left; the other, the German tomb, is on the right. There is no French tomb. The whole of that plain is a sepulchre for France. The alleged remark by Wellington about the alteration of the battlefield as described by Hugo was never documented, however. Other terrain features and notable landmarks on the field have remained virtually unchanged since the battle. These include the rolling farmland to the east of the Brussels–Charleroi Road as well as the buildings at Hougoumont, La Haye Sainte, and La Belle Alliance. Monuments: Apart from the Lion's Mound, there are several more conventional but noteworthy monuments throughout the battlefield. A cluster of monuments at the Brussels–Charleroi and Braine L'Alleud–Ohain crossroads marks the mass graves of British, Dutch, Hanoverian and King's German Legion troops. A monument to the French dead, entitled L'Aigle blessé ("The Wounded Eagle"), marks the location where it is believed one of the Imperial Guard units formed a square during the closing moments of the battle. A monument to the Prussian dead is located in the village of Plancenoit on the site where one of their artillery batteries took position. The Duhesme mausoleum is one among the few graves of the fallen. It is located at the side of Saint Martin's Church in Ways, a hamlet in the municipality of Genappe. Seventeen fallen officers are buried in the crypt of the British Monument in the Brussels Cemetery in Evere. Had the French won the Battle of Waterloo, Napoleon planned to commemorate the victory by building a pyramid of white stones, akin to the pyramids he had seen during his invasion of Egypt in 1798. Remains: After the battle, the bodies of the tens of thousands who died were hastily buried in mass graves across the battlefield – a process that took at least ten days, according to accounts by those who visited the battlefield just after the battle. Remarkably, there is no record of any such mass grave being discovered in the 20th and 21st centuries; only two complete human skeletons have been found. The remains of a soldier thought to be 23-year-old Friederich Brandt were discovered in 2012. He was a slightly hunchbacked infantryman, 1.60 metres (5 ft 3 in) tall, and was hit in the chest by a French bullet. His coins, rifle and position on the battlefield identified him as an Hanoverian fighting in the King's German Legion. In 2022 a second skeleton was found in a ditch near a former field hospital by the Waterloo Uncovered charity. In December 2022, the historians Dr. Bernard Wilkin (Belgium) and Robin Schäfer (Germany), assisted by Belgian archaeologist Dominique Bosquet, discovered and recovered the largest assembly of remains of Waterloo battlefield casualties found in recent times. In the aftermath of the historian's research into the fate of the fallen once buried on the Waterloo battlefield (see below), several local individuals had come forward who were in the possession of human remains recovered on it. Forensic examination has shown that these remains belonged to at least four soldiers, some of whom are likely to be Prussian. Another set of human remains, initially discovered on the central battlefield by illegal metal detecting and consisting of the remains of six British soldiers, was also recovered by the team. Objects found with the casualties on the central battlefield point to the fact that at least one of them served in the First Foot Guards. A possible reason for the absence of human remains in any quantity is that European battlefields of the time were often scoured for bones to make bone meal, which was much in demand as a fertilizer before the discovery of superphosphates in the 1840s. Bernard Wilkin and Robin Schäfer, supported by the British archaeologist Tony Pollard, concluded that in the aftermath of the conflict, local farmers dug up the corpses of horses and men and sold them to the Waterloo sugar factory. There, the ground-down bones were fired in kilns to make bone-char, which was then used to filter sugar syrup as part of the production process. Coin controversy: As part of the bicentennial celebration of the battle, in 2015 Belgium minted a two-euro coin depicting the Lion monument over a map of the field of battle. France officially protested against this issue of coins, while the Belgian government noted that the French mint sells souvenir medals at Waterloo. After 180,000 coins were minted but not released, the issue was melted. Instead, Belgium issued an identical commemorative coin in the non-standard value of ⁠2+1/2⁠ euros. Legally valid only within the issuing country it was minted in brass, packaged, and sold by the Belgian mint for 6 euros. A ten-euro coin, showing Wellington, Blücher, their troops and the silhouette of Napoleon, was also available in silver for 42 euros. See also: Military career of Napoleon Timeline of the Napoleonic era List of Napoleonic battles Waterloo Medal awarded to those soldiers of the British Army who fought at the battle. Battle of Waterloo reenactment Lord Uxbridge's leg was shattered by a grape-shot at the Battle of Waterloo and removed by a surgeon. The artificial leg used by Uxbridge for the rest of his life was donated to a Waterloo Museum after his death. There is also a second leg on display at his house, Plas Newydd, on Anglesey. Waterloo (1970 film) directed by Sergei Bondarchuk Waterloo (1974 song) by ABBA Notes: References: NB: Reflist: Works cited: Van der Aa, Abraham Jacob (1858). "David Hendrik, Baron Chasse". Biographisch woordenboek der Nederlanden. Deel 19 (in Dutch).

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Battle of Waterloo

Battle of Waterloo reenactment Lord Uxbridge's leg was shattered by a grape-shot at the Battle of Waterloo and removed by a surgeon. The artificial leg used by Uxbridge for the rest of his life was donated to a Waterloo Museum after his death. There is also a second leg on display at his house, Plas Newydd, on Anglesey. Waterloo (1970 film) directed by Sergei Bondarchuk Waterloo (1974 song) by ABBA Notes: References: NB: Reflist: Works cited: Van der Aa, Abraham Jacob (1858). "David Hendrik, Baron Chasse". Biographisch woordenboek der Nederlanden. Deel 19 (in Dutch). Adkin, Mark (2001), The Waterloo Companion, Aurum, ISBN 978-1-85410-764-0 Anglesey, Marquess of (George C.H.V. Paget) (1990), One Leg: The Life and Letters of Henry William Paget, First Marquess of Anglesey, K.G. 1768–1854, Pen and Sword, ISBN 978-0-85052-518-2 Baker-Smith, Veronica (2016), Wellington's Hidden Heroes: The Dutch and the Belgians at Waterloo, Casemate, ISBN 9781612003320 Barbero, Alessandro (2005), The Battle: A New History of Waterloo, Atlantic Books, ISBN 978-1-84354-310-7 Barbero, Alessandro (2006), The Battle: A New History of Waterloo (translated by John Cullen) (paperback ed.), Walker & Company, ISBN 978-0-8027-1500-5 Barbero, Alessandro (2013), The Battle: A New History of Waterloo, Atlantic Books, p. 160, ISBN 978-1-78239-138-8 Bas, F de; Wommersom, J. De T'Serclaes de (1909), La campagne de 1815 aux Pays-Bas d'après les rapports officiels néerlandais, vol. I: Quatre-Bras. II: Waterloo. III: Annexes and notes. IV: supplement: maps and plans, Brussels: Librairie Albert de Wit, retrieved 10 May 2023 Bassford, C.; Moran, D.; Pedlow, G. W. (2015) [2010]. On Waterloo: Clausewitz, Wellington, and the Campaign of 1815 (online scan ed.). Clausewitz.com. ISBN 978-1-4537-0150-8. Retrieved 25 September 2020. Beamish, N. Ludlow (1995) [1832], History of the King's German Legion, Dallington: Naval and Military Press, ISBN 978-0-9522011-0-6 Black, Jeremy (24 February 2015), "Legacy of 1815", History Today Boller, Paul F. Jr.; George Jr., John (1989), They Never Said It: A Book of Fake Quotes, Misquotes, and Misleading Attributions, New York: Oxford University Press, p. [https://books.google.com/books?id=NCOEYJ0q-DUC 12], ISBN 978-0-19-505541-2 Bodart, Gaston (1908). Militär-historisches Kriegs-Lexikon (1618-1905). Retrieved 11 June 2021. Bonaparte, Napoleon (1869), "No. 22060", in Polon, Henri; Dumaine, J. (eds.), Correspondance de Napoléon Ier; publiée par ordre de l'empereur Napoléon III (1858), vol. 28, Paris H. Plon, J. Dumaine, pp. 292, 293. Booth, John (1815), The Battle of Waterloo: Containing the Accounts Published by Authority, British and Foreign, and Other Relevant Documents, with Circumstantial Details, Previous and After the Battle, from a Variety of Authentic and Original Sources (2nd ed.), London: printed for J. Booth and T. Ergeton; Military Library, Whitehall Boulger, Demetrius C. deK. (1901), Belgians at Waterloo: With Translations of the Reports of the Dutch and Belgian Commanders, London{{citation}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) Bowden, Scott (1983), Armies at Waterloo: A detailed analysis of the armies., Empire Press. "Napoleonic Satires", Brown University Library, retrieved 22 July 2016 Chandler, David (1966), The Campaigns of Napoleon, New York: Macmillan Chesney, Charles C. (1874), Waterloo Lectures: A Study Of The Campaign Of 1815 (3rd ed.), Longmans, Green, and Co Clark-Kennedy, A.E. (1975), Attack the Colour! The Royal Dragoons in the Peninsula and at Waterloo, London: Research Publishing Co. Clausewitz, Carl von; Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of (2010), Bassford, Christopher; Moran, Daniel; Pedlow, Gregory W. (eds.), On Waterloo: Clausewitz, Wellington, and the Campaign of 1815., Clausewitz.com, ISBN 978-1453701508{{citation}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link) Clayton, Tim. (2014). Waterloo, Four days that changed Europe's destiny. Little Brown. ISBN 978-0-7481-3412-0. Clodfelter, M. (2017). Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1492-2015 (4th ed.). Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland. ISBN 978-0-7864-7470-7. Cornwell, Bernard (2015), "Those terrible grey horses, how they fight", Waterloo: The History of Four Days, Three Armies and Three Battles, Lulu Press, Inc, p. ~128, ISBN 978-1-312-92522-9 Corrigan, Gordon (2006), Wellington (reprint, eBook ed.), Continuum International Publishing Group, p. 327, ISBN 978-0-8264-2590-4 Cotton, Edward (1849), A voice from Waterloo. A history of the battle, on 18 June 1815., London: B.L. Green Creasy, Sir Edward (1877), The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World: from Marathon to Waterloo, London: Richard Bentley & Son, ISBN 978-0-306-80559-2 Davies, Huw (2012), Wellington's Wars: The Making of a Military Genius (illustrated ed.), Yale University Press, p. 244, ISBN 978-0-300-16417-6 Eenens, A.M (1879), "Dissertation sur la participation des troupes des Pays-Bas a la campagne de 1815 en Belgique", in: Societé royale des beaux arts et de littérature de Gand, Messager des Sciences Historiques, Gand: Vanderhaegen Comte d'Erlon, Jean-Baptiste Drouet (1815), Drouet's account of Waterloo to the French Parliament, Napoleon Bonaparte Internet Guide, archived from the original on 8 October 2007, retrieved 14 September 2007 Esposito, Vincent Joseph; Elting, John (1999), A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, Greenhill, ISBN 978-1-85367-346-7 Field, Andrew W. (2013), Waterloo The French Perspective, Great Britain: Pen & Sword Books, ISBN 978-1-78159-043-0 Fitchett, W.H. (2006) [1897], "Chapter: King-making Waterloo", Deeds that Won the Empire. Historic Battle Scenes, London: John Murray (Project Gutenberg) Fletcher, Ian (1994), Wellington's Foot Guards, vol. 52 of Elite Series (illustrated ed.), Osprey Publishing, ISBN 978-1-85532-392-6 Fletcher, Ian (1999), Galloping at Everything: The British Cavalry in the Peninsula and at Waterloo 1808–15, Staplehurst, UK: Spellmount, ISBN 978-1-86227-016-9 Fletcher, Ian (2001), A Desperate Business: Wellington, The British Army and the Waterloo Campaign, Staplehurst, UK: Spellmount Fortescue, John William (2004) [1920]. A History of the British Army, Vol. 10: 1814-1815. Uckfield, East Sussex: Naval & Military Press. ISBN 1-84-342724-9. Frye, W.E.

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Battle of Waterloo

52 of Elite Series (illustrated ed.), Osprey Publishing, ISBN 978-1-85532-392-6 Fletcher, Ian (1999), Galloping at Everything: The British Cavalry in the Peninsula and at Waterloo 1808–15, Staplehurst, UK: Spellmount, ISBN 978-1-86227-016-9 Fletcher, Ian (2001), A Desperate Business: Wellington, The British Army and the Waterloo Campaign, Staplehurst, UK: Spellmount Fortescue, John William (2004) [1920]. A History of the British Army, Vol. 10: 1814-1815. Uckfield, East Sussex: Naval & Military Press. ISBN 1-84-342724-9. Frye, W.E. (2004) [1908], After Waterloo: Reminiscences of European Travel 1815–1819, Project Gutenberg, retrieved 29 April 2015 Funcken, Fred; Funcken, Lilianne (1967), Le costume et les armes des soldats de tous les temps (in French), Tournai: Casterman, ISBN 2-203-14303-7 Glover, G. (2004), Letters from the Battle of Waterloo: the unpublished correspondence by Anglo-allied officers from the Siborne papers, London: Greenhill, ISBN 978-1-85367-597-3 Glover, Gareth (2007), From Corunna to Waterloo: the Letters and Journals of Two Napoleonic Hussars, 1801–1816, London: Greenhill Books Glover, Gareth (2014), Waterloo: Myth and Reality, Pen and Sword, ISBN 978-1-78159-356-1 Grant, Charles (1972), Royal Scots Greys (Men-at-Arms), Osprey, ISBN 978-0-85045-059-0 Gronow, R.H. (1862), Reminiscences of Captain Gronow, London, ISBN 978-1-4043-2792-4 Hamilton-Williams, David (1993), Waterloo. New Perspectives. The Great Battle Reappraised, London: Arms & Armour Press, ISBN 978-0-471-05225-8 Hamilton-Williams, David (1994), Waterloo, New Perspectives, The Great Battle Reappraised (Paperback ed.), New York: John Wiley and Sons, ISBN 978-0-471-14571-4 Herold, J. Christopher (1967), The Battle of Waterloo, New York: Harper & Row, ISBN 978-0-304-91603-0 Haweis, James Walter (1908), The campaign of 1815, chiefly in Flanders, Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, pp. 228–229 Hofschröer, Peter (1999), 1815: The Waterloo Campaign. The German Victory, vol. 2, London: Greenhill Books, ISBN 978-1-85367-368-9 Hofschröer, Peter (2005), Waterloo 1815: Quatre Bras and Ligny, London: Leo Cooper, ISBN 978-1-84415-168-4 Homann, Arne; Wilkin, Bernard; Schäfer, Robin. "Die Toten von Waterloo: Aus dem Massengrab in die Zuckerfabrik?". Archäologie in Deutschland. 2023 (3 (Juni-Juli)): 44–45. Hoorebeeke, C. van (September–October 2007), "Blackman, John-Lucie: pourquoi sa tombe est-elle à Hougomont?", Bulletin de l'Association Belge Napoléonienne, no. 118, pp. 6–21 Houssaye, Henri (1900), Waterloo (translated from the French), London Hugo, Victor (1862), "Chapter VII: Napoleon in a Good Humor", Les Misérables, The Literature Network, archived from the original on 12 October 2007, retrieved 14 September 2007 Jomini, Antoine-Henri (1864), The Political and Military History of the Campaign of Waterloo (3rd ed.), New York; D. Van Nostrand (translated by Benet S.V.) Keeling, Drew (27 May 2015), The Dividends of Waterloo, retrieved 3 June 2015 Kennedy, Paul (1987), The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, New York: Random House Kincaid, Captain J. (2006), "The Final Attack The Rifle Brigade Advance 7 pm 18 June 1815", in Lewis-Stemple, John (ed.), England: The Autobiography: 2,000 Years of English History by Those Who Saw it Happen (reprint ed.), UK: Penguin, pp. 434–436, ISBN 978-0-14-192869-2 Kottasova, Ivana (10 June 2015), France's new Waterloo? Euro coin marks Napoleon's defeat, CNN Lamar, Glenn J. (2000), Jérôme Bonaparte: The War Years, 1800–1815, Greenwood Press, p. 119, ISBN 978-0-313-30997-7 Longford, Elizabeth (1971), Wellington: the Years of the Sword, London: Panther, ISBN 978-0-586-03548-1 Low, E. Bruce (1911), "The Waterloo Papers", in MacBride, M. (ed.), With Napoleon at Waterloo, London{{citation}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) Lozier, J.F. (18 June 2010), What was the name of Napoleon's horse?, The Napoleon Series, retrieved 29 March 2009 Mantle, Robert (December 2000), Prussian Reserve Infantry 1813–1815: Part II: Organisation, Napoleonic Association. Marcelis, David (10 June 2015), "When Napoleon Met His Waterloo, He Was Out of Town", The Wall Street Journal Mercer, A.C. (1870a), Journal of the Waterloo Campaign: Kept Throughout the Campaign of 1815, vol. 1, Edinburgh / London: W. Blackwood Mercer, A.C. (1870b), "Waterloo, 18 June 1815: The Royal Horse Artillery Repulse Enemy Cavalry, late afternoon", Journal of the Waterloo Campaign: Kept Throughout the Campaign of 1815, vol. 2 Mercer, A.C. (1891), "No 89:Royal Artillery", in Siborne, Herbert Taylor (ed.), Waterloo letters: a selection from original and hitherto unpublished letters bearing on the operations of the 16th, 17th, and 18th June, 1815, by officers who served in the campaign, London: Cassell & Company, p. 218 Masson, David; et al. (1869), "Historical Forgeries and Kosciuszko's "Finis Poloniae"", Macmillan's Magazine, vol. 19, Macmillan and Company, p. 164 Nofi, Albert A. (1998) [1993], The Waterloo campaign, June 1815, Conshohocken, PA: Combined Books, ISBN 978-0-938289-29-6 Oman, Charles; Hall, John A. (1902), A History of the Peninsular War, Clarendon Press, p. 119 Palmer, R.R. (1956), A History of the Modern World, New York: Knopf Parkinson, Roger (2000), Hussar General: The Life of Blücher, Man of Waterloo, Wordsworth Military Library, pp. 240–241, ISBN 978-1840222531 Parry, D.H. (1900), "Waterloo", Battle of the nineteenth century, vol. 1, London: Cassell and Company, archived from the original on 16 December 2008, retrieved 14 September 2007 Dunn, James (5 April 2015), "Only full skeleton retrieved from Battle of Waterloo in 200 years identified by historian after being found under car park", The Independent Pawly, Ronald (2001), Wellington's Belgian Allies, Men at Arms nr 98. 1815, Osprey, pp. 37–43, ISBN 978-1-84176-158-9 Paxton, Robert O.

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240–241, ISBN 978-1840222531 Parry, D.H. (1900), "Waterloo", Battle of the nineteenth century, vol. 1, London: Cassell and Company, archived from the original on 16 December 2008, retrieved 14 September 2007 Dunn, James (5 April 2015), "Only full skeleton retrieved from Battle of Waterloo in 200 years identified by historian after being found under car park", The Independent Pawly, Ronald (2001), Wellington's Belgian Allies, Men at Arms nr 98. 1815, Osprey, pp. 37–43, ISBN 978-1-84176-158-9 Paxton, Robert O. (1985), Europe in the 20th Century, Orlando: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Peel, Hugues Van (11 December 2012), Le soldat retrouvé sur le site de Waterloo serait Hanovrien (in French), RTBF Rapport, Mike (13 May 2015), "Waterloo", The New York Times Roberts, Andrew (2001), Napoleon and Wellington, London: Phoenix Press, ISBN 978-1-84212-480-2 Roberts, Andrew (2005), Waterloo: 18 June 1815, the Battle for Modern Europe, New York: HarperCollins, ISBN 978-0-06-008866-8 Shapiro, Fred R., ed. (2006), The Yale Book of Quotations (illustrated ed.), Yale University Press, p. [https://books.google.com/books?id=w5-GR-qtgXsC&pg=PA128 128], ISBN 978-0-300-10798-2 Siborne, Herbert Taylor (1891), The Waterloo Letters, London: Cassell & Co. Siborne, William (1895), The Waterloo Campaign, 1815 (4th ed.), Westminster: A. Constable Simms, Brendan (2014), The Longest Afternoon: The 400 Men Who Decided the Battle of Waterloo, Allen Lane, ISBN 978-0-241-00460-9 Smith, Digby (1998), The Greenhill Napoleonic Wars Data Book, London & Pennsylvania: Greenhill Books & Stackpole Books, ISBN 978-1-85367-276-7 Steele, Charles (2014), Zabecki, David T. (ed.), Germany at War: 400 Years of Military History, ABC-CLIO, p. 178 Summerville, Christopher J (2007), Who was who at Waterloo: a biography of the battle, Pearson Education, ISBN 978-0-582-78405-5 Thiers, Adolphe (1862), Histoire du consulat et de l'empire, faisant suite à l'Histoire de la révolution française (in French), vol. 20, Paris: Lheureux et Cie. Torfs, Michaël (12 March 2015), "Belgium withdraws 'controversial' Waterloo coin under French pressure, but has a plan B", flandersnews.be Uffindell, Andrew; Corum, Michael (2002), On The Fields Of Glory: The Battlefields of the 1815 Campaign, Frontline Books, pp. 211, 232–233, ISBN 978-1-85367-514-0 Weller, J. (1992), Wellington at Waterloo, London: Greenhill Books, ISBN 978-1-85367-109-8 Weller, J. (2010), Wellington at Waterloo, Frontline Books, ISBN 978-1-84832-5-869 Wellesley, Arthur (1815), "Wellington's Dispatches 19 June 1815", Wellington's Dispatches Peninsular and Waterloo 1808–1815, War Times Journal White, John (14 December 2011), Burnham, Robert (ed.), Cambronne's Words, Letters to The Times (June 1932), the Napoleon Series, archived from the original on 25 August 2007, retrieved 14 September 2007 Wood, Evelyn (1895), Cavalry in the Waterloo Campaign, London: Sampson Low, Marston and Company Wooten, Geoffrey (1993), Waterloo, 1815: The Birth Of Modern Europe, Osprey Campaign Series, vol. 15, London: Reed International Books, p. 42 Further reading: Articles: Bijl, Marco, 8th Dutch Militia a history of the 8th Dutch Militia battalion and the Bylandt Brigade, of which it was a part, in the 1815 campaign (using original sources from the Dutch and Belgian national archives) de Wit, Pierre. The campaign of 1815: a study. Study of the campaign of 1815, based on sources from all participating armies. The Cowards at Waterloo, archived from the original on 23 December 2015, retrieved 23 March 2013 based on Dellevoet, A. (2001), Cowards at Waterloo?: A Re-Examination of Bijlandt's Dutch-Belgian Brigade in the Campaign of 1815, Stackpole books Wilkin, Bernard and Schäfer, Robin. The real fate of the Waterloo Fallen. The exploitation of bones in 19th century Belgium, Brussels, Journal of Belgian History, Cegesoma, December 2023 Books: Bonaparte, Napoleon (1995), Chandler, David G.; Cairnes, William E. (eds.), The Military Maxims of Napoleon, Da Capo Press, ISBN 978-0-306-80618-6 Buttery, David. Waterloo Battlefield Guide (Pen and Sword, 2018). Chandler, David G. (1973), Campaigns of Napoleon, New York: Scribner, ISBN 978-0-02-523660-8 Chilcott, Christopher (2015), The Royal Waggon Train: Maintaining the British Army 1803–1833, RLC Association Trust Fund Clausewitz, Carl von; Wellesley, Arthur (2010), Christopher Bassford; Daniel Moran; Gregory Pedlow (eds.), On Waterloo: Clausewitz, Wellington, and the Campaign of 1815, Clausewitz.com, ISBN 978-1-4537-0150-8 This on-line text contains Clausewitz's 58-chapter study of the Campaign of 1815 and Wellington's lengthy 1842 essay written in response to Clausewitz, as well as supporting documents and essays by the editors. Cookson, John E. (1996), The British Armed Nation, 1793–1815, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-820658-3 Gleig, George Robert, ed. (1845), The Light Dragoon, London: George Routledge & Co., archived from the original on 12 January 2012 Esdaile, Charles J. Walking Waterloo: A Guide (2019) excerpt Glover, Michael (1973), The Napoleonic Wars: An Illustrated History, 1792–1815, New York: Hippocrene Books, ISBN 978-0-88254-473-1 Hofschröer, Peter (1998), 1815: The Waterloo Campaign: Wellington, His German Allies and the Battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras, vol. 1, London: Greenhill Books, ISBN 978-1-85367-304-7 Hofschröer, Peter (2004), Wellington's Smallest Victory: The Duke, the Model Maker and the Secret of Waterloo, London: Faber & Faber, ISBN 978-0-571-21769-4 Howarth, David (1997) [1968], Waterloo a Near Run Thing, London: Phoenix/Windrush Press, ISBN 978-1-84212-719-3 Keegan, John (1976), The face of battle; A study of Agincourt, Waterloo and the Somme online Snow, Peter (2010), To War with Wellington, From the Peninsula to Waterloo, London: John Murray, ISBN 978-1-84854-103-0 online Historiography and memory: Balen, Malcolm. A Model Victory: Waterloo and the Battle for History (Harper Perennial, 2006). Bridoux, Jeff. "'Next to a battle lost, the greatest misery is a battle gained': the Battle of Waterloo-myth and reality". Intelligence and National Security 36.5 (2021): 754–770. Esdaile. Charles J. "Napoleon at Waterloo: The events of 18 June 1815 analyzed via historical simulation". JAMS: Journal of Advanced Military Studies 12#2 (2021) pp. 11–44 Evans, Mark, et al. "Waterloo Uncovered: From discoveries in conflict archaeology to military veteran collaboration and recovery on one of the world's most famous battlefields", in Historic Landscapes and Mental Well-Being (2019): 253–265. online Francois, Pieter.

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Battle of Waterloo

A Model Victory: Waterloo and the Battle for History (Harper Perennial, 2006). Bridoux, Jeff. "'Next to a battle lost, the greatest misery is a battle gained': the Battle of Waterloo-myth and reality". Intelligence and National Security 36.5 (2021): 754–770. Esdaile. Charles J. "Napoleon at Waterloo: The events of 18 June 1815 analyzed via historical simulation". JAMS: Journal of Advanced Military Studies 12#2 (2021) pp. 11–44 Evans, Mark, et al. "Waterloo Uncovered: From discoveries in conflict archaeology to military veteran collaboration and recovery on one of the world's most famous battlefields", in Historic Landscapes and Mental Well-Being (2019): 253–265. online Francois, Pieter. "'The Best Way to See Waterloo is with your Eyes Shut' British 'Histourism,' Authenticity and Commercialism in the Mid-Nineteenth Century". Anthropological Journal of European Cultures 22#1 (2013): 25–41. Heffernan, Julian Jimenez. "Lying Epitaphs: 'Vanity Fair', Waterloo, and the Cult of the Dead". Victorian Literature and Culture 40#1 (2012): 25–45. Heinzen, Jasper (2014), "A Negotiated Truce: The Battle of Waterloo in European Memory since the Second World War", History & Memory, 26 (1): 39–74, doi:10.2979/histmemo.26.1.39, S2CID 159698207, archived from the original on 6 May 2014 Kennaway, James. "Military surgery as national romance: the memory of British heroic fortitude at Waterloo". War & Society 39.2 (2020): 77–92. online Keirstead, Christopher and Marysa Demoor, eds. "Special Issue: Waterloo and Its Afterlife in the Nineteenth-Century Periodical and Newspaper Press". Victorian Periodicals Review 48#4 (2015). Mongin, Philippe. "A game-theoretic analysis of the Waterloo campaign and some comments on the analytic narrative project". Cliometrica 12.3 (2018): 451–480. online Reynolds, Luke Alexander Lewis. "Who Owned Waterloo? Wellington's Veterans and the Battle for Relevance" (PhD. Diss. City University of New York, 2019) online. Rigney, Ann. "Reframing Waterloo: Memory, mediation, experience", in The Varieties of Historical Experience (Routledge, 2019) pp. 121–139. Seaton, A.V. "War and Thanatourism: Waterloo 1815–1914". Annals of Tourism Research 26#1 (1999): 130–158. Scott, Walter. Scott on Waterloo edited by Paul O'Keeffe. (Vintage Books, 2015). Shaw, Philip. Waterloo and the Romantic Imagination (Palgrave, 2002). Turner, Harry. Courage, Blood & Luck: Poems of Waterloo (Pen and Sword Military, 2013). Maps: Shepherd, William R. (1923), "Map of the battlefield", Historical Atlas, New York: Henry Holt and Company The map from the 1911 edition is also available online. Battle of Waterloo maps and diagrams Map of the battlefield on modern Google map and satellite photographs showing main locations of the battlefield 1816 Map of the battlefield with initial dispositions by Willem Benjamin Craan Battle of Waterloo, Google Maps Primary sources: Glover, Gareth, ed. Letters from the battle of Waterloo: unpublished correspondence by Allied officers from the Siborne papers (Casemate Publishers, 2018). Earliest report of the battle in a London newspaper from The Morning Post 22 June 1815 "No. 17037". The London Gazette. 8 July 1815. pp. 1359–1362. Casualty returns. Cook, Christopher, Eye witness accounts of Napoleonic warfare, archived from the original on 3 September 2012 Staff (2009), Book review of the "Waterloo Medal Roll Call", The [British] National Archive, archived from the original on 4 December 2009 Staff (9 July 2013), British military campaign and service medals, The [British] National Archive – "For records of medals awarded for service before 1914, search by name on the Ancestry website. There are separate search pages for the Army (sourced from WO 100)..." Staff, Empire and Sea Power: The Battle of Waterloo Retrieved on 9 June 2006 BBC History Waterloo, Retrieved on 9 June 2006 Uniforms: French, Prussian and Anglo-allied uniforms during the Battle of Waterloo : Mont-Saint-Jean (FR) External links: Records and images from the UK Parliament Collections "Booknotes: Watch". Booknotes. 12 January 2003. Archived from the original on 16 November 2010. Interview with Andrew Roberts on Napoleon & Wellington: The Battle of Waterloo and the Great Commanders Who Fought It "Guides 1815" (in French). Official guides of the Waterloo battlefield. "Waterloo 200". National Army Museum, London. 10 June 2015. Archived from the original on 28 December 2008. (British site) "Farm of Hougoumont". Archaeology @ Waterloo. Retrieved 30 July 2015. George Nafgizer collection Waterloo ORBATs for French, Allied Archived 30 December 2016 at the Wayback Machine. "Rethinking Waterloo from Multiple Perspectives" (PDF). European Association of History Education. Archived (PDF) from the original on 9 October 2022. The dictionary definition of meet one's Waterloo at Wiktionary Media related to Battle of Waterloo at Wikimedia Commons

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Battle of Yarmuk

Background: In 610, during the Byzantine–Sasanian War of 602–628, Heraclius became the emperor of the Byzantine Empire, after overthrowing Phocas. Meanwhile, the Sasanian Empire conquered Mesopotamia and in 611 they overran Syria and entered Anatolia, occupying Caesarea Mazaca (now Kayseri, Turkey). In 612, Heraclius managed to expel the Persians from Anatolia but was decisively defeated in 613 when he launched a major offensive in Syria against the Persians. Over the following decade, the Persians were able to conquer Palestine and Egypt. Meanwhile, Heraclius prepared for a counterattack and rebuilt his army. In 622, Heraclius finally launched his offensive. After his overwhelming victories over the Persians and their allies in the Caucasus and Armenia, Heraclius launched a winter offensive against the Persians in Mesopotamia in 627, winning a decisive victory at the Battle of Nineveh, thus threatening the Persian capital city of Ctesiphon. Discredited by the series of disasters, Khosrow II was overthrown and killed in a coup led by his son Kavad II, who immediately sued for peace and agreed to withdraw from all occupied territories of the Byzantine Empire. Heraclius restored the True Cross to Jerusalem with a majestic ceremony in 629. Meanwhile, there had been rapid political development in the Arabian Peninsula, where Muhammad had been preaching Islam and, by 630, had successfully annexed most of Arabia under a single political authority. When Muhammad died in June 632, Abu Bakr was chosen as caliph and his political successor. Troubles emerged soon after Abu Bakr's succession, and several Arab tribes openly revolted against him. He declared war against the rebels. In what became known as the Ridda wars of 632–633, Abu Bakr managed to defeat his opponents and unite Arabia under the central authority of the caliph at Medina. Once the rebels had been subdued, Abu Bakr began a war of conquest, beginning with Iraq. His most brilliant general, Khalid ibn al-Walid, conquered Iraq in a series of successful campaigns against the Sassanid Persians. Abu Bakr's confidence grew, and once Khalid had established his stronghold in Iraq, Abu Bakr issued a call to arms for the invasion of Syria in February 634. The Muslim invasion of Syria was a series of carefully planned and well-co-ordinated military operations, which employed strategy, instead of pure strength, to deal with the Byzantine defensive measures. The Muslim armies, however, soon proved to be too small to handle the Byzantine response, and their commanders called for reinforcements. Khalid was sent by Abu Bakr from Iraq to Syria with reinforcements and to lead the invasion. In July, the Byzantines were decisively defeated at Ajnadayn. Damascus fell in September, followed by the Battle of Fahl, in which the last significant garrison of Palestine was routed. After Abu Bakr died in 634, his successor, Umar, was determined to continue the Caliphate's expansion deeper into Syria. Though previous campaigns led by Khalid had been successful, he was replaced by Abu Ubaidah. Having secured southern Palestine, Muslim forces now advanced up the trade route, and Tiberias and Baalbek fell without much struggle and conquered Emesa early in 636. The Muslims then continued their conquest across the Levant. Byzantine counterattack: Having seized Emesa, the Muslims were just a march away from Aleppo, a Byzantine stronghold, and Antioch, where Heraclius resided. Seriously alarmed by the series of setbacks, Heraclius prepared for a counterattack to reacquire the lost regions. In 635 Yazdegerd III, the Emperor of Persia, sought an alliance with the Byzantine Emperor. Heraclius married off his daughter (according to traditions, his granddaughter) Manyanh to Yazdegerd III, to cement the alliance. While Heraclius prepared for a major offensive in the Levant, Yazdegerd was to mount a simultaneous counterattack in Iraq, in what was meant to be a well-coordinated effort. When Heraclius launched his offensive in May 636, Yazdegerd could not co-ordinate with the maneuver, probably owing to the exhausted condition of his government, and what would have been a decisive plan missed the mark. Byzantine preparations began in late 635 and by May 636 Heraclius had a large force concentrated at Antioch in Northern Syria. The assembled Byzantine army contingents consisted of Slavs, Franks, Georgians, Armenians, Christian Arabs, Lombards, Avars, Khazars, Balkans and Göktürks. The force was organized into five armies, the joint leader of which was Theodore Trithyrius. Vahan, an Armenian and the former garrison commander of Emesa, was made the overall field commander, and had under his command a purely Armenian army. Buccinator (Qanatir), a Slavic prince, commanded the Slavs and Jabalah ibn al-Aiham, king of the Ghassanid Arabs, commanded an exclusively Christian Arab force. The remaining contingents, all European, were placed under Gregory and Dairjan. Heraclius himself supervised the operation from Antioch. Byzantine sources mention Niketas, son of the Persian general Shahrbaraz, among the commanders, but it is not certain which army he commanded. The Rashidun army was then split into four groups: one under Amr in Palestine, one under Shurahbil in Jordan, one under Yazid in the Damascus-Caesarea region and the last one under Abu Ubaidah along with Khalid at Emesa. As the Muslim forces were geographically divided, Heraclius sought to exploit that situation and planned to attack. He did not wish to engage in a single pitched battle but rather to employ central position and fight the enemy in detail by concentrating large forces against each of the Muslim corps before they could consolidate their troops. By forcing the Muslims to retreat, or by destroying Muslim forces separately, he would fulfil his strategy of recapturing lost territory. Reinforcements were sent to Caesarea under Heraclius' son Constantine III, probably to tie down Yazid's forces, which were besieging the town. The Byzantine imperial army moved out from Antioch and Northern Syria in the middle of June 636. The Byzantine imperial army was to operate under the following plan: Jabalah's lightly armed Christian Arabs would march to Emesa from Aleppo via Hama and hold the main Muslim army at Emesa. Dairjan would make a flanking movement between the coast and Aleppo's road and approach Emesa from the west, striking at the Muslims' left flank while they were being held frontally by Jabalah. Gregory would strike the Muslims' right flank, approaching Emesa from the northeast via Mesopotamia. Qanatir would march along the coastal route and occupy Beirut, from where he was to attack the weakly defended Damascus from the west to cut off the main Muslim army at Emesa. Vahan's corps would act as a reserve and would approach Emesa via Hama. Rashidun strategy: The Muslims discovered Heraclius' preparations at Shaizar from Byzantine prisoners. Alert to the possibility of being caught with separated forces that could be destroyed, Khalid called a council of war and advised Abu Ubaidah to pull the troops back from Palestine and Northern and Central Syria and concentrate the entire Rashidun army in one place. Abu Ubaidah ordered the concentration of troops in the vast plain near Jabiyah, as control of the area made cavalry charges possible and facilitated the arrival of reinforcements from Umar, so that a strong, united force could be fielded against the Byzantine armies. The position also benefited from close proximity to the Rashidun stronghold of Najd, if retreat became necessary. Instructions were also issued to return jizya (tribute) to people who had paid it. However, once concentrated at Jabiyah, the Muslims were subject to raids from pro-Byzantine Ghassanid forces. Encamping in the region was also precarious as a strong Byzantine force was garrisoned in Caeseara and could attack the Muslim rear while they were held in front by the Byzantine army. On Khalid's advice the Muslim forces retreated to Dara'ah (or Dara) and Dayr Ayyub, covering the gap between the Yarmuk Gorges and the Harra lava plains, and established a line of camps in the eastern part of the plain of Yarmuk. This was a strong defensive position, and the maneuverers brought the Muslims and Byzantines into a decisive battle, which the latter had tried to avoid. During the maneuvers, there were no engagements except for a minor skirmish between Khalid's elite light cavalry and the Byzantine advance guard. Battlefield: The battlefield lies in the plain of Jordanian Hauran, just southeast of the Golan Heights, an upland region currently on the frontier between Jordan and Syria, east of the Sea of Galilee. The battle was fought on the plain east of Raqqat stream ravine. That ravine joins the Yarmuk River, a tributary of the Jordan River, on its south.

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Battle of Yarmuk

This was a strong defensive position, and the maneuverers brought the Muslims and Byzantines into a decisive battle, which the latter had tried to avoid. During the maneuvers, there were no engagements except for a minor skirmish between Khalid's elite light cavalry and the Byzantine advance guard. Battlefield: The battlefield lies in the plain of Jordanian Hauran, just southeast of the Golan Heights, an upland region currently on the frontier between Jordan and Syria, east of the Sea of Galilee. The battle was fought on the plain east of Raqqat stream ravine. That ravine joins the Yarmuk River, a tributary of the Jordan River, on its south. The stream had very steep banks, ranging from 30 m (98 ft)–200 m (660 ft) in height. On the north is the Jabiyah road and to the east are the Azra hills although the hills were outside the actual field of battle. Strategically, there was only one prominence in the battlefield: a 100 m (330 ft) elevation known as Tel al Jumm'a, and for the Muslim troops concentrated there, the hill gave a good view of the plain of Yarmuk. The ravine on the west of the battlefield was accessible at a few places in 636 AD, and had one main crossing: a Roman bridge (Jisr-ur-Ruqqad) near Ain Dhakar Logistically, the Yarmuk plain had enough water supplies and pastures to sustain both armies. The plain was excellent for cavalry maneuvers. Troop deployment: Most early accounts place the size of the Muslim forces between 36,000 and 40,000 and the number of Byzantine forces between 60,000 and 70,000 (This number has been estimated by taking into account the logistical situation of the Empire and with the view that they could never have mustered such troops when the Empire was at its apex but especially not with the especially weak and exhausted realm of 628 onwards). Modern estimates for the sizes of the respective armies vary: some estimates for the Byzantine army are between 80,000 and 150,000, while other estimates are 15,000 to 20,000. Estimates for the Rashidun army are between 15,000 and 40,000. Original accounts are mostly from Arab sources, generally agreeing that the Byzantine army and their allies outnumbered the Muslim Arabs by a 2 to 1. The only early Byzantine source is Theophanes, who wrote a century later. Accounts of the battle vary, some stating it lasted a day, others six days. Rashidun army: During a council of war, the command of the Muslim army was transferred to Khalid by Abu Ubaidah, Commander in Chief of the Muslim army. After taking command, Khalid reorganized the army into 36 infantry regiments and four cavalry regiments, with his cavalry elite, the mobile guard, held in reserve. The army was organised in the Tabi'a formation, a tight, defensive infantry formation. The army was lined up on a front of 12 kilometres (7.5 mi), facing west, with its left flank lying south on the Yarmuk River a mile before the ravines of Wadi al Allan began. The army's right flank was on the Jabiyah road in the north across the heights of Tel al Jumm'a, with substantial gaps between the divisions so that their frontage would match that of the Byzantine battle line at 13 kilometres (8.1 mi). The centre of the army was under the command of Abu Ubaidah ibn al-Jarrah (left centre) and Shurahbil bin Hasana (right centre). The left wing was under the command of Yazid and the right wing was under Amr ibn al-A's. The centre, left and right wings were given cavalry regiments, to be used as a reserve for a counterattack if they were pushed back by the Byzantines. Behind the centre stood the mobile guard under the personal command of Khalid. If Khalid was too occupied in leading the general army, Dharar ibn al-Azwar would command the mobile guard. Over the course of the battle, Khalid would repeatedly make critical and decisive use of that mounted reserve. Khalid sent out several scouts to keep the Byzantines under observation. In late July, Vahan sent Jabalah with his lightly armoured Christian-Arab forces to reconnoitre-in-force, but they were repulsed by the mobile guard. After the skirmish, no engagement occurred for a month. Weaponry: Helmets used included gilded helmets similar to the silver helmets of the Sassanid empire. Mail was commonly used to protect the face, neck, and cheeks as an aventail from the helmet or as a mail coif. Heavy leather sandals, as well as Roman-type sandal boots, were also typical of the early Muslim soldiers. Armour included hardened leather scale or lamellar armour and mail armour. Infantry soldiers were more heavily armoured than horsemen. Large wooden or wickerwork shields were used. Long-shafted spears were used, with infantry spears being 2.5 m (8.2 ft) long and cavalry spears being up to 5.5 m (18 ft) long. Short infantry swords like the Roman gladius and Sassanid long swords were used; long swords were usually carried by horsemen. Swords were hung in baldrics. Bows were about 2 metres (6.6 ft) long when unbraced, similar in size to the famous English longbow. The maximum useful range of the traditional Arabian bow was about 150 m (490 ft). Early Muslim archers, while being infantry archers without the mobility of horseback archer regiments, proved to be very effective in defending against light and unarmoured cavalry attacks. Byzantine army: A few days after the Muslims encamped at the Yarmuk plain, the Byzantine army, preceded by the lightly armed Ghassanids of Jabalah, moved forward and established strongly fortified camps just north of the Wadi-ur-Ruqqad. The right flank of the Byzantine army was at the south end of the plains, near the Yarmuk River and about a mile before the ravines of Wadi al Allan began. The left flank of the Byzantines was at the north, a short distance before the Hills of Jabiyah began, and was relatively exposed. Vahan deployed the Imperial Army facing east, with a front about 13 kilometres (8.1 mi) long, as he was trying to cover the whole area between the Yarmuk gorge in the south and the Roman road to Egypt in the north, and substantial gaps had been left between the Byzantine divisions. The right wing was commanded by Gregory and the left by Qanatir. The centre was formed by the army of Dairjan and the Armenian army of Vahan, both under the overall command of Dairjan. The Byzantine regular heavy cavalry, the cataphract, was distributed equally among the four armies, each army deploying its infantry at the forefront and its cavalry as a reserve in the rear. Vahan deployed Jabalah's Christian Arabs, mounted on horses and camels, as a skirmishing force, screening the main army until its arrival. Early Muslim sources mention that the army of Gregory had used chains to link together its foot soldiers, who had all taken an oath of death. The chains were in 10-man lengths as a proof of unshakeable courage on the part of the men, who thus displayed their willingness to die where they stood and not to retreat. The chains also acted as an insurance against a breakthrough by enemy cavalry. However, modern historians suggest that the Byzantines adopted the Graeco-Roman testudo military formation in which soldiers would stand shoulder-to-shoulder with shields held high and an arrangement of 10 to 20 men would be completely shielded on all sides from missile fire, each soldier providing cover for an adjoining companion. Weaponry: The Byzantine cavalry was armed with a long sword, known as the spathion. They would also have had a light wooden lance, known as a kontarion and a bow (toxarion) with forty arrows in a quiver, hung from a saddle or from the belt. Heavy infantry, known as skoutatoi, had a short sword and a short spear. The lightly armed Byzantine troops and the archers carried a small shield, a bow hung from the shoulder across the back and a quiver of arrows. Cavalry armour consisted of a hauberk with a mail coif and a helmet with a pendant: a throat-guard lined with fabric and having a fringe and cheek piece. Infantry was similarly equipped with a hauberk, a helmet and leg armour. Light lamellar and scale armour was also used. Tensions in Byzantine army: Khalid's strategy of withdrawing from the occupied areas and concentrating all of his troops for a decisive battle forced the Byzantines to concentrate their five armies in response. The Byzantines had for centuries avoided engaging in large-scale decisive battles, and the concentration of their forces created logistical strains for which the empire was ill-prepared. Damascus was the closest logistical base, but Mansur, leader of Damascus, could not fully supply the massive Byzantine army that was gathered at the Yarmuk plain.

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Battle of Yarmuk

Cavalry armour consisted of a hauberk with a mail coif and a helmet with a pendant: a throat-guard lined with fabric and having a fringe and cheek piece. Infantry was similarly equipped with a hauberk, a helmet and leg armour. Light lamellar and scale armour was also used. Tensions in Byzantine army: Khalid's strategy of withdrawing from the occupied areas and concentrating all of his troops for a decisive battle forced the Byzantines to concentrate their five armies in response. The Byzantines had for centuries avoided engaging in large-scale decisive battles, and the concentration of their forces created logistical strains for which the empire was ill-prepared. Damascus was the closest logistical base, but Mansur, leader of Damascus, could not fully supply the massive Byzantine army that was gathered at the Yarmuk plain. Several clashes were reported with local citizens over supply requisition, as summer was at an end and there was a decline of pasturage. Greek court sources accused Vahan of treason for his disobedience to Heraclius' command not to engage in large-scale battle with Arabs. Given the massing of the Muslim armies at Yarmuk, however, Vahan had little choice but to respond in kind. Relations between the various Byzantine commanders were also fraught with tension. There was a struggle for power between Trithurios and Vahan, Jarajis, and Qanatir (Buccinator). Jabalah, the Christian Arab leader, was largely ignored, to the detriment of the Byzantines given his knowledge of the local terrain. An atmosphere of mistrust thus existed between the Romans, Armenians and Arabs. Longstanding ecclesiastical feuds between the Monophysite and Chalcedonian factions, of negligible direct impact, certainly inflamed underlying tensions. The effect of the feuds was decreased coordination and planning, one of the reasons for the catastrophic Byzantine defeat. Battle: The battle lines of the Muslims and the Byzantines were divided into four sections: the left wing, the left centre, the right centre and the right wing. Note that the descriptions of the Muslim and the Byzantine battle lines are exactly each other's opposite: the Muslim right wing faced the Byzantine left wing (see image). Vahan was instructed by Heraclius not to engage in battle until all avenues of diplomacy had been explored, probably because Yazdegerd III's forces were not yet ready for the offensive in Iraq. Accordingly, Vahan sent Gregory and then Jabalah to negotiate, but their efforts proved futile. Before the battle, on Vahan's invitation, Khalid came to negotiate peace, with a similar end. The negotiations delayed the battles for a month. On the other hand, Umar, whose forces at Qadisiyah were threatened with confronting the Sassanid armies, ordered Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas to enter negotiations with the Persians and to send emissaries to Yazdegerd III and his commander Rostam Farrokhzād, apparently inviting them to Islam. That was most probably the delaying tactic employed by Umar on the Persian front. Meanwhile, he sent reinforcements of 6,000 troops, mostly from Yemen, to Khalid. The force included 1,000 Sahaba (companions of Muhammad), among whom were 100 veterans of the Battle of Badr, the first battle in Islamic history, and included citizens of the highest rank, such as Zubayr ibn al-Awwam, Abu Sufyan, and his wife Hind bint Utbah. Also present were such distinct companions as Sa'id ibn Zayd, Fadl ibn Abbas, Abdul-Rahman ibn Abi Bakr (the son of Abu Bakr), Abdullah ibn Umar (the son of Umar), Aban ibn Uthman (the son of Uthman), Abdulreman ibn Khalid (the son of Khalid), Abdullah ibn Ja'far (the nephew of Ali), Ammar ibn Yasir, Miqdad ibn Aswad, Abu Dharr al-Ghifari, Malik al-Ashtar, Abu Ayyub al-Ansari, Qays ibn Sa'd, Hudhayfah ibn al-Yaman, Ubada ibn as-Samit, Hisham ibn al-A'as, Abu Huraira and Ikrimah ibn Abi Jahl. As it was a citizen army, in contrast to a mercenary army, the age of the soldiers ranged from 20 (in the case of Khalid's son) to 70 (in the case of Ammar). Three of the ten companions promised paradise by Muhammad, namely Sa'id, Zubayr and Abu Ubaidah, were present at Yarmuk. Umar, apparently wanting to defeat the Byzantines first, used the best Muslim troops against them. The continuing stream of Muslim reinforcements worried the Byzantines, who fearing that the Muslims with such reinforcements would grow powerful, decided that they had no choice but to attack. The reinforcements that were sent to the Muslims at Yarmuk arrived in small bands, giving the impression of a continuous stream of reinforcements to demoralize the Byzantines to compel them to attack. The same tactic would be repeated again during the Battle of Qadisiyah. Day 1: The battle began on 15 August. At dawn, both armies lined up for battle less than a mile apart. It is recorded in Muslim chronicles that before the battle started, George, a unit commander in the Byzantine right centre, rode up to the Muslim line and converted to Islam; he would die the same day fighting on the Muslim side. The battle began as the Byzantine army sent its champions to duel with the Muslim mubarizun. The mubarizun were specially trained swordsmen and lancers, with the objective to slay as many enemy commanders as possible to damage their morale. At midday, after losing a number of commanders in the duels, Vahan ordered a limited attack with a third of his infantry forces to test the strength and strategy of the Muslim army and, using their overwhelming numerical and weaponry superiority, achieve a breakthrough wherever the Muslim battle line was weak. However the Byzantine assault lacked determination; many Byzantine soldiers were unable to press the attack against the Muslim veterans. The fighting was generally moderate although in some places, it was especially intense. Vahan did not reinforce his forward infantry, two thirds of which was kept in reserve with one third deployed to engage the Muslims, and at sunset, both armies broke contact and returned to their respective camps. Day 2: Phase 1: On 16 August, Vahan decided in a council of war to launch his attack just before dawn, to catch the Muslim force unprepared as they conducted their morning prayers. He planned to engage his two central armies with the Muslim centre in an effort to stall them while the main thrusts would be against the wings of the Muslim army, which would then be driven away from the battlefield or pushed towards the centre. To observe the battlefield, Vahan had a large pavilion built behind his right wing with an Armenian bodyguard force. He ordered the army to prepare for the surprise attack. However, Khalid had prepared for such a contingency by placing a strong outpost line in front during the night to counter surprises, which gave the Muslims time to prepare for battle. At the centre, the Byzantines did not press hard, intending to pin down the Muslim centre corps in their position and preventing them from aiding the Muslim army in other areas. Thus the centre remained stable, but on the wings the situation was different. Qanatir, commanding the Byzantine left flank, which consisted of mainly Slavs, attacked in force, and the Muslim infantry on the right flank had to retreat. Amr, the Muslim right wing commander ordered his cavalry regiment to counterattack, which neutralized the Byzantine advance and stabilized the battle line on the right for some time, but the Byzantine numerical superiority caused them to retreat towards the Muslim base camp. Phase 2: Khalid, aware of the situation at the wings, ordered the cavalry of the right wing to attack the northern flank of the Byzantine left wing while he with his mobile guard attacked the southern flank of the Byzantine left wing, and the Muslim right wing infantry attacked from the front. The three-pronged attack forced the Byzantine left wing to abandon the Muslim positions they had gained on, and Amr regained his lost ground and started reorganizing his corps for another round. The situation on the Muslim left wing, which Yazid commanded was considerably more serious. The Muslim right wing enjoyed assistance from the mobile guard but not the left wing, and the numerical advantage the Byzantines enjoyed caused the Muslim positions to be overrun, with soldiers retreating towards base camps. There, the Byzantines had broken through the corps. The testudo formation that Gregory's army had adopted moved slowly but also had a good defence. Yazid used his cavalry regiment to counterattack but was repulsed. Despite stiff resistance, the warriors of Yazid on the left flank finally fell back to their camps and for a moment Vahan's plan appeared to be succeeding. The centre of the Muslim army was pinned down and its flanks had been pushed back. However, neither flank had broken though morale was severely damaged. The retreating Muslim army was met by the ferocious Arab women in the camps.

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Battle of Yarmuk

The situation on the Muslim left wing, which Yazid commanded was considerably more serious. The Muslim right wing enjoyed assistance from the mobile guard but not the left wing, and the numerical advantage the Byzantines enjoyed caused the Muslim positions to be overrun, with soldiers retreating towards base camps. There, the Byzantines had broken through the corps. The testudo formation that Gregory's army had adopted moved slowly but also had a good defence. Yazid used his cavalry regiment to counterattack but was repulsed. Despite stiff resistance, the warriors of Yazid on the left flank finally fell back to their camps and for a moment Vahan's plan appeared to be succeeding. The centre of the Muslim army was pinned down and its flanks had been pushed back. However, neither flank had broken though morale was severely damaged. The retreating Muslim army was met by the ferocious Arab women in the camps. Led by Hind, the Muslim women dismantled their tents, and armed with tent poles, charged at their husbands and fellow men singing an improvised song from the Battle of Uhud, which then had been directed against the Muslims. That boiled the blood of the retreating Muslims so much that they returned to the battlefield. Phase 3: After managing to stabilize the position on the right flank, Khalid ordered the mobile guard cavalry to provide relief to the battered left flank. Khalid detached one regiment under Dharar ibn al-Azwar and ordered him to attack the front of the army of Dairjan (left centre) to create a diversion and threaten the withdrawal of the Byzantine right wing from its advanced position. With the rest of the cavalry reserve he attacked Gregory's flank. Here again, under simultaneous attacks from the front and flanks, the Byzantines fell back but more slowly because they had to maintain their formation. At sunset, the central armies broke contact and withdrew to their original positions and both fronts were restored along the lines occupied in the morning. The death of Dairjan and the failure of Vahan's battle plan left the larger Imperial army relatively demoralized, but Khalid's successful counterattacks emboldened his troops despite their being smaller in number. Day 3: On 17 August, Vahan pondered over his failures and mistakes of the previous day, where he launched attacks against respective Muslim flanks, but after initial success, his men were pushed back. What bothered him the most was the loss of one of his commanders. The Byzantine army decided on a less ambitious plan, and Vahan now aimed to break the Muslim army at specific points. He decided to press upon the relatively exposed right flank, where his mounted troops could manoeuvrer more freely as compared to the rugged terrain at the Muslims' left flank. The junction was to be between the Muslim right centre, its right wing held by Qanatir's Slavs, to break them apart so that they would be fought separately. Phase 1: The battle resumed with Byzantine attacks on the Muslim right flank and right centre. After holding off the initial attacks by the Byzantines, the Muslim right wing fell back, followed by the right centre. They were again said to have been met by their own women, who abused and shamed them. The corps, however, managed to reorganize some distance from the camp and held their ground preparing for a counterattack. Phase 2: Knowing that the Byzantine army was focusing on the Muslim right, Khalid ibn al-Walid launched an attack with his mobile guard, along with the Muslim right flank cavalry. Khalid ibn al-Walid struck at the right flank of the Byzantines left centre, and the cavalry reserve of the Muslims right centre struck at the Byzantines left centre at its left flank. Meanwhile, he ordered the Muslims' right-wing cavalry to strike at the left flank of the Byzantines left wing. The combat soon developed into a bloodbath. Many fell on both sides. Khalid's timely flanking attacks again saved the day for Muslims and by dusk, the Byzantines had been pushed back to the positions they had at the start of the battle. Day 4: Phase 1: Vahan decided to persist with the previous day's war plan as he had been successful in inflicting damage on the Muslim right. Qanatir led two armies of Slavs against the Muslim right wing and right centre with some assistance from the Armenians and Christian Arabs led by Jabalah. The Muslim right wing and right centre again fell back. Khalid entered the fray yet again with the mobile guard. He feared a general attack on a broad front, which he would be unable to repulse, and so ordered Abu Ubaidah and Yazid on the left centre and the left wings, respectively, to attack the Byzantine armies at the respective fronts. The attack would result in stalling the Byzantine front and prevent a general advance of the Imperial army. Phase 2: Khalid divided his mobile guard into two divisions and attacked the flanks of the Byzantine left centre, and the infantry of the Muslim right centre attacked from the front. Under the three-pronged flanking manoeuvre, the Byzantines fell back. Meanwhile, the Muslim right wing renewed its offense with its infantry attacking from the front and the cavalry reserve attacking the northern flank of the Byzantine left wing. As the Byzantine left centre retreated under three-pronged attacks of Khalid, the Byzantine left wing, having been exposed at its southern flank, also fell back. While Khalid and his mobile guard were dealing with the Armenian front throughout the afternoon, the situation on the other end was worsening. Byzantine horse-archers had taken to the field and subjected Abu Ubaidah and Yazid's troops to intense archery preventing them from penetrating their Byzantine lines. Many Muslim soldiers lost their sight to Byzantine arrows on that day, which thereafter became known as the "Day of Lost Eyes". The veteran Abu Sufyan is also believed to have lost an eye that day. The Muslim armies fell back except for one regiment, led by Ikrimah bin Abi Jahal, which was on the left of Abu Ubaidah's corps. Ikrimah covered the retreat of the Muslims with his 400 members of the cavalry by attacking the Byzantine front, and the other armies reorganized themselves to counterattack and regain their lost positions. All of Ikrimah's men were either seriously injured or dead that day. Ikrimah, a childhood friend of Khalid, was mortally wounded and died later in the evening. Day 5: During the four-day offence of Vahan, his troops had failed to achieve any breakthrough and had suffered heavy casualties, especially during the mobile guard's flanking counterattacks. Early on 19 August, the fifth day of the battle, Vahan sent an emissary to the Muslim camp for a truce for the next few days so that fresh negotiations could be held. He supposedly wanted time to reorganize his demoralized troops, but Khalid deemed victory to be in reach and he declined the offer. Until now, the Muslim army had adopted a largely defensive strategy, but knowing that the Byzantines were apparently no longer eager for battle, Khalid now decided to take the offensive and reorganized his troops accordingly. All cavalry regiments were grouped together into one powerful mounted force with the mobile guard acting as its core. The total strength of the cavalry group was now about 8,000 mounted warriors, an effective mounted corps for an offensive attack the next day. The rest of the day passed uneventfully. Khalid planned to trap Byzantine troops, cutting off their every route of escape. There were three natural barriers, the three gorges in the battlefield with their steep ravines, Wadi-ur-Ruqqad at west, Wadi al Yarmouk in south and Wadi al Allah in east. The northern route was to be blocked by Muslim cavalry. There were however, some passages across the 200 metres (660 ft) deep ravines of Wadi-ur-Raqqad in west, strategically the most important one was at Ayn al Dhakar, a bridge. Khalid sent Dharar with 500 cavalry at night to secure that bridge. Dharar moved around the northern flank of Byzantines and captured the bridge, a manoeuvrer that was to prove decisive the next day. Day 6: On 20 August, Khalid put into action a simple but bold plan of attack. With his massed cavalry force, he intended to drive the Byzantine cavalry entirely off the battlefield so that the infantry, which formed the bulk of the imperial army, would be left without cavalry support and thus would be exposed when attacked from the flanks and rear. At the same time, he planned to push a determined attack to turn the left flank of the Byzantine army and drive them towards the ravine to the west. Phase 1: Khalid ordered a general attack on the Byzantine front and galloped his cavalry around the left wing of the Byzantines. Part of his cavalry engaged the Byzantine left wing cavalry while the rest of it attacked the rear of the Byzantine left wing infantry. Meanwhile, the Muslim right wing pressed against it from the front. Under the two-pronged attack, the Byzantine left wing fell back and collapsed and fell back to the Byzantine left centre, greatly disordering it.

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Battle of Yarmuk

With his massed cavalry force, he intended to drive the Byzantine cavalry entirely off the battlefield so that the infantry, which formed the bulk of the imperial army, would be left without cavalry support and thus would be exposed when attacked from the flanks and rear. At the same time, he planned to push a determined attack to turn the left flank of the Byzantine army and drive them towards the ravine to the west. Phase 1: Khalid ordered a general attack on the Byzantine front and galloped his cavalry around the left wing of the Byzantines. Part of his cavalry engaged the Byzantine left wing cavalry while the rest of it attacked the rear of the Byzantine left wing infantry. Meanwhile, the Muslim right wing pressed against it from the front. Under the two-pronged attack, the Byzantine left wing fell back and collapsed and fell back to the Byzantine left centre, greatly disordering it. The remaining Muslim cavalry then attacked the Byzantine left wing cavalry at the rear while they were held frontally by the other half of the Muslim cavalry, routing them off the battlefield to the north. The Muslim right-wing infantry now attacked the Byzantine left centre at its left flank while the Muslim right centre attacked from front. Phase 2: Vahan, noticing the huge cavalry manoeuvrer of the Muslims, ordered his cavalry to group together, but was not quick enough. Before Vahan could organize his disparate heavy cavalry squadrons, Khalid had wheeled his cavalry back to attack the concentrating Byzantine cavalry squadrons, falling upon them from the front and the flank while they were still moving into formation. The disorganized and disoriented Byzantine heavy cavalry was soon routed and dispersed to the north, leaving the infantry to its fate. Phase 3: With the Byzantine cavalry completely routed, Khalid turned to the Byzantine left centre, which already held the two-pronged attack of the Muslim infantry. The Byzantine left centre was attacked at its rear by Khalid's cavalry and was finally broken. Phase 4: With the retreat of the Byzantine left centre, a general Byzantine retreat started. Khalid took his cavalry north to block the northern route of escape. The Byzantines retreated west towards Wadi-ur-Ruqqad, where there was a bridge at Ayn al Dhakar for safe crossing across the deep gorges of the ravines of Wadi-ur-Ruqqad. Dharar had already captured the bridge as part of Khalid's plan the night before. A unit of 500 mounted troops had been sent to block the passageway. In fact, that was the route by which Khalid wanted the Byzantines to retreat all along. The Byzantines were surrounded from all sides now. Some fell into the deep ravines off the steep slopes, others tried to escape in the waters but were smashed on the rocks below and still others were killed in their flight. Nevertheless, many of the soldiers managed to escape the slaughter. Jonah, the Greek informant of the Rashidun army during the conquest of Damascus, died in the battle. The Muslims took no prisoners in the battle, but they may have captured some during the subsequent pursuit. Theodore Trithyrius was killed on the battlefield, and Niketas managed to escape and reach Emesa. Jabalah ibn al-Ayham also managed to escape and later briefly came to terms with the Muslims, but he soon defected to the Byzantine court again. Aftermath: Immediately after the operation was over, Khalid and his mobile guard moved north to pursue the retreating Byzantine soldiers and found them near Damascus and attacked. Vahan, who had escaped the fate of most of his men at Yarmuk, was probably killed in the ensuing fighting. Khalid then entered Damascus, where he was welcomed by the local residents, thus recapturing the city. When news of the disaster reached Heraclius at Antioch, the emperor was devastated and enraged. He blamed his wrongdoings for the loss, primarily referring to his incestuous marriage to his niece Martina. He would have tried to reconquer the province if he had the resources but now had neither the men nor the money to defend the province any more. Instead, he retreated to the cathedral of Antioch, where he observed a solemn service of intercession. He summoned a meeting of his advisers at the cathedral and scrutinized the situation. He was told almost unanimously and accepted the fact that the defeat was God's decision and a result of the sins of the people of the land, including him. Heraclius took to the sea on a ship to Constantinople in the night. His ship supposedly set sail, and he bade a last farewell to Syria,:Farewell, a long farewell to Syria, my fair province. Thou art an infidel's (enemy's) now. Peace be with you, O Syria—what a beautiful land you will be for the enemy's hands.Heraclius abandoned Syria with the holy relic of the True Cross, which was, along with other relics held at Jerusalem, secretly boarded on ship by Sophronius, Patriarch of Jerusalem, just to protect it from the invading Arabs. It is said that he had a fear of water, and a pontoon bridge was made for Heraclius to cross the Bosphorus to Constantinople. After abandoning Syria, he began to concentrate on his remaining forces for the defence of Anatolia and Egypt instead. Byzantine Armenia fell to the Muslims in 638–39, and Heraclius created a buffer zone in central Anatolia by ordering all the forts east of Tarsus to be evacuated. In 639–642 the Muslims, led by Amr ibn al-A'as, who had commanded the right flank of the Rashidun army at Yarmuk, invaded and captured Byzantine Egypt. Evaluation: The Imperial Byzantine commanders allowed their enemy to have the battlefield of his choosing. Even then, they were at no substantial tactical disadvantage. Khalid knew all along that he was up against a force superior in numbers and, until the last day of the battle, conducted an essentially defensive campaign, suited to his relatively limited resources. When he decided to take the offensive and attack on the final day of battle, he did so with a degree of imagination, foresight and courage that none of the Byzantine commanders managed to display. Although he commanded a smaller force and needed all the men he could muster, he had the confidence and foresight to dispatch a cavalry regiment the night before his assault to seal off a critical path of the retreat that he had anticipated for the enemy army. Because of his leadership at Yarmuk, Khalid ibn al-Walid is considered one of the finest generals in history, and his use of mounted warriors throughout the battle showed just how well he understood the potential strengths and weaknesses of his mounted troops. His mobile guard moved quickly from one point to another, always changed the course of events wherever they appeared, and, then just as quickly, galloped away to change the course of events elsewhere on the field. Vahan and his Byzantine commanders did not manage to deal with the mounted force and use the sizable advantage of their army effectively. Their own Byzantine cavalry never played a significant role in the battle and were held in static reserve for most of the six days. They never pushed their attacks, and even when they obtained what could have been a decisive breakthrough on the fourth day, they were unable to exploit it. There appeared to be a decided lack of resolve among the Imperial commanders, but that may have been caused by difficulties commanding the army because of internal conflict. Moreover, many of the Arab auxiliaries were mere levies, but the Muslim Arab army consisted for a much larger part of veteran troops. The original strategy of Heraclius, to destroy the Muslim troops in Syria, needed a rapid and quick deployment, but the commanders on the ground never displayed those qualities. Ironically, on the field at Yarmuk, Khalid carried out, on a small tactical scale, what Heraclius had planned on a grand strategic scale. By rapidly deploying and manoeuvring his forces, Khalid was able to concentrate sufficient forces at specific locations on the field temporarily to defeat the larger Byzantine army in detail. Vahan was never able to make his numerical superiority count, perhaps because of the terrain, which prevented large-scale deployment. However, Vahan never attempted to concentrate a superior force to achieve a critical breakthrough. Although he was on the offensive five out of the six days, his battle line remained remarkably static. That stands in stark contrast to the very successful offensive plan, which Khalid carried out on the final day by reorganising virtually all his cavalry and committing it to a grand manoeuvre, which won the battle. George F. Nafziger, in his book Islam at war, described the battle: Although Yarmouk is little known today, it is one of the most decisive battles in human history...... Had Heraclius' forces prevailed, the modern world would be so changed as to be unrecognizable. Notes: ^ a: Modern estimates for Roman army: Donner 1981: 20,000–40,000. Nicolle 1994: (p. 32) Maximum 25,000 with an unstated number of Arab reinforcements. (p. 65) 15,000–20,000. Akram 1970: 150,000. Kaegi 2003 (p. 242): 15,000–20,000, possibly more Kennedy 2006 (p.

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Battle of Yarmuk

George F. Nafziger, in his book Islam at war, described the battle: Although Yarmouk is little known today, it is one of the most decisive battles in human history...... Had Heraclius' forces prevailed, the modern world would be so changed as to be unrecognizable. Notes: ^ a: Modern estimates for Roman army: Donner 1981: 20,000–40,000. Nicolle 1994: (p. 32) Maximum 25,000 with an unstated number of Arab reinforcements. (p. 65) 15,000–20,000. Akram 1970: 150,000. Kaegi 2003 (p. 242): 15,000–20,000, possibly more Kennedy 2006 (p. 131): 15,000–20,000, ^ b: Roman source for Roman army: Theophanes (pp. 337–338): 80,000 Roman troops (Kennedy, 2006, p. 145) and 60,000 allied Ghassanid troops (Gibbon, Vol. 5, p. 325). ^ c: Early Muslim sources for Roman army: Baladhuri (p. 140): 200,000. Tabari (Vol. 2, p. 598): 200,000. Ibn Ishaq (Tabari, Vol. 3, p. 75): 100,000 against 24,000 Muslims. ^ d: Modern estimates for Muslim army: Kaegi 1995: 15,000–20,000 maximum Nicolle 1994: (p. 43) 20,000–40,000, likely 25,000. Akram: 40,000 maximum. Treadgold 1997: 24,000 ^ e: Primary sources for Muslim army: Ibn Ishaq (Vol. 3, p. 74): 24,000. Baladhuri: 24,000. Tabari (Vol. 2, p. 592): 40,000. ^ f: Primary sources for Roman casualties: Tabari (Vol. 2, p. 596): 120,000 killed. Ibn Ishaq (Vol. 3, p. 75): 70,000 killed. Baladhuri (p. 141): 70,000 killed. ^ g: His name is mentioned in Islamic sources as Jaban, Vahan Benaas and Mahan. Vahan is most likely to be his name as it is of Armenian origin ^ i: During the reign of Abu Bakr, Khalid ibn Walid remained the Commander-in-Chief of the army in Syria but at Umar's accession as Caliph he dismissed him from command. Abu Ubaidah ibn al-Jarrah became the new commander in chief. (See Dismissal of Khalid). ^ j: Some Byzantine sources also mention a fortified encampment at Yaqusah, 18 kilometres (11 mi) from the battlefield. E.g., A. I. Akram suggests that the Byzantine camps were north of Wadi-ur-Ruqqad, while David Nicolle agrees with early Armenian sources, which positioned camps at Yaqusah (See: Nicolle p. 61 and Akram 2004 p. 410). ^ k: Akram misinterprets the bridge at 'Ayn Dhakar for a ford while Nicolle explains the exact geography (See: Nicolle p. 64 and Akram p. 410) ^ n: Concepts used in the description of the battle lines of the Muslims and the Byzantines. See image-1. References: Bibliography: Primary sources: Al-Baladhuri (1924). Kitab Futuh Al-buldan: The Origins Of The Islamic State Vol 2. Translated by Murgotten, Francis Clark. New York: Columbia University. Futuh al Sham (The Islamic Conquest of Syria). Translated by al-Kindi, Mawlana Sulayman. Ta-Ha Publishers. 2002. Chronicle of Fredegar. 658. Dionysius Telmaharensis (774). Chronicle of Pseudo-Dionysius of Tell-Mahre. Ibn Ishaq (2004). Sirah Rasul Allah [The Life of Muhammad]. Translated by Guillaume, Alfred. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780196360331. Ibn Khaldun (2020). Nessim Joseph, Dawood (ed.). Muqaddimah [Introduction]. Translated by Rosenthal, Franz. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. doi:10.2307/j.ctvwh8dcw. ISBN 9781400866090. JSTOR j.ctvwh8dcw. The Maronite Chronicles, 664 Pseudo-Methodius (2012). Garstad, Benjamin (ed.). Apocalypse of Pseudo-Methodius. Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press. ISBN 9780674053076. Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari (1987). Yarshater, Ehsan (ed.). History of the Prophets and Kings. SUNY series in Near Eastern Studies. Vol. 2: Prophets and Patriarchs. Translated by Brinner, William M. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. doi:10.2307/jj.18252170. ISBN 9780887063138. JSTOR jj.18252170. Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari (2015). Yarshater, Ehsan (ed.). History of the Prophets and Kings. SUNY series in Near Eastern Studies. Vol. 2: The Children of Israel. Translated by Brinner, William M. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. doi:10.2307/jj.18252188. ISBN 9780791497524. JSTOR jj.18252188. Theophanes the Confessor (1997). Chronographia. Translated by Mango, Cyril; Scott, Roger. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780198225683. Thomas the Presbyter, Chronicle Fragment on the Arab Conquests, 636 Chronicle of 819 Secondary sources: Journals: Conrad, Lawrence I. (1988). "Seven and the Tasbīʿ: On the Implications of Numerical Symbolism for the Study of Medieval Islamic History". Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient. 31 (1): 42–73. doi:10.2307/3631765. JSTOR 3631765. Jandora, John W. (1986). "Developments in Islamic Warfare: The Early Conquests". Studia Islamica (64): 101–113. doi:10.2307/1596048. JSTOR 1596048. Books: Akram, A. I. (1970). The Sword of Allah: Khalid bin al-Waleed, His Life and Campaigns. Rawalpindi: Nat. Publishing House. ISBN 0-7101-0104-X. Akram, A. I. (2004). The Sword of Allah: Khalid bin al-Waleed – His Life and Campaigns (3rd ed.). ISBN 0-19-597714-9. Akram, A. I. (2009). Muslim conquest of Persia (3rd ed.). Maktabah Publications. ISBN 978-0-9548665-3-2. Donner, Fred McGraw (1981). The Early Islamic Conquests. Princeton Studies on the Near East. Vol. 1017. Princeton University Press. doi:10.1515/9781400847877. ISBN 9780691053271. Greatrex, Geoffrey; Lieu, Samuel N.C. (2002). The Roman Eastern Frontier and the Persian Wars (Part II, 363–628 AD). Oxford and New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203994542. ISBN 9780203994542. Gil, Moshe (1997). A History of Palestine, 634–1099. Translated by Broido, Ethel. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521599849. Haldon, John (1997). Byzantium in the Seventh Century: the Transformation of a Culture. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511582318. ISBN 9780521319171. Haldon, John (2008). The Byzantine Wars. Stroud: The History Press. ISBN 978-0-7524-9652-8. Hoyland, Robert G. (1997). Seeing Islam as Others Saw It. Studies in late antiquity and early Islam.

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doi:10.4324/9780203994542. ISBN 9780203994542. Gil, Moshe (1997). A History of Palestine, 634–1099. Translated by Broido, Ethel. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521599849. Haldon, John (1997). Byzantium in the Seventh Century: the Transformation of a Culture. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511582318. ISBN 9780521319171. Haldon, John (2008). The Byzantine Wars. Stroud: The History Press. ISBN 978-0-7524-9652-8. Hoyland, Robert G. (1997). Seeing Islam as Others Saw It. Studies in late antiquity and early Islam. Vol. 13. Darwin Press. ISBN 9780878501250. Kaegi, Walter Emil (1995). Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511470615. ISBN 9780521484558. Kaegi, Walter Emil (2003). Heraclius: Emperor of Byzantium. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521814591. Kennedy, Hugh N. (2006). The Byzantine And Early Islamic Near East. Ashgate Publishing. doi:10.4324/9781003554196. ISBN 9780754659099. Kennedy, Hugh (2007). The Great Arab Conquests: How the Spread of Islam Changed the World We Live In. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Da Capo Press. ISBN 978-0-306-81740-3. Luttwak, Edward N. (2009). The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-03519-5. Nafziger, George F.; Walton, Mark W. (2003). Islam at War. London: Bloomsbury Academic. ISBN 9780275981013. Nicolle, David (1994). Yarmuk 636 A.D.: The Muslim Conquest of Syria. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 9781855324145. Palmer, Andrew (1993). The Seventh Century in the West-Syrian Chronicles. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. doi:10.3828/9780853232384. ISBN 9780853232384. Regan, Geoffrey (2003). First Crusader: Byzantium's Holy Wars (1st ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9781403961518. Runciman, Steven (1987). A History of the Crusades: The First Crusade (2nd ed.). London: Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0-521-34770-9. Schumacher, Gottlieb; Oliphant, Laurence; Le Strange, Guy (1889). Across the Jordan; being an exploration and survey of part of Hauran and Jaulan. London: Alexander P. Watt. Treadgold, Warren (1997). A History of the Byzantine State and Society. Stanford: Stanford University Press. doi:10.1515/9780804779371. ISBN 9780804779371. Woods, David (2007). "Jews, Rats, and the Battle of Yarmūk". In Ariel S. Lewin; Pietrina Pellegrini (eds.). The Late Roman Army in the Near East from Diocletian to the Arab Conquest. Oxford: Archaeopress. ISBN 978-1-4073-0161-7. External links: Yarmouk in Sword of Allah at GrandeStrategy by A. I. Akram Battle of Yarmuk, 636

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Battle of the Granicus

Background: After winning the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 BC, King Philip II of Macedon forced most of the Greek states into a military alliance, the Hellenic League. Its goal was to make war on the Persian Achaemenid Empire to avenge the second Persian invasion of Greece in 480 BC. He managed to convince the other Greek states to elect him as the leader of the League and started preparing for the war. At the same time the Achaemenid Empire had been in crisis since the murder of its king Artaxerxes III in 338 BC. An important consequence of this was that Egypt again seceded from the empire. At this time there was no large Persian army in Asia Minor and the Persian fleet was not expected in the Aegean Sea soon. Philip most likely wanted to exploit the chaos in the empire, but could not launch a large-scale invasion of Asia Minor because his entire army was not yet ready. For this reason he probably sent a smaller part of his army which could be deployed. In the spring of 336 BC he ordered a Macedonian expeditionary corps of several thousand soldiers to land on the western coast of Asia Minor. The likely mission of this advance-guard was to conquer as much territory as possible, or at the very least establish a bridgehead on the Asian side of the Hellespont to facilitate the crossing of the main army later. The advance guard was most likely led by Parmenion, Philip's best general, with Attalus as second in command. Initially the campaign was a success, with many of the Greek cities of western Asia Minor surrendering peacefully to the Macedonians. At the end of 336 BC this all changed. Philip was murdered, most likely in October 336 BC. Philip was succeeded by his son, Alexander III, who had to put down several revolts in the Balkans and Greece first to reassert Macedonian authority. This distracted him from the operations in Asia Minor. Meanwhile, Darius III had become the new Great King of the Achaemenid Empire, around the autumn of 336 BC. He managed to stabilize the empire and started a counter-offensive against the Macedonian expeditionary force. Darius prioritized the suppression of the Egyptian revolt, which probably took place from the end of 336 BC to February 335 BC. When this was done he sent Memnon of Rhodes to Asia Minor at the head of a force of Greek mercenaries, who were infantry fighting as hoplites. Memnon defeated a Macedonian force at either Magnesia ad Sipylum or Magnesia on the Maeander, probably in early spring 335 BC. Later that year another Macedonian force was defeated by a Persian army in the Troad, possibly under the command of one or more Persian satraps. By the end of 335 BC most of the Greek cities had been restored to Persian control and the expeditionary force retained only Abydus and perhaps Rhoeteum. Prelude: Once Alexander had defeated the rebellions in the Balkans and Greece, he marched his army to the Hellespont in early spring 334 BC. His army numbered c. 32,000 infantry and c. 5,000 cavalry. He arrived at Sestus twenty days later, where he split his army for the crossing of the Hellespont. The main part of the army was transported from Sestus to Abydus in Asia Minor, while Alexander crossed with the remainder of the infantry from Elaeus, landing near Cape Sigeum. After visiting Ilium, he passed Arisba, Percote, Lampsacus, Colonae and Hermotus. Darius would have been informed about Alexander's movements for some time, maybe as early as the invasion force had left Macedon. This did not alarm the Great King yet, who left the defense of Asia Minor to his satraps there. The reasons for this may have been that Alexander had not proven himself as a commander abroad yet and that the Macedonian expeditionary force had been pushed back without much difficulty the previous year. The Persian satraps and commanders were encamped near Zeleia with their army when they were informed of Alexander's crossing. The army was led by Arsites, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, Spithridates, satrap of Lydia and Ionia, Arsames, satrap of Cilicia, Rheomithres, Petenes, Niphates and Memnon of Rhodes. While the ancient historians don't explicitly identify a commander-in-chief for the Persians, modern historians consider Arsites to have been in overall command because the enemy had invaded his territory. A council was held by the Persians at Zeleia to discuss the state of affairs. The ancient historians Arrian and Diodorus Siculus claim that Memnon advised the Persians to avoid open battle with the Macedonians. He reasoned that the Macedonian infantry was superior to theirs and that Alexander was present in person, while Darius was not with them. He recommended a scorched earth strategy so that Alexander would not be able to continue his campaign due to lack of supplies. Arsites and the other Persians rejected Memnon's advice because they wanted to protect the property of their subjects. They also suspected Memnon of trying to prolong the war so that he could gain favor with Darius. W. J. McCoy compares Memnon's advice with the wise counsel given by Greeks to Persians in the work of Herodotus. In Herodotus, the rejection of such counsel led to misfortune for the Persians and was employed to ridicule them. For this reason he suggests that Memnon's advice was an invention by Arrian and Diodorus. Pierre Briant argues that even if the debate took place as described, the relevance of Memnon's counsel was overstated because discussing strategy was not the purpose of the meeting. Most likely Darius had already ordered his satraps to engage Alexander's army in battle, so the council at Zeleia was held to discuss the tactics of the upcoming battle rather than the strategy of the war. After the council, the Persian army took up position at the eastern bank of the Granicus River and waited for Alexander's attack. According to Arrian, Alexander heard of the location of the Persians from his scouts while he was moving towards the Granicus. He had his army arranged in battle formation. Parmenion was worried that the army could not cross the river with its front extended, and would have to cross over in column with its battle formation disrupted. Because this would make the army vulnerable to Persian attack, he advised Alexander that the army should encamp on the western bank and make an uncontested crossing tomorrow at dawn. Alexander did not want to wait and ordered an immediate attack. These discussions on strategy and tactics between Parmenion and Alexander are a recurring motif in the writings of ancient historians. In these exchanges Parmenion is depicted as careful, while Alexander is willing to take more risks. Alexander always rejects the advice of Parmenion and is then successful in realizing his own bold plan, which the old general advised him against. This motif may have originated in the work of Callisthenes for the purpose of enhancing the heroism of Alexander. As a consequence, historians have suggested that the discussion may have been fictional. The battle was fought in the Macedonian month of Daisios, May in the Gregorian calendar. Before the battle, some of the Macedonian officers voiced their reluctance to fight because religious custom required them to avoid battles during this month. Alexander solved this by declaring that the current month should be considered a second Artemision. This month preceded Daisios and did not carry a taboo on warfare. Location: The Granicus is today called the Biga River (Turkish: Biga Çayı). Traditionally the ford where the battle took place has been located above the confluence of the river which runs through Gümüşçay and the Biga River, or further downstream on the Biga River. More recently N. G. L. Hammond proposed that at the time of the battle the Biga River possibly flowed further east in its valley. In modern times, evidence of an old riverbed can still be seen there. Furthermore, the ancient historians describe a long continuous ridge where the Greek mercenary infantry of the Persians was posted. Because there is only one candidate for this ridge, Hammond has placed the ford between the modern villages Gümüşçay (formerly called Dimetoka) and Çeşmealtı. This theory found support in later scholarship on the battle. The modern observations that the river is not difficult to cross contradicts the ancient historians, who emphasized the hardship of the fording of the river. The ancient historians might have exaggerated to make Alexander's accomplishment seem more formidable. Opposing forces: Macedonian army: The Macedonian army consisted mostly of infantry. The heavy infantry numbered 12,000 and included the Foot Companions and a smaller group of elite hypaspists. The light infantry totalled 1,000 and contained archers and elite Agrianian javelin-men. The heavy cavalry was made up of 1,800 elite Companion cavalry, 1,800 Thessalian cavalry and 600 Greek allied cavalry. The light cavalry numbered 900 in total and was composed of prodromoi, Paeonians and Thracians. Alexander also possessed Greek allied and mercenary infantry, but he had marched to the Granicus without them.

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Battle of the Granicus

The modern observations that the river is not difficult to cross contradicts the ancient historians, who emphasized the hardship of the fording of the river. The ancient historians might have exaggerated to make Alexander's accomplishment seem more formidable. Opposing forces: Macedonian army: The Macedonian army consisted mostly of infantry. The heavy infantry numbered 12,000 and included the Foot Companions and a smaller group of elite hypaspists. The light infantry totalled 1,000 and contained archers and elite Agrianian javelin-men. The heavy cavalry was made up of 1,800 elite Companion cavalry, 1,800 Thessalian cavalry and 600 Greek allied cavalry. The light cavalry numbered 900 in total and was composed of prodromoi, Paeonians and Thracians. Alexander also possessed Greek allied and mercenary infantry, but he had marched to the Granicus without them. In total, Alexander's army numbered 12,000 heavy infantry, 1,000 light infantry and 5,100 cavalry for a total of 18,100 men. From the right wing to the left, Alexander placed seven of his eight squadrons of Companion cavalry, along with the archers and Agrianians, under the command of Philotas. Because the Agrianians usually fought interspersed with the Companion cavalry, they were most likely placed in front of them. The prodromoi, the Paeonian cavalry and the eighth squadron of the Companion cavalry under Socrates were posted next to them. Overall command of these three cavalry units was held by Amyntas, son of Arrhabaeus. After them came the hypaspists commanded by Nicanor, which guarded the right flank of the Foot Companions next to them. There were six units of Foot Companions: led by Perdiccas, Coenus, Craterus, Amyntas the son of Andromenes, Philip the son of Amyntas, and Meleager. To the left of Meleager's Foot Companions were the Thracian cavalry under the command of Agathon. Next to them were stationed the allied Greek cavalry under Philip, son of Menelaus. At the extreme left were the Thessalian cavalry under the command of Calas. Alexander placed Parmenion in overall command of the Foot Companions of Philip and Meleager, and the cavalry on the left wing. Alexander commanded the remainder of the army on the right wing. The Greek allied and mercenary infantry, which were part of the invasion force, were not used during the battle. Persian army: For the Persian army Arrian gives a number of almost 20,000 infantry, all Greek mercenaries, and 20,000 cavalry. Diodorus gives a figure of 10,000 cavalry and 100,000 infantry. Justin gives an even higher number of 600,000 men in total for the Persians. The historian Azar Gat explains that although the Persian Empire and its armies were large, the size of its armies were wildly exaggerated in the Greek sources. Gat adds that this was an "invariable" habit of pre-modern writers, as they both lacked precise information and were patriotically biased. N. G. L. Hammond accepts the Persian troop numbers given by Arrian. A. M. Devine and Krzysztof Nawotka regard the numbers given by Justin and the number for infantry given by Diodorus to be fantastical because such a large army would have been a logistical impossibility. Both historians consider the figure of 10,000 cavalry given by Diodorus to be more plausible. J. F. C. Fuller also considers a number of 10,000 cavalry to be more likely, but he does not mention the figure of Diodorus. Arrian's claim on the strength and composition of the Persian infantry has elicited more detailed discussion. There have been arguments that the figure of 20,000 is accurate, but also included non-Greek native infantry. Others have argued that Greek mercenaries may have been the only infantry present but were not as numerous. Krzysztof Nawotka considers Arrian's claim of 20,000 infantry credible, but does not think it consisted entirely of Greek mercenaries. Such a large force of mercenaries would have been raised only very occasionally, after a long period of preparation and under the command of the Great King. Because the Achaemenids had not made such preparations for the battle, he judges that only a small fraction of the infantry were Greek mercenaries. Accordingly, local detachments of little military value made up the vast majority of the infantry. Based on Plutarch's statement that the infantry of both sides engaged after the Macedonian phalanx crossed the river, Ernst Badian likewise believes that non-Greek infantry was part of the Persian army and posted directly behind the cavalry. In this light, he considers 20,000 a reasonable estimate for the total number of infantry. He believes that Arrian's claim that all Persian infantry consisted of Greek mercenaries was either a mistake or an attempt to enhance Alexander's glory. A.M. Devine argues that Arrian likely exaggerated the number of Greek mercenaries for propaganda purposes. He notes that the only other information on Greek mercenaries in Asia Minor at that time is given by Diodorus and Polyaenus. Diodorus writes that Memnon's force of Greek mercenaries, which Darius III had sent to Asia Minor to fight the Macedonian expeditionary force, numbered 5,000 men. Polyaenus gives a lower number for these, 4,000. Assuming that Arrian was right in his claim that the infantry consisted exclusively of Greek mercenaries and that the figure of 10,000 cavalry given by Diodorus is plausible, he suggests that the Persian army likely numbered 14,000 to 15,000 men. This was significantly inferior both in numbers and quality compared to the 18,100 men fielded by Alexander. Like A. M. Devine, J. F. C. Fuller thinks the number of 5,000 mercenaries given by Diodorus is more realistic, but he thinks there must have also been a considerable force of local levies. A.M. Devine goes on to argue that this inferiority of the Persian force would explain why the Persians chose to defend a river crossing and place their cavalry in the front line. It would also explain why Alexander decided to risk a frontal attack there. Likewise, the encirclement and massacre of the Greek mercenaries later during the battle would have been unlikely if they had actually numbered 20,000 instead of 4,000 or 5,000. Finally, the low estimate for the size of the Persian army would fit with the small number of casualties for the Macedonians. The Persians stationed their cavalry along the bank of the Granicus. The left wing was held by Memnon and Arsames, each with their own cavalry units. Next to them Arsites commanded the Paphlagonian horsemen. Spithridates was placed next to him and led the Hyrcanian cavalry. The center was held by cavalry of unspecified ethnicity. The right wing consisted of 1,000 Median cavalry, 2,000 cavalry headed by Rheomithres and another unit of 2,000 Bactrian horse. The Persians moved some of their cavalry to reinforce their left wing when they noticed Alexander himself was stationed opposite this wing. The Greek mercenaries were placed behind the cavalry and led by the Persian Omares. Historians have criticized several decisions made by the Persian commanders. One of these is the deployment of the cavalry on the river's bank, because it did not allow the cavalry to charge. This has been explained by the fact that the Persian cavalry at that time did not use charge tactics yet. Instead, they would approach enemy formations and attack them with javelins to disrupt them from a distance. Once the formation was sufficiently disordered, the cavalry would switch to curved swords for the melee fighting. Likewise, historians have questioned why Memnon was given command of a cavalry unit at the front line, given his success with leading the Greek mercenaries. A possible motive is that the Persian commanders were jealous of him and did not trust him. Memnon would have been easier for them to control in their midst at the front line. A third point of criticism is the deployment of their infantry far from the frontline. Modern historians have suggested that the Persian commanders did so out of resentment towards the Greek mercenaries, which had defeated the Macedonians at Magnesia the year prior. By defeating Alexander with just their cavalry, they would have regained their pride. Battle: There are three different accounts of the battle given by the ancient historians Arrian, Plutarch and Diodorus Siculus. Arrian's account is the longest and most detailed, Plutarch's account is shorter but corresponds with Arrian's narrative except for some small differences. The account of Diodorus Siculus however is fundamentally different from that of Arrian and Plutarch. Account of Arrian: After both armies finished their deployment, there was a moment of silence. Alexander then ordered Amyntas, son of Arrhabeus, to attack the Persian left wing with the Companion cavalry squadron of Socrates (now led by Ptolemy, son of Philip) at the front, followed by the Paeonian cavalry, the prodromoi and an unspecified infantry unit.

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Battle of the Granicus

By defeating Alexander with just their cavalry, they would have regained their pride. Battle: There are three different accounts of the battle given by the ancient historians Arrian, Plutarch and Diodorus Siculus. Arrian's account is the longest and most detailed, Plutarch's account is shorter but corresponds with Arrian's narrative except for some small differences. The account of Diodorus Siculus however is fundamentally different from that of Arrian and Plutarch. Account of Arrian: After both armies finished their deployment, there was a moment of silence. Alexander then ordered Amyntas, son of Arrhabeus, to attack the Persian left wing with the Companion cavalry squadron of Socrates (now led by Ptolemy, son of Philip) at the front, followed by the Paeonian cavalry, the prodromoi and an unspecified infantry unit. Arrian then gives the impression that Alexander advanced at nearly the same time with the remainder of the right wing and the infantry, but later makes it clear that Alexander's attack came after the troops of Amyntas were pushed back. Arrian's source may have done so to make Alexander look more heroic. The Persians answered the charge of the vanguard with volleys of javelins. Amyntas's force was at a disadvantage because they were severely outnumbered and the Persians were defending higher ground at the top of the bank. The Macedonians suffered losses and retreated towards Alexander, who now attacked with the remaining Companion cavalry of the right wing. A. M. Devine reasons that the failure of the attack led by Amyntas was not a mistake, but a ruse to draw the Persian cavalry out of formation as they pursued the retreating force of Amyntas into the riverbed. The disruption of the Persian formation would have made them vulnerable to the second attack led by Alexander in person. There have been different translations and interpretations of Arrian's description of how Alexander executed the attack with his cavalry. Some historians have taken Arrian's description as an attack on the Persian center. J. F. C. Fuller thinks Alexander led his attack in a movement diagonally to the left to attack the left of the Persian center. Similarly, A. B. Bosworth considers this movement to have been directed downstream to the left towards the Persian center. The Macedonian forces would have moved in a diagonal line and eventually formed up in wedge formation as they ascended the eastern bank of the Granicus. Other historians maintain that Alexander attacked the Persian left wing. Ernst Badian thinks that Arrian makes it clear that the Persians had massed their cavalry at the left flank and that Alexander attacked that same mass of cavalry. This would have meant that Alexander must have moved more or less straight ahead. Presumably he would have entered the riverbed at a narrow point, so that his cavalry was in column and vulnerable to attack on their flanks as they ascended the riverbank on the Persian side at a wider point. To prevent this, Alexander would have sent his men towards the left, in the direction of the current, while still in the riverbed. This would have widened the front of his formation so that it would match the Persian formation as they emerged on the other bank. N. G. L. Hammond thinks it was a sideways movement upstream to the right so that the troops would remain in line as they crossed the Granicus. The purpose of this would have been to avoid crossing in disorder and in column, while giving Alexander's cavalry mostly the same formation as the Persian cavalry. A. M. Devine argues that it was not merely an oblique movement, but also an oblique formation. Continuing Arrian's narrative, Alexander and his men engaged the Persians and their leaders in a hard-fought battle. The Macedonians eventually got the upper hand because their lance (the xyston) was more effective in melee than the javelin used by the Persians. During the battle, Alexander himself broke his lance and asked his servant Aretis for another. As Aretis had also broken his during the fighting, Demaratus of Corinth handed his lance to Alexander. Alexander then saw Mithridates, the son-in-law of Darius, leading a cavalry unit. Alexander charged and killed him with a lance thrust to his face. Another Persian noble, Rhosaces, then hit Alexander on the helmet with a sword, but the helmet protected him. Alexander dispatched Rhosaces by thrusting him in the chest with his lance. Sphithridates was about to attack Alexander from behind with his sword, but his sword arm was cut off by Cleitus the Black. The other Macedonian cavalry had by then established a foothold on the river bank and reinforced Alexander's force. At this point in the battle the Macedonian cavalry and the light infantry which was interspersed with them forced back the Persian cavalry. This began on the Persian left flank where Alexander was fighting. Then the center was broken and the Persian cavalry on both wings fled. Alexander did not pursue them far but turned his attention to the Greek mercenaries, who had mostly remained inactive at their original position. The mercenaries were surprised by the turn of events and were attacked by both the Foot Companions from the front and the cavalry from all other directions. They were soon defeated and only a few were able to escape. Account of Plutarch: Plutarch's account focuses more on the aristeia of Alexander's personal combat with the Persian leaders and gives less attention to the movements and tactics of the armies. This account mostly corresponds to Arrian's version of events, but there are some differences. According to Plutarch the Persians had stationed both infantry and cavalry at their front line. Alexander lead the first attack against the Persians and there are minor differences in his combat with Rhosaces and Sphithridates. While the cavalry battle was ongoing, the Foot Companions crossed the river and engaged the Persian infantry. After a short confrontation, all except for the Greek mercenaries routed. The mercenaries retreated to a higher position. They asked Alexander to negotiate for their surrender, but Alexander refused this and attacked. The mercenaries fought hard and were responsible for most of the Macedonian casualties. Account of Diodorus: In the account given by Diodorus, the Macedonian and Persian armies encamped on the opposite banks of the Granicus and did not move for the rest of the day. Alexander then crossed the Granicus unopposed at dawn on the next day. Both armies then formed up and started the battle with their cavalry. Diodorus then describes the personal combat of Alexander with the Persian nobles, which differs slightly from the account of Arrian and Plutarch. When many of the Persian commanders were slain and the Persian cavalry was pushed back everywhere, the Persian cavalry opposite Alexander was routed. The rest of the Persian cavalry joined them in flight. After this, the infantry engaged each other, which soon ended with the rout of the Persian infantry. Modern interpretations: Historian Peter Green, in his 1974 book Alexander of Macedon, proposed a way to reconcile the accounts of Diodorus and Arrian. According to Green's interpretation, the riverbank was guarded by infantry, not cavalry, and Alexander's forces sustained heavy losses in the initial attempt to cross the river and were forced to retire. Alexander then grudgingly accepted Parmenion's advice and crossed the river during the night in an uncontested location, and fought the battle at dawn the next day. The Persian army hurried to the location of Alexander's crossing, with the cavalry reaching the scene of the battle first before the slower infantry, and then the battle continued largely as described by Arrian and Plutarch. Green accounts for the differences between his account and the ancient sources by suggesting that Alexander later covered up his initial failed crossing. Green devoted an entire appendix in support of his interpretation, taking the view that for political reasons, Alexander could not admit even a temporary defeat. Thus, the initial defeat was covered up by his propagandists by a very heroic (and Homeric) charge into the now well-deployed enemy. In his preface to the 2013 reprint, Green conceded that he no longer believed his theory was convincing and that the contradiction could not be explained. Other historians have dismissed the account of Diodorus as incorrect and favor Arrian's and Plutarch's narratives. The description given by Diodorus of a separate cavalry and infantry battle would have been uncharacteristic for the Macedonians, who always coordinated their infantry and cavalry to work together. It is likely that a crossing of the Granicus at night or at dawn would have been detected and opposed by the Persians. Even if an uncontested crossing elsewhere was possible, it might have induced the Persian army to retreat. In that case Alexander would have lost the opportunity to quickly destroy the only Persian army present in Asia Minor at that time. An attack in the afternoon would also have meant that the Persians would have to fight with the sun in their eyes, whereas the Macedonians would have the sun in their eyes if they had attacked at dawn. Casualties: Macedonian army: For the Macedonians, Arrian gives losses of 25 Companion cavalry in the preliminary attack, 60 from the rest of the cavalry and 30 of the infantry, a total of 115 killed. Plutarch gives 34 dead, of which 25 were cavalry and 9 were infantry. Justin mentions 9 infantry and 120 cavalry killed.

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Battle of the Granicus

Even if an uncontested crossing elsewhere was possible, it might have induced the Persian army to retreat. In that case Alexander would have lost the opportunity to quickly destroy the only Persian army present in Asia Minor at that time. An attack in the afternoon would also have meant that the Persians would have to fight with the sun in their eyes, whereas the Macedonians would have the sun in their eyes if they had attacked at dawn. Casualties: Macedonian army: For the Macedonians, Arrian gives losses of 25 Companion cavalry in the preliminary attack, 60 from the rest of the cavalry and 30 of the infantry, a total of 115 killed. Plutarch gives 34 dead, of which 25 were cavalry and 9 were infantry. Justin mentions 9 infantry and 120 cavalry killed. A. M. Devine observes that the source used by Arrian for the casualties was Ptolemy I, who in turn used Callisthenes as a source for the casualties. Plutarch used Aristobulus as his source. This suggests that Plutarch misunderstood the information, because his 25 dead cavalry are probably the 25 Companions who fell during the preliminary attack. Justin's figures seem to be a confused conflation of both Ptolemy I and Aristobulus. Because the battle was short, A. M. Devine considers Arrian's numbers to be reasonably accurate. Persian army: Next to the Persian nobles who fell in personal combat with Alexander, many Persian leaders perished in the battle. Arrian mentions Niphates, Petenes, Mithrobuzanes, the satrap of Cappadocia, Arbupales, the son of the Darius who was the son of Artaxerxes II, Pharnaces, brother of the wife of Darius, and Omares. Arsites survived and fled into Phrygia, but committed suicide later because he was blamed for the defeat. Diodorus also mentions Atizyes, the satrap of Greater Phrygia as being killed, but also mentions him later as a casualty of the Battle of Issus. For the Persians, Arrian states that 1,000 cavalry were killed and 2,000 Greek mercenaries were taken prisoner. Plutarch mentions 2,500 cavalry and 20,000 infantry killed. Diodorus gives statistics of 2,000 cavalry and 10,000 infantry killed, as well as 20,000 men who were taken prisoner. The casualty figures of Plutarch and Diodorus are judged to be impossibly large by A. M. Devine. He considers Arrian's figures of 1,000 cavalry killed and 2,000 captured Greek mercenaries to be reasonably accurate. He takes Arrian's number on the captured mercenaries to imply that the remaining 18,000 were killed, which he dismisses. Based on his theory that there were no more than 4,000 to 5,000 Greek mercenaries, it could possibly mean that 2,000 to 3,000 of them were massacred. This gives a total Persian loss of 5,000 to 6,000. Aftermath: The 2,000 Greek mercenaries who were captured were sent to Macedon to work the land as slaves. Even though they were Greeks, Alexander felt they had betrayed their fellow Greeks with their service to the Persians. In doing so, they did not abide by the agreement made at the Hellenic League, which compelled the Greeks to fight Persia and not each other. He also sent 300 suits of Persian armour to Athens as a votive offering to Athena on the Acropolis. He ordered an inscription to be fixed over them so as to mark the absence of the Spartans in his united Greek army: "Alexander, son of Philip and all the Greeks except the Lacedaemonians, present this offering from the spoils taken from the barbarians inhabiting Asia". A statue group, known as the Granicus Monument, was erected by Alexander in the sanctuary of Zeus at Dion. This consisted of bronze statues by Lysippus of Alexander with twenty-five of his companions who had died in the initial cavalry charge, all on horseback. In 146 BC, after the Fourth Macedonian War, this statue group was taken to Rome by Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, where they were displayed in a portico that he built below the Capitoline Hill. Dascylium was evacuated by its Persian garrison and occupied by Parmenion. Alexander marched to Sardis, which surrendered to him. He continued to Ephesus, which was also evacuated by its garrison of Greek mercenaries. When Magnesia and Tralles also offered their surrender, he sent Parmenion to those cities. He sent Lysimachus to the cities in Aeolis and Ionia which were still under Persian control, ordering him to break up the oligarchies there and reinstate democratic government. When Alexander arrived at Miletus the city resisted him, so he besieged it. The Persian military losses were not disastrous, as a large portion of the army managed to retreat to Halicarnassus. On the other hand, the strategic outcome was precarious for the Achaemenid Empire. Achaemenid satraps had been defeated in Asia Minor before and Sardis had been besieged, but this was the first time that the citadel of Sardis had fallen and that an enemy force could continue its march without significant obstacles until Halicarnassus. References: == Sources ==

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Battlespace

Concept: From "battlefield" to "battlespace": For many years, the understanding of the military operational environment has transformed from primarily a time and space-driven linear understanding (a "battlefield") to a multi-dimensional system of systems understanding (a battlespace). This system of systems understanding implies that managing the battlespace has become more complex, primarily because of the increased importance of the cognitive domain, a direct result of the information age. Today, militaries are expected to understand the effects of their actions on the operational environment as a whole, and not just in the military domain of their operational environment. From "Old" to "New" Battlespace: The evolution of competition and conflict during the industrial age has led to a corresponding transformation in the ability to engage in warfare in the information age. The concept of thinking and fighting in the industrial age can be described as the "Old Battlespace," characterized by clearly defined and discernible battlefield lines in the tangible domains of land, sea, and air. However, as economies and technologies have advanced, the methods by which countries and militaries compete and conduct warfare have also changed. In the information age, the tangible domains of land, sea, and air remain constant, but the emergence and prominence of cyber operations, outer space activities, civil society engagement, and social media usage have elevated the significance of intangible realms in both kinetic and non-kinetic forms of warfare. This shift to a "New Battlespace" implies that traditional barriers, such as vast distances, oceans, and legal constraints, no longer present insurmountable obstacles. Consequently, emerging domains allow for the weaponization of nearly anything, turning the entire globe into a competitive arena for state and non-state actors. In this context, everyone becomes a participant in global contestation, whether willingly or not, as anything and everything can be utilized as a weapon. These changes do not indicate a fundamental alteration in the nature of war between the Old and New Battlespaces; rather, they underscore the continuously evolving character of war due to changes in economies, technologies, and military strategies. "New Battlespace" poses complex challenges for strategists and policymakers. The internet, deep interdependencies, and hyper-connectivity present difficulties for armies that are structured around an industrial age mindset, particularly when it comes to defending one's homeland. Addressing these challenges requires a nuanced understanding of the evolving battlespace and the ability to adapt military structures and strategies to effectively compete and defend against adversaries in the information age. Battlespace agility: Battlespace agility, in the context of war-fighting, encompasses the ability of a military organization to rapidly convert knowledge into actionable strategies that yield desired outcomes within the battlespace. It emphasizes the need to outperform the opposing forces by executing appropriate actions at the right time and location. However, battlespace agility is not solely focused on speed; it also underscores the importance of executing actions in the most efficient manner possible to achieve the desired impact on the system. Fundamental to this concept is the recognition that battlespace agility relies on the quality of situational awareness and a comprehensive understanding of the battlespace, which in turn drives the renewed emphasis on the value of military intelligence. A central aspect of battlespace agility is the capacity of intelligence analysts and operational planners to perceive the battlespace and their targets as interconnected networks. This perspective facilitates a shared and more accurate understanding of the situation, thereby enabling faster decision-making and enhancing the overall effectiveness of targeting efforts. Battlespace agility finds its origins within the broader field of Command & Control (C2) research, specifically the exploration of C2 agility by NATO. However, it specifically addresses agility within the domain of war-fighting, thus aligning with the principles of effects-based thinking, system of systems analysis, and the competing Observe Orient Decide Act (OODA) loops. Battlespace awareness: Battlespace awareness (BA) is a principle derived from military philosophy that holds significant value for joint component and force commanders, aiding them in predicting potential courses of action before deploying troops into a designated area of operation (AO). It relies on the utilization of intelligence preparation assets, which play a critical role in supporting commanders to maintain a heightened state of awareness regarding recent, ongoing, and forthcoming events within their battlespace. It is based around its knowledge and understanding obtained by the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) system. It is another methodical concept used to gain information about the operational area—the environment, factors, and conditions, including the status of friendly and adversary forces, neutrals and noncombatants, weather and terrain—that enables timely, relevant, comprehensive and accurate assessments. It has become an effective concept for conventional and unconventional operations in successfully projecting, or protecting, a military force, and/or completing its mission. Battlespace awareness is a comprehensive approach rooted in the acquisition and comprehension of knowledge obtained through the intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) system. It serves as a systematic concept employed to gather pertinent information regarding the operational area, encompassing various aspects such as the environment, factors, and conditions. These include the status of friendly and adversary forces, as well as neutrals and noncombatants, weather patterns, and the terrain. Battlespace digitization: Battlespace digitization is designed to improve military operational effectiveness by integrating weapons platforms, sensor networks, ubiquitous command and control (UC2), intelligence, and network-centric warfare. This military doctrine reflects that in the future, military operations will be merged into joint operations rather than take place in separate battlespaces under the domain of individual armed services. Battlespace intelligence preparation: Intelligence preparation: Intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) is an analytical methodology employed to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace builds an extensive database for each potential area in which a unit may be required to operate. The database is then analyzed in detail to determine the impact of the enemy, environment and terrain on operations and presents it in graphic form. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is a continuing and crucial process to successful warfare. Joint intelligence preparation: Joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace (JIPB) is the analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates and other intelligence products in support of the joint force commander's decision-making process. It is a continuous process that includes defining the total battlespace environment; describing the battlespace's effects; evaluating the adversary; and determining and describing adversary potential courses of action. The process is used to analyze the aerial, terrestrial, maritime/littoral, spatial, electromagnetic, cyberspace, and human dimensions of the environment and to determine an opponent's capabilities to operate in each. JPIB products are used by the joint force and component command staffs in preparing their estimates and are also applied during the analysis and selection of friendly courses of action. Battlespace measures: Maneuver control: Maneuver control measures are the basic preliminary step in effective clearance of fire support (e.g. artillery, naval gunfire support, and close air support), marked by imaginary boundary lines used by commanders to designate the geographical area for which a particular unit is tactically responsible. It is usually established on identifiable terrain to help aid in hasty referencing for better lateral advantage in the science of fire support, normally orchestrated by a higher echelon of the general staff, mainly the operations staff sections. They are normally designated along terrain features easily recognizable on the ground. An important point on maneuver control graphics: staffs must be knowledgeable regarding the different maneuver control measures and their impact on clearance of fires. For instance, boundaries are both restrictive and permissive; corridors are restrictive, while routes, axis, and directions of attack are neither. It should be reminded of the effect on clearance of fires if subordinate maneuver units are not given zones or sectors (i.e. no boundaries established). Since boundaries serve as both permissive and restrictive measures, the decision not to employ them has profound effects upon timely clearance of fires at the lowest possible level. The higher echelon may coordinate all clearance of fires short of the Coordinated Fire Line (CFL), a very time-intensive process. It allows the unit to maneuver successfully and to swiftly and efficiently engage targets. It requires coordination and clearance only within that organization. They affect fire support in two ways: Restrictive—Restrictive control that is established in conjunction with a host nation to preclude damage or destruction to a national asset, population center, or religious structure. Its key role is the protection of an element of tactical importance, such as a fuel storage area. Restrictive fire area (RFA) is an area with specific restrictions and in which fires that exceed those restrictions will not be delivered without coordination with the establishing headquarters, or higher echelon; occasionally, it may be established to operate independently. No-fire area (NFA) is a designated area which no fire support may be delivered for fires or effects. When the establishing headquarters allows fires on a mission-by-mission basis. When a friendly force is engaged by an enemy located within the NFA and the commander returns fire to defend their forces, the amount of return fire should not exceed that sufficient to protect the force and continue the mission. Permissive—Permissive control that gives the maneuver commander the liberty to announce and engage fire support at their will, unless it otherwise is restricted by a higher echelon. In most cases, a commander will deny the use of Fire Support Coordinating Measures (FSCM). There are free-fire areas (FFA) which fire support can commence without additional coordination with the establishing headquarters. Normally, it is established on identifiable terrain by division or higher headquarters.

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Battlespace

No-fire area (NFA) is a designated area which no fire support may be delivered for fires or effects. When the establishing headquarters allows fires on a mission-by-mission basis. When a friendly force is engaged by an enemy located within the NFA and the commander returns fire to defend their forces, the amount of return fire should not exceed that sufficient to protect the force and continue the mission. Permissive—Permissive control that gives the maneuver commander the liberty to announce and engage fire support at their will, unless it otherwise is restricted by a higher echelon. In most cases, a commander will deny the use of Fire Support Coordinating Measures (FSCM). There are free-fire areas (FFA) which fire support can commence without additional coordination with the establishing headquarters. Normally, it is established on identifiable terrain by division or higher headquarters. Battlespace shaping: Battlespace shaping is a concept involved in the practice of maneuver warfare that are used for shaping a situation on the battlefield, gaining the military advantage for the commander. It forecasts the elimination of the enemy's capability by fighting in a coherent manner before deploying determine-sized forces. See also: List of command and control abbreviations Command and control Fog of war Network-centric warfare Psychological warfare References: Further reading: Blackmore, T. (2005). War X: Human Extensions in Battle-space. University of Toronto Press. ISBN 0-8020-8791-4 Galeotti, M. (2022). The Weaponisation of Everything: A Field Guide to the New Way of War. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-25344-3 Matisek, J. and Jayamaha, B. (2022). Old and New Battlespaces: Society, Military Power, and War. Lynne Rienner. ISBN 978-1-62637-996-1 Mitchell, W. (2013). Battle-space Agility 101. Royal Danish Defense College Publishing House. ISBN 978-87-7147-006-2 Mitchell, W. (2013). Battle-space Agility 201.Royal Danish Defense College Publishing House. ISBN 978-87-7147-018-5 Mitchell, W. (2012). Battle-space Intelligence. Royal Danish Defense College Publishing House. ISBN 978-87-987720-6-4 Mitchell, W. (2012). Battle-space Agility in Helmand. Royal Danish Defense College Publishing House. ISBN 978-87-987720-5-7 Mitchell, W. (2008). Comprehensive Approach Capacity Building.Royal Danish Defense College Publishing House. ISBN 978-87-91421-52-5 Owens, W. (2002). Dominant Battle-space Knowledge. University Press of the Pacific. ISBN 1-4102-0413-8 External links: Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-0: Marine Corps Operations' Achieving Dominant Battlespace Awareness Joint Synthetic Battlespace: Cornerstone for Predictive Battlespace Awareness Battlespace Digitization - Coping With Uncertainty In The Command Process Challenges for Joint Battlespace Digitization (JBD)

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Berm

Etymology: The word is from Middle Dutch and came into usage in English via French. Military use: History: In medieval military engineering, a berm (or berme) was a level space between a parapet or defensive wall and an adjacent steep-walled ditch or moat. It was intended to reduce soil pressure on the walls of the excavated part to prevent its collapse. It also meant that debris dislodged from fortifications would not fall into (and fill) a ditch or moat. In the trench warfare of World War I, the name was applied to a similar feature at the lip of a trench, which served mainly as an elbow-rest for riflemen. Modern usage: In modern military engineering, a berm is the earthen or sod wall or parapet, especially a low earthen wall adjacent to a ditch. The digging of the ditch (often by a bulldozer or military engineering vehicle) can provide the soil from which the berm is constructed. Walls constructed in this manner are an obstacle to vehicles, including most armoured fighting vehicles but are easily crossed by infantry. Because of the ease of construction, such walls can be made hundreds or thousands of kilometres long. A prominent example of such a berm is the 2,700 km (1,700 mi) Moroccan Western Sahara Wall. Erosion control: Berms are also used to control soil erosion and sedimentation by reducing the rate of surface runoff. The berms either reduce the velocity of the water, or direct water to areas that are not susceptible to erosion, thereby reducing the adverse effects of running water on exposed topsoil. Following the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, the construction of berms designed to prevent oil from reaching the fragile Louisiana wetlands (which would result in massive erosion) was proposed early on, and was officially approved by the federal government in mid-June, 2010, after numerous failures to stop and contain the oil leak with more advanced technologies. Geography: In coastal geography, a berm is a bank of sand or gravel ridge parallel to the shoreline and a few tens of centimetres high, created by wave action throwing material beyond the average level of the sea. House construction: Earth is piled up against exterior walls and packed, sloping down away from the house. The roof may or may not be fully earth covered, and windows/openings may occur on one or more sides of the shelter. Due to the building being above ground, fewer moisture problems are associated with earth berming in comparison to underground/fully recessed construction. Other applications: For general applications, a berm is a physical, stationary barrier of some kind. For example, in highway construction, a berm is a noise barrier constructed of earth, often landscaped, running along a highway to protect adjacent land users from noise pollution. The shoulder of a road is also called a berm and in New Zealand the word describes a publicly owned grassed nature strip sometimes planted with trees alongside urban roads (usually called a verge). [1] In snowboard cross, a berm is a wall of snow built up in a corner. In mountain biking, a berm is a banked turn formed by soil, commonly dug from the track, being deposited on the outer rim of the turn. In coastal systems, a berm is a raised ridge of pebbles or sand found at high tide or storm tide marks on a beach. In snow removal, a berm or windrow refers to the linear accumulation of snow cast aside by a plow. Earth berms are used above particle accelerator tunnels to provide shielding from radiation. In open-pit mining, a berm refers to dirt and rock piled alongside a haulage road or along the edge of a dump point. Intended as a safety measure, they are commonly required by government organizations to be at least half as tall as the wheels of the largest mining machine on-site. Physical security systems employ berms to exclude hostile vehicles and slow attackers on foot (similar to the military application without the trench). Security berms are common around military and nuclear facilities. An example is the berm proposed for Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant in Vermont. At Baylor Ballpark, a baseball stadium on the campus of Baylor University, a berm is constructed down the right field line. The berm replaces bleachers, and general admission tickets are sold for fans who wish to sit on the grass or watch the game from the top of the hill. Berms are also used as a method of environmental spill containment and liquid spill control. Bunding is the construction of a secondary impermeable barrier around and beneath storage or processing plant, sufficient to contain the plant's volume after a spill. This is often achieved on large sites by surrounding the plant with a berm. The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) requires that oils and fuels stored over certain volume levels be placed in secondary spill containment. Berms for spill containment are typically manufactured from polyvinyl chloride (PVC) or geomembrane fabric that provide a barrier to keep spills from reaching the ground or navigable waterways. Most berms have sidewalls to keep liquids contained for future capture and safe disposal. See also: Road verge Earthworks (engineering) Bund Moroccan Wall Marches Limes (Roman Empire) Long acre Flood-meadow Floodplain References: External links: Media related to Berms at Wikimedia Commons

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Biological warfare

Overview: A biological attack could conceivably result in large numbers of civilian casualties and cause severe disruption to economic and societal infrastructure. A nation or group that can pose a credible threat of mass casualty has the ability to alter the terms under which other nations or groups interact with it. When indexed to weapon mass and cost of development and storage, biological weapons possess destructive potential and loss of life far in excess of nuclear, chemical or conventional weapons. Accordingly, biological agents are potentially useful as strategic deterrents, in addition to their utility as offensive weapons on the battlefield. As a tactical weapon for military use, a significant problem with biological warfare is that it would take days to be effective, and therefore might not immediately stop an opposing force. Some biological agents (smallpox, pneumonic plague) have the capability of person-to-person transmission via aerosolized respiratory droplets. This feature can be undesirable, as the agent(s) may be transmitted by this mechanism to unintended populations, including neutral or even friendly forces. Worse still, such a weapon could "escape" the laboratory where it was developed, even if there was no intent to use it – for example by infecting a researcher who then transmits it to the outside world before realizing that they were infected. Several cases are known of researchers becoming infected and dying of Ebola, which they had been working with in the lab (though nobody else was infected in those cases) – while there is no evidence that their work was directed towards biological warfare, it demonstrates the potential for accidental infection even of careful researchers fully aware of the dangers. While containment of biological warfare is less of a concern for certain criminal or terrorist organizations, it remains a significant concern for the military and civilian populations of virtually all nations. History: Antiquity and Middle Ages: Rudimentary forms of biological warfare have been practiced since antiquity. The earliest documented incident of the intention to use biological weapons is recorded in Hittite texts of 1500–1200 BCE, in which victims of an unknown plague (possibly tularemia) were driven into enemy lands, causing an epidemic. The Assyrians poisoned enemy wells with the fungus ergot, though with unknown results. Scythian archers dipped their arrows and Roman soldiers their swords into excrements and cadavers – victims were commonly infected by tetanus as result. In 1346, the bodies of Mongol warriors of the Golden Horde who had died of plague were thrown over the walls of the besieged Crimean city of Kaffa. Specialists disagree about whether this operation was responsible for the spread of the Black Death into Europe, Near East and North Africa, resulting in the deaths of approximately 25 million Europeans. Biological agents were extensively used in many parts of Africa from the sixteenth century AD, most of the time in the form of poisoned arrows, or powder spread on the war front as well as poisoning of horses and water supply of the enemy forces. In Borgu, there were specific mixtures to kill, hypnotize, make the enemy bold, and to act as an antidote against the poison of the enemy as well. The creation of biologicals was reserved for a specific and professional class of medicine-men. 18th to 19th century: During the French and Indian War, in June 1763 a group of Native Americans laid siege to British-held Fort Pitt. The commander of Fort Pitt, Simeon Ecuyer, ordered his men to take smallpox-infested blankets from the infirmary and give it to a Lenape delegation during the siege. A reported outbreak that began the spring before left as many as one hundred Native Americans dead in Ohio Country from 1763 to 1764. It is not clear whether the smallpox was a result of the Fort Pitt incident or the virus was already present among the Delaware people as outbreaks happened on their own every dozen or so years and the delegates were met again later and seemingly had not contracted smallpox. During the American Revolutionary War, Continental Army officer George Washington mentioned to the Continental Congress that he had heard a rumor from a sailor that his opponent during the Siege of Boston, General William Howe, had deliberately sent civilians out of the city in the hopes of spreading the ongoing smallpox epidemic to American lines; Washington, remaining unconvinced, wrote that he "could hardly give credit to" the claim. Washington had already inoculated his soldiers, diminishing the effect of the epidemic. Some historians have claimed that a detachment of the Corps of Royal Marines stationed in New South Wales, Australia, deliberately used smallpox there in 1789. Dr Seth Carus states: "Ultimately, we have a strong circumstantial case supporting the theory that someone deliberately introduced smallpox in the Aboriginal population." World War I: By 1900 the germ theory and advances in bacteriology brought a new level of sophistication to the techniques for possible use of bio-agents in war. Biological sabotage in the form of anthrax and glanders was undertaken on behalf of the Imperial German government during World War I (1914–1918), with indifferent results. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibited the first use of chemical and biological weapons against enemy nationals in international armed conflicts. World War II: With the onset of World War II, the Ministry of Supply in the United Kingdom established a biological warfare program at Porton Down, headed by the microbiologist Paul Fildes. The research was championed by Winston Churchill and soon tularemia, anthrax, brucellosis, and botulism toxins had been effectively weaponized. In particular, Gruinard Island in Scotland, was contaminated with anthrax during a series of extensive tests for the next 56 years. Although the UK never offensively used the biological weapons it developed, its program was the first to successfully weaponize a variety of deadly pathogens and bring them into industrial production. Other nations, notably France and Japan, had begun their own biological weapons programs. When the United States entered the war, Allied resources were pooled at the request of the British. The U.S. then established a large research program and industrial complex at Fort Detrick, Maryland, in 1942 under the direction of George W. Merck. The biological and chemical weapons developed during that period were tested at the Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah. Soon there were facilities for the mass production of anthrax spores, brucellosis, and botulism toxins, although the war was over before these weapons could be of much operational use. The most notorious program of the period was run by the secret Imperial Japanese Army Unit 731 during the war, based at Pingfan in Manchuria and commanded by Lieutenant General Shirō Ishii. This biological warfare research unit conducted often fatal human experiments on prisoners, and produced biological weapons for combat use. Although the Japanese effort lacked the technological sophistication of the American or British programs, it far outstripped them in its widespread application and indiscriminate brutality. Biological weapons were used against Chinese soldiers and civilians in several military campaigns. In 1940, the Japanese Army Air Force bombed Ningbo with ceramic bombs full of fleas carrying the bubonic plague. Many of these operations were ineffective due to inefficient delivery systems, although up to 400,000 people may have died. During the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign in 1942, around 1,700 Japanese troops died out of a total 10,000 Japanese soldiers who fell ill with disease when their own biological weapons attack rebounded on their own forces. During the final months of World War II, Japan planned to use plague as a biological weapon against U.S. civilians in San Diego, California, during Operation Cherry Blossoms at Night. The plan was set to launch on 22 September 1945, but it was not executed because of Japan's surrender on 15 August 1945. Cold War: In Britain, the 1950s saw the weaponization of plague, brucellosis, tularemia and later equine encephalomyelitis and vaccinia viruses, but the programme was unilaterally cancelled in 1956. The United States Army Biological Warfare Laboratories weaponized anthrax, tularemia, brucellosis, Q-fever and others. In 1969, US President Richard Nixon decided to unilaterally terminate the offensive biological weapons program of the US, allowing only scientific research for defensive measures. This decision increased the momentum of the negotiations for a ban on biological warfare, which took place from 1969 to 1972 in the United Nation's Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. These negotiations resulted in the Biological Weapons Convention, which was opened for signature on 10 April 1972 and entered into force on 26 March 1975 after its ratification by 22 states. Despite being a party and depositary to the BWC, the Soviet Union continued and expanded its massive offensive biological weapons program, under the leadership of the allegedly civilian institution Biopreparat. The Soviet Union attracted international suspicion after the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax leak killed approximately 65 to 100 people. 1948 Arab–Israeli War: According to historians Benny Morris and Benjamin Kedar, Israel conducted a biological warfare operation codenamed "Cast Thy Bread" during the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. The Haganah initially used typhoid bacteria to contaminate water wells in newly cleared Arab villages to prevent the population including militiamen from returning. Later, the biological warfare campaign expanded to include Jewish settlements that were in imminent danger of being captured by Arab troops and inhabited Arab towns not slated for capture.

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Biological warfare

Despite being a party and depositary to the BWC, the Soviet Union continued and expanded its massive offensive biological weapons program, under the leadership of the allegedly civilian institution Biopreparat. The Soviet Union attracted international suspicion after the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax leak killed approximately 65 to 100 people. 1948 Arab–Israeli War: According to historians Benny Morris and Benjamin Kedar, Israel conducted a biological warfare operation codenamed "Cast Thy Bread" during the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. The Haganah initially used typhoid bacteria to contaminate water wells in newly cleared Arab villages to prevent the population including militiamen from returning. Later, the biological warfare campaign expanded to include Jewish settlements that were in imminent danger of being captured by Arab troops and inhabited Arab towns not slated for capture. There was also plans to expand the biological warfare campaign into other Arab states including Egypt, Lebanon and Syria, but they were not carried out. International law: International restrictions on biological warfare began with the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use but not the possession or development of biological and chemical weapons in international armed conflicts. Upon ratification of the Geneva Protocol, several countries made reservations regarding its applicability and use in retaliation. Due to these reservations, it was in practice a "no-first-use" agreement only. The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) supplements the Geneva Protocol by prohibiting the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of biological weapons. Having entered into force on 26 March 1975, the BWC was the first multilateral disarmament treaty to ban the production of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. As of March 2021, 183 states have become party to the treaty. The BWC is considered to have established a strong global norm against biological weapons, which is reflected in the treaty's preamble, stating that the use of biological weapons would be "repugnant to the conscience of mankind". The BWC's effectiveness has been limited due to insufficient institutional support and the absence of any formal verification regime to monitor compliance. In 1985, the Australia Group was established, a multilateral export control regime of 43 countries aiming to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. In 2004, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1540, which obligates all UN Member States to develop and enforce appropriate legal and regulatory measures against the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, in particular, to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors. Bioterrorism: Biological weapons are difficult to detect, economical and easy to use, making them appealing to terrorists. The cost of a biological weapon is estimated to be about 0.05 percent the cost of a conventional weapon in order to produce similar numbers of mass casualties per kilometer square. Moreover, their production is very easy as common technology can be used to produce biological warfare agents, like that used in production of vaccines, foods, spray devices, beverages and antibiotics. A major factor in biological warfare that attracts terrorists is that they can easily escape before the government agencies or secret agencies have even started their investigation. This is because the potential organism has an incubation period of 3 to 7 days, after which the results begin to appear, thereby giving terrorists a lead. A technique called Clustered, Regularly Interspaced, Short Palindromic Repeat (CRISPR-Cas9) is now so cheap and widely available that scientists fear that amateurs will start experimenting with them. In this technique, a DNA sequence is cut off and replaced with a new sequence, e.g. one that codes for a particular protein, with the intent of modifying an organism's traits. Concerns have emerged regarding do-it-yourself biology research organizations due to their associated risk that a rogue amateur DIY researcher could attempt to develop dangerous bioweapons using genome editing technology. In 2002, when CNN went through Al-Qaeda's (AQ's) experiments with crude poisons, they found out that AQ had begun planning ricin and cyanide attacks with the help of a loose association of terrorist cells. The associates had infiltrated many countries like Turkey, Italy, Spain, France and others. In 2015, to combat the threat of bioterrorism, a National Blueprint for Biodefense was issued by the Blue-Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense. Also, 233 potential exposures of select biological agents outside of the primary barriers of the biocontainment in the US were described by the annual report of the Federal Select Agent Program. Though a verification system can reduce bioterrorism, an employee, or a lone terrorist having adequate knowledge of a bio-technology company's facilities, can cause potential danger by utilizing, without proper oversight and supervision, that company's resources. Moreover, it has been found that about 95% of accidents that have occurred due to low security have been done by employees or those who had a security clearance. Entomology: Entomological warfare (EW) is a type of biological warfare that uses insects to attack the enemy. The concept has existed for centuries and research and development have continued into the modern era. EW has been used in battle by Japan and several other nations have developed and been accused of using an entomological warfare program. EW may employ insects in a direct attack or as vectors to deliver a biological agent, such as plague. Essentially, EW exists in three varieties. One type of EW involves infecting insects with a pathogen and then dispersing the insects over target areas. The insects then act as a vector, infecting any person or animal they might bite. Another type of EW is a direct insect attack against crops; the insect may not be infected with any pathogen but instead represents a threat to agriculture. The final method uses uninfected insects, such as bees or wasps, to directly attack the enemy. Genetics: Theoretically, novel approaches in biotechnology, such as synthetic biology could be used in the future to design novel types of biological warfare agents. Would demonstrate how to render a vaccine ineffective; Would confer resistance to therapeutically useful antibiotics or antiviral agents; Would enhance the virulence of a pathogen or render a nonpathogen virulent; Would increase the transmissibility of a pathogen; Would alter the host range of a pathogen; Would enable the evasion of diagnostic/detection tools; Would enable the weaponization of a biological agent or toxin. Most of the biosecurity concerns in synthetic biology are focused on the role of DNA synthesis and the risk of producing genetic material of lethal viruses (e.g. 1918 Spanish flu, polio) in the lab. Recently, the CRISPR/Cas system has emerged as a promising technique for gene editing. It was hailed by The Washington Post as "the most important innovation in the synthetic biology space in nearly 30 years." While other methods take months or years to edit gene sequences, CRISPR speeds that time up to weeks. Due to its ease of use and accessibility, it has raised a number of ethical concerns, especially surrounding its use in the biohacking space. By target: Anti-personnel: Ideal characteristics of a biological agent to be used as a weapon against humans are high infectivity, high virulence, non-availability of vaccines and availability of an effective and efficient delivery system. Stability of the weaponized agent (the ability of the agent to retain its infectivity and virulence after a prolonged period of storage) may also be desirable, particularly for military applications, and the ease of creating one is often considered. Control of the spread of the agent may be another desired characteristic. The primary difficulty is not the production of the biological agent, as many biological agents used in weapons can be manufactured relatively quickly, cheaply and easily. Rather, it is the weaponization, storage, and delivery in an effective vehicle to a vulnerable target that pose significant problems. For example, Bacillus anthracis is considered an effective agent for several reasons. First, it forms hardy spores, perfect for dispersal aerosols. Second, this organism is not considered transmissible from person to person, and thus rarely if ever causes secondary infections. A pulmonary anthrax infection starts with ordinary influenza-like symptoms and progresses to a lethal hemorrhagic mediastinitis within 3–7 days, with a fatality rate that is 90% or higher in untreated patients. Finally, friendly personnel and civilians can be protected with suitable antibiotics. Agents considered for weaponization, or known to be weaponized, include bacteria such as Bacillus anthracis, Brucella spp., Burkholderia mallei, Burkholderia pseudomallei, Chlamydophila psittaci, Coxiella burnetii, Francisella tularensis, some of the Rickettsiaceae (especially Rickettsia prowazekii and Rickettsia rickettsii), Shigella spp., Vibrio cholerae, and Yersinia pestis. Many viral agents have been studied and/or weaponized, including some of the Bunyaviridae (especially Rift Valley fever virus), Ebolavirus, many of the Flaviviridae (especially Japanese encephalitis virus), Machupo virus, Coronaviruses, Marburg virus, Variola virus, and yellow fever virus. Fungal agents that have been studied include Coccidioides spp. Toxins that can be used as weapons include ricin, staphylococcal enterotoxin B, botulinum toxin, saxitoxin, and many mycotoxins.

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Biological warfare

Many viral agents have been studied and/or weaponized, including some of the Bunyaviridae (especially Rift Valley fever virus), Ebolavirus, many of the Flaviviridae (especially Japanese encephalitis virus), Machupo virus, Coronaviruses, Marburg virus, Variola virus, and yellow fever virus. Fungal agents that have been studied include Coccidioides spp. Toxins that can be used as weapons include ricin, staphylococcal enterotoxin B, botulinum toxin, saxitoxin, and many mycotoxins. These toxins and the organisms that produce them are sometimes referred to as select agents. In the United States, their possession, use, and transfer are regulated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Select Agent Program. The former US biological warfare program categorized its weaponized anti-personnel bio-agents as either Lethal Agents (Bacillus anthracis, Francisella tularensis, Botulinum toxin) or Incapacitating Agents (Brucella suis, Coxiella burnetii, Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus, Staphylococcal enterotoxin B). Anti-agriculture: Anti-crop/anti-vegetation/anti-fisheries: The United States developed an anti-crop capability during the Cold War that used plant diseases (bioherbicides, or mycoherbicides) for destroying enemy agriculture. Biological weapons also target fisheries as well as water-based vegetation. It was believed that the destruction of enemy agriculture on a strategic scale could thwart Sino-Soviet aggression in a general war. Diseases such as wheat blast and rice blast were weaponized in aerial spray tanks and cluster bombs for delivery to enemy watersheds in agricultural regions to initiate epiphytotic (epidemics among plants). On the other hand, some sources report that these agents were stockpiled but never weaponized. When the United States renounced its offensive biological warfare program in 1969 and 1970, the vast majority of its biological arsenal was composed of these plant diseases. Enterotoxins and Mycotoxins were not affected by Nixon's order. Though herbicides are chemicals, they are often grouped with biological warfare and chemical warfare because they may work in a similar manner as biotoxins or bioregulators. The Army Biological Laboratory tested each agent and the Army's Technical Escort Unit was responsible for the transport of all chemical, biological, radiological (nuclear) materials. Biological warfare can also specifically target plants to destroy crops or defoliate vegetation. The United States and Britain discovered plant growth regulators (i.e., herbicides) during the Second World War, which were then used by the UK in the counterinsurgency operations of the Malayan Emergency. Inspired by the use in Malaysia, the US military effort in the Vietnam War included a mass dispersal of a variety of herbicides, famously Agent Orange, with the aim of destroying farmland and defoliating forests used as cover by the Viet Cong. Sri Lanka deployed military defoliants in its prosecution of the Eelam War against Tamil insurgents. Anti-livestock: During World War I, German saboteurs used anthrax and glanders to sicken cavalry horses in U.S. and France, sheep in Romania, and livestock in Argentina intended for the Entente forces. One of these German saboteurs was Anton Dilger. Also, Germany itself became a victim of similar attacks – horses bound for Germany were infected with Burkholderia by French operatives in Switzerland. During World War II, the U.S. and Canada secretly investigated the use of rinderpest, a highly lethal disease of cattle, as a bioweapon. In the 1980s Soviet Ministry of Agriculture had successfully developed variants of foot-and-mouth disease, and rinderpest against cows, African swine fever for pigs, and psittacosis to kill the chicken. These agents were prepared to spray them down from tanks attached to airplanes over hundreds of miles. The secret program was code-named "Ecology". During the Mau Mau Uprising in 1952, the poisonous latex of the African milk bush was used to kill cattle. Defensive operations: Medical countermeasures: In 2010 at The Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction in Geneva the sanitary epidemiological reconnaissance was suggested as well-tested means for enhancing the monitoring of infections and parasitic agents, for the practical implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005). The aim was to prevent and minimize the consequences of natural outbreaks of dangerous infectious diseases as well as the threat of alleged use of biological weapons against BTWC States Parties. Many countries require their active-duty military personnel to get vaccinated for certain diseases that may potentially be used as a bioweapon such as anthrax, smallpox, and various other vaccines depending on the Area of Operations of the individual military units and commands. Public health and disease surveillance: Most classical and modern biological weapons' pathogens can be obtained from a plant or an animal which is naturally infected. In the largest biological weapons accident known—the anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg) in the Soviet Union in 1979—sheep became ill with anthrax as far as 200 kilometers from the release point of the organism from a military facility in the southeastern portion of the city and still off-limits to visitors today, (see Sverdlovsk Anthrax leak). Thus, a robust surveillance system involving human clinicians and veterinarians may identify a bioweapons attack early in the course of an epidemic, permitting the prophylaxis of disease in the vast majority of people (and/or animals) exposed but not yet ill. For example, in the case of anthrax, it is likely that by 24–36 hours after an attack, some small percentage of individuals (those with the compromised immune system or who had received a large dose of the organism due to proximity to the release point) will become ill with classical symptoms and signs (including a virtually unique chest X-ray finding, often recognized by public health officials if they receive timely reports). The incubation period for humans is estimated to be about 11.8 days to 12.1 days. This suggested period is the first model that is independently consistent with data from the largest known human outbreak. These projections refine previous estimates of the distribution of early-onset cases after a release and support a recommended 60-day course of prophylactic antibiotic treatment for individuals exposed to low doses of anthrax. By making these data available to local public health officials in real time, most models of anthrax epidemics indicate that more than 80% of an exposed population can receive antibiotic treatment before becoming symptomatic, and thus avoid the moderately high mortality of the disease. Common epidemiological warnings: From most specific to least specific: Single cause of a certain disease caused by an uncommon agent, with lack of an epidemiological explanation. Unusual, rare, genetically engineered strain of an agent. High morbidity and mortality rates in regards to patients with the same or similar symptoms. Unusual presentation of the disease. Unusual geographic or seasonal distribution. Stable endemic disease, but with an unexplained increase in relevance. Rare transmission (aerosols, food, water). No illness presented in people who were/are not exposed to "common ventilation systems (have separate closed ventilation systems) when illness is seen in persons in close proximity who have a common ventilation system." Different and unexplained diseases coexisting in the same patient without any other explanation. Rare illness that affects a large, disparate population (respiratory disease might suggest the pathogen or agent was inhaled). Illness is unusual for a certain population or age-group in which it takes presence. Unusual trends of death and/or illness in animal populations, previous to or accompanying illness in humans. Many affected reaching out for treatment at the same time. Similar genetic makeup of agents in affected individuals. Simultaneous collections of similar illness in non-contiguous areas, domestic, or foreign. An abundance of cases of unexplained diseases and deaths. Bioweapon identification: The goal of biodefense is to integrate the sustained efforts of the national and homeland security, medical, public health, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement communities. Health care providers and public health officers are among the first lines of defense. In some countries private, local, and provincial (state) capabilities are being augmented by and coordinated with federal assets, to provide layered defenses against biological weapon attacks. During the first Gulf War the United Nations activated a biological and chemical response team, Task Force Scorpio, to respond to any potential use of weapons of mass destruction on civilians. The traditional approach toward protecting agriculture, food, and water: focusing on the natural or unintentional introduction of a disease is being strengthened by focused efforts to address current and anticipated future biological weapons threats that may be deliberate, multiple, and repetitive. The growing threat of biowarfare agents and bioterrorism has led to the development of specific field tools that perform on-the-spot analysis and identification of encountered suspect materials. One such technology, being developed by researchers from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), employs a "sandwich immunoassay", in which fluorescent dye-labeled antibodies aimed at specific pathogens are attached to silver and gold nanowires. In the Netherlands, the company TNO has designed Bioaerosol Single Particle Recognition eQuipment (BiosparQ). This system would be implemented into the national response plan for bioweapon attacks in the Netherlands.

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Biological warfare

The traditional approach toward protecting agriculture, food, and water: focusing on the natural or unintentional introduction of a disease is being strengthened by focused efforts to address current and anticipated future biological weapons threats that may be deliberate, multiple, and repetitive. The growing threat of biowarfare agents and bioterrorism has led to the development of specific field tools that perform on-the-spot analysis and identification of encountered suspect materials. One such technology, being developed by researchers from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), employs a "sandwich immunoassay", in which fluorescent dye-labeled antibodies aimed at specific pathogens are attached to silver and gold nanowires. In the Netherlands, the company TNO has designed Bioaerosol Single Particle Recognition eQuipment (BiosparQ). This system would be implemented into the national response plan for bioweapon attacks in the Netherlands. Researchers at Ben Gurion University in Israel are developing a different device called the BioPen, essentially a "Lab-in-a-Pen", which can detect known biological agents in under 20 minutes using an adaptation of the ELISA, a similar widely employed immunological technique, that in this case incorporates fiber optics. List of programs, projects and sites by country: United States: Fort Detrick, Maryland U.S. Army Biological Warfare Laboratories (1943–69) Building 470 One-Million-Liter Test Sphere Operation Sea-Spray Operation Whitecoat (1954–73) U.S. entomological warfare program Operation Big Itch Operation Big Buzz Operation Drop Kick Operation May Day Project Bacchus Project Clear Vision Project SHAD Project 112 Horn Island Testing Station Fort Terry Granite Peak Installation Vigo Ordnance Plant United Kingdom: Porton Down Gruinard Island Nancekuke Operation Vegetarian (1942–1944) Open-air field tests: Operation Harness off Antigua, 1948–1950. Operation Cauldron off Stornoway, 1952. Operation Hesperus off Stornoway, 1953. Operation Ozone off Nassau, 1954. Operation Negation off Nassau, 1954–5. Soviet Union and Russia: Biopreparat (18 labs and production centers) Stepnogorsk Scientific and Technical Institute for Microbiology, Stepnogorsk, northern Kazakhstan Institute of Ultra Pure Biochemical Preparations, Leningrad, a weaponized plague center Vector State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology (VECTOR), a weaponized smallpox center Institute of Applied Biochemistry, Omutninsk Kirov bioweapons production facility, Kirov, Kirov Oblast Zagorsk smallpox production facility, Zagorsk Berdsk bioweapons production facility, Berdsk Bioweapons research facility, Obolensk Sverdlovsk bioweapons production facility (Military Compound 19), Sverdlovsk, a weaponized anthrax center Institute of Virus Preparations Poison laboratory of the Soviet secret services Vozrozhdeniya Project Bonfire Project Factor Japan: Unit 731 Zhongma Fortress Kaimingjie germ weapon attack Khabarovsk War Crime Trials Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department Iraq: Al Hakum Salman Pak facility Al Manal facility South Africa: Project Coast Delta G Scientific Company Roodeplaat Research Laboratories Protechnik Rhodesia: Canada: Grosse Isle, Quebec, site (1939–45) of research into anthrax and other agents DRDC Suffield, Suffield, Alberta List of associated people: Bioweaponeers: Includes scientists and administrators Writers and activists: In popular culture: See also: References: Further reading: External links: Biological weapons and international humanitarian law Archived 11 August 2010 at the Wayback Machine, ICRC WHO: Health Aspects of Biological and Chemical Weapons "Biological Warfare". National Library of Medicine. Archived from the original on 26 April 2017. Retrieved 28 May 2013. USAMRIID (Archived 5 June 2016 at the Wayback Machine)—U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases

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Blitzkrieg

Definition: Common interpretation: The traditional meaning of "blitzkrieg" is that of German tactical and operational methodology during the first half of the Second World War that is often hailed as a new method of warfare. The word, meaning "lightning war" or "lightning attack" in its strategic sense describes a series of quick and decisive short battles to deliver a knockout blow to an enemy state before it can fully mobilize. Tactically, blitzkrieg is a coordinated military effort by tanks, motorized infantry, artillery and aircraft, to create an overwhelming local superiority in combat power, to defeat the opponent and break through its defences. Blitzkrieg as used by Germany had considerable psychological or "terror" elements, such as the Jericho Trompete, a noise-making siren on the Junkers Ju 87 dive bomber, to affect the morale of enemy forces. The devices were largely removed when the enemy became used to the noise after the Battle of France in 1940, and instead, bombs sometimes had whistles attached. It is also common for historians and writers to include psychological warfare by using fifth columnists to spread rumours and lies among the civilian population in the theatre of operations. Origin of term: The origin of the term blitzkrieg is obscure. It was never used in the title of a military doctrine or handbook of the German Army or Air Force, and no "coherent doctrine" or "unifying concept of blitzkrieg" existed; German High Command mostly referred to the group of tactics as "Bewegungskrieg" (Maneuver Warfare). The term seems to have been rarely used in the German military press before 1939, and recent research at the German Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, at Potsdam, found it in only two military articles from the 1930s. Both used the term to mean a swift strategic knockout, rather than a radically new military doctrine or approach to war. The first article (1935) dealt primarily with supplies of food and materiel in wartime. The term blitzkrieg was used in reference to German efforts to win a quick victory in the First World War but was not associated with the use of armored, mechanized or air forces. It argued that Germany must develop self-sufficiency in food because it might again prove impossible to deal a swift knockout to its enemies, which would lead to a long war. In the second article (1938), launching a swift strategic knockout was described as an attractive idea for Germany but difficult to achieve on land under modern conditions (especially against systems of fortification like the Maginot Line) unless an exceptionally high degree of surprise could be achieved. The author vaguely suggested that a massive strategic air attack might hold out better prospects, but the topic was not explored in detail. A third relatively early use of the term in German occurred in Die Deutsche Kriegsstärke (German War Strength) by Fritz Sternberg, a Jewish Marxist political economist and refugee from Nazi Germany, published in 1938 in Paris and in London as Germany and a Lightning War. Sternberg wrote that Germany was not prepared economically for a long war but might win a quick war ("Blitzkrieg"). He did not go into detail about tactics or suggest that the German armed forces had evolved a radically new operational method. His book offered scant clues as to how German lightning victories might be won. In English and other languages, the term had been used since the 1920s. The term was first used in the publications of Ferdinand Otto Miksche, first in the magazine "Army Quarterly", and in his 1941 book Blitzkrieg, in which he defined the concept. In September 1939, Time magazine termed the German military action as a "war of quick penetration and obliteration – Blitzkrieg, lightning war". After the invasion of Poland, the British press commonly used the term to describe German successes in that campaign. J. P. Harris called the term "a piece of journalistic sensationalism – a buzz-word with which to label the spectacular early successes of the Germans in the Second World War". The word was later applied to the bombing of Britain, particularly London, hence "The Blitz". The German popular press followed suit nine months later, after the Fall of France in 1940; thus, although the word had first been used in Germany, it was popularized by British journalism. Heinz Guderian referred to it as a word coined by the Allies: "as a result of the successes of our rapid campaigns our enemies ... coined the word Blitzkrieg". After the German failure in the Soviet Union in 1941, the use of the term began to be frowned upon in Nazi Germany, and Hitler then denied ever using the term and said in a speech in November 1941, "I have never used the word Blitzkrieg, because it is a very silly word". In early January 1942, Hitler dismissed it as "Italian phraseology". Military evolution, 1919–1939: Germany: In 1914, German strategic thinking derived from the writings of Carl von Clausewitz (1 June 1780 – 16 November 1831), Helmuth von Moltke the Elder (26 October 1800 – 24 April 1891) and Alfred von Schlieffen (28 February 1833 – 4 January 1913), who advocated maneuver, mass and envelopment to create the conditions for a decisive battle (Vernichtungsschlacht). During the war, officers such as Willy Rohr developed tactics to restore maneuver on the battlefield. Specialist light infantry (Stosstruppen, "storm troops") were to exploit weak spots to make gaps for larger infantry units to advance with heavier weapons, exploit the success and leave isolated strong points to the troops that were following up. Infiltration tactics were combined with short hurricane artillery bombardments, which used massed artillery. Devised by Colonel Georg Bruchmüller, the attacks relied on speed and surprise, rather than on weight of numbers. The tactics met with great success in Operation Michael, the German spring offensive of 1918 and restored temporarily the war of movement once the Allied trench system had been overrun. The German armies pushed on towards Amiens and then Paris and came within 120 kilometres (75 mi) before supply deficiencies and Allied reinforcements halted the advance. The historian James Corum criticised the German leadership for failing to understand the technical advances of the First World War, conducting no studies of the machine gun prior to the war and giving tank production the lowest priority during the war. After Germany's defeat, the Treaty of Versailles limited the Reichswehr to a maximum of 100,000 men, which prevented the deployment of mass armies. The German General Staff was abolished by the treaty but continued covertly as the Truppenamt (Troop Office) and was disguised as an administrative body. Committees of veteran staff officers were formed within the Truppenamt to evaluate 57 issues of the war to revise German operational theories. By the time of the Second World War, their reports had led to doctrinal and training publications, including H. Dv. 487, Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen ("Command and Battle of the Combined Arms)", known as Das Fug (1921–1923) and Truppenführung (1933–1934), containing standard procedures for combined-arms warfare. The Reichswehr was influenced by its analysis of pre-war German military thought, particularly infiltration tactics since at the end of the war, they had seen some breakthroughs on the Western Front and the maneuver warfare which dominated the Eastern Front. On the Eastern Front, the war did not bog down into trench warfare since the German and the Russian Armies fought a war of maneuver over thousands of miles, which gave the German leadership unique experience that was unavailable to the trench-bound Western Allies. Studies of operations in the East led to the conclusion that small and coordinated forces possessed more combat power than large uncoordinated forces. After the war, the Reichswehr expanded and improved infiltration tactics. The commander in chief, Hans von Seeckt, argued that there had been an excessive focus on encirclement and emphasised speed instead. Seeckt inspired a revision of Bewegungskrieg (maneuver warfare) thinking and its associated Auftragstaktik in which the commander expressed his goals to subordinates and gave them discretion in how to achieve them. The governing principle was "the higher the authority, the more general the orders were"; it was the responsibility of the lower echelons to fill in the details. Implementation of higher orders remained within limits that were determined by the training doctrine of an elite officer corps. Delegation of authority to local commanders increased the tempo of operations, which had great influence on the success of German armies in the early war period. Seeckt, who believed in the Prussian tradition of mobility, developed the German army into a mobile force and advocated technical advances that would lead to a qualitative improvement of its forces and better coordination between motorized infantry, tanks, and planes. Britain: The British Army took lessons from the successful infantry and artillery offensives on the Western Front in late 1918. To obtain the best co-operation between all arms, emphasis was placed on detailed planning, rigid control and adherence to orders. Mechanization of the army, as part of a combined-arms theory of war, was considered a means to avoid mass casualties and the indecisive nature of offensives.

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Implementation of higher orders remained within limits that were determined by the training doctrine of an elite officer corps. Delegation of authority to local commanders increased the tempo of operations, which had great influence on the success of German armies in the early war period. Seeckt, who believed in the Prussian tradition of mobility, developed the German army into a mobile force and advocated technical advances that would lead to a qualitative improvement of its forces and better coordination between motorized infantry, tanks, and planes. Britain: The British Army took lessons from the successful infantry and artillery offensives on the Western Front in late 1918. To obtain the best co-operation between all arms, emphasis was placed on detailed planning, rigid control and adherence to orders. Mechanization of the army, as part of a combined-arms theory of war, was considered a means to avoid mass casualties and the indecisive nature of offensives. The four editions of Field Service Regulations that were published after 1918 held that only combined-arms operations could create enough fire power to enable mobility on a battlefield. That theory of war also emphasised consolidation and recommended caution against overconfidence and ruthless exploitation. During the Sinai and Palestine campaign, operations involved some aspects of what would later be called blitzkrieg. The decisive Battle of Megiddo included concentration, surprise and speed. Success depended on attacking only in terrain favouring the movement of large formations around the battlefield and tactical improvements in the British artillery and infantry attack. General Edmund Allenby used infantry to attack the strong Ottoman front line in co-operation with supporting artillery, augmented by the guns of two destroyers. Through constant pressure by infantry and cavalry, two Ottoman armies in the Judean Hills were kept off-balance and virtually encircled during the Battles of Sharon and Nablus (Battle of Megiddo). The British methods induced "strategic paralysis" among the Ottomans and led to their rapid and complete collapse. In an advance of 65 miles (105 km), captures were estimated to be "at least 25,000 prisoners and 260 guns". Liddell Hart considered that important aspects of the operation had been the extent to which Ottoman commanders were denied intelligence on the British preparations for the attack through British air superiority and air attacks on their headquarters and telephone exchanges, which paralyzed attempts to react to the rapidly-deteriorating situation. France: Norman Stone detects early blitzkrieg operations in offensives by French Generals Charles Mangin and Marie-Eugène Debeney in 1918. However, French doctrine in the interwar years became defence-oriented. Colonel Charles de Gaulle advocated concentration of armor and airplanes. His opinions appeared in his 1934 book Vers l'Armée de métier ("Towards the Professional Army"). Like von Seeckt, de Gaulle concluded that France could no longer maintain the huge armies of conscripts and reservists that had fought the First World War, and he sought to use tanks, mechanized forces and aircraft to allow a smaller number of highly trained soldiers to have greater impact in battle. His views endeared him little to the French high command, but, according to historian Henrik Bering, were studied with great interest by Heinz Guderian. Russia and Soviet Union: In 1916, General Alexei Brusilov had used surprise and infiltration tactics during the Brusilov Offensive. Later, Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky (1893–1937), Georgii Isserson (1898–1976) and other members of the Red Army developed a concept of deep battle from the experience of the Polish–Soviet War of 1919–1920. Those concepts would guide the Red Army doctrine throughout the Second World War. Realising the limitations of infantry and cavalry, Tukhachevsky advocated mechanized formations and the large-scale industrialisation that they required. Robert Watt (2008) wrote that blitzkrieg has little in common with Soviet deep battle. In 2002, H. P. Willmott had noted that deep battle contained two important differences from blitzkrieg by being a doctrine of total war, not of limited operations, and rejecting decisive battle in favour of several large simultaneous offensives. The Reichswehr and the Red Army began a secret collaboration in the Soviet Union to evade the Treaty of Versailles occupational agent, the Inter-Allied Commission. In 1926 war games and tests began at Kazan and Lipetsk, in the Soviet Russia. The centers served to field-test aircraft and armored vehicles up to the battalion level and housed aerial- and armoured-warfare schools through which officers rotated. Nazi Germany: After becoming Chancellor of Germany in 1933, Adolf Hitler ignored the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. Within the Wehrmacht, which was established in 1935, the command for motorized armored forces was named the Panzerwaffe in 1936. The Luftwaffe, the German air force, was officially established in February 1935, and development began on ground-attack aircraft and doctrines. Hitler strongly supported the new strategy. He read Guderian's 1937 book Achtung – Panzer! and upon observing armored field exercises at Kummersdorf, he remarked, "That is what I want – and that is what I will have". Guderian: Guderian summarized combined-arms tactics as the way to get the mobile and motorized armored divisions to work together and support each other to achieve decisive success. In his 1950 book, Panzer Leader, he wrote: In this year, 1929, I became convinced that tanks working on their own or in conjunction with infantry could never achieve decisive importance. My historical studies, the exercises carried out in England and our own experience with mock-ups had persuaded me that the tanks would never be able to produce their full effect until the other weapons on whose support they must inevitably rely were brought up to their standard of speed and of cross-country performance. In such formation of all arms, the tanks must play primary role, the other weapons being subordinated to the requirements of the armor. It would be wrong to include tanks in infantry divisions; what was needed were armored divisions which would include all the supporting arms needed to allow the tanks to fight with full effect. Guderian believed that developments in technology were required to support the theory, especially by equipping armored divisions, tanks foremost, with wireless communications. Guderian insisted in 1933 to the high command that every tank in the German armored force must be equipped with a radio. At the start of World War II, only the German Army was thus prepared with all tanks being "radio-equipped". That proved critical in early tank battles in which German tank commanders exploited the organizational advantage over the Allies that radio communication gave them. All Allied armies would later copy that innovation. During the Polish campaign, the performance of armored troops, under the influence of Guderian's ideas, won over a number of skeptics who had initially expressed doubt about armored warfare, such as von Rundstedt and Rommel. Rommel: According to David A. Grossman, by the Twelfth Battle of Isonzo (October–November 1917), while he was conducting a light-infantry operation, Rommel had perfected his maneuver-warfare principles, which were the very same ones that were applied during the blitzkrieg against France in 1940 and were repeated in the Coalition ground offensive against Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War. During the Battle of France and against his staff advisor's advice, Hitler ordered that everything should be completed in a few weeks. Fortunately for the Germans, Rommel and Guderian disobeyed the General Staff's orders (particularly those of General Paul Ludwig Ewald von Kleist) and forged ahead making quicker progress than anyone had expected, on the way "inventing the idea of Blitzkrieg". It was Rommel who created the new archetype of Blitzkrieg by leading his division far ahead of flanking divisions. MacGregor and Williamson remark that Rommel's version of blitzkrieg displayed a significantly better understanding of combined-arms warfare than that of Guderian. General Hermann Hoth submitted an official report in July 1940 which declared that Rommel had "explored new paths in the command of Panzer divisions". Methods of operations: Schwerpunkt: Schwerpunktprinzip was a heuristic device (conceptual tool or thinking formula) that was used in the German Army from the nineteenth century to make decisions from tactics to strategy about priority. Schwerpunkt has been translated as center of gravity, crucial, focal point and point of main effort. None of those forms is sufficient to describe the universal importance of the term and the concept of Schwerpunktprinzip. Every unit in the army, from the company to the supreme command, decided on a Schwerpunkt by schwerpunktbildung, as did the support services, which meant that commanders always knew what was the most important and why. The German army was trained to support the Schwerpunkt even when risks had to be taken elsewhere to support the point of main effort and to attack with overwhelming firepower. Schwerpunktbildung allowed the German Army to achieve superiority at the Schwerpunkt, whether attacking or defending, to turn local success at the Schwerpunkt into the progressive disorganisation of the opposing force and to create more opportunities to exploit that advantage even if the Germans were numerically and strategically inferior in general. In the 1930s, Guderian summarized that as Klotzen, nicht kleckern! ("Kick, don't spatter them!")

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Every unit in the army, from the company to the supreme command, decided on a Schwerpunkt by schwerpunktbildung, as did the support services, which meant that commanders always knew what was the most important and why. The German army was trained to support the Schwerpunkt even when risks had to be taken elsewhere to support the point of main effort and to attack with overwhelming firepower. Schwerpunktbildung allowed the German Army to achieve superiority at the Schwerpunkt, whether attacking or defending, to turn local success at the Schwerpunkt into the progressive disorganisation of the opposing force and to create more opportunities to exploit that advantage even if the Germans were numerically and strategically inferior in general. In the 1930s, Guderian summarized that as Klotzen, nicht kleckern! ("Kick, don't spatter them!") Pursuit: Having achieved a breakthrough of the enemy's line, units comprising the Schwerpunkt were not supposed to become decisively engaged with enemy front line units to the right and the left of the breakthrough area. Units pouring through the hole were to drive upon set objectives behind the enemy front line. During the Second World War, German Panzer forces used their motorized mobility to paralyze the opponent's ability to react. Fast-moving mobile forces seized the initiative, exploited weaknesses and acted before the opposing forces could respond. Central to that was the decision cycle (tempo). Through superior mobility and faster decision-making cycles, mobile forces could act faster than the forces opposing them. Directive control was a fast and flexible method of command. Rather than receiving an explicit order, a commander would be told of his superior's intent and the role that his unit was to fill in that concept. The method of execution was then a matter for the discretion of the subordinate commander. The staff burden was reduced at the top and spread among tiers of command with knowledge about their situation. Delegation and the encouragement of initiative aided implementation, and important decisions could be taken quickly and communicated verbally or with only brief written orders. Mopping-up: The last part of an offensive operation was the destruction of unsubdued pockets of resistance, which had been enveloped earlier and bypassed by the fast-moving armored and motorized spearheads. The Kesselschlacht ("cauldron battle") was a concentric attack on such pockets. It was there that most losses were inflicted upon the enemy, primarily through the mass capture of prisoners and weapons. During Operation Barbarossa, huge encirclements in 1941 produced nearly 3.5 million Soviet prisoners, along with masses of equipment. Air power: Close air support was provided in the form of the dive bomber and medium bomber, which would support the focal point of attack from the air. German successes are closely related to the extent to which the German Luftwaffe could control the air war in early campaigns in Western and Central Europe and in the Soviet Union. However, the Luftwaffe was a broadly based force with no constricting central doctrine other than its resources should be used generally to support national strategy. It was flexible and could carry out both operational-tactical, and strategic bombing. Flexibility was the strength of the Luftwaffe in 1939 to 1941. Paradoxically, that became its weakness. While Allied Air Forces were tied to the support of the Army, the Luftwaffe deployed its resources in a more general operational way. It switched from air superiority missions to medium-range interdiction, to strategic strikes to close support duties, depending on the need of the ground forces. In fact, far from it being a specialist panzer spearhead arm, less than 15 percent of the Luftwaffe was intended for close support of the army in 1939. Stimulants: Methamphetamine, known as "pervitin," use is believed to have played a role in the speed of Germany's initial Blitzkrieg since military success with combined arms demanded long hours of continuous operations with minimal rest. Limitations and countermeasures: Environment: The concepts associated with the term blitzkrieg (deep penetrations by armor, large encirclements, and combined arms attacks) were largely dependent upon terrain and weather conditions. Wherever the ability for rapid movement across "tank country" was not possible, armored penetrations often were avoided or resulted in failure. The terrain would ideally be flat, firm, unobstructed by natural barriers or fortifications, and interspersed with roads and railways. If it were instead hilly, wooded, marshy, or urban, armor would be vulnerable to infantry in close-quarters combat and unable to break out at full speed. Additionally, units could be halted by mud (thawing along the Eastern Front regularly slowed both sides) or extreme snow. Operation Barbarossa helped confirm that armor effectiveness and the requisite aerial support depended on weather and terrain. The disadvantages of terrain could be nullified if surprise was achieved over the enemy by an attack in areas that had been considered natural obstacles, as occurred during the Battle of France in which the main German offensive went through the Ardennes. Since the French thought that the Ardennes unsuitable for massive troop movement, particularly for tanks, the area was left with only light defences, which were quickly overrun by the Wehrmacht. The Germans quickly advanced through the forest and knocked down the trees that the French had thought would impede them. Air superiority: The influence of air forces over forces on the ground changed significantly over the course of the Second World War. Early German successes were conducted when Allied aircraft could not make a significant impact on the battlefield. In May 1940, there was near parity in numbers of aircraft between the Luftwaffe and the Allies, but the Luftwaffe had been developed to support Germany's ground forces, had liaison officers with the mobile formations and operated a higher number of sorties per aircraft. In addition, the Germans' air parity or superiority allowed the unencumbered movement of ground forces, their unhindered assembly into concentrated attack formations, aerial reconnaissance, aerial resupply of fast moving formations and close air support at the point of attack. The Allied air forces had no close air support aircraft, training or doctrine. The Allies flew 434 French and 160 British sorties a day but methods of attacking ground targets had yet to be developed and so Allied aircraft caused negligible damage. Against the Allies' 600 sorties, the Luftwaffe on average flew 1,500 sorties a day. On 13 May, Fliegerkorps VIII flew 1,000 sorties in support of the crossing of the Meuse. The following day the Allies made repeated attempts to destroy the German pontoon bridges, but German fighter aircraft, ground fire and Luftwaffe flak batteries with the panzer forces destroyed 56 percent of the attacking Allied aircraft, and the bridges remained intact. Allied air superiority became a significant hindrance to German operations during the later years of the war. By June 1944, the Western Allies had the complete control of the air over the battlefield, and their fighter-bomber aircraft were very effective at attacking ground forces. On D-Day, the Allies flew 14,500 sorties over the battlefield area alone, not including sorties flown over Northwestern Europe. Against them the Luftwaffe flew some 300 sorties on 6 June. Though German fighter presence over Normandy increased over the next days and weeks, it never approached the numbers that the Allies commanded. Fighter-bomber attacks on German formations made movement during daylight almost impossible. Subsequently, shortages soon developed in food, fuel and ammunition and severely hampered the German defenders. German vehicle crews and even flak units experienced great difficulty moving during daylight. Indeed, the final German offensive operation in the west, Operation Wacht am Rhein, was planned to take place during poor weather to minimise interference by Allied aircraft. Under those conditions, it was difficult for German commanders to employ the "armored idea", if at all. Counter-tactics: Blitzkrieg is vulnerable to an enemy that is robust enough to weather the shock of the attack and does not panic at the idea of enemy formations in its rear area. That is especially true if the attacking formation lacks the reserve to keep funnelling forces into the spearhead or the mobility to provide infantry, artillery and supplies into the attack. If the defender can hold the shoulders of the breach, it has the opportunity to counter-attack into the flank of the attacker and potentially to cut it off the van, as what happened to Kampfgruppe Peiper in the Ardennes. During the Battle of France in 1940, the 4th Armoured Division (Major-General Charles de Gaulle) and elements of the 1st Army Tank Brigade (British Expeditionary Force) made probing attacks on the German flank and pushed into the rear of the advancing armored columns at times. That may have been a reason for Hitler to call a halt to the German advance. Those attacks combined with Maxime Weygand's hedgehog tactic would become the major basis for responding to blitzkrieg attacks in the future. Deployment in depth, or permitting enemy or "shoulders" of a penetration, was essential to channelling the enemy attack; artillery, properly employed at the shoulders, could take a heavy toll on attackers. Allied forces in 1940 lacked the experience to develop those strategies successfully, which resulted in the French armistice with heavy losses, but those strategies characterized later Allied operations. At the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army used a combination of defence in great depth, extensive minefields and tenacious defense of breakthrough shoulders.

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That may have been a reason for Hitler to call a halt to the German advance. Those attacks combined with Maxime Weygand's hedgehog tactic would become the major basis for responding to blitzkrieg attacks in the future. Deployment in depth, or permitting enemy or "shoulders" of a penetration, was essential to channelling the enemy attack; artillery, properly employed at the shoulders, could take a heavy toll on attackers. Allied forces in 1940 lacked the experience to develop those strategies successfully, which resulted in the French armistice with heavy losses, but those strategies characterized later Allied operations. At the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army used a combination of defence in great depth, extensive minefields and tenacious defense of breakthrough shoulders. In that way, they depleted German combat power even as German forces advanced. The reverse can be seen in the Russian summer offensive of 1944, Operation Bagration, which resulted in the destruction of Army Group Center. German attempts to weather the storm and fight out of encirclements failed because of the Soviets' ability to continue to feed armored units into the attack, maintain the mobility and strength of the offensive and arrive in force deep in the rear areas faster than the Germans could regroup. Logistics: Although effective in quick campaigns against Poland and France, mobile operations could not be sustained by Germany in later years. Strategies based on maneuver have the inherent danger of the attacking force overextending its supply lines and can be defeated by a determined foe who is willing and able to sacrifice territory for time in which to regroup and rearm, as the Soviets did on the Eastern Front, as opposed to, for example, the Dutch, who had no territory to sacrifice. Tank and vehicle production was a constant problem for Germany. Indeed, late in the war, many panzer "divisions" had no more than a few dozen tanks. As the end of the war approached, Germany also experienced critical shortages in fuel and ammunition stocks as a result of Anglo-American strategic bombing and blockade. Although the production of Luftwaffe fighter aircraft continued, they could not fly because of lack of fuel. What fuel there was went to panzer divisions, and even then, they could not operate normally. Of the Tiger tanks lost against the US Army, nearly half of them were abandoned for lack of fuel. Military operations: Spanish Civil War: German volunteers first used armor in live field-conditions during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). Armor commitment consisted of Panzer Battalion 88, a force built around three companies of Panzer I tanks that functioned as a training cadre for Spain's Nationalists. The Luftwaffe deployed squadrons of fighters, dive-bombers and transport aircraft as the Condor Legion. Guderian said that the tank deployment was "on too small a scale to allow accurate assessments to be made". (The true test of his "armored idea" would have to wait for the Second World War.) However, the Luftwaffe also provided volunteers to Spain to test both tactics and aircraft in combat, including the first combat use of the Stuka. During the war, the Condor Legion undertook the 1937 bombing of Guernica, which had a tremendous psychological effect on the populations of Europe. The results were exaggerated, and the Western Allies concluded that the "city-busting" techniques were now part of the German way in war. The targets of the German aircraft were actually the rail lines and bridges, but lacking the ability to hit them with accuracy (only three or four Ju 87s saw action in Spain), the Luftwaffe chose a method of carpet bombing, resulting in heavy civilian casualties. Poland, 1939: Although journalists popularized the term Blitzkrieg during the September 1939 invasion of Poland, the historians Matthew Cooper and J. P. Harris have written that German operations during the campaign were consistent with traditional methods. The Wehrmacht strategy was more in line with Vernichtungsgedanke, a focus on envelopment to create pockets in broad-front annihilation. The German generals dispersed Panzer forces among the three German concentrations with little emphasis on independent use. They deployed tanks to create or destroy close pockets of Polish forces and to seize operational-depth terrain in support of the largely-unmotorized infantry, which followed. The Wehrmacht used available models of tanks, Stuka dive-bombers and concentrated forces in the Polish campaign, but the majority of the fighting involved conventional infantry and artillery warfare, and most Luftwaffe action was independent of the ground campaign. Matthew Cooper wrote: Throughout the Polish Campaign, the employment of the mechanised units revealed the idea that they were intended solely to ease the advance and to support the activities of the infantry.... Thus, any strategic exploitation of the armoured idea was still-born. The paralysis of command and the breakdown of morale were not made the ultimate aim of the... German ground and air forces, and were only incidental by-products of the traditional maneuvers of rapid encirclement and of the supporting activities of the flying artillery of the Luftwaffe, both of which had as their purpose the physical destruction of the enemy troops. Such was the Vernichtungsgedanke of the Polish campaign. John Ellis wrote that "there is considerable justice in Matthew Cooper's assertion that the panzer divisions were not given the kind of strategic mission that was to characterize authentic armored blitzkrieg, and were almost always closely subordinated to the various mass infantry armies". Steven Zaloga wrote, "Whilst Western accounts of the September campaign have stressed the shock value of the panzer and Stuka attacks, they have tended to underestimate the punishing effect of German artillery on Polish units. Mobile and available in significant quantity, artillery shattered as many units as any other branch of the Wehrmacht." Low Countries and France, 1940: The German invasion of France, with subsidiary attacks on Belgium and the Netherlands, consisted of two phases, Operation Yellow (Fall Gelb) and Operation Red (Fall Rot). Yellow opened with a feint conducted against the Netherlands and Belgium by two armored corps and paratroopers. Most of the German armored forces were placed in Panzer Group Kleist, which attacked through the Ardennes, a lightly defended sector that the French planned to reinforce if necessary before the Germans could bring up heavy and siege artillery. There was no time for the French to send such reinforcement, as the Germans did not wait for siege artillery but reached the Meuse and achieved a breakthrough at the Battle of Sedan in three days. Panzer Group Kleist raced to the English Channel, reached the coast at Abbeville and cut off the BEF, the Belgian Army and some of the best-equipped divisions of the French Army in northern France. Armored and motorized units under Guderian, Rommel and others advanced far beyond the marching and horse-drawn infantry divisions and far in excess of what Hitler and the German high command had expected or wished. When the Allies counter-attacked at Arras by using the heavily armored British Matilda I and Matilda II tanks, a brief panic ensued in the German High Command. Hitler halted his armored and motorized forces outside the port of Dunkirk, which the Royal Navy had started using to evacuate the Allied forces. Hermann Göring promised that the Luftwaffe would complete the destruction of the encircled armies, but aerial operations failed to prevent the evacuation of the majority of the Allied troops. In Operation Dynamo, some 330,000 French and British troops escaped. Case Yellow surprised everyone by overcoming the Allies' 4,000 armored vehicles, many of which were better than their German equivalents in armor and gunpower. The French and British frequently used their tanks in the dispersed role of infantry support, rather than by concentrating force at the point of attack, to create overwhelming firepower. The French armies were much reduced in strength and the confidence of their commanders shaken. With much of their own armor and heavy equipment lost in Northern France, they lacked the means to fight a mobile war. The Germans followed their initial success with Operation Red, a triple-pronged offensive. The XV Panzer Corps attacked towards Brest, XIV Panzer Corps attacked east of Paris, towards Lyon and the XIX Panzer Corps encircled the Maginot Line. The French, hard pressed to organise any sort of counter-attack, were continually ordered to form new defensive lines and found that German forces had already bypassed them and moved on. An armored counter-attack, organized by Colonel Charles de Gaulle, could not be sustained, and he had to retreat. Prior to the German offensive in May, Winston Churchill had said, "Thank God for the French Army". The same French Army collapsed after barely two months of fighting. That was in shocking contrast to the four years of trench warfare on which French forces had engaged during the First World War. French Prime Minister Paul Reynaud, analyzed the collapse in a speech on 21 May 1940: The truth is that our classic conception of the conduct of war has come up against a new conception. At the basis of this... there is not only the massive use of heavy armoured divisions or cooperation between them and airplanes, but the creation of disorder in the enemy's rear by means of parachute raids. The Germans had not used paratroopry attacks in France and made only one large drop in the Netherlands to capture three bridges; some small glider-landings were conducted in Belgium to take bottlenecks on routes of advance before the arrival of the main force (the most renowned being the landing on Fort Eben-Emael in Belgium). Eastern Front, 1941–44: Use of armored forces was crucial for both sides on the Eastern Front.

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French Prime Minister Paul Reynaud, analyzed the collapse in a speech on 21 May 1940: The truth is that our classic conception of the conduct of war has come up against a new conception. At the basis of this... there is not only the massive use of heavy armoured divisions or cooperation between them and airplanes, but the creation of disorder in the enemy's rear by means of parachute raids. The Germans had not used paratroopry attacks in France and made only one large drop in the Netherlands to capture three bridges; some small glider-landings were conducted in Belgium to take bottlenecks on routes of advance before the arrival of the main force (the most renowned being the landing on Fort Eben-Emael in Belgium). Eastern Front, 1941–44: Use of armored forces was crucial for both sides on the Eastern Front. Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, involved a number of breakthroughs and encirclements by motorized forces. Its goal, according to Führer Directive 21 (18 December 1940), was "to destroy the Russian forces deployed in the West and to prevent their escape into the wide-open spaces of Russia". The Red Army was to be destroyed west of the Dvina and Dnieper rivers, which were about 500 kilometres (310 mi) east of the Soviet border, to be followed by a mopping-up operation. The surprise attack resulted in the near annihilation of the Voyenno-Vozdushnye Sily (VVS, Soviet Air Force) by simultaneous attacks on airfields, allowing the Luftwaffe to achieve total air supremacy over all the battlefields within the first week. On the ground, four German panzer groups outflanked and encircled disorganized Red Army units, and the marching infantry completed the encirclements and defeated the trapped forces. In late July, after 2nd Panzer Group (commanded by Guderian) captured the watersheds of the Dvina and Dnieper rivers near Smolensk, the panzers had to defend the encirclement, because the marching infantry divisions remained hundreds of kilometers to the west. The Germans conquered large areas of the Soviet Union, but their failure to destroy the Red Army before the winter of 1941-1942 was a strategic failure and made German tactical superiority and territorial gains irrelevant. The Red Army had survived enormous losses and regrouped with new formations far to the rear of the front line. During the Battle of Moscow (October 1941 to January 1942), the Red Army defeated the German Army Group Center and for the first time in the war seized the strategic initiative. In the summer of 1942, Germany launched another offensive and this time focusing on Stalingrad and the Caucasus in the southern Soviet Union. The Soviets again lost tremendous amounts of territory, only to counter-attack once more during winter. The German gains were ultimately limited because Hitler diverted forces from the attack on Stalingrad and drove towards the Caucasus oilfields simultaneously. The Wehrmacht became overstretched. Although it won operationally, it could not inflict a decisive defeat as the durability of the Soviet Union's manpower, resources, industrial base and aid from the Western Allies began to take effect. In July 1943, the Wehrmacht conducted Operation Zitadelle (Citadel) against a salient at Kursk, which Soviet troop heavily defended. Soviet defensive tactics had by now hugely improved, particularly in the use of artillery and air support. By April 1943, the Stavka had learned of German intentions through intelligence supplied by front-line reconnaissance and Ultra intercepts. In the following months, the Red Army constructed deep defensive belts along the paths of the planned German attack. The Soviets made a concerted effort to disguise their knowledge of German plans and the extent of their own defensive preparations, and the German commanders still hoped to achieve operational surprise when the attack commenced. The Germans did not achieve surprise and could not outflank or break through into enemy rear areas during the operation. Several historians assert that Operation Citadel was planned and intended to be a blitzkrieg operation. Many of the German participants who wrote about the operation after the war, including Erich von Manstein, make no mention of blitzkrieg in their accounts. In 2000, Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson characterised only the southern pincer of the German offensive as a "classical blitzkrieg attack". Pier Battistelli wrote that the operational planning marked a change in German offensive thinking away from blitzkrieg and that more priority was given to brute force and fire power than to speed and maneuver. In 1995, David Glantz stated that blitzkrieg was at Kursk for the first time defeated in summer, and the opposing Soviet forces mounted a successful counter-offensive. The Battle of Kursk ended with two Soviet counter-offensives and the revival of deep operations. In the summer of 1944, the Red Army destroyed Army Group Centre in Operation Bagration by using combined-arms tactics for armor, infantry and air power in a coordinated strategic assault, known as deep operations, which led to an advance of 600 kilometres (370 mi) in six weeks. Western Front, 1944–1945: Allied armies began using combined-arms formations and deep-penetration strategies that Germany had used in the opening years of the war. Many Allied operations in the Western Desert and on the Eastern Front, relied on firepower to establish breakthroughs by fast-moving armored units. The artillery-based tactics were also decisive in Western Front operations after 1944's Operation Overlord, and the British Commonwealth and American armies developed flexible and powerful systems for using artillery support. What the Soviets lacked in flexibility, they made up for in number of rocket launchers, guns and mortars. The Germans never achieved the kind of fire concentrations that their enemies were achieving 1944. After the Allied landings in Normandy (June 1944), the Germans began a counter-offensive to overwhelm the landing force with armored attacks, but they failed because of a lack of co-ordination and to Allied superiority in anti-tank defense and in the air. The most notable attempt to use deep-penetration operations in Normandy was Operation Luttich at Mortain, which only hastened the Falaise Pocket and the destruction of German forces in Normandy. The Mortain counter-attack was defeated by the American 12th Army Group with little effect on its own offensive operations. The last German offensive on the Western front, the Battle of the Bulge (Operation Wacht am Rhein), was an offensive launched towards the port of Antwerp in December 1944. Launched in poor weather against a thinly-held Allied sector, it achieved surprise and initial success as Allied air-power was grounded due to cloud cover. Determined defense by American troops in places throughout the Ardennes, the lack of good roads and German supply shortages caused delays. Allied forces deployed to the flanks of the German penetration, and as soon as the skies cleared, Allied aircraft returned to the battlefield. Allied counter-attacks soon forced back the Germans, who abandoned much equipment for lack of fuel. Post-war controversy: Blitzkrieg had been called a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), but many writers and historians have concluded that the Germans did not invent a new form of warfare but applied new technologies to traditional ideas of Bewegungskrieg (maneuver warfare) to achieve decisive victory. Strategy: In 1965, Captain Robert O'Neill, Professor of the History of War at the University of Oxford produced an example of the popular view. In Doctrine and Training in the German Army 1919–1939, O'Neill wrote: What makes this story worth telling is the development of one idea: the blitzkrieg. The German Army had a greater grasp of the effects of technology on the battlefield, and went on to develop a new form of warfare by which its rivals when it came to the test were hopelessly outclassed. Other historians wrote that blitzkrieg was an operational doctrine of the German armed forces and a strategic concept on which the leadership of Nazi Germany based its strategic and economic planning. Military planners and bureaucrats in the war economy appear rarely, if ever, to have employed the term blitzkrieg in official documents. That the German army had a "blitzkrieg doctrine" was rejected in the late 1970s by Matthew Cooper. The concept of a blitzkrieg Luftwaffe was challenged by Richard Overy in the late 1970s and by Williamson Murray in the mid-1980s. That Nazi Germany went to war on the basis of "blitzkrieg economics" was criticized by Richard Overy in the 1980s, and George Raudzens described the contradictory senses in which historians have used the word. The notion of a German blitzkrieg concept or doctrine survives in popular history and many historians still support the thesis. Frieser wrote that after the failure of the Schlieffen Plan in 1914, the German army concluded that decisive battles were no longer possible in the changed conditions of the twentieth century. Frieser wrote that the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), which was created in 1938 had intended to avoid the decisive battle concepts of its predecessors and planned for a long war of exhaustion (Ermattungskrieg). It was only after the improvised plan for the Battle of France in 1940 was unexpectedly successful that the German General Staff came to believe that Vernichtungskrieg was still feasible.

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Blitzkrieg

The notion of a German blitzkrieg concept or doctrine survives in popular history and many historians still support the thesis. Frieser wrote that after the failure of the Schlieffen Plan in 1914, the German army concluded that decisive battles were no longer possible in the changed conditions of the twentieth century. Frieser wrote that the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), which was created in 1938 had intended to avoid the decisive battle concepts of its predecessors and planned for a long war of exhaustion (Ermattungskrieg). It was only after the improvised plan for the Battle of France in 1940 was unexpectedly successful that the German General Staff came to believe that Vernichtungskrieg was still feasible. German thinking reverted to the possibility of a quick and decisive war for the Balkan campaign and Operation Barbarossa. Doctrine: Most academic historians regard the notion of blitzkrieg as military doctrine to be a myth. Shimon Naveh wrote, "The striking feature of the blitzkrieg concept is the complete absence of a coherent theory which should have served as the general cognitive basis for the actual conduct of operations". Naveh described it as an "ad hoc solution" to operational dangers, thrown together at the last moment. Overy disagreed with the idea that Hitler and the Nazi regime ever intended a blitzkrieg war because the once-popular belief that the Nazi state organized its economy to carry out its grand strategy in short campaigns was false. Hitler had intended for a rapid unlimited war to occur much later than 1939, but Germany's aggressive foreign policy forced the state into war before it was ready. The planning of Hitler and the Wehrmacht in the 1930s did not reflect a blitzkrieg method but the opposite. J. P. Harris wrote that the Wehrmacht never used the word, and it did not appear in German army or air force field manuals. The word was coined in September 1939 by a Times newspaper reporter. Harris also found no evidence that German military thinking developed a blitzkrieg mentality. Karl-Heinz Frieser and Adam Tooze reached similar conclusions to Overy and Naveh that the notions of blitzkrieg economy and strategy are myths. Frieser wrote that surviving German economists and General Staff officers denied that Germany went to war with a blitzkrieg strategy. Robert M. Citino argues: Blitzkrieg was not a doctrine, or an operational scheme, or even a tactical system. In fact, it simply doesn't exist, at least not in the way we usually think it does. The Germans never used the term Blitzkrieg in any precise sense, and almost never used it outside of quotations. It simply meant a rapid and decisive victory (lightning war)... The Germans didn't invent anything new in the interwar period, but rather used new technologies like tanks and air and radio-controlled command to restore an old way of war that they still found to be valid, Bewegungskrieg. Historian Victor Davis Hanson states that Blitzkrieg "played on the myth of German technological superiority and industrial dominance" and adds that German successes, particularly that of its Panzer divisions were "instead predicated on the poor preparation and morale of Germany's enemies". Hanson also reports that at a Munich public address in November 1941, Hitler had "disowned" the concept of Blitzkrieg by calling it an "idiotic word". Further, successful Blitzkrieg operations were predicated on superior numbers, air support and were possible for only short periods of time without sufficient supply lines. For all intents and purposes, Blitzkrieg ended at the Eastern Front once the German forces had given up Stalingrad, after they faced hundreds of new T-34 tanks, when the Luftwaffe became unable to assure air dominance, and after the stalemate at Kursk. To that end, Hanson concludes that German military success was not accompanied by the adequate provisioning of its troops with food and materiel far from the source of supply, which contributed to its ultimate failures. Despite its later disappointments as German troops extended their lines at too great a distance, the very specter of armored Blitzkrieg forces initially proved victorious against the Polish, Dutch, Belgian and French Armies early in the war. Economics: In the 1960s, Alan Milward developed a theory of blitzkrieg economics: Germany could not fight a long war and chose to avoid comprehensive rearmament and armed in breadth to win quick victories. Milward described an economy positioned between a full war economy and a peacetime economy. The purpose of the blitzkrieg economy was to allow the German people to enjoy high living standards in the event of hostilities and avoid the economic hardships of the First World War. Overy wrote that blitzkrieg as a "coherent military and economic concept has proven a difficult strategy to defend in light of the evidence". Milward's theory was contrary to Hitler's and German planners' intentions. The Germans, aware of the errors of the First World War, rejected the concept of organizing its economy to fight only a short war. Therefore, focus was given to the development of armament in depth for a long war, instead of armament in breadth for a short war. Hitler claimed that relying on surprise alone was "criminal" and that "we have to prepare for a long war along with surprise attack". During the winter of 1939–1940, Hitler demobilized many troops from the army to return as skilled workers to factories because the war would be decided by production, not a quick "Panzer operation". In the 1930s, Hitler had ordered rearmament programs that cannot be considered limited. In November 1937, he had indicated that most of the armament projects would be completed by 1943–1945. The rearmament of the Kriegsmarine was to have been completed in 1949 and the Luftwaffe rearmament program was to have matured in 1942, with a force capable of strategic bombing with heavy bombers. The construction and the training of motorized forces and a full mobilization of the rail networks would not begin until 1943 and 1944, respectively. Hitler needed to avoid war until these projects were complete but his misjudgements in 1939 forced Germany into war before rearmament was complete. After the war, Albert Speer claimed that the German economy achieved greater armaments output not because of diversions of capacity from civilian to military industry but by streamlining of the economy. Overy pointed out some 23 percent of German output was military by 1939. Between 1937 and 1939, 70 percent of investment capital went into the rubber, synthetic fuel, aircraft and shipbuilding industries. Hermann Göring had consistently stated that the task of the Four Year Plan was to rearm Germany for total war. Hitler's correspondence with his economists also reveals that his intent was to wage war in 1943–1945, when the resources of central Europe had been absorbed into Nazi Germany. Living standards were not high in the late 1930s. Consumption of consumer goods had fallen from 71 percent in 1928 to 59 percent in 1938. The demands of the war economy reduced the amount of spending in non-military sectors to satisfy the demand for the armed forces. On 9 September, Göring, as Head of the Reich Defense Council, called for complete "employment" of living and fighting power of the national economy for the duration of the war. Overy presents that as evidence that a "blitzkrieg economy" did not exist. Adam Tooze wrote that the German economy was being prepared for a long war. The expenditure for the war was extensive and put the economy under severe strain. The German leadership were concerned less with how to balance the civilian economy and the needs of civilian consumption but to figure out how to best prepare the economy for total war. Once war had begun, Hitler urged his economic experts to abandon caution and expend all available resources on the war effort, but the expansion plans only gradually gained momentum in 1941. Tooze wrote that the huge armament plans in the pre-war period did not indicate any clear-sighted blitzkrieg economy or strategy. Heer: Frieser wrote that the Heer (German pronunciation: [ˈheːɐ̯]) was not ready for blitzkrieg at the start of the war. A blitzkrieg method called for a young, highly skilled mechanized army. In 1939–1940, 45 percent of the army was 40 years old and 50 percent of the soldiers had only a few weeks' training. The German Army, contrary to the blitzkrieg legend, was not fully motorized and had only 120,000 vehicles, compared to the 300,000 of the French Army. The British also had an "enviable" contingent of motorized forces. Thus, "the image of the German 'Blitzkrieg' army is a figment of propaganda imagination". During the First World War, the German army used 1.4 million horses for transport and in the Second World War 2.7 million horses. Only ten percent of the army was motorized in 1940. Half of the German divisions available in 1940 were combat ready, but they were less well-equipped than the British and French or the Imperial German Army of 1914.

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Blitzkrieg

In 1939–1940, 45 percent of the army was 40 years old and 50 percent of the soldiers had only a few weeks' training. The German Army, contrary to the blitzkrieg legend, was not fully motorized and had only 120,000 vehicles, compared to the 300,000 of the French Army. The British also had an "enviable" contingent of motorized forces. Thus, "the image of the German 'Blitzkrieg' army is a figment of propaganda imagination". During the First World War, the German army used 1.4 million horses for transport and in the Second World War 2.7 million horses. Only ten percent of the army was motorized in 1940. Half of the German divisions available in 1940 were combat ready, but they were less well-equipped than the British and French or the Imperial German Army of 1914. In the spring of 1940, the German army was semi-modern in which a small number of well-equipped and "elite" divisions were offset by many second and third rate divisions". In 2003, John Mosier wrote that while the French soldiers in 1940 were better trained than German soldiers, as were the Americans later and that the German Army was the least mechanized of the major armies, its leadership cadres were larger and better and that the high standard of leadership was the main reason for the successes of the German army in World War II, as it had been in World War I. Luftwaffe: James Corum wrote that it was a myth that the Luftwaffe had a doctrine of terror bombing in which civilians were attacked to break the will or aid the collapse of an enemy by the Luftwaffe in blitzkrieg operations. After the bombing of Guernica in 1937 and the Rotterdam Blitz in 1940, it was commonly assumed that terror bombing was a part of Luftwaffe doctrine. During the interwar period, the Luftwaffe leadership rejected the concept of terror bombing in favour of battlefield support and interdiction operations: The vital industries and transportation centers that would be targeted for shutdown were valid military targets. Civilians were not to be targeted directly, but the breakdown of production would affect their morale and will to fight. German legal scholars of the 1930s carefully worked out guidelines for what type of bombing was permissible under international law. While direct attacks against civilians were ruled out as "terror bombing", the concept of the attacking the vital war industries – and probable heavy civilian casualties and breakdown of civilian morale – was ruled as acceptable. Corum continued: General Walther Wever compiled a doctrine known as The Conduct of the Aerial War. This document, which the Luftwaffe adopted, rejected Giulio Douhet's theory of terror bombing. Terror bombing was deemed to be "counter-productive", increasing rather than destroying the enemy's will to resist. Such bombing campaigns were regarded as diversion from the Luftwaffe's main operations; destruction of the enemy armed forces. The bombings of Guernica, Rotterdam and Warsaw were tactical missions in support of military operations and were not intended as strategic terror attacks. J. P. Harris wrote that most Luftwaffe leaders from Goering through the general staff believed, as did their counterparts in Britain and the United States, that strategic bombing was the chief mission of the air force and that given such a role, the Luftwaffe would win the next war and that Nearly all lectures concerned the strategic uses of airpower; virtually none discussed tactical co-operation with the Army. Similarly in the military journals, emphasis centred on 'strategic' bombing. The prestigious Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau, the War Ministry's journal, which was founded in 1936, published a number of theoretical pieces on future developments in air warfare. Nearly all discussed the use of strategic airpower, some emphasising that aspect of air warfare to the exclusion of others. One author commented that European military powers were increasingly making the bomber force the heart of their airpower. The manoeuvrability and technical capability of the next generation of bombers would be 'as unstoppable as the flight of a shell. The Luftwaffe ended up with an air force consisting mainly of relatively short-range aircraft, but that does not prove that the German air force was solely interested in "tactical" bombing. It happened because the German aircraft industry lacked the experience to build a long-range bomber fleet quickly and because Hitler was insistent on the very rapid creation of a numerically large force. It is also significant that Germany's position in the centre of Europe to a large extent obviated the need to make a clear distinction between bombers suitable only for "tactical" purposes and those necessary for strategic purposes in the early stages of a likely future war. Fuller and Liddell Hart: The British theorists John Frederick Charles Fuller and Captain Basil Henry Liddell Hart have often been associated with the development of blitzkrieg, but that is a matter of controversy. In recent years historians have uncovered that Liddell Hart distorted and falsified facts to make it appear as if his ideas has been adopted. After the war Liddell Hart imposed his own perceptions after the event by claiming that the mobile tank warfare has been practiced by the Wehrmacht was a result of his influence. By manipulation and contrivance, Liddell Hart distorted the actual circumstances of the blitzkrieg formation, and he obscured its origins. By his indoctrinated idealization of an ostentatious concept, he reinforced the myth of blitzkrieg. Imposing retrospectively his own perceptions of mobile warfare upon the shallow concept of blitzkrieg, he "created a theoretical imbroglio that has taken 40 years to unravel". Blitzkrieg was not an official doctrine, and historians in recent times have come to the conclusion that it did not exist as such: It was the opposite of a doctrine. Blitzkrieg consisted of an avalanche of actions that were sorted out less by design and more by success. In hindsight—and with some help from Liddell Hart—this torrent of action was squeezed into something it never was: an operational design. The early 1950s literature transformed blitzkrieg into a historical military doctrine, which carried the signature of Liddell Hart and Guderian. The main evidence of Liddell Hart's deceit and "tendentious" report of history can be found in his letters to Erich von Manstein, Heinz Guderian, and the relatives and associates of Erwin Rommel. Liddell Hart, in letters to Guderian, "imposed his own fabricated version of blitzkrieg on the latter and compelled him to proclaim it as original formula". Kenneth Macksey found Liddell Hart's original letters to Guderian in the latter's papers. Liddell Hart requested Guderian to give him credit for "impressing him" with his ideas of armored warfare. When Liddell Hart was questioned about this in 1968 and the discrepancy between the English and German editions of Guderian's memoirs, "he gave a conveniently unhelpful though strictly truthful reply. ('There is nothing about the matter in my file of correspondence with Guderian himself except... that I thanked him... for what he said in that additional paragraph'.)". During the First World War, Fuller had been a staff officer attached to the new tank corps. He developed Plan 1919 for massive independent tank operations, which he claimed were subsequently studied by the German military. It is variously argued that Fuller's wartime plans and post-war writings were inspirations or that his readership was low and German experiences during the war received more attention. The German view of themselves as the losers of the war may be linked to the senior and experienced officers' undertaking a thorough review in studying and rewriting of all of their Army doctrine and training manuals. Fuller and Liddell Hart were "outsiders". Liddell Hart was unable to serve as a soldier after 1916 after being gassed on the Somme, and Fuller's abrasive personality resulted in his premature retirement in 1933. Their views had limited impact in the British army; the War Office permitted the formation of an Experimental Mechanized Force on 1 May 1927, composed of tanks, motorized infantry, self-propelled artillery and motorized engineers but the force was disbanded in 1928 on the grounds that it had served its purpose. A new experimental brigade was intended for the next year and became a permanent formation in 1933, during the cuts of the 1932/33–1934/35 financial years. Continuity: It has been argued that blitzkrieg was not and that that the Germans did not invent something called blitzkrieg in the 1920s and 1930s. Rather, the German concept of wars of movement and concentrated force were seen in wars of Prussia and the German Wars of Unification. The first European general to introduce rapid movement, concentrated power and integrated military effort was Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus during the Thirty Years' War. The appearance of the aircraft and tank in the First World War, called an RMA, offered the German military a chance to get back to the traditional war of movement as practiced by Moltke the Elder. The so-called "blitzkrieg campaigns" of 1939 to around 1942 were well within that operational context. At the outbreak of war, the German army had no radically new theory of war.

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Blitzkrieg

Continuity: It has been argued that blitzkrieg was not and that that the Germans did not invent something called blitzkrieg in the 1920s and 1930s. Rather, the German concept of wars of movement and concentrated force were seen in wars of Prussia and the German Wars of Unification. The first European general to introduce rapid movement, concentrated power and integrated military effort was Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus during the Thirty Years' War. The appearance of the aircraft and tank in the First World War, called an RMA, offered the German military a chance to get back to the traditional war of movement as practiced by Moltke the Elder. The so-called "blitzkrieg campaigns" of 1939 to around 1942 were well within that operational context. At the outbreak of war, the German army had no radically new theory of war. The operational thinking of the German army had not changed significantly since the First World War or since the late 19th century. J. P. Harris and Robert M. Citino point out that the Germans had always had a marked preference for short decisive campaigns but were unable to achieve short-order victories in First World War conditions. The transformation from the stalemate of the First World War into tremendous initial operational and strategic success in the Second World War was partly the employment of a relatively-small number of mechanized divisions, most importantly the Panzer divisions, and the support of an exceptionally powerful air force. Guderian: Heinz Guderian is widely regarded as being highly influential in developing the military methods of warfare used by Germany's tank men at the start of the Second World War. That style of warfare brought the maneuver back to the fore and placed an emphasis on the offensive. Along with the shockingly-rapid collapse in the armies that opposed it, that came to be branded as blitzkrieg warfare. After Germany's military reforms of the Guderian emerged as a strong proponent of mechanized forces. Within the Inspectorate of Transport Troops, Guderian and colleagues performed theoretical and field exercise work. Guderian met with opposition from some in the General Staff, who were distrustful of the new weapons and who continued to view the infantry as the primary weapon of the army. Among them, Guderian claimed, was Chief of the General Staff Ludwig Beck (1935–1938), who he alleged was skeptical that armored forces could be decisive. That claim has been disputed by later historians. James Corum wrote: Guderian expressed a hearty contempt for General Ludwig Beck, chief of the General Staff from 1935 to 1938, whom he characterized as hostile to ideas of modern mechanised warfare: [Corum quoting Guderian] "He [Beck] was a paralysing element wherever he appeared.... [S]ignificantly of his way of thought was his much-boosted method of fighting which he called delaying defence". This is a crude caricature of a highly competent general who authored Army Regulation 300 (Troop Leadership) in 1933, the primary tactical manual of the German Army in World War II, and under whose direction the first three panzer divisions were created in 1935, the largest such force in the world of the time. By Guderian's account, he single-handedly created the German tactical and operational methodology. Between 1922 and 1928 Guderian wrote a number of articles concerning military movement. As the ideas of making use of the combustible engine in a protected encasement to bring mobility back to warfare developed in the German army, Guderian was a leading proponent of the formations that would be used for this purpose. He was later asked to write an explanatory book, which was titled Achtung Panzer! (1937) in which he explained the theories of the tank men and defended them. Guderian argued that the tank would be the decisive weapon of the next war. "If the tanks succeed, then victory follows", he wrote. In an article addressed to critics of tank warfare, he wrote that "until our critics can produce some new and better method of making a successful land attack other than self-massacre, we shall continue to maintain our beliefs that tanks—properly employed, needless to say—are today the best means available for land attack". Addressing the faster rate at which defenders could reinforce an area than attackers could penetrate it during the First World War, Guderian wrote that "since reserve forces will now be motorized, the building up of new defensive fronts is easier than it used to be; the chances of an offensive based on the timetable of artillery and infantry co-operation are, as a result, even slighter today than they were in the last war." He continued, "We believe that by attacking with tanks we can achieve a higher rate of movement than has been hitherto obtainable, and—what is perhaps even more important—that we can keep moving once a breakthrough has been made". Guderian additionally required for tactical radios to be widely used to facilitate coordination and command by having one installed in all tanks. Guderian's leadership was supported, fostered and institutionalized by his supporters in the Reichswehr General Staff system, which worked the Army to greater and greater levels of capability through massive and systematic Movement Warfare war games in the 1930s. Guderian's book incorporated the work of theorists such as Ludwig Ritter von Eimannsberger, whose book, The Tank War (Der Kampfwagenkrieg) (1934) gained a wide audience in the German Army. Another German theorist, Ernst Volckheim, wrote a huge amount on tank and combined arms tactics and was influential to German thinking on the use of armored formations, but his work was not acknowledged in Guderian's writings. See also: AirLand Battle, blitzkrieg-like doctrine of US Army in 1980s Armoured warfare Maneuver warfare Shock and awe, the 21st century US military doctrine. Vernichtungsgedanke, or "annihilation concept". Mission-type tactics Deep Battle, Soviet Red Army Military Doctrine from the 1930s often confused with blitzkrieg. Battleplan (documentary TV series) Vernichtungsschlacht, Battle of annihilation Notes: References: Bibliography: Books: Conferences: Glantz, David (2001b). The Soviet-German War 1941–1945: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay. A Paper Presented as the 20th Anniversary Distinguished Lecture at the Strom Thurmond Institute of Government and Public Affairs. no ISBN. Clemson, SC: Clemson University. Archived from the original on 18 February 2015. Journals: Erickson, Edward J. (2001b). "Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War". Contributions in Military Studies (201). Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press. ISSN 0883-6884. OCLC 43481698. Fanning, William Jr. (April 1997). "The Origin of the term "Blitzkrieg": Another View". Journal of Military History. 61 (2): 283–302. doi:10.2307/2953968. ISSN 0899-3718. JSTOR 2953968. Harris, John Paul (November 1995). "The Myth of Blitzkrieg". War in History. II: 335–352. doi:10.1177/096834459500200306. ISSN 0968-3445. S2CID 159933010. Watt, Robert (2008). "Feeling the Full Force of a Four Point Offensive: Re-Interpreting The Red Army's 1944 Belorussian and L'vov-Przemyśl Operations". The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. XXI (4). Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. doi:10.1080/13518040802497564. ISSN 1351-8046. S2CID 143413006. Winchester, Charles (20 January 2002). "Advancing Backwards: The Demodernization of the German Army in World War 2". Military Journal. 2 (1). Osprey: 18–25. ISBN 978-1-84176-041-4. ISSN 1467-1379. Archived from the original on 5 April 2013. Retrieved 11 August 2015. Yerxa, Donald (June 2011). "Military History at the Operational Level: An Interview with Robert M. Citino". Historically Speaking. 12 (3): 10–12. doi:10.1353/hsp.2011.0039. S2CID 162320393. Websites: Andreas, Peter (2020). "How Methamphetamine Became a Key Part of Nazi Military Strategy (January 7, 2020)". Time. Time USA, LLC. Retrieved 23 February 2022. De Gaulle, Charles (2009). "1890–1940: un officier non-conformiste" [1890–1940: An Unorthodox Officer]. charles-de-gaulle.org (in French). Archived from the original on 25 May 2015. Retrieved 13 December 2009.

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Yerxa, Donald (June 2011). "Military History at the Operational Level: An Interview with Robert M. Citino". Historically Speaking. 12 (3): 10–12. doi:10.1353/hsp.2011.0039. S2CID 162320393. Websites: Andreas, Peter (2020). "How Methamphetamine Became a Key Part of Nazi Military Strategy (January 7, 2020)". Time. Time USA, LLC. Retrieved 23 February 2022. De Gaulle, Charles (2009). "1890–1940: un officier non-conformiste" [1890–1940: An Unorthodox Officer]. charles-de-gaulle.org (in French). Archived from the original on 25 May 2015. Retrieved 13 December 2009. Further reading: External links: Armstrong, G. P. The Controversy over Tanks in the British Army 1919 to 1933 (PhD 1976) Sinesi, Michael. Patrick. Modern Bewegungskrieg: German Battle Doctrine, 1920–1940 (2001) Vardi, Gil-Li. The Enigma of German Operational Theory: the Evolution of Military Thought in Germany, 1919–1938 (PhD 2008) Spiegel Online: The Nazi Death Machine, Hitler's Drugged Soldiers

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Blockade

History: Although primitive naval blockades had been in use for millennia, the first successful attempts at establishing a full naval blockade were made by the British Royal Navy during the Seven Years' War (1754–1763) against France. Following the British naval victory at Quiberon Bay, which ended any immediate threat of a major invasion of Britain, Britain established a close blockade on the French coast. This starved French ports of commerce, weakening France's economy. Admiral Edward Hawke took command of the blockading fleet off Brest and extended the blockade to cover the entire French Atlantic coast from Dunkirk to Bordeaux, and also to Marseilles on France's Mediterranean coast. The strategic importance of blockade was shown during the French Revolutionary Wars and Napoleonic Wars, when the Royal Navy successfully blockaded France, leading to major economic disruptions. The Union blockade of southern ports was a major factor in the American Civil War. During World War I, the Allies blockaded the Central Powers, depriving them of food and other strategic materials. Germany's attempted U-boat blockade caused some shortages in Britain, but ultimately failed. This outcome was repeated in World War II. Naval strategic thinkers, such as Sir Julian Corbett and Alfred Thayer Mahan, wrote that naval conflicts were won primarily by decisive battles, but also by blockade. Types of blockade: Close, distant, and loose blockades: A close blockade entails placing warships within sight of the blockaded coast or port, to ensure the immediate interception of any ship entering or leaving. It is both the most effective and the most difficult form of blockade to implement. Difficulties arise because the blockading ships must remain continuously at sea, exposed to storms and hardship, usually far from any support, and vulnerable to sudden attack from the blockaded side, whose ships may stay safe in harbor until they choose to come out. In a distant blockade, the blockaders stay well away from the blockaded coast and try to intercept any ships going in or out. This may require more ships on station, but they can usually operate closer to their bases, and are at much less risk from enemy raids. This was almost impossible prior to the 16th century due to the nature of the ships used. A loose blockade is a close blockade where the blockading ships are withdrawn out of sight from the coast (behind the horizon) but no farther. The object of loose blockade is to lure the enemy into venturing out but to stay close enough to strike. British admiral Horatio Nelson applied a loose blockade at Cádiz in 1805. The Franco-Spanish fleet under Pierre-Charles Villeneuve then came out, resulting in the Battle of Trafalgar. Pacific blockade: Until 1827, blockades, as part of economic warfare, were always a part of a war. This changed when France, Russia and Britain came to the aid of the Greek rebels against Turkey. They blockaded the Turkish-occupied coast, which led to the battle of Navarino. War was never declared, however, so it is considered the first pacific — i.e. peaceful — blockade. The first truly pacific blockade, involving no shooting at all, was the British blockade of the Republic of New Granada in 1837, established to compel New Granada to release an imprisoned British consul. Legal status: Since 1945, the United Nations Security Council determines the legal status of blockades and by article 42 of the UN Charter, the council can also apply blockades. The UN Charter allows for the right of self-defense but requires that this must be immediately reported to the Security Council to ensure the maintenance of international peace. According to the not ratified document San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, 12 June 1994, a blockade is a legal method of warfare at sea but is governed by rules. The manual describes what can never be contraband. The blockading nation is free to select anything else as contraband in a list, which it must publish. The blockading nation typically establishes a blockaded area of water, but any ship can be inspected as soon as it is established that it is attempting to break the blockade. This inspection can occur inside the blockaded area or in international waters, but never inside the territorial waters of a neutral nation. A neutral ship must obey a request to stop for inspection from the blockading nation. If the situation so demands, the blockading nation can request that the ship divert to a known place or harbour for inspection. If the ship does not stop, then the ship is subject to capture. If people aboard the ship resist capture, they can be lawfully attacked. Act of war: Whether or not a blockade was seen as lawful depended on the laws of the nations whose trade was influenced by the blockade. The Brazilian blockade of Río de la Plata in 1826 during the Cisplatine War, for instance, was considered lawful according to British law but unlawful according to French and American law. The latter two countries announced they would actively defend their ships against Brazilian blockaders, while Britain was forced to steer for a peaceful solution between Brazil and Argentina. Blockade planning: Blockades depend on four general factors The value of the item being blockaded must warrant the need to blockade. For example, during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the items to be blockaded (or "quarantined" to use the more neutral term selected by President John F. Kennedy) were Medium-range ballistic missiles, capable of delivering nuclear weaponry, bound for Cuba. Their value was high, as a military threat against the United States. The strength of the blockading force must be equal to or greater in strength than the opposition. The blockade is only successful if the 'thing' in question is prevented from reaching its receiver. For example, the overwhelming power of the Royal Navy allowed a successful blockade of Germany during and after World War I. Geography. Knowing the routes of the enemy will help the blockader choose where to blockade: for example, a high mountain pass or a strait is a natural choke point and a candidate for fortification. A blockade tends to be a long campaign requiring a long-term commitment by the blockading power. The Atlantic U-boat campaign of World War I and Battle of the Atlantic were essentially about German blockades, and lasted nearly as long as their respective wars. The Imperial Japanese Navy, however, made only sporadic efforts at blockade during the Pacific war, preferring to seek victory by fleet action. Blockade running: Blockade running is the practice of delivering cargo (food, for example) to a blockaded area. It has mainly been done by ships (called blockade runners) across ports under naval blockade. Blockade runners were typically the fastest ships available and often lightly armed and armored. It is now also been done by aircraft, forming airbridges, such as over the Berlin Blockade after World War II. See also: Blockade of the Gaza Strip Blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh Command of the sea List of blockades Maritime Exclusion Zone No-fly zone Sea lines of communication References: Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Blockade" . Encyclopædia Britannica (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press.

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Blue-water navy

Attributes: In public discourse, blue-water capability is identified with the operation of capital ships such as battleships, battlecruisers, aircraft carriers, and nuclear submarines. For instance, during the debate in the 1970s whether Australia should replace HMAS Melbourne, a former chief of navy claimed that if Australia did not replace her last aircraft carrier, she "would no longer have a blue-water navy". In the end Australia did not buy a new carrier, but former Parliamentary defence advisor Gary Brown could still claim in 2004 that her navy remained "an effective blue-water force". The Soviet Navy towards the end of the Cold War is another example of a blue-water navy that had minimal carrier aviation, relying instead on submarines, missile-carrying surface ships, and long-range bombers based on land. A blue-water navy implies force protection from underwater warfare, surface warfare, and aerial warfare threats and a sustainable logistic reach, allowing a persistent presence at long range. A hallmark of a true blue-water navy is the ability to conduct replenishment at sea (RAS), and the commissioning of underway replenishment ships is a strong sign of a navy's blue-water ambitions. While a blue-water navy can project sea control power into another nation's littoral waters, it remains susceptible to threats from less capable forces (asymmetric warfare). Maintenance and logistics at range have high costs, and there might be a saturation advantage over a deployed force through the use of land-based air or surface-to-surface missile assets, diesel-electric submarines, or asymmetric tactics with fast attack craft (FAC). An example of this vulnerability was the October 2000 USS Cole bombing in Aden. The term 'blue-water navy' should not be confused with the capability of an individual ship. For example, vessels of a green-water navy can often operate in blue water for short periods of time. A number of nations have extensive maritime assets but lack the capability to maintain the required sustainable logistic reach. Some of them join coalition task groups in blue-water deployments such as anti-piracy patrols off Somalia. Definitions: According to a dictionary definition, blue-water capability refers to an oceangoing fleet able to operate on the high seas far from its nation's home ports. Some operate throughout the world. In their 2012 publication, "Sea Power and the Asia-Pacific", professors Geoffrey Till and Patrick C. Bratton outlined what they termed as "concise criteria" with regard to the definitions of brown-, green- and blue-water navies. Quote; "...a brown-water navy standing for a navy capable of defending its coastal zones, a green-water navy for a navy competent to operate in regional sea and finally [a] blue-water navy described as a navy with capability to operate across the deep waters." They go on to say that even with such a definition and understanding of naval hierarchy, it is still "ambiguous". For example, while France and the United States may be considered blue-water navies, he states that the "operational capability and geographic reach of both navies are definitely different." Another definition states that 'brown-water' refers to the littoral areas within 100 nautical miles of the coastline. 'Green-water' begins from 100 nautical miles out to the next major land formation, while 'blue-water' is the ability to project force out to at least 1,500 nautical miles beyond the coast. Traditionally a distinction used to be made between a coastal brown-water navy operating in the littoral zone to 200 nautical miles (or 370 kilometres) and an oceangoing blue-water navy. However, the United States Navy created a new term, green-water navy, to replace the term 'brown-water navy' in US Navy parlance. Today, a brown-water navy has come to be known as a predominantly riverine and littoral force. Despite the above, however, there is no agreed definition of the term. Classification and naval hierarchy: There have been many attempts by naval scholars and other authorities to classify world navies, including; Michael Morris, British naval historians Eric Grove and Professor Geoffrey Till, French strategist Hervé Coutau-Bégarie and professors Daniel Todd and Michael Lindberg. All identify basic common criteria for gauging the capability of navies, such as; total displacement and number of ships; modernity and power of weapons and systems; logistical and geographic reach with capacity for sustained operations; and the professional qualifications/disposition of sailors. The table below shows the world naval hierarchy according to the classification system by professors Daniel Todd and Michael Lindberg. Their system originates from 1996 and outlines ten ranks, distinguished by capability. Since then it has been used by various other experts to illustrate the subject. According to Todd and Lindberg, a "blue-water navy" is one that can project any sort of power beyond its own territorial waters. However they used the principle of loss of strength gradient and other criteria to distinguish navies by capability under the four "blue-water" ranks. The six ranks of "Non blue-water navies" can be further broken down into "green-water" and "brown-water navies", and according to Todd and Lindberg, these are navies only capable of operating as coastal defence forces, coast guards or riverine forces. Overseas basing: Historically, and to present day, blue-water navies have tended to establish overseas bases to extend the reach of supply lines, provide repair facilities and enhance the "effective striking power" of a fleet beyond the capabilities provided by the nation's homeports. Generally, these overseas bases are located within areas where potential conflicts or threats to the nation's interests may arise. For example, since World War II the Royal Navy and later the United States Navy have continued to base forces in Bahrain for operations in the Persian Gulf. The military importance and value of overseas basing is primarily dependent on geographical location. A base located at choke points in narrow or enclosed seas can be of high value, especially if positioned near, or within striking distance of an enemy's sea lines of communications. However advanced operating bases (or forward operating bases) can be equally as valuable. Naval Station Pearl Harbor acts as a "gateway" for the US Navy to "operate forward" in the Pacific Ocean. Examples: These are examples of navies that have been described by various defense experts or academics as being blue-water navies. Some have successfully used their blue-water capabilities to exercise control on the high seas and from there have projected power into other nations' littoral waters. However, there is no agreed upon definition among authorities as to what constitutes a blue-water navy. China: The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is subject to a variety of assessments regarding its capabilities. China's ambition towards blue-water capability received much attention, particularly from the United States Congress and Department of Defense, with both acknowledging that China's primary aim was to project power in the First and Second island chains. In a 2013 report to Congress, defense experts also asserted that over the coming decades, China would gain the capability to project power across the globe – similar to Britain's 1982 Falklands War. In addition, there were those who thought China already had a blue-water navy, such as British naval historian and professor Geoffrey Till, and also, Professor David Shambaugh who believed that the PLAN had transitioned from a green-water navy to that of a "limited" blue-water navy. According to Todd and Lindberg's classification system, the PLAN was a rank four "regional power projection navy". Since 2008, the PLAN has conducted anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden on a continuous basis. France: The French Navy is recognised as being a blue-water navy by various experts and academics.[A] According to professors Daniel Todd and Michael Lindberg, the French Navy is a rank two "limited global-reach power projection navy". The navy operates a single nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (Charles de Gaulle) which forms the centrepiece of the Navy's principal expeditionary task group (known as the Aeronaval Group). In addition to this, the navy maintains a secondary Amphibious Group (known as Le Groupe Amphibie) based around the Mistral-class amphibious assault ships. Both these formations are part of the Force d'action navale (or Naval Action Force). The 'Forces sous-marines' operates four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and six nuclear-powered fleet submarines. France retains a network of overseas naval facilities around the world; from Fort de France in the Caribbean, to Le Port, Réunion in the Indian Ocean, Papeete in the Pacific and in several other parts of the world too, including the Gulf, South Atlantic and the Western Pacific. The navy's operational duties include the protection of French interests abroad and the security of the nation's many overseas departments and territories, as such the Navy undertakes a number of standing commitments worldwide. India: The Indian Navy is unique among Asian navies due to its long experience in carrier power projection since 1961. This, according to Dr. George J. Gilboy and political scientist Eric Heginbotham, gives the Indian Navy the "leading power projection capability in the region". The Indian Navy is also the only Asian navy considered to be a rank three "multi-regional power projection navy" per Todd and Lindberg's classification system. In his discussion paper for Consultancy Africa Intelligence, Greg Ryan asserts that in recent years, the Indian Navy has emerged as a "global power in the blue water sense".

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Blue-water navy

The navy's operational duties include the protection of French interests abroad and the security of the nation's many overseas departments and territories, as such the Navy undertakes a number of standing commitments worldwide. India: The Indian Navy is unique among Asian navies due to its long experience in carrier power projection since 1961. This, according to Dr. George J. Gilboy and political scientist Eric Heginbotham, gives the Indian Navy the "leading power projection capability in the region". The Indian Navy is also the only Asian navy considered to be a rank three "multi-regional power projection navy" per Todd and Lindberg's classification system. In his discussion paper for Consultancy Africa Intelligence, Greg Ryan asserts that in recent years, the Indian Navy has emerged as a "global power in the blue water sense". India initially outlined its intentions of developing blue-water capabilities under the 2007 Maritime Capabilities Perspective Plan, with the navy's priority being the projection of "power in India's area of strategic interest", the Indian Ocean Region. Since 2007 the navy has increased its presence in the Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa to the Strait of Malacca, and routinely conducts anti-piracy operations and partnership building with other navies in the region. It also conducts routine two to three month-long deployments in the South and East China seas as well as the western Mediterranean simultaneously. The navy has a listening post in Madagascar. India inducted its first aircraft carrier in 1961, and the navy has ever since operated two independent carrier task forces. After INS Viraat and INS Vikrant were decommissioned, the country’s strike force currently centers on the two carrier battle groups: INS Vikramaditya, and a new indigenous aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant commissioned in September 2022, restoring India's two-carrier capability. The Indian Navy also possesses an amphibious transport dock, INS Jalashwa, and currently operates 2 Arihant-class indigenously developed nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine with two more under construction, along with leasing one Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarine and has many more ships of different types planned or under construction. Italy: The Italian Navy was categorised as a "regional blue-water navy" in Liu Huaqing's Memoirs (1994), and as a rank three "multi regional power projection navy" by Professors Daniel Todd and Michael Lindberg in 1996. In the former 1989 publication "The Atlantic Alliance and the Middle East", Joseph I. Coffey asserted that Italy's blue-water capabilities didn't extend beyond the Mediterranean sea. Today the navy possesses two aircraft carriers (Cavour and Giuseppe Garibaldi), a third one to be commissioned in 2023, as well as a modern fleet of surface combatants and submarines. The Marina Militare routinely deploys to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf as part of multinational anti-piracy missions such as Operation Ocean Shield and Operation Atalanta, and is capable of deploying a carrier battle group in support of NATO or EU operations such as during Operation Enduring Freedom (2001) and EU Navfor Med (European migrant crisis). In 2015 scholar Sarah Kirchberger mentioned Italy as a blue-water navy capable of operating in the high seas far from its home. As of June 2024 the Italian Navy has deployed a Carrier Strike Group, based on the Cavour (CVH 550) STOVL aircraft carrier (with F-35B onboard), for a five-months deployment to the Indo-Pacific region, reaching Singapore, Australia, Japan and the Philippines. Italian Navy will also participate to the Exercise RIMPAC, the world's largest international maritime warfare exercise. This is an indisputable evidence of the top level capabilities reached by the Italian Navy, which place the same at the level of the Royal Navy. Russia: The Soviet Navy maintained naval forces able to rival those of the United States; however, following the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian Navy experienced a severe decline due to lack of funding. By the late 1990s, there was little tangible evidence of Russian blue-water capability. It wasn't until 2007, under President Vladimir Putin, that "naval ambition broadened in scope and aimed at re-creating a large blue-water navy". Today, the Russian Navy is considered to be a rank 3 "multi-regional power projection navy" by Todd and Lindberg's classification system. The Russian Navy has also been described as a blue-water navy by British naval historian Professor Geoffrey Till. United Kingdom: The Royal Navy is considered to be a blue-water navy by naval experts and academics. This position is likely to be further cemented with the introduction of two new Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers, eighteen new frigates (8 Type 26, 5 Type 31, and 5 Type 32), and other warships currently being procured.[A][B] A term used commonly in the United Kingdom is that the Royal Navy maintains a maritime expeditionary capability. According to Todd and Lindberg's classification system, the Royal Navy is a rank two "limited global-reach power projection navy". The Royal Navy supports a number of standing commitments worldwide on a continuous basis and maintains an expeditionary task force known as the Joint Expeditionary Force (Maritime) (JEF (M)). The Royal Navy Submarine Service operates four Vanguard-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and seven nuclear-powered Astute and Trafalgar class fleet submarines which operate globally. The Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) maintains a number of ships which support Royal Navy operations globally by resupplying personnel, food, water, armament and fuel to their ships. The RFA also augment the Royal Navy's amphibious landing capabilities by operating the Bay class. The United Kingdom maintains five overseas naval facilities, including a naval support facility, named the British Defence Singapore Support Unit, in Sembawang, Singapore in the Far East. The U.S. Naval War College identifies the Royal Navy's tasks as fighting wars, conducting distant expeditions, maintaining good order at sea and preventing and deterring conflict. As such, the Navy views the retention of its "world-class" high-end disciplines in anti-air and anti-submarine warfare as strategically important. The Royal Navy has shown many examples of its expeditionary capabilities[C] since World War II, such as the Korean War, the 1982 Falklands War, the 1990–91 Gulf War, Sierra Leone, the War in Afghanistan, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and during the 2011 military intervention in Libya. United States: The United States Navy is considered a blue-water navy by experts and academics. It is distinguished from other power projection navies in that it is considered a global blue-water navy, able to operate in the deep waters of every ocean simultaneously. According to Todd and Lindberg's classification system, the United States Navy is a rank one "global-reach power projection navy", and the only navy to occupy this rank. The USN maintains eleven carrier strike groups (centered on the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier and Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carriers), of which six are deployed or ready for deployment within 30 days, and two ready for deployment within 90 days under the Fleet Response Plan (FRP). The USN also maintains a continuous deployment of nine expeditionary strike groups that embark a Marine Expeditionary Unit with an Aviation Combat Element on amphibious warfare ships. The US Military Sealift Command is the largest of its kind in the world and is responsible for delivering military transport and ship replenishment around the globe. The US Navy has shown countless examples of its blue-water combat capabilities and has the ability to project force onto the littoral regions of the world, engage in forward areas during peacetime, and rapidly respond to regional crises. Some examples of such are World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf War, the War in Afghanistan and the Iraq War. The United States Coast Guard, while not technically a navy, is also a blue-water naval force capable of deploying to waters throughout the world. From green-water to blue-water: Some green-water navies have ambitions towards the development of blue-water capabilities. While considered to be a green-water navy, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force is undergoing transition to develop blue-water capabilities. It began in 1981 when Prime Minister Zenkō Suzuki put forward a new doctrine requiring the JMSDF to expand its operations by 1,000 miles for defense of the nation's sea lines of communication. To respond to the growing blue-water requirements, the JMSDF has been developing impressive capabilities, most notably the creation of destroyer flotillas centered on large helicopter destroyers (such as the Hyūga-class helicopter carrier) and large Aegis-equipped destroyers. The first Japanese post-WWII overseas naval air facility was established next to Djibouti-Ambouli International Airport; it supports a number of Lockheed P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft. It was then decided to operate F-35B fighters on board the Izumo-class, a development of the Hyūga-class, and by July 2021 JS Izumo had completed modifications for this purpose, followed by an operational test using the U.S. Marine Corps F-35B in October. The Republic of Korea Navy also has ambitions to develop blue-water capabilities. In 2001, the South Korean President, Kim Dae-jung, announced plans to build a "Strategic Mobile Fleet".

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Blue-water navy

The first Japanese post-WWII overseas naval air facility was established next to Djibouti-Ambouli International Airport; it supports a number of Lockheed P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft. It was then decided to operate F-35B fighters on board the Izumo-class, a development of the Hyūga-class, and by July 2021 JS Izumo had completed modifications for this purpose, followed by an operational test using the U.S. Marine Corps F-35B in October. The Republic of Korea Navy also has ambitions to develop blue-water capabilities. In 2001, the South Korean President, Kim Dae-jung, announced plans to build a "Strategic Mobile Fleet". The plan includes the construction of up to three Dokdo-class amphibious assault ships, with a ski-jump for the operation of V/STOL jet fighters being considered for the second vessel currently under construction. On 3 December 2021 the National Assembly passed the budget to fund a fixed-wing aircraft carrier tentatively named CVX-class aircraft carrier capable of operating F35B, expected to enter operations possibly as early as 2033. The Brazilian Navy is experiencing a "shift in maritime priorities" with ambitions of developing a blue-water navy. While the navy maintains a mix of capabilities enabling it to operate in the wider South Atlantic Ocean, the Brazilian government wishes to be recognized as "the leading maritime power in the Southern Hemisphere" and is seeking to develop a modern naval shipbuilding industry. The Iranian Navy aims to develop blue-water capabilities: in July 2016, it announced plans to establish a presence in the Atlantic Ocean, and as of May 2021 has sent ships into the region. See also: Maritime geography Expeditionary warfare Power projection Footnotes: A. ^ Professor of International Politics, Adrian Hyde-Price, highlights that in the post-Cold War era both Britain and France have re-focused their attention "towards expeditionary warfare and power projection. Power projection has always been an element of British and French military thinking given their residual overseas interests, but it has now moved centre stage." B. ^ Royal United Services Institute (Occasional Paper, September 2013): "As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the independent ability to deploy a credible and powerful conventional force that enables access to most of the globe by sea is compelling. This force offers Britain the opportunity to commit political support in emerging crises to deter, prevent, coerce or – if necessary – destroy an aggressor, as envisaged in the UK's National Security Strategy (NSS)." C. ^ The Royal Navy does not typically use the term blue-water navy, but rather the term expeditionary. "The Navy is always expeditionary and is able to deal with threats to our nation's interest at range." References: External links: Description of the Falklands War (naval-history.net) The Pacific War (pwencycl.kgbudge.com)

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Bomber

Classification: Strategic: Strategic bombing is done by heavy bombers primarily designed for long-range bombing missions against strategic targets such as supply bases, bridges, factories, shipyards, and cities themselves, to diminish the enemy's ability to wage war by limiting access to resources through crippling infrastructure or reducing industrial output. Current examples include the strategic nuclear-armed bombers: B-2 Spirit, B-52 Stratofortress, Tupolev Tu-95 'Bear', Tupolev Tu-22M 'Backfire' and Tupolev Tu-160 "Blackjack"; historically notable examples are the: Gotha G.IV, Avro Lancaster, Heinkel He 111, Junkers Ju 88, Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress, Consolidated B-24 Liberator, Boeing B-29 Superfortress, and Tupolev Tu-16 'Badger'. Tactical: Tactical bombing, aimed at countering enemy military activity and in supporting offensive operations, is typically assigned to smaller aircraft operating at shorter ranges, typically near the troops on the ground or against enemy shipping. This role is filled by tactical bomber class, which crosses and blurs with various other aircraft categories: light bombers, medium bombers, dive bombers, interdictors, fighter-bombers, attack aircraft, multirole combat aircraft, and others. Current examples: Xian JH-7, Dassault Mirage 2000D, and the Panavia Tornado IDS Historical examples: Ilyushin Il-2 Shturmovik, Junkers Ju 87 Stuka, Republic P-47 Thunderbolt, Hawker Typhoon and Mikoyan MiG-27. History: The first use of an air-dropped bomb (actually four hand grenades specially manufactured by the Italian naval arsenal) was carried out by Italian Second Lieutenant Giulio Gavotti on 1 November 1911 during the Italo-Turkish war in Libya – although his plane was not designed for the task of bombing, and his improvised attacks on Ottoman positions had little impact. These picric acid-filled steel spheres were nicknamed "ballerinas" from the fluttering fabric ribbons attached. Early bombers: On 16 October 1912, Bulgarian observer Prodan Tarakchiev dropped two of those bombs on the Turkish railway station of Karağaç (near the besieged Edirne) from an Albatros F.2 aircraft piloted by Radul Milkov, during the First Balkan War. This is deemed to be the first use of an aircraft as a bomber. The first heavier-than-air aircraft purposely designed for bombing were the Italian Caproni Ca 30 and British Bristol T.B.8, both of 1913. The Bristol T.B.8 was an early British single engined biplane built by the Bristol Aeroplane Company. They were fitted with a prismatic Bombsight in the front cockpit and a cylindrical bomb carrier in the lower forward fuselage capable of carrying twelve 10 lb (4.5 kg) bombs, which could be dropped singly or as a salvo as required. The aircraft was purchased for use both by the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps (RFC), and three T.B.8s, that were being displayed in Paris during December 1913 fitted with bombing equipment, were sent to France following the outbreak of war. Under the command of Charles Rumney Samson, a bombing attack on German gun batteries at Middelkerke, Belgium was executed on 25 November 1914. The dirigible, or airship, was developed in the early 20th century. Early airships were prone to disaster, but slowly the airship became more dependable, with a more rigid structure and stronger skin. Prior to the outbreak of war, Zeppelins, a larger and more streamlined form of airship designed by German Count Ferdinand von Zeppelin, were outfitted to carry bombs to attack targets at long range. These were the first long range, strategic bombers. Although the German air arm was strong, with a total of 123 airships by the end of the war, they were vulnerable to attack and engine failure, as well as navigational issues. German airships inflicted little damage on all 51 raids, with 557 Britons killed and 1,358 injured. The German Navy lost 53 of its 73 airships, and the German Army lost 26 of its 50 ships. The Caproni Ca 30 was built by Gianni Caproni in Italy. It was a twin-boom biplane with three 67 kW (80 hp) Gnome rotary engines and first flew in October 1914. Test flights revealed power to be insufficient and the engine layout unworkable, and Caproni soon adopted a more conventional approach installing three 81 kW (110 hp) Fiat A.10s. The improved design was bought by the Italian Army and it was delivered in quantity from August 1915. While mainly used as a trainer, Avro 504s were also briefly used as bombers at the start of the First World War by the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) when they were used for raids on the German airship sheds. Strategic bombing: Bombing raids and interdiction operations were mainly carried out by French and British forces during the War as the German air arm was forced to concentrate its resources on a defensive strategy. Notably, bombing campaigns formed a part of the British offensive at the Battle of Neuve Chapelle in 1915, with Royal Flying Corps squadrons attacking German railway stations in an attempt to hinder the logistical supply of the German army. The early, improvised attempts at bombing that characterized the early part of the war slowly gave way to a more organized and systematic approach to strategic and tactical bombing, pioneered by various air power strategists of the Entente, especially Major Hugh Trenchard; he was the first to advocate that there should be "... sustained [strategic bombing] attacks with a view to interrupting the enemy's railway communications ... in conjunction with the main operations of the Allied Armies." When the war started, bombing was very crude (hand-held bombs were thrown over the side) yet by the end of the war long-range bombers equipped with complex mechanical bombing computers were being built, designed to carry large loads to destroy enemy industrial targets. The most important bombers used in World War I were the French Breguet 14, British de Havilland DH-4, German Albatros C.III and Russian Sikorsky Ilya Muromets. The Russian Sikorsky Ilya Muromets, was the first four-engine bomber to equip a dedicated strategic bombing unit during World War I. This heavy bomber was unrivaled in the early stages of the war, as the Central Powers had no comparable aircraft until much later. Long range bombing raids were carried out at night by multi-engine biplanes such as the Gotha G.IV (whose name was synonymous with all multi-engine German bombers) and later the Handley Page Type O; the majority of bombing was done by single-engined biplanes with one or two crew members flying short distances to attack enemy lines and immediate hinterland. As the effectiveness of a bomber was dependent on the weight and accuracy of its bomb load, ever larger bombers were developed starting in World War I, while considerable money was spent developing suitable bombsights. World War II: With engine power as a major limitation, combined with the desire for accuracy and other operational factors, bomber designs tended to be tailored to specific roles. By the start of the war this included: dive bomber – specially strengthened for vertical diving attacks for greater accuracy light bomber, medium bomber and heavy bomber – subjective definitions based on size and/or payload capacity torpedo bomber – specialized aircraft armed with torpedoes ground attack aircraft – aircraft used against targets on a battlefield such as troop or tank concentrations night bomber – specially equipped to operate at night when opposing defences are limited maritime patrol – long range bombers that were used against enemy shipping, particularly submarines fighter-bomber – a modified fighter aircraft used as a light bomber Bombers of this era were not intended to attack other aircraft although most were fitted with defensive weapons. World War II saw the beginning of the widespread use of high speed bombers which began to minimize defensive weaponry in order to attain higher speed. Some smaller designs were used as the basis for night fighters. A number of fighters, such as the Hawker Hurricane were used as ground attack aircraft, replacing earlier conventional light bombers that proved unable to defend themselves while carrying a useful bomb load. Cold War: At the start of the Cold War, bombers were the only means of carrying nuclear weapons to enemy targets, and had the role of deterrence. With the advent of guided air-to-air missiles, bombers needed to avoid interception. High-speed and high-altitude flying became a means of evading detection and attack. Designs such as the English Electric Canberra could fly faster or higher than contemporary fighters. When surface-to-air missiles became capable of hitting high-flying bombers, bombers were flown at low altitudes to evade radar detection and interception. Once "stand off" nuclear weapon designs were developed, bombers did not need to pass over the target to make an attack; they could fire and turn away to escape the blast. Nuclear strike aircraft were generally finished in bare metal or anti-flash white to minimize absorption of thermal radiation from the flash of a nuclear explosion. The need to drop conventional bombs remained in conflicts with non-nuclear powers, such as the Vietnam War or Malayan Emergency.

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Bomber

With the advent of guided air-to-air missiles, bombers needed to avoid interception. High-speed and high-altitude flying became a means of evading detection and attack. Designs such as the English Electric Canberra could fly faster or higher than contemporary fighters. When surface-to-air missiles became capable of hitting high-flying bombers, bombers were flown at low altitudes to evade radar detection and interception. Once "stand off" nuclear weapon designs were developed, bombers did not need to pass over the target to make an attack; they could fire and turn away to escape the blast. Nuclear strike aircraft were generally finished in bare metal or anti-flash white to minimize absorption of thermal radiation from the flash of a nuclear explosion. The need to drop conventional bombs remained in conflicts with non-nuclear powers, such as the Vietnam War or Malayan Emergency. The development of large strategic bombers stagnated in the later part of the Cold War because of spiraling costs and the development of the Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) – which was felt to have similar deterrent value while being impossible to intercept. Because of this, the United States Air Force XB-70 Valkyrie program was cancelled in the early 1960s; the later B-1B Lancer and B-2 Spirit aircraft entered service only after protracted political and development problems. Their high cost meant that few were built and the 1950s-designed B-52s are projected to remain in use until the 2040s. Similarly, the Soviet Union used the intermediate-range Tu-22M 'Backfire' in the 1970s, but their Mach 3 bomber project stalled. The Mach 2 Tu-160 'Blackjack' was built only in tiny numbers, leaving the 1950s Tupolev Tu-16 and Tu-95 'Bear' heavy bombers to continue being used into the 21st century. The British strategic bombing force largely came to an end when the V bomber force was phased out; the last of which left service in 1983. The French Mirage IV bomber version was retired in 1996, although the Mirage 2000N and the Rafale have taken on this role. The only other nation that fields strategic bombing forces is China, which has a number of Xian H-6s. Modern era: Currently, only the United States Air Force, the Russian Aerospace Forces' Long-Range Aviation command, and China's People's Liberation Army Air Force operate strategic heavy bombers. Other air forces have transitioned away from dedicated bombers in favor of multirole combat aircraft. At present, these air forces are each developing stealth replacements for their legacy bomber fleets, the USAF with the Northrop Grumman B-21, the Russian Aerospace Forces with the PAK DA, and the PLAAF with the Xian H-20. As of 2021, the B-21 is expected to enter service by 2026–2027. The B-21 would be capable of loitering near target areas for extended periods of time. Other uses: Occasionally, military aircraft have been used to bomb ice jams with limited success as part of an effort to clear them. In 2018, the Swedish Air Force dropped bombs on a forest fire, snuffing out flames with the aid of the blast waves. The fires had been raging in an area contaminated with unexploded ordnance, rendering them difficult to extinguish for firefighters. See also: Aerial bombing of cities Air interdiction Assembly ship Carpet bombing Fighter aircraft List of bomber aircraft Offensive counter air Strategic bomber References: == External links ==

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Booby trap

Etymology: The Spanish word bobo translates to "stupid, daft, naïve, simple, fool, idiot, clown, funny man, one who is easily cheated" and similar pejorative terms. The slang of bobo, bubie, translates to "dunce". Variations of this word exist in other languages (such as Latin), with their meaning being "to stammer". In approximately 1590, the word began appearing in the English language as booby, meaning "stupid person, slow bird". The seabird in question was the genus Sula, with their common name being boobies. These birds have large flat feet and wide wingspans for marine habitats but are clumsy and slow on shore making them easy to catch. The birds are also known for landing aboard seagoing vessels, whereupon they have been eaten by the crew. The phrase booby trap originally applied to schoolboy pranks, but took on its more serious connotation during World War I. Military booby traps: A military booby trap is designed to kill or injure a person who activates its trigger, or employed to reveal the location of an enemy by setting off a signalling device. Most, but not all, military booby traps involve explosives. Part of the skill in placing booby traps lies in exploiting natural human behaviors such as habit, self–preservation, curiosity or acquisitiveness. A common trick is to provide victims with a simple solution to a problem, for example, leaving only one door open in an otherwise secure building, luring them straight toward the firing mechanism. An example that exploits an instinct for self–preservation was used in the Vietnam War. Spikes known as punji sticks were hidden in grassy areas. When fired upon, soldiers instinctively sought to take cover by throwing themselves down on the ground, impaling themselves on the spikes. Many purpose–built booby–trap firing devices exist such as the highly versatile M142 universal firing device (identical to the British L5A1 or Australian F1A1), or Yugoslavian UMNOP-1 which allow a variety of different ways of triggering explosives e.g. via trip wire (either pulling it or releasing the tension on it), direct pressure on an object (e.g. standing on it), or pressure release (lift/shift something) etc. Most explosive booby traps use between 250 g and 1 kg of explosive. Since most booby traps are rigged to detonate within a metre of the victim's body, this is adequate to kill or severely wound. Effects: Booby traps are indiscriminate weapons. Like anti-personnel mines, they can harm civilians and noncombatants during and after the conflict. The use against civilians is prohibited by the Protocol on Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, and the protocol also prohibits boobytrapping e.g. the wounded or dead, medical equipment, food, and drink. History: A type of booby trap was referred to in an 1839 news story in The Times. During the Vietnam War, motorcycles were rigged with explosives by the National Liberation Front and abandoned. U.S. soldiers would be tempted to ride the motorcycle and thus trigger the explosives. In addition, NLF soldiers would rig rubber band grenades and place them in huts that US soldiers would likely burn. Another popular booby trap was the "Grenade in a Can", a grenade with the safety pin removed in a container and a string attached, sometimes with the grenade's fuse mechanism modified to give a much shorter delay than the four to seven seconds typical with grenade fuses. The NLF soldiers primarily used these on doors and attached them to tripwires on jungle paths. The CIA and Green Berets countered by booby trapping the enemy's ammunition supplies, in an operation code–named "Project Eldest Son". The propellant in a rifle or machine–gun cartridge was replaced with high explosive. Upon being fired, the sabotaged round would destroy the gun and kill or injure the shooter. Mortar shells were similarly rigged to explode when dropped down the tube, instead of launching properly. This ammunition was then carefully re–packed to eliminate any evidence of tampering, and planted in enemy munitions dumps by covert insertion teams. A sabotaged round might also be planted in a rifle magazine or machine–gun belt and left on the body of a dead NLF soldier, in anticipation that the deceased's ammo would be picked up and used by his comrades. No more than one sabotaged round would be planted in any case, magazine, or belt of ammunition, to reduce the chances of the enemy finding it no matter how diligently they inspected their supplies. False rumors and forged documents were circulated to make it appear that the Communist Chinese were supplying the NLF with defective weapons and ammunition. Northern Ireland: During the Troubles, an ethnonationalist conflict in Northern Ireland, booby traps were used by Irish republican and Ulster loyalist paramilitaries to target British security forces and civilians. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) was the most prolific user of the booby traps during the conflict; according to the Sutton Index of Deaths, 180 people were killed during the Troubles as the result of booby trap bombs, the vast majority of them laid by the IRA. A common type of booby trap was the car bomb, which involved attaching a bomb to a car so that starting or driving it would detonate the explosive. Middle East: During the Al-Aqsa Intifada, some Arab–Palestinian groups made wide use of booby traps. The largest use of booby traps (between 2000 and 2005, the period of the Intifada) was in the Battle of Jenin during Operation Defensive Shield where a large number (1000–2000 according to Palestinian militant captured in Jenin during the battle ) of explosive devices were planted by insurgents. Booby traps had been laid in the streets of both the camp and the town, ready to be triggered if a foot snagged a tripwire or a vehicle rolled over a mine. Some of the bombs were huge, containing as much as 250 lb (110 kg) of explosives. To counter the booby traps, anti–tank and anti–personnel mines the IDF sent armored D9 bulldozers to clear the area out of any explosive device and booby trap planted. The IDF D9 bulldozers were heavily armored and thus did not sustain any damage from the explosions, which were triggered by them as they pushed forwards. Eventually, a dozen D9 bulldozers went into action, razing the center of the refugee camp and forcing the Palestinian militants inside to surrender. Gallery: Civilian use and legal ramifications: Booby traps have been applied as defensive weapons against unwelcome guests or against non–military trespassers, but most jurisdictions consider the practice illegal. Practical jokes: Instead of being used to kill, maim or injure people, booby traps can also be used for entertainment. Practical joke booby traps are typically disguised as everyday items such as cigars or packets of chewing gum, nuts or other snack items. When the victims attempts to use the item, the trap is triggered. Two of the best known examples of this are the exploding cigar and dribble glass; others include the Snake Nut Can and shocking gum. Booby traps can also be constructed out of household or workplace items and be triggered when the victim performs a common action. Examples of this include loosening the bolts in a chair so that it collapses when sat upon, or placing a bucket of water on top of a partly open door so that when the door is fully opened, the bucket tips onto the victim. See also: References: External links: US Army Training Film from 1944 (humorous cartoon with a serious message) Mines & Boobytrap devices - British guide dated 1943 How not to get caught by mines and boobytraps – US warning guide dated 1944, and still relevant How not to get caught by Vietnamese boobytraps - US guide dated 1969 Army Field Manual FM531 Boobytraps - US guide dated 1965 Photos of booby trap devices used in Angola Booby trap concepts and detection techniques The Straight Dope: What's the origin of "booby trap"? Archived 2008-11-20 at the Wayback Machine Photos of injuries inflicted by explosive boobytraps (Warning: graphic images) The M142 multi-function boobytrap firing device (technical specifications) Archived 2010-09-28 at the Wayback Machine Cut-away diagram and technical specifications of M5 pressure release boobytrap firing device Photo of M5 pressure release boobytrap firing device connected to a one pound block of TNT explosive Archived 2021-04-03 at the Wayback Machine Paolo Borsellino's road side bombing triggered by a booby trapped door bell

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Bounding overwatch

Example of tactic: A squad (2–3 fireteams) in an urban combat zone must advance to a building 100 feet away, crossing an intersection they believe might be in enemy rifle sights from elevated buildings. If the team simply made a run for it, they expose themselves to potential enemy fire without protection. This is where bounding overwatch comes into play. One fireteam takes an overwatch position while the other team bounds (a bound is a 3–5 second rush) to a new covered position. This way there is always an overwatch team that can react instantaneously to enemy fire (the bounding team would have to stop, take cover, locate the enemy, and aim before they could return fire). Once the covered position is reached by the bounding team, they now assume overwatch positions while the other team then becomes the bounding team. By using bounding overwatch, this unit is able to effectively move through a hostile urban street and intersection, without unnecessarily exposing themselves to enemy fire. If enemy contact is made, the overwatch team opens fire and the unit takes up a process called fire and maneuver which is very similar to bounding overwatch in that teams alternate firing and maneuvering. During fire and maneuver, the commander takes more direct control of team movements and positions. In infantry tactics, leapfrogging (also called The Buddy System) is a technique for advancing personnel and/or equipment on or past a target area being defended by an opposing force. This technique is taught in U.S. Army Basic Training and reinforced with all unit and advanced training throughout a soldier's career. It can be modified for use with equipment as well as personnel. Leapfrogging: Leapfrogging requires dividing an attacking force into at least two parts (for example Team A and Team B). The teams agree on a signal for role assignment; for existing units, the signal is often preset and practiced. Team A will redirect or suppress the enemy by firing on the target while Team B changes positions. When the signal is given, the teams switch roles: Team B redirects or suppresses while Team A moves. Before changing positions, the moving team will usually identify a location that advances them on the target, has adequate cover and line of sight to engage the target. Variations of this technique may employ more than two teams (with as few as one person) in the suppressing or moving roles. A variation may be chosen based on the size and equipment of the defending force, as well as the distance and frequency of available cover. In situations where the defending force is unaware of the attacking force, it may be possible to hold fire and conduct part or all of the movement without being observed. See also: Fire and movement Center peel Overwatch (military tactic) Siege == References ==

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Broken-backed war theory

Origin of the phrase: Broken-backed war theory was first formally elaborated on in the 1952 British Defence White Paper, to describe what would presumably happen after a major nuclear exchange. The American "New Look Strategy of 1953/54" utterly rejected the notion of broken-backed war. They dropped the term from the 1955 white paper, and the phrase has since faded from common usage. Commentary: Klaus Knorr purported that in a broken-backed war scenario, only military weapons and vehicles on hand prior to the sustained hostilities would be of use, as the economic potential of both sides would be, at least in theory, utterly shattered: Do current predictions on the nature of future warfare exhaust not only all possible, but all likely, contingencies? It can be granted that a long-drawn-out and massive war conducted with conventional, by which I mean modernized but nonatomic, weapons, is so unlikely to occur that it may be safely neglected as a contingency. There definitely is no future for World War II. It can also be granted that, once unlimited thermonuclear war has broken out, there is no economic war potential to be mobilized for its conduct. Even a broken-backed war would have to be fought overwhelmingly, if not entirely, with munitions on hand at the start of the fighting. Herman Kahn, in his tome On Thermonuclear War, posited that a broken-backed war is implausible, because one side would likely absorb vastly more damage than its opposition. The "broken-back" war notion is obsolete not only because of the possibility of mutual devastation but even more because it is so very unlikely that the forces of both sides would become attrited in even roughly the same way. One side is likely to get a rather commanding advantage and exploit this lead to force the other side to choose between surrender and the physical destruction of its capability to continue. The nuclear strategist Bernard Brodie argued that this form of conflict may be impractical simply because it is almost impossible to plan for. His writings on the subject came before the advent of counter-force doctrine, and during a time of nuclear plenty, when it was safe to assume that a nuclear exchange would render a nation's industry useless. During the Cold War, Colonel Virgil Ney hypothesized that a nuclear exchange alone would not be enough to defeat the Soviet Union, and he argued for a modest construction of underground facilities and infrastructure. In popular culture: The table-top role-playing game Twilight: 2000 released by Game Designers' Workshop in 1984 entails a broken-backed war; in the aftermath of a nuclear exchange in 1997, by 2000, Warsaw Pact and NATO forces are still fighting for a decisive victory in Europe and elsewhere with dwindling conventional arms and munitions. The plot of the 2005 video game Cuban Missile Crisis: The Aftermath is about an alternate history where world powers scramble for resources after the Cuban Missile Crisis resulted in an initial nuclear exchange. == References ==

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Brown-water navy

History: River Thames: The River Thames was a regular thoroughfare for the Sovereign until the middle of the 19th century. Monarchs would be rowed up and down the river in a Royal barge, with transport and security organised by the King's Bargemaster. The barges were operated by the Royal Watermen, drawn from the ranks of the Company of Watermen and Lightermen. In 1798, Watermen and other groups of river tradesmen on the River Thames voluntarily formed associations of River Fencibles. These were officially drawn together in 1803 as the "Corps of River Fencibles of the City of London". Members of the Corps escorted the barge carrying the body of Lord Nelson along the Thames in small boats during his state funeral in 1806. The Corps of River Fencibles was eventually disbanded in 1813. Habsburg and Ottoman Empires: Both the Habsburg Empire and the Ottoman Empire maintained river flotillas on the Danube in 18th and 19th centuries, most notable for the use of šajka boats. Men who served in the Habsburg flotilla were known as Šajkaši. Napoleonic Wars: After losing its blue-water fleet in the Battle of Copenhagen in 1807, the kingdom of Denmark-Norway quickly built a brown-water navy. The partial successes of the resulting Gunboat War were undone by land invasion. Mexican–American War: During the Mexican–American War, Commodore Matthew C. Perry decided to invade the Mexican towns along the Gulf Coast near Tabasco. In October 1846 Perry was in command of USS Mississippi, USS Vixen, USRC McLane, USS Reefer, USS Bonito, USS Nonata and USRC Forward with a 253-man landing force. After capturing the port of Frontera on the Tabasco River, the ships under Perry's command crossed the bar at the mouth of the river and traveled 74 miles (119 km) up river to the town of Tabasco. After several days of bombardment of Tabasco, Perry's ships captured several Mexican ships on the river and brought them back to Frontera. Some were commissioned into U.S. Navy service and others were burned. The city of Tampico was poorly defended and offered a base for operations for the conquest of the state of Tamaulipas. For these reasons Tampico became the next target for seizure by American naval forces. Commodore David Conner directed that it be attacked in late October 1846 and those plans were captured by General Antonio López de Santa Anna. Santa Anna directed that Tampico be almost abandoned and his forces be moved up river to Pánuco. This move was completed by 28 October. The bar at the mouth of the Pánuco River was only eight feet and hindered the movement of American ships up the river. The wife of the former American consul at Tampico sent word to Conner that the river was rising and that the town had been abandoned. Conner's forces crossed the bar on 14 November and began shelling the town. Almost immediately the remaining garrison at Tampico surrendered and Conner learned that the troops stationed there had retreated to Pánuco 25 miles upstream from Tampico. After Conner's ships moved to Pánuco and several days of naval bombardment, the Mexican forces at Pánuco surrendered. The American Army quickly occupied Tampico and used it for a staging point for a planned attack on Veracruz. American Civil War: The U.S. Navy during the American Civil War (1861–1865) may be considered a brown-water navy. As a blueprint for the "strangulation" of the Confederate States of America, Winfield Scott's Anaconda Plan called for a two-pronged approach by first blocking the South's harbors and then pushing along the Mississippi River, effectively cutting the Confederate territory in two while also robbing the South of its main artery of transport. The U.S. Navy was assigned the blockade of the seaports, while a new force of gunboats and river ironclads, together with regular army units, would take, or at least lay siege to, the Confederate forts and cities along the Mississippi. In the early days of the war, U.S. Army built and crewed these boats, with the naval officers commanding them being the only direct connection to the U.S. Navy. By the autumn of 1862, the boats and their mission were transferred to the Department of the Navy. Because of the river's murky brown water, the ships that participated in these Mississippi campaigns were quickly referred to as the brown-water navy, as opposed to the regular U.S. Navy (which was henceforth referred to as the deep-water or blue-water navy). Paraguayan War: After the end of the American civil war the next major military conflict in the world was the Paraguayan War (1864–1870). In this the Brazilian brown-water navy, which comprised large ironclads as well as river monitors, had a crucial role. The natural water highway to the Republic of Paraguay was the River Paraguay but this route was blocked by the formidable Fortress of Humaitá. It comprised a 6,000-foot (1,800 m) line of artillery batteries overlooking a sharp concave bend in the river, at a point where the channel was only 200 yards (180 m) wide. A chain boom could be raised to block the navigation. The fortress was exceedingly hard to take from the landward side for it was protected by impassible swamp, marsh or lagoons and, where not, by 8 miles (13 km) of trenches with a garrison of 18,000 men. The river was shallow, uncharted and capable of trapping large vessels if the water level should fall. In that environment the greatest threat to shipping was "torpedoes" (nineteenth-century floating naval mines). Six vessels of the Brazilian ironclad squadron eventually succeeded in dashing past Humaitá in an incident known as the Passage of Humaitá, an event considered as nearly impossible. Although it could not operate far beyond its military forward base, nevertheless, Brazilian domination of the river meant that Paraguay could no longer resupply the fortress, and eventually it was starved out and captured by the land forces in the Siege of Humaitá. Even after Humaitá was captured − which took more than two years – the Paraguayans improvised further strongpoints along the river, further delaying the Allies (the Empire of Brazil, the Argentine Republic and the Republic of Uruguay). U.S. gunboat diplomacy in China: Save for an occasional river patrol boat, the United States' river ironclad navy was all but abolished at the end of the American Civil War. Yet the concept of a river defense force lived on in countries and regions where rivers enabled the U.S. to project its military presence, allowing it to protect its foreign interests abroad. U.S. river boats (gunboats) of the Asiatic Fleet operated in portions of Chinese rivers, sometimes referred to as the "Asiatic Navy" or "China Navy", during the turbulent 1920s, patrolling for insurgents and river pirates. Two of the most notable China gunboats were USS Panay, which was sunk in 1937 by Japanese military aircraft prior to World War II, and USS Wake, which was captured by the Japanese in December 1941. The U.S. Navy of that era used the term for protecting U.S. foreign policy and its citizens abroad "gunboat diplomacy". The U.S. Navy, China gunboat, USS Asheville, was sunk by the Japanese in March 1942. Second Sino-Japanese War: During the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Manchukuo Imperial Navy served principally to patrol the Sungari, Amur, and Ussuri rivers, support Army operations against Chinese resistance forces, and guard Manchukuo's riverine borders with the Soviet Union. In 1939 the Navy's forces came under the control of the Manchukuo Imperial Army as the River Defence Fleet. Indochina War: During the First Indochina War, the French Navy created the Dinassaut (naval assault divisions), in 1947, to operate in the waters of the Mekong and Red rivers, conducting search and destroy missions, against communist guerillas and river pirates. They succeeded the river flotillas created in 1945, by the request of General Leclerc. The Dinassaut served until the end of the conflict in 1955, and its concept would be latter adopted by the United States Navy in the Vietnam War. Ten Dinassauts were created, with five based in Cochinchina and the others in Tonkin. Each one was made of about ten vessels and one Commandos Marine unit. The types of vessels operated by a Dinassaut included LCI, LCT, LCM, LCVP, LCS, LCA, LSSL and fire support vessels. The role of the Dinassaut was to transport, land and support the infantry, to patrol the watercourses and to assure the supply of the isolated posts. The sailors that served in the Dinassaut were referred as the "Navy in Khaki", in comparison with the sailors that served in the ocean that were referred as the "Navy in White".

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Brown-water navy

The Dinassaut served until the end of the conflict in 1955, and its concept would be latter adopted by the United States Navy in the Vietnam War. Ten Dinassauts were created, with five based in Cochinchina and the others in Tonkin. Each one was made of about ten vessels and one Commandos Marine unit. The types of vessels operated by a Dinassaut included LCI, LCT, LCM, LCVP, LCS, LCA, LSSL and fire support vessels. The role of the Dinassaut was to transport, land and support the infantry, to patrol the watercourses and to assure the supply of the isolated posts. The sailors that served in the Dinassaut were referred as the "Navy in Khaki", in comparison with the sailors that served in the ocean that were referred as the "Navy in White". Portuguese Colonial War: In Portuguese service, the brown-water navy has been often referred as the "Naval Dust" (Portuguese: Poeira Naval), for its use of a large number of small vessels, in comparison with the conventional blue-water navy that uses a smaller number of larger vessels. In several historical periods, the Portuguese Navy had to develop riverine forces to operate in then-Portuguese colonies in Asia, South America and Africa. During the Portuguese Colonial War, from 1961 to 1974, the Portuguese Navy created a brown-water navy to operate in the rivers and lakes of Angola, Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique, against the separatist, communist guerrillas, as well as river pirates. For the organization of their riverine forces, the Portuguese were inspired by the French experience in Indochina with the Dinassaut and by their own historical experience in the operation of river flotillas in support of the Portuguese colonial pacification campaigns in Africa during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Under the local commands of the Navy, the Portuguese created river boat flotillas (esquadrilhas de lanchas) in the Zaire River in Angola, in the Lake Nyasa in Mozambique and in the river system of the Portuguese Guinea. Smaller riverine forces were also created in the Cabinda Province of Angola, in Eastern Angola (to operate in the Cuito, Zambezi, Cuando, Lungué Bungo and Cuanza rivers) and in Tete to operate in the Mozambican section of the Zambezi river. These forces were responsible for reconnaissance, surveillance, the interdiction of the rivers and lakes to the enemy, and to avoid their use for the infiltration and supply of guerrillas in the interior of Portuguese territory. Additionally, the riverine forces were also tasked with the mobile fire support to the land forces, the movement of troops, the supply of the Portuguese garrisons and the support of the civilian population in the riverine areas. For these riverine forces, the Portuguese Navy conceived five types of vessels: the LFG (large river patrol boats of 200–300 t), the LFP (small river patrol boats of 18–40 t), the LDG (large landing craft of 480–550 t), the LDM (medium landing craft of 50 t) and the LDP (small landing craft of 12 t). The LFGs were armed with 40 mm guns and the LDPs with 20 mm guns, with several units of both types being also armed with rocket launchers. The LDG, LDM and LDP types were based, respectively, in the LCT, LCM and LCVP/LCA designs, but were modified in order to have a greater mission endurance and to be used for patrolling, fire support and as a mobile base for the Marines. This modifications included the protection of sensitive parts with armor, the installation of 40 mm (LDGs) or 20 mm (LDMs and LDPs) guns and the improvement of the crew accommodations, partially at the expense of the cargo deck. The river boat flotillas were complemented by assault units of Special Marines (fuzileiros especiais) and security units of Marines (fuzileiros). The Portuguese Marines operated based in the patrol boats and landing craft and also using their own rubber boats. Vietnam War: On 18 December 1965, for the first time since the American Civil War, the United States Navy formalized its new, brown-water navy in Vietnam. Initially, the brown-water navy patrolled the inland waterways of the Mekong River, primarily with South Vietnamese river craft (RAG—River Assault Groups) boats, which were mostly inherited from the French Navy during the previous war and in turn, had been received from the U.S., as military aid, in the French fight against the Viet Minh, the Communist-led Vietnamese alliance. As the new fiberglass Patrol Boat, River using water jet propulsion, became available, it became the main interdiction vessel for patrolling the Vietnamese Mekong River country. For coastal duty the South Vietnamese Navy used larger seaworthy craft. These were replaced by newer U.S. Navy Swift Boats (PCF—Patrol Craft Fast, aluminum 50 footers) and United States Coast Guard Point-class cutters. By the late 1960s, the Swift Boat would commence operations alongside the PBRs in the inland waters, as well as maintaining operations along the coastline. Navy and Coast Guard ships assumed coastal duties. The Swift boats were operated by small crews but became a staple asset in riverine operations; they patrolled waterways, performed special operations, gunfire support and insertion of troops into enemy territory. The brown-water Mobile Riverine Force was a joint venture between the Navy and the Army, modeled after the earlier French Riverine and coastal patrols in the First Indochina War (1946–1954). In the beginning this force consisted of mostly modified surplus U.S. World War II landing craft (boats), such as the LCMs, LCVPs, LCIs, etc. The only entirely new riverine boat from the French Indochina War had been the French designed STCN (an all-steel "V" hulled boat, approximately 40 feet in length, whose design had been influenced by the U.S. LCVP). This particular craft influenced the design of the U.S. Navy's only original riverine boat built for the Vietnam War—the 50-foot all-steel hull, aluminum superstructured Assault Support Patrol Boat (ASPB) or "Alpha Boat". The ASPB was built by the Gunderson Company, in Oregon, USA, and was of reinforced construction, in order to survive exploding mines. As a consequence, the ASPB earned a reputation as the "minesweeper" of the riverine forces. Along with the aforementioned PBRs, other riverine craft included PCFs, ASPBs, and monitors (modified LCMs). Together these craft formed a Mobile Riverine Force, that utilized various supporting facilities, such as the Yard Repair Berthing and Messings, advance bases, LSTs, helicopter and seawolf units. The brown-water navy (in conjunction with other efforts, such as Operation Market Time and Operation Game Warden) was largely successful in its efforts to stop North Vietnam using the South Vietnamese coast and rivers to resupply its military and the Viet Cong. The flow of weapons and ammunition came to a virtual standstill during Operation Market Time, from 1965 and 1970. Brown-water river assault units were formalized in January 1967 with the 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division arriving under the command of Major General William Fulton. Later that same year, in combination with U.S. Navy Task Force 116 & 117 they formed the Mobile Riverine Force. In 1970, for the last time since the Civil War, the Navy stood down the last of its brown-water navy units, as they were turned over to the South Vietnamese and Cambodian governments under the Vietnamization policy. See also: United States Navy Riverine Squadron Special warfare combatant-craft crewmen Navies of landlocked countries Insect-class gunboat Mississippi Marine Brigade Amur Military Flotilla Maritime geography Operation Sealords Serbian River Flotilla River Battalion (Croatia) Humaitá-class gunboat River gunboat River pirate Green-water navy References: Bibliography: External links: Riverine Warfare/Brown Water Navy Resources at Texas Tech

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Bull horn formation

Early life: Shaka (roughly translated as "intestinal beetle") was born to the Zulu king. He was the eldest of many sons, but was considered to be a bastard child and was sent away to live in another neighboring tribe known as the Elangeni, where his mother was originally from, leaving his half-brother to rule the Zulu kingdom. At the time, the Zulu were a regional tribe relying on pastoral livestock, maize, and milk. When Shaka reached a suitable age, he and his mother were sent to the Mthethwa clan, the most powerful regional tribe. There, he matured, and served as a warrior under Jobe, and then for Dingiswayo, a respected warrior and chief of the clan. When Inkosi Dingiswayo discovered Shaka was royalty, he put him in charge of a regiment, helping to develop Shaka's military tactics and strategy. After Inkosi Zwide murdered Dingiswayo, Shaka sought to avenge his death. During that encounter, Zwide's mother, Ntombazi, a sangoma, was killed by Shaka. Shaka chose a particularly gruesome revenge on her by locking her in a house with jackals or hyenas inside. They devoured her, and in the morning, Shaka burned the house to the ground. Shaka continued his pursuit of Zwide. It was not until around 1825 that the two military leaders met in the vicinity of Pongola, near the present-day border of Mpumalanga, a province in South Africa. Shaka was victorious in battle, although his forces sustained heavy casualties, including his military commander, Mgobhozi Ovela Entabeni. Already at this time, Shaka had grown famous for his use of the short stabbing spear. It was deadly and easy to thrust, whereas before, tribesmen barely tried to customize or improve their weapons. Shaka's innovative tactics, among them the bull horn tactic, devastated Zwide's forces at the battle of Gqokli Hill. In his initial years, Shaka had neither the influence nor reputation to compel any but the smallest of groups to join him, and upon Dingiswayo's death, he moved southwards across the Thukela River, establishing his capital, Bulawayo, in Qwabe territory. He never returned to the traditional Zulu heartland. In Qwabe, Shaka may have intervened in an existing succession dispute to help his own choice, Nqetho, into power. Expansion of power and conflict with Zwide: As Shaka became more respected by his people, he was able to spread his ideas along with greater ease. Using his background as a soldier, Shaka taught the Zulus that the most effective way of gaining power quickly was by conquering and controlling other tribes. His teachings greatly influenced the social outlook of the Zulus. The Zulu tribe soon developed a warrior outlook, which Shaka used to his advantage. Shaka's hegemony was primarily based on military might, smashing rivals and incorporating scattered remnants into his own army. He supplemented this with a mixture of diplomacy and patronage, incorporating friendly chieftains, including Zihlandlo of the Mkhize, Jobe of the Sithole, and Mathubane of the Thuli. These people were never defeated in battle by the Zulus; they did not have to be. Shaka won them over with subtler tactics, such as patronage and reward. As for the ruling of Qwabe, they began re-inventing their genealogies to give the impression that Qwabe and Zulu were closely related (i.e. as Nguni) in the past. In this way, a greater sense of cohesion was created, though it never became complete, as subsequent civil wars attest. Shaka still recognised Dingiswayo and his larger Mthethwa clan, as overlord after he returned to the Zulu land but, some years later, Dingiswayo was ambushed by Zwide's Ndwandwe and killed. There is no evidence to suggest that Shaka betrayed Dingiswayo. The core Zulus had to retreat before several Ndwandwe incursions; the Ndwandwe was clearly the most aggressive grouping in the sub-region. Shaka was able to form an alliance with the leaders of the Mthethwa clan and was able to establish himself amongst the Qwabe, after Phakathwayo was overthrown with relative ease. With Qwabe, Hlubi and Mkhize support, Shaka was finally able to summon a force capable of resisting the Ndwandwe (of the Nxumalo clan). Shaka's first major battle against Zwide, of the Ndwandwe, was the Battle of Gqokli Hill, on the Mfolozi River. Shaka's troops maintained a strong position on the crest of the hill. A frontal assault by their opponents failed to dislodge them, and Shaka sealed the victory by sending his reserve forces in a sweep around the hill to attack the enemy's rear. Losses were high overall but the efficiency of the new Shakan innovations was proven. It is probable that, over time, the Zulus were able to hone and improve their encirclement tactics. Another decisive battle eventually took place on the Mhlatuze River, at the confluence with the Mvuzane stream. In the two-day running battle, the Zulus inflicted a resounding defeat on their opponents. Shaka then led a fresh reserve some 110 kilometres (70 mi) to the royal kraal of Zwide, ruler of the Ndwandwe, and destroyed it. Zwide himself escaped with a handful of followers before falling afoul of a chieftain named Mjanji, ruler of a Babelu clan. (He died in mysterious circumstances soon afterwards.) Zwide's general, Soshangane (of the Shangaan), moved north towards what is now Mozambique to inflict further damage on less resistant foes and take advantage of slaving opportunities, obliging Portuguese traders to pay tribute. Shaka later had to contend again with Zwide's son, Sikhunyane, in 1826. Shaka granted permission to Europeans to enter Zulu territory on rare occasions. In the mid-1820s, Henry Francis Fynn provided medical treatment to the king after an assassination attempt by a rival tribe member hidden in a crowd. To show his gratitude, Shaka permitted European settlers to enter and operate in the Zulu kingdom. Shaka observed several demonstrations of European technology and knowledge, but he held that the Zulu way was superior to that of the foreigners. Death: Dingane and Mhlangana, Shaka's half-brothers, appeared to have made at least two attempts to assassinate Shaka before they succeeded, with support from the Mpondo elements and some disaffected iziYendane people. Shaka had made enough enemies among his own people to hasten his demise. It came relatively quickly after the death of his mother, Nandi , in October 1827 and the devastation caused by Shaka's subsequent erratic behavior. According to Donald Morris, Shaka ordered that no crops should be planted during the following year of mourning, no milk (the basis of the Zulu diet at the time) was to be used, and any woman who became pregnant was to be killed along with her husband. At least 7,000 people who were deemed to be insufficiently grief-stricken were executed, although the killing was not restricted to humans; cows were slaughtered so that their calves would know what losing a mother felt like. Shaka was killed by three assassins sometime in 1828; September is the most frequently cited date, when almost all available Zulu manpower had been sent on yet another mass sweep to the north. This left the royal kraal critically lacking in protection. It was all the conspirators needed. An iNduna named Mbopa created a diversion, and Dingane and Mhlangana struck the fatal blows. Shaka's corpse was dumped by his assassins in an empty grain pit, which was then filled with stones and mud. The exact location is unknown. A monument was built at one alleged site. Historian Donald Morris holds that the true site is somewhere on Couper Street in the village of Stanger, in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. Dingane assumed power and embarked on an extensive purge of pro-Shaka elements and chieftains, over the course of several years, in order to secure his position. The initial problem Dingane faced was maintaining the loyalty of the Zulu fighting regiments. He set up his main residence at Mgungundlovu and established his authority over the Zulu kingdom. Dingane ruled for some twelve years, during which time he fought, disastrously, against the Voortrekkers, and against another half-brother, Mpande, who, with Boer and British support, took over the Zulu leadership in 1840, ruling for some 30 years. Social and military revolution: Some older histories have doubted the military and social innovations customarily attributed to Shaka, denying them outright, or attributing them variously to European influences. More modern researchers argue that such explanations fall short, and that the general Zulu culture, which included other tribes and clans, contained a number of practices that Shaka could have drawn on to fulfill his objectives, whether in raiding, conquest or hegemony.

mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv

Bull horn formation

The initial problem Dingane faced was maintaining the loyalty of the Zulu fighting regiments. He set up his main residence at Mgungundlovu and established his authority over the Zulu kingdom. Dingane ruled for some twelve years, during which time he fought, disastrously, against the Voortrekkers, and against another half-brother, Mpande, who, with Boer and British support, took over the Zulu leadership in 1840, ruling for some 30 years. Social and military revolution: Some older histories have doubted the military and social innovations customarily attributed to Shaka, denying them outright, or attributing them variously to European influences. More modern researchers argue that such explanations fall short, and that the general Zulu culture, which included other tribes and clans, contained a number of practices that Shaka could have drawn on to fulfill his objectives, whether in raiding, conquest or hegemony. Some of these practices are shown below. Weapons changes: Shaka is often said to have been dissatisfied with the long throwing assegai, and is credited with having introduced a new variant of the weapon: the iklwa, a short stabbing spear with a long, broad, sword-like spearhead. Although he is credited with introducing the ilkwa to his people, Shaka likely did not invent it himself. He most likely outsourced it from Nzama, who later had a feud with him because he did not want to pay for the spears. According to Zulu scholar John Laband, Shaka insisted that his warriors train with the weapon, which gave them a "terrifying advantage over opponents who clung to the traditional practice of throwing their spears and avoiding hand-to-hand conflict." The throwing spear was not discarded, but used as an initial missile weapon before close contact with the enemy, when the shorter stabbing spear was used in hand-to-hand combat. It is also supposed that Shaka introduced a larger, heavier version of the Nguni shield. Furthermore, it is believed that he taught his warriors how to use the shield's left side to hook the enemy's shield to the right, exposing the enemy's ribs for a fatal spear stab. In Shaka's time, these cowhide shields were supplied by the king, and they remained the king's property. Different coloured shields distinguished different amabutho within Shaka's army. Some had black shields, others used white shields with black spots, and some had white shields with brown spots, while others used pure brown or white shields. Mobility of the army: The story that sandals were discarded to toughen the feet of Zulu warriors has been noted in various military accounts such as The Washing of the Spears, Like Lions They Fought, and Anatomy of the Zulu Army. Implementation was typically blunt. Those who objected to going without sandals were simply killed. Shaka drilled his troops frequently, in forced marches that sometimes covered more than 80 kilometres (50 mi) a day in a fast trot over hot, rocky terrain. He also drilled the troops to carry out encirclement tactics. Historian John Laband dismisses these stories as myth, writing: "What are we to make, then, of [European trader Henry Francis] Fynn's statement that once the Zulu army reached hard and stony ground in 1826, Shaka ordered sandals of ox-hide to be made for himself?" Laband also dismissed the idea of an 80-kilometre (50 mi) march in a single day as ridiculous. He further claims that even though these stories have been repeated by "astonished and admiring white commentators," the Zulu army covered "no more than 19 kilometres [12 mi] a day, and usually went only about 14 kilometres [8+1⁄2 mi]." Furthermore, Zulus under Shaka sometimes advanced more slowly. They spent two whole days recuperating in one instance, and on another they rested for a day and two nights before pursuing their enemy. Several other historians of the Zulu and the Zulu military system, however, affirm the mobility rate of up to 80 kilometres (50 mi) per day. Logistic support by youths: Boys aged six and over joined Shaka's force as apprentice warriors (udibi) and served as carriers of rations, supplies such as cooking pots and sleeping mats, and extra weapons until they joined the main ranks. It is sometimes held that such support was used more for very light forces designed to extract tribute in cattle and slaves from neighbouring groups. Nevertheless, the concept of "light" forces is questionable. The fast-moving Zulu raiding party, or "ibutho lempi," on a mission invariably travelled light, driving cattle as provisions on the hoof, and were not weighed down with heavy weapons and supply packs. Age-grade regimental system: Age-grade groupings of various sorts were common in the Bantu culture of the day, and indeed are still important in much of Africa. Age grades were responsible for a variety of activities, from guarding the camp, to cattle herding, to certain rituals and ceremonies. Shaka organised various grades into regiments, and quartered them in special military kraals, with regiments having their own distinctive names and insignia. The regimental system clearly built on existing tribal cultural elements that could be adapted and shaped to fit an expansionist agenda. "Bull horn" formation: Most historians credit Shaka with initial development of the famous "bull horn" formation. It was composed of three elements: The main force, the "chest," closed with the enemy impi and pinned it in position, engaging in melee combat. The warriors who formed the "chest" were senior veterans. While the enemy impi was pinned by the "chest," the "horns" would flank the Impi from both sides and encircle it; in conjunction with the "chest" they would then destroy the trapped force. The warriors who formed the "horns" were young and fast juniors. The "loins," a large reserve, was hidden, seated, behind the "chest" with their backs to the battle, for the sake of them not losing any confidence. The "loins" would be committed wherever the enemy impi threatened to break out of the encirclement. Discipline: Shaka created ruthless determination in his army by instilling in his warriors the knowledge of what would happen if their courage failed them in battle or their regiments were defeated. A brutal fate awaited them and their families if they did not perform well in combat. H. Rider Haggard learned about Shaka's methods from his nephew and late 19th-century Zulu king, Cetshwayo kaMpande: As Shaka conquered a tribe, he enrolled its remnants in his army, so that they might in their turn help to conquer others. He armed his regiments with the short stabbing Iklwa, instead of the throwing assegai which they had been accustomed to use, and kept them subject to an iron discipline. If a man was observed to show the slightest hesitation about coming to close quarters with the enemy, he was executed as soon as the fight was over. If a regiment had the misfortune to be defeated, whether by its own fault or not, it would on its return to headquarters find that a goodly proportion of the wives and children belonging to it had been beaten to death on Shaka's orders, and that he was waiting their arrival to complete his vengeance by dashing out their brains. The result was, that though Shaka's armies were occasionally defeated, they were rarely annihilated, and they never ran away. Shaka's methods versus European technology: The expanding Zulu power inevitably clashed with European hegemony in the decades after Shaka's death. In fact, European travellers to Shaka's kingdom demonstrated advanced technology such as firearms and writing, but the Zulu monarch was less than convinced. There was no need to record messages, he held, since his messengers stood under penalty of death should they bear inaccurate tidings. As for firearms, Shaka acknowledged their utility as missile weapons after seeing muzzle-loaders demonstrated, but he argued that in the time a gunman took to reload, he would be swamped by charging spear-wielding warriors. The first major clash after Shaka's death took place under his successor Dingane, against expanding European Voortrekkers from the Cape. Initial Zulu success rested on fast-moving surprise attacks and ambushes, but the Voortrekkers recovered and dealt the Zulu a severe defeat from their fortified wagon laager at the Battle of Blood River. The second major clash was against the British during 1879. Once again, most Zulu successes rested on their mobility, ability to screen their forces and to close when their opponents were unfavourably deployed. Their major victory at the Battle of Isandlwana was the most prominent one, but they also forced back a British column at the Battle of Hlobane, by deploying fast-moving regiments over a wide area of rugged ravines and gullies, and attacking the British who were forced into a rapid disorderly fighting retreat, back to the town of Kambula. Creator of a revolutionary warfare style: A number of historians argue that Shaka "changed the nature of warfare in Southern Africa" from "a ritualised exchange of taunts with minimal loss of life into a true method of subjugation by wholesale slaughter." Others dispute this characterization. A number of writers focus on Shaka's military innovations such as the iklwa – the Zulu thrusting spear, and the "buffalo horns" formation.

mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv

Bull horn formation

Once again, most Zulu successes rested on their mobility, ability to screen their forces and to close when their opponents were unfavourably deployed. Their major victory at the Battle of Isandlwana was the most prominent one, but they also forced back a British column at the Battle of Hlobane, by deploying fast-moving regiments over a wide area of rugged ravines and gullies, and attacking the British who were forced into a rapid disorderly fighting retreat, back to the town of Kambula. Creator of a revolutionary warfare style: A number of historians argue that Shaka "changed the nature of warfare in Southern Africa" from "a ritualised exchange of taunts with minimal loss of life into a true method of subjugation by wholesale slaughter." Others dispute this characterization. A number of writers focus on Shaka's military innovations such as the iklwa – the Zulu thrusting spear, and the "buffalo horns" formation. This combination has been compared to the standardisation supposedly implemented by the reorganised Roman legions under Marius. Combined with Shaka's "buffalo horns" attack formation for surrounding and annihilating enemy forces, the Zulu combination of iklwa and shield—similar to the Roman legionaries' use of gladius and scutum—was devastating. By the time of Shaka's assassination in 1828, it had made the Zulu kingdom the greatest power in southern Africa and a force to be reckoned with, even against Britain's modern army in 1879. Much controversy still surrounds the character, methods and activities of the Zulu king. From a military standpoint, historian John Keegan notes exaggerations and myths that surround Shaka, but nevertheless maintains: Fanciful commentators called him Shaka, the Black Napoleon, and allowing for different societies and customs, the comparison is apt. Shaka is without doubt the greatest commander to have come out of Africa. As a borrower, not an innovator: Some scholars hold that popular depictions of Shaka as a suddenly appearing genius creating innovation are overstated, and that to the contrary, Shaka was a borrower and imitator of indigenous methods, customs and even ruler-lineages already in place. They also argue that Shaka's line was relatively short-lived and receives undue attention, compared to other, longer established lines and rulers in the region. It seems much more likely that Shaka, seeking to build the power of a previously insignificant chiefdom, drew on an existing heritage of statecraft known to his immediate neighbors. J.H. Soga implied as much when he used genealogical evidence to argue that the Zulu were an upstart group inferior in dignity and distinction to established chiefdoms in their region, for example, the Hlubi, Ndwandwe, and Dlamini lines. Using different informants and genealogical charts, A.T. Bryant arrived at similar conclusions. The Zulu line – "a royal house of doubtful pedigree" – was very short in comparison to the Langene, Ndwandwe, Swazi, and Hlubi lines. Using his standard formula of eighteen years per reign, Bryant calculated that the Swazi, Ndwandwe, and Hlubi lines could be traced back to the beginning of the fifteenth century, while the eponymous chief Zulu had died at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Shaka's triumphs did not succeed in obliterating or diminishing the memories of his better-born rivals. The hypothesis that several states of a new kind arose about the same time does not take account of the contrast between the short line of Shaka and the long pedigrees of his most important opponents – especially the coalition grouped around his deadly enemy Zwide (d. 1822). The founders of the states which Omer-Cooper called "Zulu-type states," including the Ndebele, the Gasa, the Ngoni, and the Swazi had all been closely associated with Zwide. Instead of hypothesizing that they all chose to imitate Shaka, it is easier to imagine that he modeled his state on theirs. And as they stemmed from ancient families it is entirely possible that states of that type existed in a more remote past. Soga and Bryant related each of them to a larger grouping they called Mho. Scholarship: Biographical sources: Scholarship in recent years has revised views of the sources on Shaka's reign. The earliest are two eyewitness accounts written by European adventurer-traders who met Shaka during the last four years of his reign. Nathaniel Isaacs published his Travels and Adventures in Eastern Africa in 1836, creating a picture of Shaka as a degenerate and pathological monster, which survives in modified forms to this day. Isaacs was aided in this by Henry Francis Fynn, whose diary (actually a rewritten collage of various papers) was edited by James Stuart only in 1950. Their accounts may be balanced by the rich resource of oral histories collected around 1900 by the same James Stuart, now published in six volumes as The James Stuart Archive. Stuart's early 20th century work was continued by D. McK. Malcolm in 1950. These and other sources such as A.T. Bryant gives us a more Zulu-centred picture. Most popular accounts are based on E.A. Ritter's novel Shaka Zulu (1955), a potboiling romance that was re-edited into something more closely resembling a history. John Wright (history professor at University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg), Julian Cobbing and Dan Wylie (Rhodes University, Grahamstown) are among a number of writers who have modified these stories. Various modern historians writing on Shaka and the Zulu point to the uncertain nature of Fynn and Isaac's accounts of Shaka's reign. A general reference work in the field is Donald Morris's "The Washing of The Spears", which notes that the sources, as a whole, for this historical era are not the best. Morris references a large number of sources, including Stuart, and A. T. Bryant's "Olden Times in Zululand and Natal", which is based on four decades of interviews of tribal sources. After sifting through these sources and noting their strengths and weaknesses, Morris generally credits Shaka with a large number of military and social innovations. This is the general consensus in the field. A 1998 study by historian Carolyn Hamilton summarizes much of the scholarship on Shaka towards the dawn of the 21st century in areas ranging from ideology, politics and culture, to the use of his name and image in a popular South African theme park, Shakaland. It argues that in many ways, the image of Shaka has been "invented" in the modern era according to whatever agenda persons hold. This "imagining of Shaka" it is held, should be balanced by a sober view of the historical record, and allow greater scope for the contributions of indigenous African discourse. Military historians of the Zulu War describe Zulu fighting methods and tactics, including authors Ian Knight and Robert Edgerton. General histories of Southern Africa include Noel Mostert's "Frontiers" and a detailed account of the results from the Zulu expansion, J.D. Omer-Cooper's "The Zulu Aftermath", which advances the traditional Mfecane/Difaqane theory. The Mfecane: History and legacy: The increased military efficiency led to more and more clans being incorporated into Shaka's Zulu empire, while other tribes moved away to be out of range of Shaka's impis. The ripple effect caused by these mass migrations would become known (though only in the twentieth century) as the Mfecane/Difaqane (annihilation). Shaka's army set out on a massive programme of expansion, killing or enslaving those who resisted in the territories he conquered. His impis (warrior regiments) were rigorously disciplined: failure in battle meant death. At the time of his death, Shaka ruled over 250,000 people and could muster more than 50,000 warriors. His 10-year-long kingship resulted in a massive number of deaths, mostly due to the disruptions the Zulu caused in neighbouring tribes, although the exact death toll is a matter of scholarly dispute. Further unquantifiable deaths occurred during mass tribal migrations to escape his armies. The Mfecane produced Mzilikazi of the Khumalo, a general of Shaka's. He fled Shaka's employ, and in turn conquered an empire in Zimbabwe, after clashing with European groups like the Boers. The settling of Mzilikazi's people, the AmaNdebele or Matabele, in the south of Zimbabwe with the concomitant driving of the Mashona into the north caused a tribal conflict that still resonates today. Other notable figures to arise from the Mfecane/Difaqane include Soshangane, who expanded from the Zulu area into what is now Mozambique, and Zwangendaba. Disruptions of the Mfecane/Difaqane: The theory of the Mfecane holds that the aggressive expansion of Shaka's armies caused a brutal chain reaction across the southern areas of the continent, as dispossessed tribe after tribe turned on their neighbours in a deadly cycle of fight and conquest. Some scholars contend that this theory must be treated with caution as it generally neglects several other factors such as the impact of European encroachment, slave trading and expansion in that area of Southern Africa around the same time.

mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv

Bull horn formation

The settling of Mzilikazi's people, the AmaNdebele or Matabele, in the south of Zimbabwe with the concomitant driving of the Mashona into the north caused a tribal conflict that still resonates today. Other notable figures to arise from the Mfecane/Difaqane include Soshangane, who expanded from the Zulu area into what is now Mozambique, and Zwangendaba. Disruptions of the Mfecane/Difaqane: The theory of the Mfecane holds that the aggressive expansion of Shaka's armies caused a brutal chain reaction across the southern areas of the continent, as dispossessed tribe after tribe turned on their neighbours in a deadly cycle of fight and conquest. Some scholars contend that this theory must be treated with caution as it generally neglects several other factors such as the impact of European encroachment, slave trading and expansion in that area of Southern Africa around the same time. Normal estimates for the death toll range from 1 million to 2 million. These numbers are, however, controversial. According to Julian Cobbing, the development of the view that Shaka was the monster responsible for the devastation is based on the need of apartheid era historians to justify the apartheid regime's racist policies. Other scholars acknowledge distortion of the historical record by apartheid supporters and shady European traders seeking to cover their tracks, but dispute the revisionist approach, noting that stories of cannibalism, raiding, burning of villages, or mass slaughter were not developed out of thin air but based on the clearly documented accounts of hundreds of black victims and refugees. Confirmation of such accounts can also be seen in modern archaeology of the village of Lepalong, an entire settlement built underground to shelter remnants of the Kwena people from 1827 to 1836 against the tide of disruption that engulfed the region during Shakan times. William Rubinstein wrote that "Western guilt over colonialism, have also accounted for much of this distortion of what pre-literate societies actually were like, as does the wish to avoid anything which smacks of racism, even when this means distorting the actual and often appalling facts of life in many pre-literate societies". Rubinstein also notes: One element in Shaka's destruction was to create a vast artificial desert around his domain... 'to make the destruction complete, organized bands of Zulu murderers regularly patrolled the waste, hunting for any stray men and running them down like wild pig'... An area 200 miles [320 km] to the north of the center of the state, 300 miles [480 km] to the west, and 500 miles [800 km] to the south was ravaged and depopulated... South African historian Dan Wylie has expressed skepticism of the portrayal of Shaka as a pathological monster destroying everything within reach. He argues that attempts to distort his life and image have been systematic— beginning with the first European visitors to his kingdom. One visitor, Nathaniel Isaacs, wrote to Henry Fynn, a white adventurer, trader and quasi-local chieftain: Here you are about to publish. Do make Shaka out to be as bloodthirsty as you can; it helps swell out the work and make it interesting. Fynn, according to Wylie, complied with the request, and Wylie notes that he had an additional motive to distort Shaka's image— he applied for a huge grant of land— an area allegedly depopulated by Shaka's savagery. [Fynn] stated that Shaka had killed 'a million people.' You will still find this figure, and higher, repeated in today's literature. However, Fynn had no way of knowing any such thing: it was a thumb-suck based in a particular view of Shaka—Shaka as a kind of genocidal maniac, an unresting killing-machine. But why the inventive lie? ... Fynn was bidding for a stretch of land, which allegedly had been depopulated by Shaka.. [he insinuated], Shaka didn't deserve that land anyway because he was such a brute, while he—Fynn— was a lonely, morally upright pioneer of civilisation. Michal Lesniewski has criticised Wylie for some of his attempts to revise Western thinking about Shaka. Physical descriptions: Though much remains unknown about Shaka's personal appearance, sources tend to agree he had a strong, muscular body. He was tall and his skin tone was dark brown. Shaka's enemies described him as ugly in some respects. He had a big nose, according to Baleka of the Qwabe, as told by her father. He also had two prominent front teeth. Her father also told Baleka that Shaka spoke as though "his tongue were too big for his mouth." Many said that he spoke with a speech impediment. There is an anecdote that Shaka joked with one of his friends, Magaye, that he could not kill Magaye because he would be laughed at. Supposedly if he killed Magaye, it would appear to be out of jealousy because Magaye was so handsome and "Shaka himself was ugly, with a protruding forehead". In Zulu culture: The figure of Shaka still sparks interest among not only the contemporary Zulu but many worldwide who have encountered the tribe and its history. The current tendency appears to be to lionise him; popular film and other media have certainly contributed to his appeal. Certain aspects of traditional Zulu culture still revere the dead monarch. The praise song is one of the most widely used poetic forms in Africa, applying not only to spirits but to men, animals, plants and even towns. Other Zulu sources are sometimes critical of Shaka, and numerous negative images abound in Zulu oral history. When Shaka's mother Nandi died for example, the monarch ordered a massive outpouring of grief including mass executions, forbidding the planting of crops or the use of milk, and the killing of all pregnant women and their husbands. Oral sources record that in this period of devastation, a single Zulu, a man named "Gala", eventually stood up to Shaka and objected to these measures, pointing out that Nandi was not the first person to die in Zululand. Taken aback by such candid talk, the Zulu king is supposed to have called off the destructive edicts, rewarding the blunt teller-of-truths with a gift of cattle. The figure of Shaka thus remains an ambiguous one in African oral tradition, defying simplistic depictions of the Zulu king as a heroic, protean nation builder on one hand, or a depraved monster on the other. This ambiguity continues to lend the image of Shaka its continued power and influence, almost two centuries after his death. Legacy: uShaka Marine World, an aquatic theme park on the Durban beach front opened in 2004. The King Shaka International Airport at La Mercy, 35 km (22 mi) north of the Durban city centre was opened on 1 May 2010 in preparation for the 2010 FIFA World Cup after a protracted debate over the naming of the airport. In popular culture: Jah Shaka, British Jamaican sound system operator, prolific conscious roots reggae and dub record producer and sound engineer was named in honour of Shaka Zulu A large wooden statue representing Shaka is located at Camden Market in London. Shaka features in Nada the Lily (1892), an historical adventure novel by Sir H. Rider Haggard. Haggard refers to him using the alternate spelling of Chaka. Shaka Zulu, a 10-part 1986 SABC TV miniseries about Shaka, which starred Henry Cele in the title role. The series was written by Joshua Sinclair. Shaka has been featured as a playable leader for the Zulu civilization in all six Civilization games. A television series entitled King Shaka is being developed at Showtime, with Antoine Fuqua directing and executive producing. Shaka Ilembe, 13-episode South African TV show on Mzansi Magic See also: List of Zulu kings Hintsa kaKhawuta Amathole Mountains Matiwane African military systems to 1800 African military systems (1800–1900) African military systems after 1900 Legends of Africa Moshoeshoe I Ndebele List of South Africans Chaka Emperor Shaka the Great Lion's Blood Sekhukhune I References: Notes: Citations: Sources: Further reading: External links: Shaka: Zulu chieftain at the Wayback Machine (archived 30 September 2007) The History of Shaka Statue proposal at the Wayback Machine (archived 10 August 2007) "Shaka Zulu", Carpe Noctem at the Wayback Machine (archived 14 December 2007)

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Carpet bombing

Early history: One of the first attempts at carpet bombing was at the Battle of El Mazuco during the Spanish Civil War in 1937, against widely-dispersed infantry on rocky slopes, and the attacking Condor Legion learned that carpet bombing was not very effective in such terrain. In March 1938, the Bombing of Barcelona saw Italian and German airstrikes killing up to 1,300 people and wounding 2,000. It is considered the first carpet bombing of a city, and set a precedent for several such bombings in World War II. The Japanese bombing of China's wartime capital Chongqing from 18 February 1938 to 23 August 1943 caused 23,600 deaths and over 30,000 wounded. During World War II: Pre-war expectation: In the inter-war years, a growing expectation developed that, on the outbreak of war, cities would be rapidly destroyed by bombing raids. The use of poison gas was expected and a high level of devastation was anticipated from high explosive bombs. This originated, in part, from the views of military experts such as Douhet, and was taken up by politicians and journalists, with, for example, Stanley Baldwin coining the phrase "The bomber will always get through". The targeting of the civilian population would, some theories suggested, cause a breakdown in morale that would lead to civil unrest that would compel a government to surrender. The combatant powers could, according to Baldwin, be in a competition to break the morale of the other side's civilian population first. There were two results from this. Firstly, civil defence programs were set up, with gas masks being issued, plans for air raid shelters were set up and organisations to manage civilians before a raid and deal with damage and casualties after one were put in place. Secondly, agreements were sought to make the targeting of civilians illegal under international law. At the time that Douhet and others were publishing their ideas, no air force had planned their capabilities with the intent of making a "knockout blow" against civilian targets. The Hague Rules of Air Warfare were developed in 1922/23 to prevent deliberately attacking civilians, yet it was not ratified by any country. At the start of World War II, the Royal Air Force had an initial instruction to abide by the Hague Rules for as long as the enemy did. This restraint was followed by both Britain and Germany until 11 May 1940, when, with Winston Churchill now in the role of Prime Minister and the war in France going badly, the RAF attacked industrial and transport infrastructure targets in Mönchengladbach. This raid caused civilian casualties. Bombing by Germany: In the European theatre, the first city to suffer heavily from aerial bombardment was Warsaw, on 25 September 1939 following the start of the German invasion of Poland. Continuing this trend in warfare, the Rotterdam Blitz was an aerial bombardment of Rotterdam by 90 bombers of the German air force on 14 May 1940, during the German invasion of the Netherlands. The objective was to support the German assault on the city, break Dutch resistance, and force the Dutch to surrender. Despite a ceasefire, the bombing destroyed almost the entire historic city centre, killing nearly nine hundred civilians and leaving 30,000 people homeless. The destructive success of the bombing led the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL, the Luftwaffe high command) to threaten to destroy the city of Utrecht if the Dutch Government did not surrender. The Dutch capitulated early the next morning. As the war progressed, the Battle of Britain developed from a fight for air supremacy into the strategic and aerial bombing of London, Liverpool, Coventry and other British cities. Bombing by the Western Allies: At the beginning of war, RAF Bomber Command lacked both the navigation systems for finding a target and the numbers of bombers that were needed to make attacks of any scale in Germany. As heavy bombers were brought into service and technology and tactics were improved, the selection of targets was changed. The intention of avoiding civilian casualties as collateral damage disappeared. Instead, the civilian population which worked in war-related industries – and their housing – became the target. Some of this change came from a wish to retaliate for the German attack on Coventry. It was also based on what was learnt from being the target in the Blitz. It had been found that factory buildings were more resistant to critical damage than the homes of their workers. Absenteeism of the workforce rose significantly if their housing was uninhabitable, so affecting industrial production. Whilst morale was still discussed, the meaning of the word changed from its pre-war usage. Now a reduction in morale was intended to reduce industrial production that supported the war effort. The area bombing directive was issued to RAF Bomber Command in 1942 The Eighth Air Force of the USAAF arrived in Britain over the summer of 1942. Despite Roosevelt's pleas to Hitler to avoid bombing civilians prior to the US joining the war, he was a supporter of bombing Germany. Both Churchill and Roosevelt were in the position that Stalin was pressing for the Western Allies to open a new front in Europe – something which they were not ready to do. Therefore a bombing campaign - the Combined Bomber Offensive - following the Casablanca directive to the Allied air forces was all they could offer to support the Soviet Union. Operation Gomorrah, carried out by Bomber Command against Hamburg, targeted a city with both high susceptibility to fire and a large number of factories making products for the German war effort. The raid caused substantial damage to the city, especially the housing of industrial workers. A carefully developed mix of high explosive bombs and incendiaries was used. High explosives broke windows and made fire-fighting dangerous, whilst the incendiaries set the buildings on fire. This methodology was used for further attacks on urban areas (though not with such major effect) throughout the war, with Dresden being one of the final targets. Carpet bombing was also used as close air support (as "flying artillery") for ground operations. The massive bombing was concentrated in a narrow and shallow area of the front (a few kilometers by a few hundred meters deep), closely coordinated with the advance of friendly troops. The first successful use of the technique was on 6 May 1943, at the end of the Tunisia Campaign. Carried out under Sir Arthur Tedder, it was hailed by the press as Tedder's bomb-carpet (or Tedder's carpet). The bombing was concentrated in a four by three-mile area, preparing the way for the First Army. This tactic was later used in many cases in the Normandy Campaign; for example, in the Battle for Caen. Pacific War: In the Pacific War, carpet bombing was used extensively against Japanese cities such as Tokyo. On the night of 9–10 March 1945, 334 B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers were directed to attack the most heavily populated civilian sectors of Tokyo. In just one night, over 100,000 people burned to death from a heavy bombardment of incendiary bombs, comparable to the wartime number of U.S. casualties in the entire Pacific theater. Another 100,000 to one million Japanese were left homeless. These attacks were followed by similar ones against Kobe, Osaka, and Nagoya, as well as other sectors of Tokyo, where over 9,373 tons of incendiary bombs were dropped on civilian and military targets. By the time of the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, light and medium bombers were being directed to bomb targets of convenience, as most urban areas had already been destroyed. In the 9-month long bombing campaign, over 300,000 Japanese civilians died and 400,000 were wounded. During the final months of the war in the Philippines, the United States military used carpet bombing against the Japanese forces in Manila and Baguio, reducing much of the cities to rubble. Manila became the second-most-destroyed city of World War II. Vietnam War: During the Vietnam War, with the escalating situation in Southeast Asia, twenty-eight B-52Fs were fitted with external racks for twenty-four 750-pound (340 kg) bombs under project South Bay in June 1964; an additional forty-six aircraft received similar modifications under project Sun Bath. In March 1965, the United States commenced Operation Rolling Thunder. The first combat mission, Operation Arc Light, was flown by B-52Fs on 18 June 1965, when 30 bombers of the 9th and 441st Bombardment Squadrons struck a communist stronghold near the Bến Cát District in South Vietnam. The first wave of bombers arrived too early at a designated rendezvous point, and while maneuvering to maintain station, two B-52s collided, which resulted in the loss of both bombers and eight crewmen. The remaining bombers, minus one more that turned back for mechanical problems, continued toward the target. Twenty-seven Stratofortresses dropped on a one-mile by two-mile target box from between 19,000 and 22,000 feet (5,800 and 6,700 m), a little more than 50% of the bombs falling within the target zone. The force returned to Andersen AFB except for one bomber with electrical problems that recovered to Clark AFB, the mission having lasted 13 hours. Post-strike assessment by teams of South Vietnamese troops with American advisors found evidence that the VC had departed the area before the raid, and it was suspected that infiltration of the south's forces may have tipped off the north because of the ARVN troops involved in the post-strike inspection.

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Carpet bombing

The remaining bombers, minus one more that turned back for mechanical problems, continued toward the target. Twenty-seven Stratofortresses dropped on a one-mile by two-mile target box from between 19,000 and 22,000 feet (5,800 and 6,700 m), a little more than 50% of the bombs falling within the target zone. The force returned to Andersen AFB except for one bomber with electrical problems that recovered to Clark AFB, the mission having lasted 13 hours. Post-strike assessment by teams of South Vietnamese troops with American advisors found evidence that the VC had departed the area before the raid, and it was suspected that infiltration of the south's forces may have tipped off the north because of the ARVN troops involved in the post-strike inspection. Beginning in late 1965, a number of B-52Ds underwent Big Belly modifications to increase bomb capacity for carpet bombings. While the external payload remained at twenty-four 500-pound (227 kg) or 750-pound (340 kg) bombs, the internal capacity increased from twenty-seven to eighty-four 500-pound bombs or from twenty-seven to forty-two 750-pound bombs. The modification created enough capacity for a total of 60,000 pounds (27,215 kg) in one hundred and eight bombs. Thus modified, B-52Ds could carry 22,000 pounds (9,980 kg) more than B-52Fs. Designed to replace B-52Fs, modified B-52Ds entered combat in April 1966 flying from Andersen Air Force Base, Guam. Each bombing mission lasted 10 to 12 hours with an aerial refueling by KC-135 Stratotankers. In spring 1967, the aircraft began flying from U Tapao Airfield in Thailand giving the aircraft the advantage of not requiring in-flight refueling. The zenith of B-52 attacks in Vietnam was Operation Linebacker II (sometimes referred to as the Christmas Bombing) which consisted of waves of B-52s (mostly D models, but some Gs without jamming equipment and with a smaller bomb load). Over 12 days, B-52s flew 729 sorties and dropped 15,237 tons of bombs on Hanoi, Haiphong, and other targets. Originally 42 B-52s were committed to the war; however, numbers were frequently twice this figure. See also: Notes: References: Bibliography: Budiansky, Stephen (2004). Air Power: The Men, Machines, and Ideas that Revolutionized War, from Kitty Hawk to Iraq. New York: Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0-670-03285-3.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) Condor, Albert E (1994). Air Force Gunners (AFGA): The Men Behind the Guns, The History of Enlisted Aerial Gunnery, 1917–1991. Nashville, Tennessee: Turner Publishing. ISBN 978-1-56311-167-9. Dick, Ron; Patterson, Dan (2006). Aviation Century: War & Peace In The Air. Eden Prairie, Ontario: Boston Mills Press. ISBN 978-1-55046-430-6. Donald, David (1997). The Encyclopedia of World Aircraft. Etobicoke, Ontario, Canada: Prospero Books. ISBN 978-1-85605-375-4. Hobson, Chris (2001). Vietnam Air Losses, USAF, USN, USMC, Fixed-Wing Aircraft Losses in Southeast Asia 1961–1973. North Branch, Minnesota: Specialty Press. ISBN 978-1-85780-115-6. Hooton, E. R. (2007). Luftwaffe at War; Blitzkrieg in the West. London: Chevron/Ian Allan. ISBN 978-1-85780-272-6. Knaack, Marcelle Size (1988). Post-World War II Bombers, 1945–1973 (PDF). Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History. ISBN 978-0-16-002260-9. Lake, Jon; Styling, Mark (2004). B-52 Stratofortress Units in Combat 1955–73. London: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84176-607-2. Overy, Richard (2013). The Bombing War, Europe 1939-45 (Kindle, 2014 ed.). London: Penguin Books Ltd. ISBN 978-0-141-92782-4. Schlight, John (1988). The War in South Vietnam: The Years of the Offensive, 1965–1968 (The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia). Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force. ISBN 978-0-912799-51-3. External links: "Bombs Over Cambodia" from The Walrus

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Category:Articles needing additional references from December 2013

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Category:Articles needing additional references from October 2015

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Category:Incomplete lists from December 2013

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Category:Military lists

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Category:Military tactics

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Cavalry

Role: Historically, cavalry was divided into light cavalry and heavy cavalry. The differences were their roles in combat, the size of their mounts, and how much armor was worn by the mount and rider. Heavy cavalry, such as Byzantine cataphracts and knights of the Early Middle Ages in Europe, were used as shock troops, charging the main body of the enemy at the height of a battle; in many cases their actions decided the outcome of the battle, hence the later term battle cavalry. Light cavalry, such as horse archers, hussars, and Cossack cavalry, were assigned all the numerous roles that were ill-suited to more narrowly-focused heavy forces. This includes scouting, deterring enemy scouts, foraging, raiding, skirmishing, pursuit of retreating enemy forces, screening of retreating friendly forces, linking separated friendly forces, and countering enemy light forces in all these same roles. Light and heavy cavalry roles continued through early modern warfare, but armor was reduced, with light cavalry mostly unarmored. Yet many cavalry units still retained cuirasses and helmets for their protective value against sword and bayonet strikes, and the morale boost these provide to the wearers, despite the actual armour giving little protection from firearms. By this time the main difference between light and heavy cavalry was in their training and weight; the former was regarded as best suited for harassment and reconnaissance, while the latter was considered best for close-order charges. By the start of the 20th century, as total battlefield firepower increased, cavalry increasingly tended to become dragoons in practice, riding mounted between battles, but dismounting to fight as infantry, even though retaining unit names that reflected their older cavalry roles. Military conservatism was however strong in most continental cavalry during peacetime and in these dismounted action continued to be regarded as a secondary function until the outbreak of World War I in 1914. With the development of armored warfare, the heavy cavalry role of decisive shock troops had been taken over by armored units employing medium and heavy tanks, and later main battle tanks. Despite horse-borne cavalry becoming obsolete, the term cavalry is still used, referring in modern times to units continuing to fulfill the traditional light cavalry roles, employing fast armored cars, light tanks, and infantry fighting vehicles instead of horses, while air cavalry employs helicopters. Early history: Origins: Before the Iron Age, the role of cavalry on the battlefield was largely performed by light chariots. The chariot originated with the Sintashta-Petrovka culture in Central Asia and spread by nomadic or semi-nomadic Indo-Iranians. The chariot was quickly adopted by settled peoples both as a military technology and an object of ceremonial status, especially by the pharaohs of the New Kingdom of Egypt from 1550 BC as well as the Assyrian army and Babylonian royalty. The power of mobility given by mounted units was recognized early on, but was offset by the difficulty of raising large forces and by the inability of horses (then mostly small) to carry heavy armor. Nonetheless, there are indications that, from the 15th century BC onwards, horseback riding was practiced amongst the military elites of the great states of the ancient Near East, most notably those in Egypt, Assyria, the Hittite Empire, and Mycenaean Greece. Cavalry techniques, and the rise of true cavalry, were an innovation of equestrian nomads of the Eurasian Steppe and pastoralist tribes such as the Iranic Parthians and Sarmatians. Together with a core of armoured lancers, these were predominantly horse archers using the Parthian shot tactic. The photograph straight above shows Assyrian cavalry from reliefs of 865–860 BC. At this time, the men had no spurs, saddles, saddle cloths, or stirrups. Fighting from the back of a horse was much more difficult than mere riding. The cavalry acted in pairs; the reins of the mounted archer were controlled by his neighbour's hand. Even at this early time, cavalry used swords, shields, spears, and bows. The sculpture implies two types of cavalry, but this might be a simplification by the artist. Later images of Assyrian cavalry show saddle cloths as primitive saddles, allowing each archer to control his own horse. As early as 490 BC a breed of large horses was bred in the Nisaean plain in Media to carry men with increasing amounts of armour (Herodotus 7,40 & 9,20), but large horses were still very exceptional at this time. By the fourth century BC the Chinese during the Warring States period (403–221 BC) began to use cavalry against rival states, and by 331 BC when Alexander the Great defeated the Persians the use of chariots in battle was obsolete in most nations; despite a few ineffective attempts to revive scythed chariots. The last recorded use of chariots as a shock force in continental Europe was during the Battle of Telamon in 225 BC. However, chariots remained in use for ceremonial purposes such as carrying the victorious general in a Roman triumph, or for racing. Outside of mainland Europe, the southern Britons met Julius Caesar with chariots in 55 and 54 BC, but by the time of the Roman conquest of Britain a century later chariots were obsolete, even in Britannia. The last mention of chariot use in Britain was by the Caledonians at the Mons Graupius, in 84 AD. Ancient Greece: city-states, Thebes, Thessaly and Macedonia: During the classical Greek period cavalry were usually limited to those citizens who could afford expensive war-horses. Three types of cavalry became common: light cavalry, whose riders, armed with javelins, could harass and skirmish; heavy cavalry, whose troopers, using lances, had the ability to close in on their opponents; and finally those whose equipment allowed them to fight either on horseback or foot. The role of horsemen did however remain secondary to that of the hoplites or heavy infantry who comprised the main strength of the citizen levies of the various city states. Cavalry played a relatively minor role in ancient Greek city-states, with conflicts decided by massed armored infantry. However, Thebes produced Pelopidas, their first great cavalry commander, whose tactics and skills were absorbed by Philip II of Macedon when Philip was a guest-hostage in Thebes. Thessaly was widely known for producing competent cavalrymen, and later experiences in wars both with and against the Persians taught the Greeks the value of cavalry in skirmishing and pursuit. The Athenian author and soldier Xenophon in particular advocated the creation of a small but well-trained cavalry force; to that end, he wrote several manuals on horsemanship and cavalry operations. The Macedonian kingdom in the north, on the other hand, developed a strong cavalry force that culminated in the hetairoi (Companion cavalry) of Philip II of Macedon and Alexander the Great. In addition to these heavy cavalry, the Macedonian army also employed lighter horsemen called prodromoi for scouting and screening, as well as the Macedonian pike phalanx and various kinds of light infantry. There were also the Ippiko (or "Horserider"), Greek "heavy" cavalry, armed with kontos (or cavalry lance), and sword. These wore leather armour or mail plus a helmet. They were medium rather than heavy cavalry, meaning that they were better suited to be scouts, skirmishers, and pursuers rather than front line fighters. The effectiveness of this combination of cavalry and infantry helped to break enemy lines and was most dramatically demonstrated in Alexander's conquests of Persia, Bactria, and northwestern India. Roman Republic and early Empire: The cavalry in the early Roman Republic remained the preserve of the wealthy landed class known as the equites—men who could afford the expense of maintaining a horse in addition to arms and armor heavier than those of the common legions. Horses were provided by the Republic and could be withdrawn if neglected or misused, together with the status of being a cavalryman. As the class grew to be more of a social elite instead of a functional property-based military grouping, the Romans began to employ Italian socii for filling the ranks of their cavalry. The weakness of Roman cavalry was demonstrated by Hannibal Barca during the Second Punic War where he used his superior mounted forces to win several battles. The most notable of these was the Battle of Cannae, where he inflicted a catastrophic defeat on the Romans. At about the same time the Romans began to recruit foreign auxiliary cavalry from among Gauls, Iberians, and Numidians, the last being highly valued as mounted skirmishers and scouts (see Numidian cavalry). Julius Caesar had a high opinion of his escort of Germanic mixed cavalry, giving rise to the Cohortes Equitatae. Early emperors maintained an ala of Batavian cavalry as their personal bodyguards until the unit was dismissed by Galba after the Batavian Rebellion. For the most part, Roman cavalry during the early Republic functioned as an adjunct to the legionary infantry and formed only one-fifth of the standing force comprising a consular army. Except in times of major mobilisation about 1,800 horsemen were maintained, with three hundred attached to each legion.

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The most notable of these was the Battle of Cannae, where he inflicted a catastrophic defeat on the Romans. At about the same time the Romans began to recruit foreign auxiliary cavalry from among Gauls, Iberians, and Numidians, the last being highly valued as mounted skirmishers and scouts (see Numidian cavalry). Julius Caesar had a high opinion of his escort of Germanic mixed cavalry, giving rise to the Cohortes Equitatae. Early emperors maintained an ala of Batavian cavalry as their personal bodyguards until the unit was dismissed by Galba after the Batavian Rebellion. For the most part, Roman cavalry during the early Republic functioned as an adjunct to the legionary infantry and formed only one-fifth of the standing force comprising a consular army. Except in times of major mobilisation about 1,800 horsemen were maintained, with three hundred attached to each legion. The relatively low ratio of horsemen to infantry does not mean that the utility of cavalry should be underestimated, as its strategic role in scouting, skirmishing, and outpost duties was crucial to the Romans' capability to conduct operations over long distances in hostile or unfamiliar territory. On some occasions Roman cavalry also proved its ability to strike a decisive tactical blow against a weakened or unprepared enemy, such as the final charge at the Battle of Aquilonia. After defeats such as the Battle of Carrhae, the Romans learned the importance of large cavalry formations from the Parthians. At the same time heavy spears and shields modelled on those favoured by the horsemen of the Greek city-states were adopted to replace the lighter weaponry of early Rome. These improvements in tactics and equipment reflected those of a thousand years earlier when the first Iranians to reach the Iranian Plateau forced the Assyrians to undertake similar reform. Nonetheless, the Romans would continue to rely mainly on their heavy infantry supported by auxiliary cavalry. Late Roman Empire and the Migration Period: In the army of the late Roman Empire, cavalry played an increasingly important role. The Spatha, the classical sword throughout most of the 1st millennium was adopted as the standard model for the Empire's cavalry forces. By the 6th century these had evolved into lengthy straight weapons influenced by Persian and other eastern patterns. Other specialist weapons during this period included javlins, long reaching lancers, axes and maces. The most widespread employment of heavy cavalry at this time was found in the forces of the Iranian empires, the Parthians and their Persian Sasanian successors. Both, but especially the former, were famed for the cataphract (fully armored cavalry armed with lances) even though the majority of their forces consisted of lighter horse archers. The West first encountered this eastern heavy cavalry during the Hellenistic period with further intensive contacts during the eight centuries of the Roman–Persian Wars. At first the Parthians' mobility greatly confounded the Romans, whose armoured close-order infantry proved unable to match the speed of the Parthians. However, later the Romans would successfully adapt such heavy armor and cavalry tactics by creating their own units of cataphracts and clibanarii. The decline of the Roman infrastructure made it more difficult to field large infantry forces, and during the 4th and 5th centuries cavalry began to take a more dominant role on the European battlefield, also in part made possible by the appearance of new, larger breeds of horses. The replacement of the Roman saddle by variants on the Scythian model, with pommel and cantle, was also a significant factor as was the adoption of stirrups and the concomitant increase in stability of the rider's seat. Armored cataphracts began to be deployed in Eastern Europe and the Near East, following the precedents established by Persian forces, as the main striking force of the armies in contrast to the earlier roles of cavalry as scouts, raiders, and outflankers. The late-Roman cavalry tradition of organized units in a standing army differed fundamentally from the nobility of the Germanic invaders—individual warriors who could afford to provide their own horses and equipment. While there was no direct linkage with these predecessors the early medieval knight also developed as a member of a social and martial elite, able to meet the considerable expenses required by his role from grants of land and other incomes. Asia: Central Asia: Xiongnu, Tujue, Avars, Kipchaks, Khitans, Mongols, Don Cossacks and the various Turkic peoples are also examples of the horse-mounted groups that managed to gain substantial successes in military conflicts with settled agrarian and urban societies, due to their strategic and tactical mobility. As European states began to assume the character of bureaucratic nation-states supporting professional standing armies, recruitment of these mounted warriors was undertaken in order to fill the strategic roles of scouts and raiders. The best known instance of the continued employment of mounted tribal auxiliaries were the Cossack cavalry regiments of the Russian Empire. In Eastern Europe, and out onto the steppes, cavalry remained important much longer and dominated the scene of warfare until the early 17th century and even beyond, as the strategic mobility of cavalry was crucial for the semi-nomadic pastoralist lives that many steppe cultures led. Tibetans also had a tradition of cavalry warfare, in several military engagements with the Chinese Tang dynasty (618–907 AD). Khanates of Central Asia: East Asia: China: Further east, the military history of China, specifically northern China, held a long tradition of intense military exchange between Han Chinese infantry forces of the settled dynastic empires and the mounted nomads or "barbarians" of the north. The naval history of China was centered more to the south, where mountains, rivers, and large lakes necessitated the employment of a large and well-kept navy. In 307 BC, King Wuling of Zhao, the ruler of the former state of Jin, ordered his commanders and troops to adopt the trousers of the nomads as well as practice the nomads' form of mounted archery to hone their new cavalry skills. The adoption of massed cavalry in China also broke the tradition of the chariot-riding Chinese aristocracy in battle, which had been in use since the ancient Shang dynasty (c. 1600–1050 BC). By this time large Chinese infantry-based armies of 100,000 to 200,000 troops were now buttressed with several hundred thousand mounted cavalry in support or as an effective striking force. The handheld pistol-and-trigger crossbow was invented in China in the fourth century BC; it was written by the Song dynasty scholars Zeng Gongliang, Ding Du, and Yang Weide in their book Wujing Zongyao (1044 AD) that massed missile fire by crossbowmen was the most effective defense against enemy cavalry charges. On many occasions the Chinese studied nomadic cavalry tactics and applied the lessons in creating their own potent cavalry forces, while in others they simply recruited the tribal horsemen wholesale into their armies; and in yet other cases nomadic empires proved eager to enlist Chinese infantry and engineering, as in the case of the Mongol Empire and its sinicized part, the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368). The Chinese recognized early on during the Han dynasty (202 BC – 220 AD) that they were at a disadvantage in lacking the number of horses the northern nomadic peoples mustered in their armies. Emperor Wu of Han (r 141–87 BC) went to war with the Dayuan for this reason, since the Dayuan were hoarding a massive amount of tall, strong, Central Asian bred horses in the Hellenized–Greek region of Fergana (established slightly earlier by Alexander the Great). Although experiencing some defeats early on in the campaign, Emperor Wu's war from 104 BC to 102 BC succeeded in gathering the prized tribute of horses from Fergana. Cavalry tactics in China were enhanced by the invention of the saddle-attached stirrup by at least the 4th century, as the oldest reliable depiction of a rider with paired stirrups was found in a Jin dynasty tomb of the year 322 AD. The Chinese invention of the horse collar by the 5th century was also a great improvement from the breast harness, allowing the horse to haul greater weight without heavy burden on its skeletal structure. Korea: The horse warfare of Korea was first started during the ancient Korean kingdom Gojoseon. Since at least the 3rd century BC, there was influence of northern nomadic peoples and Yemaek peoples on Korean warfare. By roughly the first century BC, the ancient kingdom of Buyeo also had mounted warriors. The cavalry of Goguryeo, one of the Three Kingdoms of Korea, were called Gaemamusa (개마무사, 鎧馬武士), and were renowned as a fearsome heavy cavalry force. King Gwanggaeto the Great often led expeditions into the Baekje, Gaya confederacy, Buyeo, Later Yan and against Japanese invaders with his cavalry. In the 12th century, Jurchen tribes began to violate the Goryeo–Jurchen borders, and eventually invaded Goryeo Korea. After experiencing invasion by the Jurchen, Korean general Yun Kwan realized that Goryeo lacked efficient cavalry units. He reorganized the Goryeo military into a professional army that would contain decent and well-trained cavalry units. In 1107, the Jurchen were ultimately defeated, and surrendered to Yun Kwan.

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The cavalry of Goguryeo, one of the Three Kingdoms of Korea, were called Gaemamusa (개마무사, 鎧馬武士), and were renowned as a fearsome heavy cavalry force. King Gwanggaeto the Great often led expeditions into the Baekje, Gaya confederacy, Buyeo, Later Yan and against Japanese invaders with his cavalry. In the 12th century, Jurchen tribes began to violate the Goryeo–Jurchen borders, and eventually invaded Goryeo Korea. After experiencing invasion by the Jurchen, Korean general Yun Kwan realized that Goryeo lacked efficient cavalry units. He reorganized the Goryeo military into a professional army that would contain decent and well-trained cavalry units. In 1107, the Jurchen were ultimately defeated, and surrendered to Yun Kwan. To mark the victory, General Yun built nine fortresses to the northeast of the Goryeo–Jurchen borders (동북 9성, 東北 九城). Japan: The ancient Japanese of the Kofun period also adopted cavalry and equine culture by the 5th century AD. The emergence of the samurai aristocracy led to the development of armoured horse archers, themselves to develop into charging lancer cavalry as gunpowder weapons rendered bows obsolete. Japanese cavalry was largely made up of landowners who would be upon a horse to better survey the troops they were called upon to bring to an engagement, rather than traditional mounted warfare seen in other cultures with massed cavalry units. An example is Yabusame (流鏑馬), a type of mounted archery in traditional Japanese archery. An archer on a running horse shoots three special "turnip-headed" arrows successively at three wooden targets. This style of archery has its origins at the beginning of the Kamakura period. Minamoto no Yoritomo became alarmed at the lack of archery skills his samurai had. He organized yabusame as a form of practice. Currently, the best places to see yabusame performed are at the Tsurugaoka Hachiman-gū in Kamakura and Shimogamo Shrine in Kyoto (during Aoi Matsuri in early May). It is also performed in Samukawa and on the beach at Zushi, as well as other locations. Kasagake or Kasakake (笠懸, かさがけ lit. "hat shooting") is a type of Japanese mounted archery. In contrast to yabusame, the types of targets are various and the archer shoots without stopping the horse. While yabusame has been played as a part of formal ceremonies, kasagake has developed as a game or practice of martial arts, focusing on technical elements of horse archery. South Asia: Indian subcontinent: In the Indian subcontinent, cavalry played a major role from the Gupta dynasty (320–600) period onwards. India has also the oldest evidence for the introduction of toe-stirrups. Indian literature contains numerous references to the mounted warriors of the Central Asian horse nomads, notably the Sakas, Kambojas, Yavanas, Pahlavas and Paradas. Numerous Puranic texts refer to a conflict in ancient India (16th century BC) in which the horsemen of five nations, called the "Five Hordes" (pañca.ganan) or Kṣatriya hordes (Kṣatriya ganah), attacked and captured the state of Ayudhya by dethroning its Vedic King Bahu The Mahabharata, Ramayana, numerous Puranas and some foreign sources attest that the Kamboja cavalry frequently played role in ancient wars. V. R. Ramachandra Dikshitar writes: "Both the Puranas and the epics agree that the horses of the Sindhu and Kamboja regions were of the finest breed, and that the services of the Kambojas as cavalry troopers were utilised in ancient wars". J.A.O.S. writes: "Most famous horses are said to come either from Sindhu or Kamboja; of the latter (i.e. the Kamboja), the Indian epic Mahabharata speaks among the finest horsemen". The Mahabharata speaks of the esteemed cavalry of the Kambojas, Sakas, Yavanas and Tusharas, all of whom had participated in the Kurukshetra war under the supreme command of Kamboja ruler Sudakshin Kamboj. Mahabharata and Vishnudharmottara Purana pay especial attention to the Kambojas, Yavansa, Gandharas etc. being ashva.yuddha.kushalah (expert cavalrymen). In the Mahabharata war, the Kamboja cavalry along with that of the Sakas, Yavanas is reported to have been enlisted by the Kuru king Duryodhana of Hastinapura. Herodotus (c. 484 – c. 425 BC) attests that the Gandarian mercenaries (i.e. Gandharans/Kambojans of Gandari Strapy of Achaemenids) from the 20th strapy of the Achaemenids were recruited in the army of emperor Xerxes I (486–465 BC), which he led against the Hellas. Similarly, the men of the Mountain Land from north of Kabul-River equivalent to medieval Kohistan (Pakistan), figure in the army of Darius III against Alexander at Arbela, providing a cavalry force and 15 elephants. This obviously refers to Kamboja cavalry south of Hindukush. The Kambojas were famous for their horses, as well as cavalrymen (asva-yuddha-Kushalah). On account of their supreme position in horse (Ashva) culture, they were also popularly known as Ashvakas, i.e. the "horsemen" and their land was known as "Home of Horses". They are the Assakenoi and Aspasioi of the Classical writings, and the Ashvakayanas and Ashvayanas in Pāṇini's Ashtadhyayi. The Assakenoi had faced Alexander with 30,000 infantry, 20,000 cavalry and 30 war elephants. Scholars have identified the Assakenoi and Aspasioi clans of Kunar and Swat valleys as a section of the Kambojas. These hardy tribes had offered stubborn resistance to Alexander (c. 326 BC) during latter's campaign of the Kabul, Kunar and Swat valleys and had even extracted the praise of the Alexander's historians. These highlanders, designated as "parvatiya Ayudhajivinah" in Pāṇini's Astadhyayi, were rebellious, fiercely independent and freedom-loving cavalrymen who never easily yielded to any overlord. The Sanskrit drama Mudra-rakashas by Visakha Dutta and the Jaina work Parishishtaparvan refer to Chandragupta's (c. 320 BC – c. 298 BC) alliance with Himalayan king Parvataka. The Himalayan alliance gave Chandragupta a formidable composite army made up of the cavalry forces of the Shakas, Yavanas, Kambojas, Kiratas, Parasikas and Bahlikas as attested by Mudra-Rakashas (Mudra-Rakshasa 2). These hordes had helped Chandragupta Maurya defeat the ruler of Magadha and placed Chandragupta on the throne, thus laying the foundations of Mauryan dynasty in Northern India. The cavalry of Hunas and the Kambojas is also attested in the Raghu Vamsa epic poem of Sanskrit poet Kalidasa. Raghu of Kalidasa is believed to be Chandragupta II (Vikaramaditya) (375–413/15 AD), of the well-known Gupta dynasty. As late as the mediaeval era, the Kamboja cavalry had also formed part of the Gurjara-Pratihara armed forces from the eighth to the 10th centuries AD. They had come to Bengal with the Pratiharas when the latter conquered part of the province. Ancient Kambojas organised military sanghas and shrenis (corporations) to manage their political and military affairs, as Arthashastra of Kautiliya as well as the Mahabharata record. They are described as Ayuddha-jivi or Shastr-opajivis (nations-in-arms), which also means that the Kamboja cavalry offered its military services to other nations as well. There are numerous references to Kambojas having been requisitioned as cavalry troopers in ancient wars by outside nations. Mughal Empire: The Mughal armies (lashkar) were primarily a cavalry force. The elite corps were the ahadi who provided direct service to the Emperor and acted as guard cavalry. Supplementary cavalry or dakhilis were recruited, equipped and paid by the central state. This was in contrast to the tabinan horsemen who were the followers of individual noblemen. Their training and equipment varied widely but they made up the backbone of the Mughal cavalry. Finally there were tribal irregulars led by and loyal to tributary chiefs.

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They are described as Ayuddha-jivi or Shastr-opajivis (nations-in-arms), which also means that the Kamboja cavalry offered its military services to other nations as well. There are numerous references to Kambojas having been requisitioned as cavalry troopers in ancient wars by outside nations. Mughal Empire: The Mughal armies (lashkar) were primarily a cavalry force. The elite corps were the ahadi who provided direct service to the Emperor and acted as guard cavalry. Supplementary cavalry or dakhilis were recruited, equipped and paid by the central state. This was in contrast to the tabinan horsemen who were the followers of individual noblemen. Their training and equipment varied widely but they made up the backbone of the Mughal cavalry. Finally there were tribal irregulars led by and loyal to tributary chiefs. These included Hindus, Afghans and Turks summoned for military service when their autonomous leaders were called on by the Imperial government. European Middle Ages: As the quality and availability of heavy infantry declined in Europe with the fall of the Roman Empire, heavy cavalry became more effective. Infantry that lack the cohesion and discipline of tight formations are more susceptible to being broken and scattered by shock combat—the main role of heavy cavalry, which rose to become the dominant force on the European battlefield. As heavy cavalry increased in importance, it became the main focus of military development. The arms and armour for heavy cavalry increased, the high-backed saddle developed, and stirrups and spurs were added, increasing the advantage of heavy cavalry even more. This shift in military importance was reflected in an increasingly hierarchical society as well. From the late 10th century onwards heavily armed horsemen, milites or knights, emerged as an expensive elite taking centre stage both on and off the battlefield. This class of aristocratic warriors was considered the "ultimate" in heavy cavalry: well-equipped with the best weapons, state-of-the-art armour from head to foot, leading with the lance in battle in a full-gallop, close-formation "knightly charge" that might prove irresistible, winning the battle almost as soon as it began. But knights remained the minority of total available combat forces; the expense of arms, armour, and horses was only affordable to a select few. While mounted men-at-arms focused on a narrow combat role of shock combat, medieval armies relied on a large variety of foot troops to fulfill all the rest (skirmishing, flank guards, scouting, holding ground, etc.). Medieval chroniclers tended to pay undue attention to the knights at the expense of the common soldiers, which led early students of military history to suppose that heavy cavalry was the only force that mattered on medieval European battlefields. But well-trained and disciplined infantry could defeat knights. Massed English longbowmen triumphed over French cavalry at Crécy, Poitiers and Agincourt, while at Gisors (1188), Bannockburn (1314), and Laupen (1339), foot-soldiers proved they could resist cavalry charges as long as they held their formation. Once the Swiss developed their pike squares for offensive as well as defensive use, infantry started to become the principal arm. This aggressive new doctrine gave the Swiss victory over a range of adversaries, and their enemies found that the only reliable way to defeat them was by the use of an even more comprehensive combined arms doctrine, as evidenced in the Battle of Marignano. The introduction of missile weapons that required less skill than the longbow, such as the crossbow and hand cannon, also helped remove the focus somewhat from cavalry elites to masses of cheap infantry equipped with easy-to-learn weapons. These missile weapons were very successfully used in the Hussite Wars, in combination with Wagenburg tactics. This gradual rise in the dominance of infantry led to the adoption of dismounted tactics. From the earliest times knights and mounted men-at-arms had frequently dismounted to handle enemies they could not overcome on horseback, such as in the Battle of the Dyle (891) and the Battle of Bremule (1119), but after the 1350s this trend became more marked with the dismounted men-at-arms fighting as super-heavy infantry with two-handed swords and poleaxes. In any case, warfare in the Middle Ages tended to be dominated by raids and sieges rather than pitched battles, and mounted men-at-arms rarely had any choice other than dismounting when faced with the prospect of assaulting a fortified position. Islamic States: Arabs: The Islamic Prophet Muhammad made use of cavalry in many of his military campaigns including the Expedition of Dhu Qarad, and the expedition of Zaid ibn Haritha in al-Is which took place in September, 627 AD, fifth month of 6 AH of the Islamic calendar. Early organized Arab mounted forces under the Rashidun caliphate comprised a light cavalry armed with lance and sword. Its main role was to attack the enemy flanks and rear. These relatively lightly armored horsemen formed the most effective element of the Muslim armies during the later stages of the Islamic conquest of the Levant. The best use of this lightly armed fast moving cavalry was revealed at the Battle of Yarmouk (636 AD) in which Khalid ibn Walid, knowing the skills of his horsemen, used them to turn the tables at every critical instance of the battle with their ability to engage, disengage, then turn back and attack again from the flank or rear. A strong cavalry regiment was formed by Khalid ibn Walid which included the veterans of the campaign of Iraq and Syria. Early Muslim historians have given it the name Tali'a mutaharrikah(طليعة متحركة), or the Mobile guard. This was used as an advance guard and a strong striking force to route the opposing armies with its greater mobility that give it an upper hand when maneuvering against any Byzantine army. With this mobile striking force, the conquest of Syria was made easy. The Battle of Talas in 751 AD was a conflict between the Arab Abbasid Caliphate and the Chinese Tang dynasty over the control of Central Asia. Chinese infantry were routed by Arab cavalry near the bank of the River Talas. Until the 11th century the classic cavalry strategy of the Arab Middle East incorporated the razzia tactics of fast moving raids by mixed bodies of horsemen and infantry. Under the talented leadership of Saladin and other Islamic commanders the emphasis changed to Mamluk horse-archers backed by bodies of irregular light cavalry. Trained to rapidly disperse, harass and regroup these flexible mounted forces proved capable of withstanding the previously invincible heavy knights of the western crusaders at battles such as Hattin in 1187. Mamluks: Originating in the 9th century as Central Asian ghulams or captives utilised as mounted auxiliaries by Arab armies, Mamluks were subsequently trained as cavalry soldiers rather than solely mounted-archers, with increased priority being given to the use of lances and swords. Mamluks were to follow the dictates of al-furusiyya, a code of conduct that included values like courage and generosity but also doctrine of cavalry tactics, horsemanship, archery and treatment of wounds. By the late 13th century the Manluk armies had evolved into a professional elite of cavalry, backed by more numerous but less well-trained footmen. Maghreb: The Islamic Berber states of North Africa employed elite horse mounted cavalry armed with spears and following the model of the original Arab occupiers of the region. Horse-harness and weapons were manufactured locally and the six-monthly stipends for horsemen were double those of their infantry counterparts. During the 8th century Islamic conquest of Iberia large numbers of horses and riders were shipped from North Africa, to specialise in raiding and the provision of support for the massed Berber footmen of the main armies. Maghrebi traditions of mounted warfare eventually influenced a number of sub-Saharan African polities in the medieval era. The Esos of Ikoyi, military aristocrats of the Yoruba peoples, were a notable manifestation of this phenomenon. Al-Andalus: Iran: Qizilbash, were a class of Safavid militant warriors in Iran during the 15th to 18th centuries, who often fought as elite cavalry. Ottoman: During its period of greatest expansion, from the 14th to 17th centuries, cavalry formed the powerful core of the Ottoman armies. Registers dated 1475 record 22,000 Sipahi feudal cavalry levied in Europe, 17,000 Sipahis recruited from Anatolia, and 3,000 Kapikulu (regular body-guard cavalry). During the 18th century however the Ottoman mounted troops evolved into light cavalry serving in the thinly populated regions of the Middle East and North Africa. Such frontier horsemen were largely raised by local governors and were separate from the main field armies of the Ottoman Empire. At the beginning of the 19th century modernised Nizam-I Credit ("New Army") regiments appeared, including full-time cavalry units officered from the horse guards of the Sultan. Renaissance Europe: Ironically, the rise of infantry in the early 16th century coincided with the "golden age" of heavy cavalry; a French or Spanish army at the beginning of the century could have up to half its numbers made up of various kinds of light and heavy cavalry, whereas in earlier medieval and later 17th-century armies the proportion of cavalry was seldom more than a quarter.

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During the 18th century however the Ottoman mounted troops evolved into light cavalry serving in the thinly populated regions of the Middle East and North Africa. Such frontier horsemen were largely raised by local governors and were separate from the main field armies of the Ottoman Empire. At the beginning of the 19th century modernised Nizam-I Credit ("New Army") regiments appeared, including full-time cavalry units officered from the horse guards of the Sultan. Renaissance Europe: Ironically, the rise of infantry in the early 16th century coincided with the "golden age" of heavy cavalry; a French or Spanish army at the beginning of the century could have up to half its numbers made up of various kinds of light and heavy cavalry, whereas in earlier medieval and later 17th-century armies the proportion of cavalry was seldom more than a quarter. Knighthood largely lost its military functions and became more closely tied to social and economic prestige in an increasingly capitalistic Western society. With the rise of drilled and trained infantry, the mounted men-at-arms, now sometimes called gendarmes and often part of the standing army themselves, adopted the same role as in the Hellenistic age, that of delivering a decisive blow once the battle was already engaged, either by charging the enemy in the flank or attacking their commander-in-chief. From the 1550s onwards, the use of gunpowder weapons solidified infantry's dominance of the battlefield and began to allow true mass armies to develop. This is closely related to the increase in the size of armies throughout the early modern period; heavily armored cavalrymen were expensive to raise and maintain and it took years to train a skilled horseman or a horse, while arquebusiers and later musketeers could be trained and kept in the field at much lower cost, and were much easier to recruit. The Spanish tercio and later formations relegated cavalry to a supporting role. The pistol was specifically developed to try to bring cavalry back into the conflict, together with manoeuvres such as the caracole. The caracole was not particularly successful, however, and the charge (whether with lance, sword, or pistol) remained as the primary mode of employment for many types of European cavalry, although by this time it was delivered in much deeper formations and with greater discipline than before. The demi-lancers and the heavily armored sword-and-pistol reiters were among the types of cavalry whose heyday was in the 16th and 17th centuries. During this period the Polish Winged hussars were a dominating heavy cavalry force in Eastern Europe that initially achieved great success against Swedes, Russians, Turks and other, until repeatably beaten by either combined arms tactics, increase in firepower or beaten in melee with the Drabant cavalry of the Swedish Empire. From their last engagement in 1702 (at the Battle of Kliszów) until 1776, the obsolete Winged hussars were demoted and largely assigned to ceremonial roles. The Polish Winged hussars military prowess peaked at the Siege of Vienna in 1683, when hussar banners participated in the largest cavalry charge in history and successfully repelled the Ottoman attack. 18th-century Europe and Napoleonic Wars: Cavalry retained an important role in this age of regularization and standardization across European armies. They remained the primary choice for confronting enemy cavalry. Attacking an unbroken infantry force head-on usually resulted in failure, but extended linear infantry formations were vulnerable to flank or rear attacks. Cavalry was important at Blenheim (1704), Rossbach (1757), Marengo (1800), Eylau and Friedland (1807), remaining significant throughout the Napoleonic Wars. Even with the increasing prominence of infantry, cavalry still had an irreplaceable role in armies, due to their greater mobility. Their non-battle duties often included patrolling the fringes of army encampments, with standing orders to intercept suspected shirkers and deserters, as well as, serving as outpost pickets in advance of the main body. During battle, lighter cavalry such as hussars and uhlans might skirmish with other cavalry, attack light infantry, or charge and either capture enemy artillery or render them useless by plugging the touchholes with iron spikes. Heavier cavalry such as cuirassiers, dragoons, and carabiniers usually charged towards infantry formations or opposing cavalry in order to rout them. Both light and heavy cavalry pursued retreating enemies, the point where most battle casualties occurred. The greatest cavalry charge of modern history was at the 1807 Battle of Eylau, when the entire 11,000-strong French cavalry reserve, led by Joachim Murat, launched a huge charge on and through the Russian infantry lines. Cavalry's dominating and menacing presence on the battlefield was countered by the use of infantry squares. The most notable examples are at the Battle of Quatre Bras and later at the Battle of Waterloo, the latter which the repeated charges by up to 9,000 French cavalrymen ordered by Michel Ney failed to break the British-Allied army, who had formed into squares. Massed infantry, especially those formed in squares were deadly to cavalry, but offered an excellent target for artillery. Once a bombardment had disordered the infantry formation, cavalry were able to rout and pursue the scattered foot soldiers. It was not until individual firearms gained accuracy and improved rates of fire that cavalry was diminished in this role as well. Even then light cavalry remained an indispensable tool for scouting, screening the army's movements, and harassing the enemy's supply lines until military aircraft supplanted them in this role in the early stages of World War I. 19th century: Europe: By the beginning of the 19th century, European cavalry fell into four main categories: Cuirassiers, heavy cavalry, adorned with body armor, especially a cuirass, and primarily armed with pistols and a sword Dragoons, originally mounted infantry, but later regarded as medium cavalry Hussars, light cavalry, primarily armed with sabres Lancers or Uhlans, light cavalry, primarily armed with lances There were cavalry variations for individual nations as well: France had the chasseurs à cheval; Prussia had the Jäger zu Pferde; Bavaria, Saxony and Austria had the Chevaulegers; and Russia had Cossacks. Britain, from the mid-18th century, had Light Dragoons as light cavalry and Dragoons, Dragoon Guards and Household Cavalry as heavy cavalry. Only after the end of the Napoleonic wars were the Household Cavalry equipped with cuirasses, and some other regiments were converted to lancers. In the United States Army prior to 1862 the cavalry were almost always dragoons. The Imperial Japanese Army had its cavalry uniformed as hussars, but they fought as dragoons. In the Crimean War, the Charge of the Light Brigade and the Thin Red Line at the Battle of Balaclava showed the vulnerability of cavalry, when deployed without effective support. Franco-Prussian War: During the Franco-Prussian War, at the Battle of Mars-la-Tour in 1870, a Prussian cavalry brigade decisively smashed the centre of the French battle line, after skilfully concealing their approach. This event became known as Von Bredow's Death Ride after the brigade commander Adalbert von Bredow; it would be used in the following decades to argue that massed cavalry charges still had a place on the modern battlefield. Imperial expansion: Cavalry found a new role in colonial campaigns (irregular warfare), where modern weapons were lacking and the slow moving infantry-artillery train or fixed fortifications were often ineffective against indigenous insurgents (unless the latter offered a fight on an equal footing, as at Tel-el-Kebir, Omdurman, etc.). Cavalry "flying columns" proved effective, or at least cost-effective, in many campaigns—although an astute native commander (like Samori in western Africa, Shamil in the Caucasus, or any of the better Boer commanders) could turn the tables and use the greater mobility of their cavalry to offset their relative lack of firepower compared with European forces. In 1903 the British Indian Army maintained forty regiments of cavalry, numbering about 25,000 Indian sowars (cavalrymen), with British and Indian officers. Among the more famous regiments in the lineages of the modern Indian and Pakistani armies are: Governor General's Bodyguard (now President's Bodyguard) Skinner's Horse (now India's 1st Horse (Skinner's Horse)) Gardner's Lancers (now India's 2nd Lancers (Gardner's Horse)) Hodson's Horse (now India's 3rd Horse (Hodson's)) of the Bengal Lancers fame 6th Bengal Cavalry (later amalgamated with 7th Hariana Lancers to form 18th King Edward's Own Cavalry) now 18th Cavalry of the Indian Army Probyn's Horse (now 5th Horse, Pakistan) Royal Deccan Horse (now India's The Deccan Horse) Poona Horse (now India's The Poona Horse) Scinde Horse (now India's The Scinde Horse) Queen's Own Guides Cavalry (now Pakistan). 11th Prince Albert Victor's Own Cavalry (Frontier Force) (now 11th Cavalry (Frontier Force), Pakistan) Several of these formations are still active, though they now are armoured formations, for example the Guides Cavalry of Pakistan.

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11th Prince Albert Victor's Own Cavalry (Frontier Force) (now 11th Cavalry (Frontier Force), Pakistan) Several of these formations are still active, though they now are armoured formations, for example the Guides Cavalry of Pakistan. The French Army maintained substantial cavalry forces in Algeria and Morocco from 1830 until the end of World War II. Much of the Mediterranean coastal terrain was suitable for mounted action and there was a long established culture of horsemanship amongst the Arab and Berber inhabitants. The French forces included Spahis, Chasseurs d' Afrique, Foreign Legion cavalry and mounted Goumiers. Both Spain and Italy raised cavalry regiments from amongst the indigenous horsemen of their North African territories (see regulares, Italian Spahis and savari respectively). Imperial Germany employed mounted formations in South West Africa as part of the Schutztruppen (colonial army) garrisoning the territory. United States: In the early American Civil War the regular United States Army mounted rifle, dragoon, and two existing cavalry regiments were reorganized and renamed cavalry regiments, of which there were six. Over a hundred other federal and state cavalry regiments were organized, but the infantry played a much larger role in many battles due to its larger numbers, lower cost per rifle fielded, and much easier recruitment. However, cavalry saw a role as part of screening forces and in foraging and scouting. The later phases of the war saw the Federal army developing a truly effective cavalry force fighting as scouts, raiders, and, with repeating rifles, as mounted infantry. The distinguished 1st Virginia Cavalry ranks as one of the most effectual and successful cavalry units on the Confederate side. Noted cavalry commanders included Confederate general J.E.B. Stuart, Nathan Bedford Forrest, and John Singleton Mosby (a.k.a. "The Grey Ghost") and on the Union side, Philip Sheridan and George Armstrong Custer. Post Civil War, as the volunteer armies disbanded, the regular army cavalry regiments increased in number from six to ten, among them Custer's U.S. 7th Cavalry Regiment of Little Bighorn fame, and the African-American U.S. 9th Cavalry Regiment and U.S. 10th Cavalry Regiment. The black units, along with others (both cavalry and infantry), collectively became known as the Buffalo Soldiers. According to Robert M. Utley: the frontier army was a conventional military force trying to control, by conventional military methods, a people that did not behave like conventional enemies and, indeed, quite often were not enemies at all. This is the most difficult of all military assignments, whether in Africa, Asia, or the American West. These regiments, which rarely took the field as complete organizations, served throughout the American Indian Wars through the close of the frontier in the 1890s. Volunteer cavalry regiments like the Rough Riders consisted of horsemen such as cowboys, ranchers and other outdoorsmen, that served as a cavalry in the United States Military. Developments 1900–1914: At the beginning of the 20th century, all armies still maintained substantial cavalry forces, although there was contention over whether their role should revert to that of mounted infantry (the historic dragoon function). With motorised vehicles and aircraft still under development, horse mounted troops remained the only fully mobile forces available for manoeuvre warfare until 1914. England: Following the experience of the South African War of 1899–1902 (where mounted Boer citizen commandos fighting on foot from cover proved more effective than regular cavalry), the British Army withdrew lances for all but ceremonial purposes and placed a new emphasis on training for dismounted action in 1903. Lances were however readopted for active service in 1912. Russia: In 1882, the Imperial Russian Army converted all its line hussar and lancer regiments to dragoons, with an emphasis on mounted infantry training. In 1910 these regiments reverted to their historic roles, designations and uniforms. Germany: By 1909, official regulations dictating the role of the Imperial German cavalry had been revised to indicate an increasing realization of the realities of modern warfare. The massive cavalry charge in three waves which had previously marked the end of annual maneuvers was discontinued and a new emphasis was placed in training on scouting, raiding and pursuit; rather than main battle involvement. The perceived importance of cavalry was however still evident, with thirteen new regiments of mounted rifles (Jäger zu Pferde) being raised shortly before the outbreak of war in 1914. France: In spite of significant experience in mounted warfare in Morocco during 1908–14, the French cavalry remained a highly conservative institution. The traditional tactical distinctions between heavy, medium, and light cavalry branches were retained. French cuirassiers wore breastplates and plumed helmets unchanged from the Napoleonic period, during the early months of World War I. Dragoons were similarly equipped, though they did not wear cuirasses and did carry lances. Light cavalry were described as being "a blaze of colour". French cavalry of all branches were well mounted and were trained to change position and charge at full gallop. One weakness in training was that French cavalrymen seldom dismounted on the march and their horses suffered heavily from raw backs in August 1914. First World War: Opening stages: Europe 1914: In August 1914, all combatant armies still retained substantial numbers of cavalry and the mobile nature of the opening battles on both Eastern and Western Fronts provided a number of instances of traditional cavalry actions, though on a smaller and more scattered scale than those of previous wars. The 110 regiments of Imperial German cavalry, while as colourful and traditional as any in peacetime appearance, had adopted a practice of falling back on infantry support when any substantial opposition was encountered. These cautious tactics aroused derision amongst their more conservative French and Russian opponents but proved appropriate to the new nature of warfare. A single attempt by the German army, on 12 August 1914, to use six regiments of massed cavalry to cut off the Belgian field army from Antwerp floundered when they were driven back in disorder by rifle fire. The two German cavalry brigades involved lost 492 men and 843 horses in repeated charges against dismounted Belgian lancers and infantry. One of the last recorded charges by French cavalry took place on the night of 9/10 September 1914 when a squadron of the 16th Dragoons overran a German airfield at Soissons, while suffering heavy losses. Once the front lines stabilised on the Western Front with the start of Trench Warfare, a combination of barbed wire, uneven muddy terrain, machine guns and rapid fire rifles proved deadly to horse mounted troops and by early 1915 most cavalry units were no longer seeing front line action. On the Eastern Front, a more fluid form of warfare arose from flat open terrain favorable to mounted warfare. On the outbreak of war in 1914 the bulk of the Russian cavalry was deployed at full strength in frontier garrisons and, during the period that the main armies were mobilizing, scouting and raiding into East Prussia and Austrian Galicia was undertaken by mounted troops trained to fight with sabre and lance in the traditional style. On 21 August 1914 the 4th Austro-Hungarian Kavalleriedivison fought a major mounted engagement at Jaroslavic with the Russian 10th Cavalry Division, in what was arguably the final historic battle to involve thousands of horsemen on both sides. While this was the last massed cavalry encounter on the Eastern Front, the absence of good roads limited the use of mechanized transport and even the technologically advanced Imperial German Army continued to deploy up to twenty-four horse-mounted divisions in the East, as late as 1917. Europe 1915–1918: For the remainder of the War on the Western Front, cavalry had virtually no role to play. The British and French armies dismounted many of their cavalry regiments and used them in infantry and other roles: the Life Guards for example spent the last months of the War as a machine gun corps; and the Australian Light Horse served as light infantry during the Gallipoli campaign. In September 1914 cavalry comprised 9.28% of the total manpower of the British Expeditionary Force in France—by July 1918 this proportion had fallen to 1.65%. As early as the first winter of the war most French cavalry regiments had dismounted a squadron each, for service in the trenches. The French cavalry numbered 102,000 in May 1915 but had been reduced to 63,000 by October 1918. The German Army dismounted nearly all their cavalry in the West, maintaining only one mounted division on that front by January 1917. Italy entered the war in 1915 with thirty regiments of line cavalry, lancers and light horse. While employed effectively against their Austro-Hungarian counterparts during the initial offensives across the Isonzo River, the Italian mounted forces ceased to have a significant role as the front shifted into mountainous terrain. By 1916 most cavalry machine-gun sections and two complete cavalry divisions had been dismounted and seconded to the infantry. Some cavalry were retained as mounted troops in reserve behind the lines, in anticipation of a penetration of the opposing trenches that it seemed would never come.

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The French cavalry numbered 102,000 in May 1915 but had been reduced to 63,000 by October 1918. The German Army dismounted nearly all their cavalry in the West, maintaining only one mounted division on that front by January 1917. Italy entered the war in 1915 with thirty regiments of line cavalry, lancers and light horse. While employed effectively against their Austro-Hungarian counterparts during the initial offensives across the Isonzo River, the Italian mounted forces ceased to have a significant role as the front shifted into mountainous terrain. By 1916 most cavalry machine-gun sections and two complete cavalry divisions had been dismounted and seconded to the infantry. Some cavalry were retained as mounted troops in reserve behind the lines, in anticipation of a penetration of the opposing trenches that it seemed would never come. Tanks, introduced on the Western Front by the British in September 1916 during the Battle of the Somme, had the capacity to achieve such breakthroughs but did not have the reliable range to exploit them. In their first major use at the Battle of Cambrai (1917), the plan was for a cavalry division to follow behind the tanks, however they were not able to cross a canal because a tank had broken the only bridge. On a few other occasions, throughout the war, cavalry were readied in significant numbers for involvement in major offensives; such as in the Battle of Caporetto and the Battle of Moreuil Wood. However it was not until the German Army had been forced to retreat in the Hundred Days Offensive of 1918, that limited numbers of cavalry were again able to operate with any effectiveness in their intended role. There was a successful charge by the British 7th Dragoon Guards on the last day of the war. In the wider spaces of the Eastern Front, a more fluid form of warfare continued and there was still a use for mounted troops. Some wide-ranging actions were fought, again mostly in the early months of the war. However, even here the value of cavalry was overrated and the maintenance of large mounted formations at the front by the Russian Army put a major strain on the railway system, to little strategic advantage. In February 1917, the Russian regular cavalry (exclusive of Cossacks) was reduced by nearly a third from its peak number of 200,000, as two squadrons of each regiment were dismounted and incorporated into additional infantry battalions. Their Austro-Hungarian opponents, plagued by a shortage of trained infantry, had been obliged to progressively convert most horse cavalry regiments to dismounted rifle units starting in late 1914. Middle East: In the Middle East, during the Sinai and Palestine Campaign mounted forces (British, Indian, Ottoman, Australian, Arab and New Zealand) retained an important strategic role both as mounted infantry and cavalry. In Egypt, the mounted infantry formations like the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade and Australian Light Horse of ANZAC Mounted Division, operating as mounted infantry, drove German and Ottoman forces back from Romani to Magdhaba and Rafa and out of the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula in 1916. After a stalemate on the Gaza–Beersheba line between March and October 1917, Beersheba was captured by the Australian Mounted Division's 4th Light Horse Brigade. Their mounted charge succeeded after a coordinated attack by the British Infantry and Yeomanry cavalry and the Australian and New Zealand Light Horse and Mounted Rifles brigades. A series of coordinated attacks by these Egyptian Expeditionary Force infantry and mounted troops were also successful at the Battle of Mughar Ridge, during which the British infantry divisions and the Desert Mounted Corps drove two Ottoman armies back to the Jaffa—Jerusalem line. The infantry with mainly dismounted cavalry and mounted infantry fought in the Judean Hills to eventually almost encircle Jerusalem which was occupied shortly after. During a pause in operations necessitated by the German spring offensive in 1918 on the Western Front, joint infantry and mounted infantry attacks towards Amman and Es Salt resulted in retreats back to the Jordan Valley which continued to be occupied by mounted divisions during the summer of 1918. The Australian Mounted Division was armed with swords and in September, after the successful breaching of the Ottoman line on the Mediterranean coast by the British Empire infantry XXI Corps was followed by cavalry attacks by the 4th Cavalry Division, 5th Cavalry Division and Australian Mounted Divisions which almost encircled two Ottoman armies in the Judean Hills forcing their retreat. Meanwhile, Chaytor's Force of infantry and mounted infantry in ANZAC Mounted Division held the Jordan Valley, covering the right flank to later advance eastwards to capture Es Salt and Amman and half of a third Ottoman army. A subsequent pursuit by the 4th Cavalry Division and the Australian Mounted Division followed by the 5th Cavalry Division to Damascus. Armoured cars and 5th Cavalry Division lancers were continuing the pursuit of Ottoman units north of Aleppo when the Armistice of Mudros was signed by the Ottoman Empire. Post–World War I: A combination of military conservatism in almost all armies and post-war financial constraints prevented the lessons of 1914–1918 being acted on immediately. There was a general reduction in the number of cavalry regiments in the British, French, Italian and other Western armies but it was still argued with conviction (for example in the 1922 edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica) that mounted troops had a major role to play in future warfare. The 1920s saw an interim period during which cavalry remained as a proud and conspicuous element of all major armies, though much less so than prior to 1914. Cavalry was extensively used in the Russian Civil War and the Soviet-Polish War. The last major cavalry battle was the Battle of Komarów in 1920, between Poland and the Russian Bolsheviks. Colonial warfare in Morocco, Syria, the Middle East and the North West Frontier of India provided some opportunities for mounted action against enemies lacking advanced weaponry. The post-war German Army (Reichsheer) was permitted a large proportion of cavalry (18 regiments or 16.4% of total manpower) under the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles. The British Army mechanised all cavalry regiments between 1929 and 1941, redefining their role from horse to armoured vehicles to form the Royal Armoured Corps together with the Royal Tank Regiment. The U.S. Cavalry abandoned its sabres in 1934 and commenced the conversion of its horsed regiments to mechanized cavalry, starting with the First Regiment of Cavalry in January 1933. During the Turkish War of Independence, Turkish cavalry under General Fahrettin Altay was instrumental in the Kemalist victory over the invading Greek Army in 1922 during the Battle of Dumlupınar. The 5th Cavalry Division was able to slip behind the main Greek army, cutting off all communication and supply lines as well as retreat options. This forced the surrender of the remaining Greek forces and may have been the last time in history that cavalry played a definitive role in the outcome of a battle. During the 1930s, the French Army experimented with integrating mounted and mechanised cavalry units into larger formations. Dragoon regiments were converted to motorised infantry (trucks and motor cycles), and cuirassiers to armoured units; while light cavalry (chasseurs a' cheval, hussars and spahis) remained as mounted sabre squadrons. The theory was that mixed forces comprising these diverse units could utilise the strengths of each according to circumstances. In practice mounted troops proved unable to keep up with fast moving mechanised units over any distance. The 39 cavalry regiments of the British Indian Army were reduced to 21 as the result of a series of amalgamations immediately following World War I. The new establishment remained unchanged until 1936 when three regiments were redesignated as permanent training units, each with six, still mounted, regiments linked to them. In 1938, the process of mechanization began with the conversion of a full cavalry brigade (two Indian regiments and one British) to armoured car and tank units. By the end of 1940, all of the Indian cavalry had been mechanized, initially and in the majority of cases, to motorized infantry transported in 15cwt trucks. The last horsed regiment of the British Indian Army (other than the Viceroy's Bodyguard and some Indian States Forces regiments) was the 19th King George's Own Lancers which had its final mounted parade at Rawalpindi on 28 October 1939. This unit still exists in the Pakistan Army as an armored regiment. World War II: While most armies still maintained cavalry units at the outbreak of World War II in 1939, significant mounted action was largely restricted to the Polish, Balkan, and Soviet campaigns. Rather than charge their mounts into battle, cavalry units were either used as mounted infantry (using horses to move into position and then dismounting for combat) or as reconnaissance units (especially in areas not suited to tracked or wheeled vehicles). Polish: A popular myth is that Polish cavalry armed with lances charged German tanks during the September 1939 campaign. This arose from misreporting of a single clash on 1 September near Krojanty, when two squadrons of the Polish 18th Lancers armed with sabres scattered German infantry before being caught in the open by German armoured cars. Two examples illustrate how the myth developed.

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This unit still exists in the Pakistan Army as an armored regiment. World War II: While most armies still maintained cavalry units at the outbreak of World War II in 1939, significant mounted action was largely restricted to the Polish, Balkan, and Soviet campaigns. Rather than charge their mounts into battle, cavalry units were either used as mounted infantry (using horses to move into position and then dismounting for combat) or as reconnaissance units (especially in areas not suited to tracked or wheeled vehicles). Polish: A popular myth is that Polish cavalry armed with lances charged German tanks during the September 1939 campaign. This arose from misreporting of a single clash on 1 September near Krojanty, when two squadrons of the Polish 18th Lancers armed with sabres scattered German infantry before being caught in the open by German armoured cars. Two examples illustrate how the myth developed. First, because motorised vehicles were in short supply, the Poles used horses to pull anti-tank weapons into position. Second, there were a few incidents when Polish cavalry was trapped by German tanks, and attempted to fight free. However, this did not mean that the Polish army chose to attack tanks with horse cavalry. Later, on the Eastern Front, the Red Army did deploy cavalry units effectively against the Germans. A more correct term would be "mounted infantry" instead of "cavalry", as horses were primarily used as a means of transportation, for which they were very suitable in view of the very poor road conditions in pre-war Poland. Another myth describes Polish cavalry as being armed with both sabres and lances; lances were used for peacetime ceremonial purposes only and the primary weapon of the Polish cavalryman in 1939 was a rifle. Individual equipment did include a sabre, probably because of well-established tradition, and in the case of a melee combat this secondary weapon would probably be more effective than a rifle and bayonet. Moreover, the Polish cavalry brigade order of battle in 1939 included, apart from the mounted soldiers themselves, light and heavy machine guns (wheeled), the Anti-tank rifle, model 35, anti-aircraft weapons, anti tank artillery such as the Bofors 37 mm, also light and scout tanks, etc. The last cavalry vs. cavalry mutual charge in Europe took place in Poland during the Battle of Krasnobród, when Polish and German cavalry units clashed with each other. The last classical cavalry charge of the war took place on March 1, 1945, during the Battle of Schoenfeld by the 1st "Warsaw" Independent Cavalry Brigade. Infantry and tanks had been employed to little effect against the German position, both of which floundered in the open wetlands only to be dominated by infantry and antitank fire from the German fortifications on the forward slope of Hill 157, overlooking the wetlands. The Germans had not taken cavalry into consideration when fortifying their position which, combined with the "Warsaw"s swift assault, overran the German anti-tank guns and consolidated into an attack into the village itself, now supported by infantry and tanks. Greek: The Italian invasion of Greece in October 1940 saw mounted cavalry used effectively by the Greek defenders along the mountainous frontier with Albania. Three Greek cavalry regiments (two mounted and one partially mechanized) played an important role in the Italian defeat in this difficult terrain. Soviet: The contribution of Soviet cavalry to the development of modern military operational doctrine and its importance in defeating Nazi Germany has been eclipsed by the higher profile of tanks and airplanes. Soviet cavalry contributed significantly to the defeat of the Axis armies. They were able to provide the most mobile troops available in the early stages, when trucks and other equipment were low in quality; as well as providing cover for retreating forces. Considering their relatively limited numbers, the Soviet cavalry played a significant role in giving Germany its first real defeats in the early stages of the war. The continuing potential of mounted troops was demonstrated during the Battle of Moscow, against Guderian and the powerful central German 9th Army. Pavel Belov was given by Stavka a mobile group including the elite 9th tank brigade, ski battalions, Katyusha rocket launcher battalion among others, the unit additionally received new weapons. This newly created group became the first to carry the Soviet counter-offensive in late November, when the general offensive began on 5 December. These mobile units often played major roles in both defensive and offensive operations. Cavalry were amongst the first Soviet units to complete the encirclement in the Battle of Stalingrad, thus sealing the fate of the German 6th Army. Mounted Soviet forces also played a role in the encirclement of Berlin, with some Cossack cavalry units reaching the Reichstag in April 1945. Throughout the war they performed important tasks such as the capture of bridgeheads which is considered one of the hardest jobs in battle, often doing so with inferior numbers. For instance the 8th Guards Cavalry Regiment of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Division (Soviet Union), 1st Guards Cavalry Corps often fought outnumbered against elite German units. By the final stages of the war only the Soviet Union was still fielding mounted units in substantial numbers, some in combined mechanized and horse units. The main advantage of this tactical approach was in enabling mounted infantry to keep pace with advancing tanks. Other factors favoring the retention of mounted forces included the high quality of Russian Cossacks, which provided about half of all mounted Soviet cavalry throughout the war. They excelled in warfare manoeuvers, since the lack of roads limited the effectiveness of wheeled vehicles in many parts of the Eastern Front. Another consideration was that sufficient logistic capacity was often not available to support very large motorized forces, whereas cavalry was relatively easy to maintain when detached from the main army and acting on its own initiative. The main usage of the Soviet cavalry involved infiltration through front lines with subsequent deep raids, which disorganized German supply lines. Another role was the pursuit of retreating enemy forces during major front-line operations and breakthroughs. Hungarian: During World War II, the Royal Hungarian Army's hussars were typically only used to undertake reconnaissance tasks against Soviet forces, and then only in detachments of section or squadron strength. The last documented hussar attack was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Kálmán Mikecz on August 16, 1941, at Nikolaev. The hussars arriving as reinforcements, were employed to break through Russian positions ahead of German troops. The hussars equipped with swords and submachine guns broke through the Russian lines in a single attack. An eyewitness account of the last hussar attack by Erich Kern, a German officer, was written in his memoir in 1948: … We were again in a tough fight with the desperately defensive enemy who dug himself along a high railway embankment. We've been attacked four times already, and we've been kicked back all four times. The battalion commander swore, but the company commanders were helpless. Then, instead of the artillery support we asked for countless times, a Hungarian hussar regiment appeared on the scene. We laughed. What the hell do they want here with their graceful, elegant horses? We froze at once: these Hungarians went crazy. Cavalry Squadron approached after a cavalry squadron. The command word rang. The bronze-brown, slender riders almost grew to their saddle. Their shining colonel of golden parolis jerked his sword. Four or five armored cars cut out of the wings, and the regiment slashed across the wide plain with flashing swords in the afternoon sun. Seydlitz attacked like this once before. Forgetting all caution, we climbed out of our covers. It was all like a great equestrian movie. The first shots rumbled, then became less frequent. With astonished eyes, in disbelief, we watched as the Soviet regiment, which had so far repulsed our attacks with desperate determination, now turned around and left its positions in panic. And the triumphant Hungarians chased the Russian in front of them and shredded them with their glittering sabers. The hussar sword, it seems, was a bit much for the nerves of Russians. Now, for once, the ancient weapon has triumphed over modern equipment .... Italian: The last mounted sabre charge by Italian cavalry occurred on August 24, 1942, at Isbuscenski (Russia), when a squadron of the Savoia Cavalry Regiment charged the 812th Siberian Infantry Regiment. The remainder of the regiment, together with the Novara Lancers made a dismounted attack in an action that ended with the retreat of the Russians after heavy losses on both sides. The final Italian cavalry action occurred on October 17, 1942, in Poloj (now Croatia) by a squadron of the Alexandria Cavalry Regiment against a large group of Yugoslav partisans. Other Axis Powers: Romanian, Hungarian and Italian cavalry were dispersed or disbanded following the retreat of the Axis forces from Russia. Germany still maintained some mounted (mixed with bicycles) SS and Cossack units until the last days of the War. Finnish: Finland used mounted troops against Russian forces effectively in forested terrain during the Continuation War. The last Finnish cavalry unit was not disbanded until 1947. American: The U.S.

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The remainder of the regiment, together with the Novara Lancers made a dismounted attack in an action that ended with the retreat of the Russians after heavy losses on both sides. The final Italian cavalry action occurred on October 17, 1942, in Poloj (now Croatia) by a squadron of the Alexandria Cavalry Regiment against a large group of Yugoslav partisans. Other Axis Powers: Romanian, Hungarian and Italian cavalry were dispersed or disbanded following the retreat of the Axis forces from Russia. Germany still maintained some mounted (mixed with bicycles) SS and Cossack units until the last days of the War. Finnish: Finland used mounted troops against Russian forces effectively in forested terrain during the Continuation War. The last Finnish cavalry unit was not disbanded until 1947. American: The U.S. Army's last horse cavalry actions were fought during World War II: a) by the 26th Cavalry Regiment—a small mounted regiment of Philippine Scouts which fought the Japanese during the retreat down the Bataan peninsula, until it was effectively destroyed by January 1942; and b) on captured German horses by the mounted reconnaissance section of the U.S. 10th Mountain Division in a spearhead pursuit of the German Army across the Po Valley in Italy in April 1945. The last horsed U.S. Cavalry (the Second Cavalry Division) were dismounted in March 1944. British: All British Army cavalry regiments had been mechanised since 1 March 1942 when the Queen's Own Yorkshire Dragoons (Yeomanry) was converted to a motorised role, following mounted service against the Vichy French in Syria the previous year. The final cavalry charge by British Empire forces occurred on 21 March 1942 when a 60 strong patrol of the Burma Frontier Force encountered Japanese infantry near Toungoo airfield in central Myanmar. The Sikh sowars of the Frontier Force cavalry, led by Captain Arthur Sandeman of The Central India Horse (21st King George V's Own Horse), charged in the old style with sabres and most were killed. Mongolian: In the early stages of World War II, mounted units of the Mongolian People's Army were involved in the Battle of Khalkhin Gol against invading Japanese forces. Soviet forces under the command of Georgy Zhukov, together with Mongolian forces, defeated the Japanese Sixth army and effectively ended the Soviet–Japanese Border Wars. After the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact of 1941, Mongolia remained neutral throughout most of the war, but its geographical situation meant that the country served as a buffer between Japanese forces and the Soviet Union. In addition to keeping around 10% of the population under arms, Mongolia provided half a million trained horses for use by the Soviet Army. In 1945 a partially mounted Soviet-Mongolian Cavalry Mechanized Group played a supporting role on the western flank of the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. The last active service seen by cavalry units of the Mongolian Army occurred in 1946–1948, during border clashes between Mongolia and the Republic of China. Post–World War II to the present day: While most modern "cavalry" units have some historic connection with formerly mounted troops this is not always the case. The modern Irish Defence Forces (DF) includes a "Cavalry Corps" equipped with armoured cars and Scorpion tracked combat reconnaissance vehicles. The DF has never included horse cavalry since its establishment in 1922 (other than a small mounted escort of Blue Hussars drawn from the Artillery Corps when required for ceremonial occasions). However, the mystique of the cavalry is such that the name has been introduced for what was always a mechanised force. Some engagements in late 20th and early 21st century guerrilla wars involved mounted troops, particularly against partisan or guerrilla fighters in areas with poor transport infrastructure. Such units were not used as cavalry but rather as mounted infantry. Examples occurred in Afghanistan, Portuguese Africa and Rhodesia. The French Army used existing mounted squadrons of Spahis to a limited extent for patrol work during the Algerian War (1954–1962). The Swiss Army maintained a mounted dragoon regiment for combat purposes until 1973. The Portuguese Army used horse mounted cavalry with some success in the wars of independence in Angola and Mozambique in the 1960s and 1970s. During the 1964–1979 Rhodesian Bush War the Rhodesian Army created an elite mounted infantry unit called Grey's Scouts to fight unconventional actions against the rebel forces of Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo. The horse mounted infantry of the Scouts were effective and reportedly feared by their opponents in the rebel African forces. In the 1978 to present Afghan Civil War period there have been several instances of horse mounted combat. Central and South American armies maintained mounted cavalry for longer than those of Asia, Europe, or North America. The Mexican Army included a number of horse mounted cavalry regiments as late as the mid-1990s and the Chilean Army had five such regiments in 1983 as mounted mountain troops. The Soviet Army retained horse cavalry divisions until 1955. Operational horse cavalry: Today the Indian Army's 61st Cavalry is reported to be the largest existing horse-mounted cavalry unit still having operational potential. It was raised in 1951 from the amalgamated state cavalry squadrons of Gwalior, Jodhpur, and Mysore. While primarily utilised for ceremonial purposes, the regiment can be deployed for internal security or police roles if required. The 61st Cavalry and the President's Body Guard parade in full dress uniform in New Delhi each year in what is probably the largest assembly of traditional cavalry still to be seen in the world. Both the Indian and the Pakistani armies maintain armoured regiments with the titles of Lancers or Horse, dating back to the 19th century. As of 2007, the Chinese People's Liberation Army employed two battalions of horse-mounted border guards in Xinjiang for border patrol purposes. PLA mounted units last saw action during border clashes with Vietnam in the 1970s and 1980s, after which most cavalry units were disbanded as part of major military downsizing in the 1980s. In the wake of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, there were calls to rebuild the army horse inventory for disaster relief in difficult terrain. Subsequent Chinese media reports confirm that the PLA maintains operational horse cavalry at squadron strength in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia for scouting, logistical, and border security purposes, and one at company strength in Qinghai. The Chilean Army still maintains a mixed armoured cavalry regiment, with elements of it acting as mounted mountain exploration troops, based in the city of Angol, being part of the III Mountain Division, and another independent exploration cavalry detachment in the town of Chaitén. The rugged mountain terrain calls for the use of special horses suited for that use. The Argentine Army has two mounted cavalry units: the Regiment of Horse Grenadiers, which performs mostly ceremonial duties but at the same time is responsible for the president's security (in this case, acting as infantry), and the 4th Mountain Cavalry Regiment (which comprises both horse and light armoured squadrons), stationed in San Martín de los Andes, where it has an exploration role as part the 6th Mountain Brigade. Most armoured cavalry units of the Army are considered successors to the old cavalry regiments from the Independence Wars, and keep their traditional names, such as Hussars, Cuirassiers, Lancers, etc., and uniforms. Equestrian training remains an important part of their tradition, especially among officers. Ceremonial horse cavalry and armored cavalry retaining traditional titles: Cavalry or mounted gendarmerie units continue to be maintained for purely or primarily ceremonial purposes by the Algerian, Argentine, Bolivian, Brazilian, British, Bulgarian, Canadian, Chilean, Colombian, Danish, Dutch, Finnish, French, Hungarian, Indian, Italian, Jordanian, Malaysian, Moroccan, Nepalese, Nigerian, North Korean, Omani, Pakistani, Panamanian, Paraguayan, Peruvian, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, Senegalese, Spanish, Swedish, Thai, Tunisian, Turkmenistan, United States, Uruguayan and Venezuelan armed forces. A number of armoured regiments in the British Army retain the historic designations of Hussars, Dragoons, Light Dragoons, Dragoon Guards, Lancers and Yeomanry. Only the Household Cavalry (consisting of the Life Guards' mounted squadron, The Blues and Royals' mounted squadron, the State Trumpeters of The Household Cavalry and the Household Cavalry Mounted Band) are maintained for mounted (and dismounted) ceremonial duties in London. The French Army still has regiments with the historic designations of Cuirassiers, Hussars, Chasseurs, Dragoons and Spahis. Only the cavalry of the Republican Guard and a ceremonial fanfare detachment of trumpeters for the cavalry/armoured branch as a whole are now mounted. In the Canadian Army, a number of regular and reserve units have cavalry roots, including The Royal Canadian Hussars (Montreal), the Governor General's Horse Guards, Lord Strathcona's Horse, The British Columbia Dragoons , The Royal Canadian Dragoons, and the South Alberta Light Horse. Of these, only Lord Strathcona's Horse and the Governor General's Horse Guards maintain an official ceremonial horse-mounted cavalry troop or squadron. The modern Pakistan army maintains about 40 armoured regiments with the historic titles of Lancers, Cavalry or Horse.

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The French Army still has regiments with the historic designations of Cuirassiers, Hussars, Chasseurs, Dragoons and Spahis. Only the cavalry of the Republican Guard and a ceremonial fanfare detachment of trumpeters for the cavalry/armoured branch as a whole are now mounted. In the Canadian Army, a number of regular and reserve units have cavalry roots, including The Royal Canadian Hussars (Montreal), the Governor General's Horse Guards, Lord Strathcona's Horse, The British Columbia Dragoons , The Royal Canadian Dragoons, and the South Alberta Light Horse. Of these, only Lord Strathcona's Horse and the Governor General's Horse Guards maintain an official ceremonial horse-mounted cavalry troop or squadron. The modern Pakistan army maintains about 40 armoured regiments with the historic titles of Lancers, Cavalry or Horse. Six of these date back to the 19th century, although only the President's Body Guard remains horse-mounted. In 2002, the Army of the Russian Federation reintroduced a ceremonial mounted squadron wearing historic uniforms. Both the Australian and New Zealand armies follow the British practice of maintaining traditional titles (Light Horse or Mounted Rifles) for modern mechanised units. However, neither country retains a horse-mounted unit. Several armored units of the modern United States Army retain the designation of "armored cavalry". The United States also has "air cavalry" units equipped with helicopters. The Horse Cavalry Detachment of the U.S. Army's 1st Cavalry Division, made up of active duty soldiers, still functions as an active unit, trained to approximate the weapons, tools, equipment and techniques used by the United States Cavalry in the 1880s. Non-combat support roles: The First Troop Philadelphia City Cavalry is a volunteer unit within the Pennsylvania Army National Guard which serves as a combat force when in federal service but acts in a mounted disaster relief role when in state service. In addition, the Parsons' Mounted Cavalry is a Reserve Officer Training Corps unit which forms part of the Corps of Cadets at Texas A&M University. Valley Forge Military Academy and College also has a Mounted Company, known as D-Troop . Some individual U.S. states maintain cavalry units as a part of their respective state defense forces. The Maryland Defense Force includes a cavalry unit, Cavalry Troop A, which serves primarily as a ceremonial unit. The unit training includes a saber qualification course based upon the 1926 U.S. Army course. Cavalry Troop A also assists other Maryland agencies as a rural search and rescue asset. In Massachusetts, The National Lancers trace their lineage to a volunteer cavalry militia unit established in 1836 and are currently organized as an official part of the Massachusetts Organized Militia. The National Lancers maintain three units, Troops A, B, and C, which serve in a ceremonial role and assist in search and rescue missions. In July 2004, the National Lancers were ordered into active state service to guard Camp Curtis Guild during the 2004 Democratic National Convention. The Governor's Horse Guard of Connecticut maintains two companies which are trained in urban crowd control. In 2020, the California State Guard stood up the 26th Mounted Operations Detachment, a search-and-rescue cavalry unit. Social status: From the beginning of civilization to the 20th century, ownership of heavy cavalry horses has been a mark of wealth amongst settled peoples. A cavalry horse involves considerable expense in breeding, training, feeding, and equipment, and has very little productive use except as a mode of transport. For this reason, and because of their often decisive military role, the cavalry has typically been associated with high social status. This was most clearly seen in the feudal system, where a lord was expected to enter combat armored and on horseback and bring with him an entourage of lightly armed peasants on foot. If landlords and peasant levies came into conflict, the poorly trained footmen would be ill-equipped to defeat armored knights. In later national armies, service as an officer in the cavalry was generally a badge of high social status. For instance prior to 1914 most officers of British cavalry regiments came from a socially privileged background and the considerable expenses associated with their role generally required private means, even after it became possible for officers of the line infantry regiments to live on their pay. Options open to poorer cavalry officers in the various European armies included service with less fashionable (though often highly professional) frontier or colonial units. These included the British Indian cavalry, the Russian Cossacks or the French Chasseurs d'Afrique. During the 19th and early 20th centuries most monarchies maintained a mounted cavalry element in their royal or imperial guards. These ranged from small units providing ceremonial escorts and palace guards, through to large formations intended for active service. The mounted escort of the Spanish Royal Household provided an example of the former and the twelve cavalry regiments of the Prussian Imperial Guard an example of the latter. In either case the officers of such units were likely to be drawn from the aristocracies of their respective societies. On film: Some sense of the noise and power of a cavalry charge can be gained from the 1970 film Waterloo, which featured some 2,000 cavalrymen, some of them Cossacks. It included detailed displays of the horsemanship required to manage animal and weapons in large numbers at the gallop (unlike the real battle of Waterloo, where deep mud significantly slowed the horses). The Gary Cooper movie They Came to Cordura contains a scene of a cavalry regiment deploying from march to battle line formation. A smaller-scale cavalry charge can be seen in The Lord of the Rings: The Return of the King (2003); although the finished scene has substantial computer-generated imagery, raw footage and reactions of the riders are shown in the Extended Version DVD Appendices. Other films that show cavalry actions include: The Charge of the Light Brigade, about the Battle of Balaclava in the Crimean War 40,000 Horsemen, about the Australian Light Horse during the Sinai and Palestine campaign of World War I The Lighthorsemen, about the Battle of Beersheba, 1917 War Horse, about the British cavalry in Europe during World War I Hubal, about the last months (September 1939 – April 1940) of Poland's first World War II guerrilla, Major Henryk Dobrzański, "Hubal" The Patriot includes light cavalry usage. And Quiet Flows the Don depicts Don Cossacks during World War I Kingdom of Heaven includes a cavalry charge during the Siege of Kerak The Life and Times of Joseph J. Dumas semi-fictional video biography of a notable, modern cavalry officer The Last Samurai – a US army veteran, is hired by the Japanese emperor to train his army in the modern warfare techniques Napoleon, cavalry units play a role in several battles. The scene of the Battle of Waterloo includes the British use of infantry squares to defend against cavalry attacks. Examples: Types: Units: Notable horse cavalrymen: Georgios Stanotas, commander of the Hellenic Army's Cavalry Division during World War II Didier Courrèges, major in the French Army, member of École Nationale d'Équitation's Cadre Noir, Olympian at 2004 Summer Olympics Edwin Ramsey, lieutenant colonel in the 26th Cavalry Regiment during World War II, recipient of the Distinguished Service Cross, led the last cavalry charge in American military history General Fahrettin Altay, commander of the V. Cavalry Division of the Turkish 1st Army during the Turkish War of Independence, which was instrumental in victory over the invading Greek Army. His name is given to the new Turkish battle tank Altay. Atatürk'ün Bütün Eserleri, Cilt 27, Kaynak Yayınları, 1998, ISBN 978-975-343-235-1, p. 81. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph J. Dumas, 46th Professor of Military Science at Michigan State University and a notable member and representative of the distinguished cavalry lineage. Gallery: See also: Cavalry tactics Shock tactics Horses in warfare Armored reconnaissance – a modern role in most militaries for 'cavalry' titled units Notes: References: Ebrey, Patricia Buckley (1999). The Cambridge Illustrated History of China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-43519-6. Ebrey PB, Walthall A, Palais JB (2006). East Asia: A Cultural, Social, and Political History. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. ISBN 978-0-6181-3384-0. OCLC 61446526. Falls, Cyril; G. MacMunn (1930). Military Operations Egypt & Palestine from the outbreak of war with Germany to June 1917. Official History of the Great War Based on Official Documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Vol. 1. London: HM Stationery Office. OCLC 610273484. Falls, Cyril; A. F. Becke (maps) (1930). Military Operations Egypt & Palestine from June 1917 to the End of the War. Official History of the Great War Based on Official Documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Vol. 2 Part I. London: HM Stationery Office. OCLC 644354483.

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Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. ISBN 978-0-6181-3384-0. OCLC 61446526. Falls, Cyril; G. MacMunn (1930). Military Operations Egypt & Palestine from the outbreak of war with Germany to June 1917. Official History of the Great War Based on Official Documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Vol. 1. London: HM Stationery Office. OCLC 610273484. Falls, Cyril; A. F. Becke (maps) (1930). Military Operations Egypt & Palestine from June 1917 to the End of the War. Official History of the Great War Based on Official Documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Vol. 2 Part I. London: HM Stationery Office. OCLC 644354483. Falls, Cyril; A. F. Becke (maps) (1930). Military Operations Egypt & Palestine from June 1917 to the End of the War. Official History of the Great War Based on Official Documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Vol. 2 Part II. London: HM Stationery Office. OCLC 256950972. Lynn, John Albert (1997). Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army, 1610–1715. Cambridge University Press. Menon, Shanti (April 1995). "Chariot racers of the Steppes". Discover. Archived from the original on 2007-10-13. Muir, William (1883). Annals of the Early Caliphate: From Original Sources. London: Smith, Elder & co. Needham, Joseph (1986). Science and Civilization in China. Vol. 4, Physics and Physical Technology, Part 2, Mechanical Engineering. Taipei: Caves Books, Ltd.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) Pargiter, Frederick Eden, Dr., Chronology based on: Ancient Indian Historical Tradition, Oxford University Press, H. Milford, 1924, Reprint 1997 Peers, C. J. (2006). Soldiers of the Dragon: Chinese Armies 1500 BC–AD 1840. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. Rodger, N. A. M. (1999). The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain 660–1649. W. W. Norton & Co Ltd. ISBN 0-393-04579-X. Warry, John (1980). Warfare in the Classical World. Salamander Books. ISBN 0-86101-034-5. White, Matthew (2012). The Great Big Book of Horrible Things. W. W. Norton. ISBN 9780393081923. External links: CavalryScouts.org Napoleonic Cavalry Cavalry tactics from Francis J. Lippitt's, A Treatise on the Tactical Use of the Three Arms: Infantry, Artillery and Cavalry (1865) Cavalry in Mass (U.S. report on Russian cavalry organization and operations in World War II) Society of the Military Horse Gesellschaft der Freunde der Kavallerie (German) The Horse and Mule in the British Army during WW1

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Cavalry charge

Infantry charges: Ancient charges: It may be assumed that the charge was used in prehistoric warfare, but clear evidence only comes with later literate societies. The tactics of the classical Greek phalanx included an ordered approach march, with a final charge to contact. Highland charge: In response to the introduction of firearms, Irish and Scottish troops at the end of the 16th century developed a tactic that combined a volley of musketry with a transition to rapid hand-to-hand combat using melee weapons. Initially successful, it was countered by effective discipline and the development of defensive bayonet tactics. Banzai charge: A term used by the Allied forces to refer to Japanese human wave attacks and swarming staged by infantry units armed with bayonets and swords. This term came from the Japanese battle cry "Tennōheika Banzai" (天皇陛下万歳, "Long live His Majesty the Emperor"), shortened to banzai, specifically referring to a tactic used by the Imperial Japanese Army during the Pacific War. Bayonet charge: The development of the bayonet in the late 17th century led to the bayonet charge becoming the main infantry charge tactic through the 18th and 19th centuries and well into the first half of the 20th century. As early as the 19th century, tactical scholars were already noting that most bayonet charges did not result in close combat. Instead, one side usually fled before actual bayonet fighting ensued. The act of fixing bayonets has been held to be primarily connected to morale, the making of a clear signal to friend and foe of a willingness to kill at close quarters. Cavalry charges: The shock value of a charge attack has been especially exploited in cavalry tactics, both of armored knights and lighter mounted troops of both earlier and later eras. Historians such as John Keegan have shown that when correctly prepared against (such as by improvising fortifications) and, especially, by standing firm in face of the onslaught, cavalry charges often failed against infantry, with horses refusing to gallop into the dense mass of enemies, or the charging unit itself breaking up. However, when cavalry charges succeeded, it was usually due to the defending formation breaking up (often in fear) and scattering, to be hunted down by the enemy. While it was not recommended for a cavalry charge to continue against unbroken infantry, charges were still a viable danger to heavy infantry. Parthian lancers were noted to require significantly dense formations of Roman legionaries to stop, and Frankish knights were reported to be even harder to stop, if the writing of Anna Komnene is to be believed. However, only highly trained horses would voluntarily charge dense, unbroken enemy formations directly, and in order to be effective, a strong formation had to be kept – being the result of efficient training. Heavy cavalry lacking even a single part of this combination – composed of high morale, excellent training, quality equipment, individual prowess, and collective discipline of both the warrior and the mount – would suffer in a charge against unbroken heavy infantry, and only the very best heavy cavalrymen (e.g., knights and cataphracts) throughout history would own these in regards to their era and terrain. European Middle Ages: The cavalry charge was a significant tactic in the Middle Ages. Although cavalry had charged before, a combination of the adoption of a frame saddle secured in place by a breast-band, stirrups and the technique of couching the lance under the arm delivered a hitherto unachievable ability to utilise the momentum of the horse and rider. These developments began in the 7th century but were not combined to full effect until the 11th century. The Battle of Dyrrhachium (1081) was an early instance of the familiar medieval cavalry charge; recorded to have a devastating effect by both Norman and Byzantine chroniclers. By the time of the First Crusade in the 1090s, the cavalry charge was being employed widely by European armies. However, from the dawn of the Hundred Years' War onward, the use of professional pikemen and longbowmen with high morale and functional tactics meant that a knight would have to be cautious in a cavalry charge. Men wielding either pike or halberd in formation, with high morale, could stave off all but the best cavalry charges, whilst English archers with the longbow could unleash a torrent of arrows capable of wreaking havoc, though not necessarily a massacre, upon the heads of heavy infantry and cavalry in unsuitable terrain. It became increasingly common for knights to dismount and fight as elite heavy infantry, although some continued to stay mounted throughout combat. The use of cavalry for flanking manoeuvres became more useful, although some interpretations of the knightly ideal often led to reckless, undisciplined charges. Cavalry could still charge dense heavy infantry formations head-on if the cavalrymen had a combination of certain traits. They had a high chance of success if they were in a formation, collectively disciplined, highly skilled, and equipped with the best arms and armour, as well as mounted upon horses trained to endure the physical and mental stresses of such charges. However, the majority of cavalry personnel lacked at least one of these traits, particularly discipline, formations, and horses trained for head-on charges. Thus, the use of the head-on cavalry charge declined, although Polish hussars, French cuirassiers, and Spanish and Portuguese conquistadores were still capable of succeeding in such charges, often due to their possession of the previously mentioned combination of the traits required for success in such endeavours. Twentieth century: In the twentieth century, the cavalry charge was seldom used, though it enjoyed sporadic and occasional success. Elements of the 7th Cavalry Regiment of the United States attacked Villista forces in the Battle of Guerrero on 29 March 1916. The battle was a victory for the Americans, occurring in desert terrain, at the Mexican town of Vicente Guerrero, Chihuahua. One of the most successful offensive cavalry charges of the 20th century was not conducted by cavalry at all, but rather by mounted infantry, when on 31 October 1917, the Australian 4th Light Horse Brigade charged across two miles of open terrain in the face of Ottoman artillery and machine gun fire to successfully capture Beersheba in what would come to be known as the Battle of Beersheba. On 23 September 1918, the Jodhpur Lancers and Mysore Lancers of the 15th (Imperial Service) Cavalry Brigade charged Turkish positions on horseback at Haifa. Together the two regiments captured 1,350 German and Ottoman prisoners, including two German officers, 35 Ottoman officers, 17 artillery guns including four 4.2 in (11 cm) guns, eight 77 mm (3.0 in) guns and four camel guns as well as a 6 in (15 cm) naval gun, and 11 machine guns. Their own casualties amounted to eight dead and 34 wounded. 60 horses were killed and another 83 injured. On 16 May 1919, during the Third Anglo-Afghan War, the 1st King's Dragoon Guards made the last recorded charge by a British horsed cavalry regiment at Dakka, a village in Afghan territory, north west of the Khyber Pass. During the Spanish Civil War, there was a massive cavalry charge by a Francoist division during the Battle of Alfambra on 5 February 1938, the last great mounted charge in Western Europe. Several attempted charges were made in World War II. The Polish cavalry, in spite of being primarily trained to operate as rapid infantry and being better armed than regular Polish infantry (more anti-tank weapons and armored vehicles per capita) did execute up to 15 cavalry charges during the Invasion of Poland. The majority of the charges were successful and none were meant as a charge against armored vehicles. Some battles featured mutual charges by the Polish and German cavalry such as the Battle of Krasnobród (1939). The German cavalry scouts from 4th Light Division (Germany) charged the Polish infantry from 10th Motorized Cavalry Brigade (Poland) and were countered by Polish tankettes moving from concealed positions at Zakliczyn. On November 17, 1941, during the Battle of Moscow, the Soviet 44th Cavalry Division charged the German lines near Musino, west of the capital. The mounted Soviets were ravaged by German artillery, then by machine guns. The charge failed, and the Germans said they killed 2,000 cavalrymen without a single loss to themselves. On 24 August 1942, the defensive charge of the Savoia Cavalleria at Izbushensky against Russian lines near the Don River was successful. British and American cavalry units also made similar cavalry charges during World War II. (See 26th Cavalry Regiment). The last successful cavalry charge of World War II was executed during the Battle of Schoenfeld on March 1, 1945. The Polish cavalry, fighting on the Soviet side, overwhelmed the German artillery position and allowed for infantry and tanks to charge into the city. The cavalry sustained only seven dead, while 26 Polish tankmen and 124 infantrymen as well as around 500 German soldiers were killed.) After World War II, the cavalry charge was clearly outdated and was no longer employed; this, however, did not stop modern troops from utilising horses for transport, and in countries with mounted police, similar (albeit unarmed) techniques to the cavalry charge are sometimes employed to fend off rioters and large crowds.

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Cavalry charge

British and American cavalry units also made similar cavalry charges during World War II. (See 26th Cavalry Regiment). The last successful cavalry charge of World War II was executed during the Battle of Schoenfeld on March 1, 1945. The Polish cavalry, fighting on the Soviet side, overwhelmed the German artillery position and allowed for infantry and tanks to charge into the city. The cavalry sustained only seven dead, while 26 Polish tankmen and 124 infantrymen as well as around 500 German soldiers were killed.) After World War II, the cavalry charge was clearly outdated and was no longer employed; this, however, did not stop modern troops from utilising horses for transport, and in countries with mounted police, similar (albeit unarmed) techniques to the cavalry charge are sometimes employed to fend off rioters and large crowds. Twenty-first century: At the start of the war in Afghanistan by United States forces, there was a cavalry charge by a unit of Green Berets led by Captain Mark Nutsch, and their use of horses in the charge was made into a Hollywood movie, 12 Strong. Across from the site of the former World Trade Center (1973–2001) there is a monument to the 'horse soldiers' who took part in that daring cavalry charge. Age of firearms: In the age of firearms, the basic parameters are speed of advance against rate (or effectiveness) of fire. If the attackers advance at a more rapid rate than the defenders can kill or disable them then the attackers will reach the defenders (though not necessarily without being greatly weakened in numbers). There are many modifiers to this simple comparison – timing, covering fire, organization, formation and terrain, among others. A failed charge may leave the would-be attackers vulnerable to a counter-charge. There has been a constant rise in an army's rate of fire for the last 700 years or so, but while massed charges have been successfully broken they have also been victorious. It is only since the mid-19th century that straight charges have become less successful, especially since the introduction of the repeating rifles, machine guns, and breech-loading artillery. They are often still useful on a far smaller scale in confined areas where the enemy's firepower cannot be brought to bear. Bayonet charges are still seen in the early 20th century, but are often limited to use against adversaries with inferior firepowers, when ammunition supply is scarce, or simply as a form of suicide attack to inflict fear on the enemy. In modern times, melee charges are practically extinct outside of riot control and street fighting, with a few exceptions such as the bayonet charge at the Battle of Danny Boy, but military charging tactics mainly take place with armored fighting vehicles such as tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored cars. These ground combat vehicles can either advance directly with marching fire, or transport infantry attackers quickly into proximity with the target position in order to assault and capture it. Air assaults are also a frequently used tactic to insert special operation raids against high-value targets. Notable charges: Battle of the Golden Spurs (July 11, 1302): The French cavalry, consisting of many nobles, was defeated in battle by heavily armed Flemish militiamen on foot. The cavalry charge was cited to be rash and premature with the battlefield's many ditches and marshes blamed for the loss, and at a few points on the Flemish line the French horsemen did manage to break through before being surrounded and annihilated. However it also demonstrated that well-disciplined and heavily armed infantry could defeat cavalry charges, ending the perception that heavy cavalry was practically invincible against infantry. The Battle of the Golden Spurs had been seen as the first example of the gradual "Infantry Revolution" in Medieval warfare across Europe during the 14th century. Charge of the Light Brigade (October 25, 1854) at the Battle of Balaclava in the Crimean War. Due to faulty orders a tiny force of 670 British light cavalrymen charged an enemy force many times their size. They succeeded in breaking through as well as disengaging, but suffered extremely heavy casualties and achieved no important objectives. Extensively memorialised and the subject of several literary and cinematographic works. Pickett's Charge (July 3, 1863) at the Battle of Gettysburg in the American Civil War. A mass infantry assault on the Union lines repulsed with substantial loss. Pickett's Charge has become one of the central symbols of the literary and cultural movement known as the Lost Cause. Battle of Mars-la-Tour (August 16, 1870): "Von Bredow's Death Ride". Prussian heavy cavalry brigade overrun French infantry and artillery to reinforce left flank of Prussian Army, at the cost of half the brigade. One of the few notable examples of successful cavalry charges after the introduction of modern firearms. Its success won it renown among military historians, which created a myth to the effect that for some decades 'Bredow's achievement was the norm', that cavalry could still play a decisive role in battle in a modern war between equally equipped forces, and so cavalry units continued to be part of the armed forces of major European powers for the next half century. See also: Banzai charge Human wave attack Bayonet charge Highland charge References: Barker, Juliet (2009). Conquest: The English Kingdom of France (PDF). London: Little, Brown. ISBN 978-1-4087-0083-9. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2018-06-12.

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Cavalry tactics

History: Chariots: Chariot tactics had been the basis for using the horse in war. The chariot's advantage of speed was outdone by the agility of riding on horseback. The ability of horsemen to pass more difficult terrain was also crucial to this change. Horsemen supplanted most light chariots. In Celtic warfare, light chariots (essedum) persisted among mounted troops, for their ability to transport heavily armoured warriors and as mobile command platforms. War elephants: Elephant cavalry first appeared three thousand years ago, simultaneously in India's Vedic Civilization and in China. Female Asian elephants were used, sometimes in small groups, sometimes in vast regiments of thousands of animals in the 13th century, primarily to produce a tactical "shock and awe" effect in the field. In addition, the large animals provided elevated platforms from which archers could rain down arrows on the enemy, and from which generals could survey the battle. The psychological effect of war elephants was often their main tactical use. After encountering elephant cavalry in the Battle of the Hydaspes River, Alexander the Great's troops mutinied and refused to press further into India. However, the animals were often not tractable in battle, and when faced with determined opponents, would often flee and trample their own infantry in their flight. Horse cavalry developed tent pegging tactics to deal with elephant cavalry. If they maintained their nerve in the face of the larger mounts, horse cavalry could rout elephant cavalry, especially by moving into close quarters and attacking the elephants' vulnerable feet. The Mongols would loose arrows at their enemy elephants' feet and legs until the elephants ran and trampled over their own army. Dromedary and camel cavalry: Next to elephants, camels were the tallest and heaviest animals available for cavalry. They are neither as agile nor as fast as horses. Their use as riding animals, reported from the battle of Qarqar, was more frequent than horses in ancient times. Their advantage was that while they were standing, a mounted archer could aim and shoot with a strong bow from behind an infantry formation. Camels equipped with small cannons gave the Afghan troops an advantage during the third battle of Panipat. Another advantage was their effect on horses, if the horses had never before encountered camels. In the battle of Pterium experienced Lydian cavalry suddenly had to struggle with their horses panicking, when trying to face an attack of dromedary riders. The psychological effect of the best trained and most reliable soldiers being overrun in confusion decided the battle. Riding and fighting on horseback: At first it was not considered effective to use weapons on horseback, but rather to use the horse as transportation. "Mounted infantry" would ride to battle, and then dismount to fight. For a long time, riders and charioteers worked alongside each other in the cavalry. Early domesticated horses were smaller and shorter than the warhorses of later history. Combined with a lack of developed cavalry tactics and the skittish nature of an untrained horse, fighting on horseback was unintuitive at first. The first recorded instance of mounted warriors are the mounted archers of the Iranian tribes appearing in Assyrian records from the 9th century BC. Mongolian troops had a Buryat bow, for showering the enemy with arrows from a safe distance. The aim on horseback was better than in a jiggling chariot, after it was discovered that the best time to shoot was while all the hooves of the horse were in the air. Nevertheless, an archer in a chariot could shoot potentially stronger infantry bows. Javelins were employed as a powerful ranged weapon by many cavalries. They were easy to handle on horseback. Up to ten javelins would be carried, depending on their size and weight. Thrown javelins have less range than arrows, but often prevailed in use nevertheless, due to its greater mass and armour-piercing capability, usually inflicted fatal wounds more frequently than arrows. Usage is reported for both light cavalry and heavy cavalry, for example, by the Numidia and Mongol light cavalry, and the Celtic, Cataphract, and Mamluk heavy cavalry. The Celtic horsemen's training was copied by the Roman equites. A significant element learned from the Celts was turning on horseback to throw javelins backwards, similar to the Parthian shot with bow and arrows. Stirrups and spurs improved the ability of riders to act fast and securely in melées and manoeuvres demanding agility of the horse, but their employment was not unquestioned; ancient shock cavalry performed quite satisfactorily without them. Modern historical reenactors have shown that neither the stirrup nor the saddle are strictly necessary for the effective use of the couched lance, refuting a previously widely held belief. Free movement of the rider on horseback were highly esteemed for light cavalry to shoot and fight in all directions, and contemporaries regarded stirrups and spurs as inhibiting for this purpose. Andalusian light cavalry refused to employ them until the 12th century, nor were they used by the Baltic turcopoles of the Teutonic Order in the battle of Legnica (1241). An example of combined arms and the efficiency of cavalry forces were the Medieval Mongols. Important for their horse archery was the use of stirrups for the archer to stand while shooting. This new position enabled them to use larger and stronger cavalry bows than the enemy. Tactics of light cavalry using bows: Armies of horse archers could cover enemy troops with arrows from a distance and never had to engage in close combat. Slower enemies without effective long range weapons often had no chance against them. It was in this manner that the cavalry of the Parthian Empire destroyed the troops of Marcus Licinius Crassus (53 BC) in the Battle of Carrhae. During their raids in Central and Western Europe during the 9th and 10th centuries, Magyar mounted archers spread terror in West Francia and East Francia; a prayer from Modena pleads de sagittis Hungarorum libera nos, domine ("From the arrows of the Hungarians, deliver us, Lord") Another fairly popular tactic was known as "shower shooting". The Sassanid Persians and the Mamluks were the chief proponents of the idea, although Muslim cavalry in India had also been known to use it in battle. It involved a line of fairly well-armoured cavalrymen (often on armoured horses) standing in a massed static position, or advancing in an ordered formation at the walk while loosing their arrows as quickly as possible. It was very effective against unsteady enemies who could easily be unnerved by the sight of a vast cloud of arrows raining down upon them; however, an enemy provided with good armour and discipline would often be able to hold out at least temporarily against the barrage. A case in point is Procopius's accounts of Belisarius's wars against the Sassanids where he states how the Byzantine cavalry engaged in massed archery duels against their Persian counterparts. The Persians loosed their arrows with far greater frequency, but as their bows were much weaker, they did not do much damage compared to the stronger Roman bows. The great weakness of mounted archers was their need of space and their light equipment (compared to contemporary heavy cavalry). If they were forced to fight in close combat against better armoured enemies, they usually lost. Furthermore, they were not suited for participating in sieges. For example, although victorious in the field the Mongols originally had been unable to take the fortified Chinese cities until they managed to capture and enlist the services of Islamic siege engineers. The Mongols subsequently failed to retake Hungary in 1280 after the Hungarians became more focused on Western European heavy cavalry and castle building. Good cavalry troops needed much training and very good horses. Many peoples who engaged in this form of classical cavalry, such as the Hungarians and Mongols, practically lived on horseback. The Battle of Dorylaeum (1097) during the First Crusade shows the advantages and disadvantages of mounted archers; the rider groups of the Seljuk sultan, Kilij Arslan I, were able to surround an army of Crusaders and shoot them from a distance. Suddenly, reinforcements under the command of Godfrey of Bouillon arrived, and the Seljuks themselves were encircled. They could no longer escape and were annihilated in close combat. The defeat of the Seljuks at Dorylaeum was so complete that the Crusaders then crossed Anatolia virtually unchallenged. Tactics of heavy cavalry using lances: Medieval European knights attacked in several different ways, implementing shock tactics if possible, but always in formations of several knights, not individually. For defense and mêlée a formation of horsemen was as tight as possible next to each other in a line. This prevented their enemy from charging, and also from surrounding them individually. The most devastating charging method was to ride in a looser formation fast into attack. This attack was often protected by simultaneous or shortly preceding ranged attacks of archers or crossbowmen. The attack began from a distance of about 350 m (1,150 ft) and took about 15–20 seconds to cross the contemporary long range weapon's effective distance. A most important element, and one not easily mastered, was to stay in one line with fixed spaces while accelerating and having the maximum speed at impact.

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Tactics of heavy cavalry using lances: Medieval European knights attacked in several different ways, implementing shock tactics if possible, but always in formations of several knights, not individually. For defense and mêlée a formation of horsemen was as tight as possible next to each other in a line. This prevented their enemy from charging, and also from surrounding them individually. The most devastating charging method was to ride in a looser formation fast into attack. This attack was often protected by simultaneous or shortly preceding ranged attacks of archers or crossbowmen. The attack began from a distance of about 350 m (1,150 ft) and took about 15–20 seconds to cross the contemporary long range weapon's effective distance. A most important element, and one not easily mastered, was to stay in one line with fixed spaces while accelerating and having the maximum speed at impact. Often knights would come in several waves, with the first being the best equipped and armored. The lance as a primary weapon pierced the enemy. If an enemy soldier was hit in full gallop by a knight's lance couched under the armpit, he was thrown backwards with such a momentum that he knocked over several of his compatriots, and was more often than not, killed; in some cases, the lance would even skewer the man and kill or wound the soldier behind him. The heavy lances were dropped after the attack and the battle was continued with secondary mêlée weapons, such as swords, battle axes, war hammers, or maces. The Persians deployed their cataphracts in mixed formations with light archers in the rear ranks, supporting the charge with arrows. Mongolian heavy cavalry improved upon the charging effect by attaching hooks to their lances to take enemies down when bypassing. Usually, employed a two-ranks deep formation of heavy cavalry charging the enemy. They were supported by three ranks of light cavalry, delivering rapid closeup shots with heavy armour-breaking arrows. Chinese and Japanese cavalry often used polearms. Both handled their primary weapons in the two-handed Asian style. This method of charging attack was very effective, but it depended very much on favourable ground on the chosen battlefield. Many knights during Medieval battles fought on foot. Attacks would be carried out on horseback only under favorable conditions. If the enemy infantry was equipped with polearms and fought in tight formations it was not possible to charge without heavy losses. A fairly common solution to this was for the men-at-arms to dismount and assault the enemy on foot, such as the way Scottish knights dismounted to stiffen the infantry schiltron or the English combination of longbowmen with dismounted men-at-arms in the Hundred Years' War. Another possibility was to bluff an attack, but turn around before impact. This tempted many infantrymen to go on the chase, leaving their formation. The heavy cavalry then turned around again in this new situation and rode down the scattered infantry. Such a tactic was deployed in the Battle of Hastings (1066). A further improvement of fighting ability was the use of well-armed infantry reserves during knightly battles on horseback. After some time, the battle would often split into several small groups, with space in between, and both sides would become exhausted. Then, an infantry rush could concentrate on selected targets and rout the enemy. Infantry also helped knights to remount in battle and aided the wounded. The Polish-Lithuanian hussars' primary battle tactic was the charge. They carried the charge to, and through the enemy. The charge started at a slow pace and in a relatively loose formation. The formation gradually gathered pace and closed ranks while approaching the enemy, and reached its highest pace and closest formation immediately before engagement. They tended to repeat the charge several times until the enemy formation broke (they had supply wagons with spare lances). The tactic of a charge by heavily armoured hussars and horses was effective for nearly two centuries. The hussars fought with long lances (a hussar's lance usually ranged from 4.5–6.2 m (15–20 ft) in length), a koncerz (long thrusting sword), a szabla (sabre), one or two pistols, and often a carbine or arquebus, known in Polish as a bandolet. Winged hussars also carried other weapons, such as the nadziak (horseman's pick), a type of war hammer and battle axe. The lighter, Turkish-style saddle, allowed for more armour to be used by both the horses and the warriors. Moreover, the horses were bred to run very fast with a heavy load and to recover quickly. This was achieved by breeding old Polish horses with Eastern horses, usually from Tatar tribes. As a result, these horses could walk hundreds of kilometres, loaded with over 100 kg (220 lb) and still be able to charge in an instant. Also, hussar horses were very quick and manoeuvrable. This allowed hussars to fight with any cavalry or infantry force, from Western heavy Kissaiers, to Eastern light Tatars. They were widely regarded as the most powerful cavalry in the world. In the battles of Lubiszew in 1577, Byczyna (1588), Kokenhausen (1601), Kircholm (1605), Kłuszyn (1610), Chocim (1621), Martynów (1624), Trzciana (1629), Ochmatów (1644), Beresteczko (1651), Połonka (1660), Cudnów (1660), Chocim (1673), Lwów (1675), Vienna (1683), and Párkány (1683), the Polish-Lithuanian hussars proved to be the decisive factor, often against overwhelming odds. For instance, in the Battle of Kłuszyn, during the Polish–Russian War, the Russians and Swedes outnumbered the commonwealth army five-to-one, yet were soundly defeated. Tactics of heavy cavalry using bows and javelins: Attempts at integrating ranged weapons and heavy cavalry were, for example, made by the Greeks and Persians, equipping their heavier cavalry with bows and javelins. Prior to charging, the enemy would be weakened by repeated missile attacks from combined light cavalry and heavy cavalry (cataphracts). This tactical system was adopted by the Romans, as attested by the presence of an "equites sagittarii clibanarii" unit in the Notitia Dignitatum, and passed down into the tactical repertoire of their Byzantine successors. An enemy who could suddenly strike and retreat using guerilla warfare tactics was a serious problem for the heavy cavalry. It was therefore important to have enough light cavalry to support the heavier mounted units. As mentioned earlier, heavy cavalry with lances were always supported by ranged combat units. They could be heavily armoured archers, like cataphracts or clibanarii with bows, advancing together with the charging cavalry. This bow-armed cavalry could loose their arrows as they advanced in the early stages of their charge with the intention of weakening and demoralizing the enemy formation prior to the moment of shock, possibly in shower shooting style. While the enemy was usually capable of countering with equal measures of ranged combat, the horse archers often wore protective equipment, so the changeover from light to heavy cavalry is not always clear and it seems in cases they formed the second charging rank. A similar tactic of heavy skirmishers developed in Late Medieval Europe, employing the easier to handle crossbow. Frontal assaults of heavy cavalry became considered ineffective against formations of spearmen or pikemen combined with crossbowmen or longbow archers. Most of the cavalrymen wore armour that could be penetrated by contemporary crossbows at close ranges. It resulted in the development of new cavalry tactics, whereby knights and mounted mercenaries, deployed in deep triangular wedges, with the most heavily armoured men (especially those able to afford armoured horses) being deployed in the front ranks. To increase its effect, part of the formation would carry small, powerful all-metal crossbows of their own. These mounted crossbowmen could sally out from the rear ranks to provide a skirmish screen or a preliminary barrage of bolts. Later on, the tactical landscape featured harquebusiers, musketeers, halberdiers, and pikemen, deployed in combined-arms formations and pitted against cavalry firing pistols or carbines. One of the cavalry tactics employed in such encounters was the caracole, developed in the mid-16th century in an attempt to integrate gunpowder weapons into cavalry tactics. Equipped with one or two wheellock pistols, cavalrymen would advance on their target at less than a gallop. As each rank came into range, the soldiers would turn away, discharge their pistols at the target, retire to reload and then repeat the manoeuvre. Early on, they had an advantage in firepower, but infantry firepower eventually increased. With the invention of the bayonet, the pike screen against charges could also be turned into a rank of firing soldiers. This tactic was accompanied by the increasing popularity of the German reiters in European armies from about 1540, or similar equipped, but usually more lightly armoured hakkapeliitta.

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Cavalry tactics

One of the cavalry tactics employed in such encounters was the caracole, developed in the mid-16th century in an attempt to integrate gunpowder weapons into cavalry tactics. Equipped with one or two wheellock pistols, cavalrymen would advance on their target at less than a gallop. As each rank came into range, the soldiers would turn away, discharge their pistols at the target, retire to reload and then repeat the manoeuvre. Early on, they had an advantage in firepower, but infantry firepower eventually increased. With the invention of the bayonet, the pike screen against charges could also be turned into a rank of firing soldiers. This tactic was accompanied by the increasing popularity of the German reiters in European armies from about 1540, or similar equipped, but usually more lightly armoured hakkapeliitta. Their main weapons were two or more pistols and a sword; initially, most wore three-quarters armour, though as time passed this was reduced to a helmet and a cuirass over a leather coat; sometimes they also carried a long cavalry firearm known as an arquebus or a carbine (although this type of horsemen soon became regarded as a separate class of cavalry – the arquebusier or, in Britain, harquebusier). Modern historians regard the caracole as a tactical system that ultimately proved ineffective. It sacrificed the cavalry advantages of speed and mobility, while also leaving mounted soldiers at a disadvantage to massed infantry equipped with heavier and longer-ranged weapons. The caracole gave way to close artillery support (see Horse artillery), deployed to break up the infantry formations and force the foot soldiers to scatter, so that the cavalry would regain their advantage in close-quarters combat. Contemporary writers did not seem to have used the term "caracole" in its modern sense; John Cruso, for example, explained it as a manoeuvre whereby a formation of cuirassiers would receive the enemy's charge by splitting apart to either side, and then charging back into the flanks of the overextended enemy. Some historians associate the demise of the caracole with the name of Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden (1594–1632). He regarded the technique as fairly inefficient and forbade the cavalry regiments in Swedish employment from using it. However, he was definitely not the first military commander to dismiss the caracole; François de la Noue, in his account of his service under Henry IV of France, mentioned that the pistol-armed Protestant cavalry used their weapons much like very long swords or lances, charging fiercely against the enemy formation before discharging the pistols at point-blank range (or even laying the pistol's muzzle directly against the opponent's armour before firing). There is reason to believe that the Sweders were influenced by Henry IV's ideas, whether directly or through Dutch mediation – especially by the agency of Swedish officers who served in the Low Countries (Eighty Years' War), such as Jacob De la Gardie. Infantry countertactics: Against light cavalry with bows and javelins It was impossible for infantry to engage light cavalry with bows and javelins in close combat on ground that did not seriously hinder cavalry movement. The only resort for engagement were missile weapons in ranged combat. In this case both cavalry and infantry fought only in a missile exchange. While the infantry can be considered static in comparison to the cavalry, their own protection, the damage their missiles would cause and the hit rate were important. For example, in the prelude to the Battle of Mohi, crossbowmen protected by pavises sniped at the Mongol light cavalry, resulting in a tactical defeat of this Mongol unit, although the Mongols did go on to win the overall battle. The defence of such ranged combat units was important, for cavalry could always switch roles and engage the ranged combat infantry (often lightly armored skirmishers) in close combat. Against heavy cavalry with lances The longbow and the crossbow were able to counter the dominance of mounted knights on the battlefield. Although knights of the Middle Ages often fought on foot or at least avoided futile frontal attacks, it happened several times that knightly armies led charges in obeyance to their warrior ideal only to meet with disaster. At Crécy (1346) and Poitiers (1356), the French knights suffered heavy casualties against the Welsh and English longbowmen. The ability to keep several arrows in the air at any given time was an important advantage of the medieval archer. Thus, while a cavalry charge followed a strict pattern of acceleration (400 m (1,300 ft) in 2 minutes, gallop at the last 150 m (490 ft)) from a distance beyond effective missile range, once they came within range they could be met with a hail of arrows that could severely injure both horse and rider alike. However, unsupported light infantry and archers would not be able to cause enough casualties to a cavalry force, if it were charging across suitable terrain, to tip the odds in their favour in the following melee. Thus, it was always advisable for missile troops to fight on terrain disadvantageous to cavalry charges, and with supporting heavy infantry close by. The long spears (pikes) of the Scots and Swiss were an excellent defensive weapon against cavalry. The warriors stood in tight formations like an ancient phalanx, the end of their pikes embedded in the ground, presenting a massive spiked wall. In battle against the Scots, the English knights proved to be as narrow-minded as their French counterparts, employing the classic cavalry charge despite the new challenge of the Scottish pike. In the battles of Stirling Bridge (1297) and Bannockburn (1314) they were defeated by the Scots. While the English imitated this tactic successfully against the French, the Swiss perfected it. Despite longer lances for the knights, this formation was now almost impenetrable. Pikemen with polearms remained an important part of armies throughout the Thirty Years' War. Later tactics used against this formation included caracole maneuvers with ranged weapons. However, a well-trained cavalry force could outflank a force of enemy pikemen on even terrain and triumph. The most elite knights, with the best armour, immense prowess and extremely-well trained horses, could charge pike formations and still, even if only scarcely, hold their own, sometimes even triumphing; however, the cost to raise and maintain such troops was enormous and impractical when considering alternative options to the head-on charge. Lancers needed firm even ground and ample unobstructed space for a cavalry charge to be effective. Opponents could limit avenues for such charges by deploying their forces near rivers, marshes, woodlands, or other types of rough terrain. The later Roman generals were able to defeat the Parthian Cataphracts by securing their flanks. The Scots did this at Bannockburn and Stirling, and in nearly all their guerilla fighting against the English, as did the Welsh to a great extent. The Swiss defeated the Austrian knights at the Battle of Morgarten (1315) by attacking the knightly army in a narrow place between an acclivity and a swamp. The peasants of Dithmarschen faced in 1500, at Hemmingstedt, the army of the Danish king. They opened the dykes and flooded the country. If the terrain was not well suited for a cavalry attack, knights often fought on foot and used their lances as pikes. New tactics of light cavalry and mounted infantry: With increasing firepower and no sufficient protection, the role of cavalry on the battlefield was slowly reduced. Light cavalry with firearms could return fire, but the aim from a moving platform was not as good as for infantry. So most important for cavalry was the ability to quickly attack enemy cavalry or scattered infantry with lances and sabres. Speed reduced the time vulnerable to gunfire, but still closed formations became impossible to defeat. This tactic was a striking surprise of Mongolian light cavalry in the battle of the Kalka River. The alternative was to use them as dragoons, reaching their positions quickly, dismounting, and fighting like infantry, often with projectile weapons. Such a way of fighting had started in Europe at least in the mid-13th century with mounted longbow and crossbow archers, but was also employed by the Mongols with their Buryatian longbows. Cavalry in modern warfare: Cavalry is featured in modern warfare with cavalrymen retaining the light cavalry missions, albeit the missions of reconnaissance and security remain the same. Heavy cavalry, as such, has its role of shock effect fulfilled by tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles. Land cavalry: Since the early 20th century, the use of horses and other animals for frontline cavalry has been largely supplanted by infantry fighting vehicles and armored cars. The first regular cavalry unit to mechanize was the 11th Hussars of the British Army, switching from horses to armored cars in 1928. Since then, many cavalry units have mechanized and switched to armored vehicles and armed helicopters, with horses only being used for ceremonial purposes, if not phased out of service entirely. However, some modern units, such as the Indian Army's 61st Cavalry and some People's Liberation Army's border units in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, continue to use horses on deployments. Examples of modern military vehicles built specifically for the cavalry role include the M3 Bradley CFV and the M113 ACAV. Air cavalry: Air cavalry, originally sky cavalry is a United States Army term that refers to helicopter-equipped units that perform reconnaissance, screening, security, and economy-of-force missions.

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Cavalry tactics

The first regular cavalry unit to mechanize was the 11th Hussars of the British Army, switching from horses to armored cars in 1928. Since then, many cavalry units have mechanized and switched to armored vehicles and armed helicopters, with horses only being used for ceremonial purposes, if not phased out of service entirely. However, some modern units, such as the Indian Army's 61st Cavalry and some People's Liberation Army's border units in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, continue to use horses on deployments. Examples of modern military vehicles built specifically for the cavalry role include the M3 Bradley CFV and the M113 ACAV. Air cavalry: Air cavalry, originally sky cavalry is a United States Army term that refers to helicopter-equipped units that perform reconnaissance, screening, security, and economy-of-force missions. The term and unit designation properly only refers to those squadrons (i.e., battalion-level organizations), and some independent troops (i.e., companies), affiliated with historical U.S. cavalry regiments, that perform the traditional cavalry mission. After the Vietnam War, there also existed one independent brigade-sized air cavalry organization, the 6th Air Cavalry Combat Brigade. U.S. air cavalry squadrons consisted of three air cavalry troops, one armored cavalry troop, and a headquarters and headquarters troop. The air cavalry troops consisted of an aero-scout platoon, an aero-weapons platoon, an aero-rifle platoon, a service platoon, and a headquarters and operations platoon. The troop was commanded by a major, with a captain as executive officer, and a troop first sergeant. Each platoon was commanded by a captain with a lieutenant as assistant platoon commander/section leader and a sergeant first class as platoon sergeant. References: Verbruggen, J.F. (1997). The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages. The Boydel Press. ISBN 0-85115-570-7. Polybius World History German Wikipedia, partly translated article Cavalry Tactics during the Napoleonic Wars External links: American Civil War: US cavalry tactics ("Cooke's Cavalry Tactics (1862)")

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Ceasefire

Overview: Ceasefire agreements are more likely to be reached when the costs of conflict are high and when the actors in a conflict have lower audience costs. Scholars emphasize that war termination is more likely to occur when actors have more information about each other, when actors can make credible commitments, and when the domestic political situation makes it possible for leaders to make war termination agreements without incurring domestic punishment. By one estimate, there were at least 2202 ceasefires across 66 countries in 109 civil conflicts over the period 1989–2020. Historical examples: Historically, the concept of a ceasefire existed at least by the time of the Middle Ages, when it was known as a 'truce of God'. World War I: During World War I, on December 24, 1914, there was an unofficial ceasefire on the Western Front as France, the United Kingdom, and Germany observed Christmas. There are accounts that claimed the unofficial ceasefire took place throughout the week leading to Christmas, and that British and German troops exchanged seasonal greetings and songs between their trenches. The ceasefire was brief but spontaneous. Beginning when German soldiers lit Christmas trees, it quickly spread up and down the Western Front. One account described the development in the following words: It was good to see the human spirit prevailed amongst all sides at the front, the sharing and fraternity. All was well until the higher echelons of command got to hear about the effect of the ceasefire, whereby their wrath ensured a return to hostilities. There was no peace treaty signed during the Christmas truce, and the war resumed after a few days. Karachi Agreement: The Karachi Agreement of 1949 was signed by the military representatives of India and Pakistan, supervised by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, establishing a cease-fire line in Kashmir following the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947. Korean War: On November 29, 1952, the US president-elect, Dwight D. Eisenhower, went to Korea to see how to end the Korean War. With the UN's acceptance of India's proposed armistice, the ceasefire between the UN Command on the one side and the Korean People's Army (KPA) and the People's Volunteer Army (PVA) on the other took hold at approximately the 38th parallel north. These parties signed the Korean Armistice Agreement on July 27, 1953 but South Korean President Syngman Rhee, who attacked the ceasefire proceedings, did not. Upon agreeing to the ceasefire which called upon the governments of South Korea, the United States, North Korea and China to participate in continued peace talks, the principal belligerents of the war established the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and it has since been patrolled by the joint Republic of Korea Army, US, and UN Command on the one side and the KPA on the other. The war is considered to have ended at that point even though there still is no peace treaty. Vietnam War: On New Years Day, 1968, Pope Paul VI convinced South Vietnam and the United States to declare a 24-hour-truce. However, the Viet Cong and North Vietnam did not adhere to the truce, and ambushed the 2nd Battalion, Republic of Vietnam Marine Division, 10 minutes after midnight in Mỹ Tho. The Viet Cong would also attack a U.S. Army fire support base near Saigon, causing more casualties. On January 15, 1973, US President Richard Nixon ordered a ceasefire of the aerial bombings in North Vietnam. The decision came after Henry Kissinger, the National Security Advisor to the President, returned to Washington, D.C., from Paris, France, with a draft peace proposal. Combat missions continued in South Vietnam. By January 27, 1973, all parties of the Vietnam War signed a ceasefire as a prelude to the Paris Peace Accord. Gulf War: After Iraq was driven out of Kuwait by US-led coalition forces during Operation Desert Storm, Iraq and the UN Security Council signed a ceasefire agreement on March 3, 1991. Subsequently, throughout the 1990s, the U.N. Security Council passed numerous resolutions calling for Iraq to disarm its weapons of mass destruction unconditionally and immediately. Because no peace treaty was signed after the Gulf War, the war still remained in effect, including an alleged assassination attempt of former US President George H. W. Bush by Iraqi agents while on a visit to Kuwait; Iraq being bombed in June 1993 as a response, Iraqi forces firing on coalition aircraft patrolling the Iraqi no-fly zones, US President Bill Clinton's bombing of Baghdad in 1998 during Operation Desert Fox, and an earlier 1996 bombing of Iraq by the US during Operation Desert Strike. The war remained in effect until 2003, when US and UK forces invaded Iraq and toppled Saddam Hussein's regime from power. Kashmir conflict: A UN-mediated ceasefire was agreed between India and Pakistan, on 1 January 1949, ending the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 (also called the 1947 Kashmir War). Fighting broke out between the two newly independent countries in Kashmir in October 1947, with India intervening on behalf of the princely ruler of Kashmir, who had joined India, and Pakistan supporting the rebels. The fighting was limited to Kashmir, but, apprehensive that it might develop into a full-scale international war, India referred the matter to the UN Security Council under Article 35 of the UN Charter, which addresses situations "likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace". The Security Council set up the dedicated United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, which mediated for an entire year as the fighting continued. After several UN resolutions outlining a procedure for resolving the dispute via a plebiscite, a ceasefire agreement was reached between the countries towards the end of December 1948, which came into effect in the New Year. The Security Council set up the United Nations Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) to monitor the ceasefire line. India declared a ceasefire in Kashmir Valley during Ramadan in 2018. Northern Ireland: The Irish Republican Army held several Christmas ceasefires (usually referred to as truces) during the Northern Ireland conflict. Israeli–Palestinian conflict: An example of a ceasefire in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict was announced between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority on February 8, 2005. When announced, chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat publicly defined the ceasefire as follows: "We have agreed that today President Mahmoud Abbas will declare a full cessation of violence against Israelis anywhere and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon will declare a full cessation of violence and military activities against Palestinians anywhere." On November 21, 2023, Qatar announced that they had negotiated a truce between Israel and Hamas would pause Gaza fighting, allow for the release of some hostages and bring more aid to Palestinian civilians. As part of the deal, 50 Hamas held hostages are to be released while Israel will release 150 Palestinian prisoners. Syrian Civil War: Several attempts have been made to broker ceasefires in the Syrian Civil War. Russo-Ukrainian War: Several attempts have been made to broker ceasefires during the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In May 2023, Donald Trump told the UK's GB news that as US president he would end the war within 24 hours, given that he had good relationships with the leaders of the Ukraine and Russia. He added that it would be easy to conclude a ceasefire agreement to end the war. 2020 global ceasefire: The 2020 global ceasefire was a response to a formal appeal by United Nations Secretary-General António Manuel de Oliveira Guterres on March 23 for a global ceasefire as part of the United Nations' response to the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic. On 24 June 2020, 170 UN Member States and Observers signed a non-binding statement in support of the appeal, rising to 172 on 25 June 2020, and on 1 July 2020, the UN Security Council passed a resolution demanding a general and immediate global cessation of hostilities for at least 90 days. See also: 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement Armistice De-escalation Demilitarized zone Olympic Truce Korean Armistice Agreement Peacebuilding Peacemaking Peace process Peace treaty References: Further reading: Clayton Govinda, Nygård Håvard Mokleiv, Strand Håvard, Rustad Siri Aas, Wiehler Claudia, Sagård Tora, Landsverk Peder, Ryland Reidun, Sticher Valerie, Wink Emma, Bara Corrine. 2022. “Introducing the Civil Conflict Ceasefire Dataset.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. Akebo, Malin. (2016). Ceasefire Agreements and Peace Processes: A Comparative Study. Routledge. Colletta, Nat. (2011). "Mediating ceasefires and cessations of hostilities agreements in the framework of peace processes." In Peacemaking: From Practice to Theory. Praeger, 135–147. Forster, Robert A. (2019). Ceasefires. In The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Global Security Studies. Palgrave. Fortna, Virginia Page. (2004). Peace Time: Cease-fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace. Princeton University Press. Williams, R., Gustafson, D., Gent, S., & Crescenzi, M. (2021).

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Ceasefire

2022. “Introducing the Civil Conflict Ceasefire Dataset.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. Akebo, Malin. (2016). Ceasefire Agreements and Peace Processes: A Comparative Study. Routledge. Colletta, Nat. (2011). "Mediating ceasefires and cessations of hostilities agreements in the framework of peace processes." In Peacemaking: From Practice to Theory. Praeger, 135–147. Forster, Robert A. (2019). Ceasefires. In The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Global Security Studies. Palgrave. Fortna, Virginia Page. (2004). Peace Time: Cease-fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace. Princeton University Press. Williams, R., Gustafson, D., Gent, S., & Crescenzi, M. (2021). "A latent variable approach to measuring and explaining peace agreement strength." Political Science Research and Methods, 9(1), 89–105. External links: University of Edinburgh Ceasefires Tracker Search for ceasefire agreements on the Peace Agreement Access Tool (PA-X), 1990-2015. Search for ceasefire agreements in the UN Peacemaker Database Search for women and ceasefire agreements in PA-X Women Database

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Center peel

Types of peel: A peel begins with an infantry element deciding to disengage from contact with an opposing force. The soldiers begin by using suppressing fire to delay the enemy's attack and advance. Upon issuance of the verbal command to initiate the peel, the infantryman closest to the enemy, in the opposite direction of the intended post-peel movement, ceases fire and works his way behind the element towards the other side, takes a position beyond from the farthest soldier on this side in the direction of disengagement, and resumes suppressing fire. Then, the process repeats until the party has safely disengaged the target. One specific type of peel is a center peel, in which the retreat is conducted in between two files of the squad in column formation, allowing for the squad to conduct effective suppressive fire to the flanks. The center peel is typically used when linear terrain features dictate that the element must move in column formation, or when the squad unexpectedly makes contact while in a column formation. References in film and literature: The center peel tactic was demonstrated in the final gunfight of the 2003 movie, Tears of the Sun, where Lieutenant Waters (Bruce Willis) directs his men away from a significantly larger group of aggressive Nigerian troops. This tactic was also shown in episode 6 of season 2 of the Amazon Prime show, Jack Ryan, where a small group of 3 soldiers were ambushed in a ravine. The peel tactic can also be seen in the 1995 film Heat as the LAPD intercept the heist crew as they are leaving the bank. See also: Fire and movement Bounding overwatch Overwatch (military tactic) Siege == References ==

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Charge (warfare)

Infantry charges: Ancient charges: It may be assumed that the charge was used in prehistoric warfare, but clear evidence only comes with later literate societies. The tactics of the classical Greek phalanx included an ordered approach march, with a final charge to contact. Highland charge: In response to the introduction of firearms, Irish and Scottish troops at the end of the 16th century developed a tactic that combined a volley of musketry with a transition to rapid hand-to-hand combat using melee weapons. Initially successful, it was countered by effective discipline and the development of defensive bayonet tactics. Banzai charge: A term used by the Allied forces to refer to Japanese human wave attacks and swarming staged by infantry units armed with bayonets and swords. This term came from the Japanese battle cry "Tennōheika Banzai" (天皇陛下万歳, "Long live His Majesty the Emperor"), shortened to banzai, specifically referring to a tactic used by the Imperial Japanese Army during the Pacific War. Bayonet charge: The development of the bayonet in the late 17th century led to the bayonet charge becoming the main infantry charge tactic through the 18th and 19th centuries and well into the first half of the 20th century. As early as the 19th century, tactical scholars were already noting that most bayonet charges did not result in close combat. Instead, one side usually fled before actual bayonet fighting ensued. The act of fixing bayonets has been held to be primarily connected to morale, the making of a clear signal to friend and foe of a willingness to kill at close quarters. Cavalry charges: The shock value of a charge attack has been especially exploited in cavalry tactics, both of armored knights and lighter mounted troops of both earlier and later eras. Historians such as John Keegan have shown that when correctly prepared against (such as by improvising fortifications) and, especially, by standing firm in face of the onslaught, cavalry charges often failed against infantry, with horses refusing to gallop into the dense mass of enemies, or the charging unit itself breaking up. However, when cavalry charges succeeded, it was usually due to the defending formation breaking up (often in fear) and scattering, to be hunted down by the enemy. While it was not recommended for a cavalry charge to continue against unbroken infantry, charges were still a viable danger to heavy infantry. Parthian lancers were noted to require significantly dense formations of Roman legionaries to stop, and Frankish knights were reported to be even harder to stop, if the writing of Anna Komnene is to be believed. However, only highly trained horses would voluntarily charge dense, unbroken enemy formations directly, and in order to be effective, a strong formation had to be kept – being the result of efficient training. Heavy cavalry lacking even a single part of this combination – composed of high morale, excellent training, quality equipment, individual prowess, and collective discipline of both the warrior and the mount – would suffer in a charge against unbroken heavy infantry, and only the very best heavy cavalrymen (e.g., knights and cataphracts) throughout history would own these in regards to their era and terrain. European Middle Ages: The cavalry charge was a significant tactic in the Middle Ages. Although cavalry had charged before, a combination of the adoption of a frame saddle secured in place by a breast-band, stirrups and the technique of couching the lance under the arm delivered a hitherto unachievable ability to utilise the momentum of the horse and rider. These developments began in the 7th century but were not combined to full effect until the 11th century. The Battle of Dyrrhachium (1081) was an early instance of the familiar medieval cavalry charge; recorded to have a devastating effect by both Norman and Byzantine chroniclers. By the time of the First Crusade in the 1090s, the cavalry charge was being employed widely by European armies. However, from the dawn of the Hundred Years' War onward, the use of professional pikemen and longbowmen with high morale and functional tactics meant that a knight would have to be cautious in a cavalry charge. Men wielding either pike or halberd in formation, with high morale, could stave off all but the best cavalry charges, whilst English archers with the longbow could unleash a torrent of arrows capable of wreaking havoc, though not necessarily a massacre, upon the heads of heavy infantry and cavalry in unsuitable terrain. It became increasingly common for knights to dismount and fight as elite heavy infantry, although some continued to stay mounted throughout combat. The use of cavalry for flanking manoeuvres became more useful, although some interpretations of the knightly ideal often led to reckless, undisciplined charges. Cavalry could still charge dense heavy infantry formations head-on if the cavalrymen had a combination of certain traits. They had a high chance of success if they were in a formation, collectively disciplined, highly skilled, and equipped with the best arms and armour, as well as mounted upon horses trained to endure the physical and mental stresses of such charges. However, the majority of cavalry personnel lacked at least one of these traits, particularly discipline, formations, and horses trained for head-on charges. Thus, the use of the head-on cavalry charge declined, although Polish hussars, French cuirassiers, and Spanish and Portuguese conquistadores were still capable of succeeding in such charges, often due to their possession of the previously mentioned combination of the traits required for success in such endeavours. Twentieth century: In the twentieth century, the cavalry charge was seldom used, though it enjoyed sporadic and occasional success. Elements of the 7th Cavalry Regiment of the United States attacked Villista forces in the Battle of Guerrero on 29 March 1916. The battle was a victory for the Americans, occurring in desert terrain, at the Mexican town of Vicente Guerrero, Chihuahua. One of the most successful offensive cavalry charges of the 20th century was not conducted by cavalry at all, but rather by mounted infantry, when on 31 October 1917, the Australian 4th Light Horse Brigade charged across two miles of open terrain in the face of Ottoman artillery and machine gun fire to successfully capture Beersheba in what would come to be known as the Battle of Beersheba. On 23 September 1918, the Jodhpur Lancers and Mysore Lancers of the 15th (Imperial Service) Cavalry Brigade charged Turkish positions on horseback at Haifa. Together the two regiments captured 1,350 German and Ottoman prisoners, including two German officers, 35 Ottoman officers, 17 artillery guns including four 4.2 in (11 cm) guns, eight 77 mm (3.0 in) guns and four camel guns as well as a 6 in (15 cm) naval gun, and 11 machine guns. Their own casualties amounted to eight dead and 34 wounded. 60 horses were killed and another 83 injured. On 16 May 1919, during the Third Anglo-Afghan War, the 1st King's Dragoon Guards made the last recorded charge by a British horsed cavalry regiment at Dakka, a village in Afghan territory, north west of the Khyber Pass. During the Spanish Civil War, there was a massive cavalry charge by a Francoist division during the Battle of Alfambra on 5 February 1938, the last great mounted charge in Western Europe. Several attempted charges were made in World War II. The Polish cavalry, in spite of being primarily trained to operate as rapid infantry and being better armed than regular Polish infantry (more anti-tank weapons and armored vehicles per capita) did execute up to 15 cavalry charges during the Invasion of Poland. The majority of the charges were successful and none were meant as a charge against armored vehicles. Some battles featured mutual charges by the Polish and German cavalry such as the Battle of Krasnobród (1939). The German cavalry scouts from 4th Light Division (Germany) charged the Polish infantry from 10th Motorized Cavalry Brigade (Poland) and were countered by Polish tankettes moving from concealed positions at Zakliczyn. On November 17, 1941, during the Battle of Moscow, the Soviet 44th Cavalry Division charged the German lines near Musino, west of the capital. The mounted Soviets were ravaged by German artillery, then by machine guns. The charge failed, and the Germans said they killed 2,000 cavalrymen without a single loss to themselves. On 24 August 1942, the defensive charge of the Savoia Cavalleria at Izbushensky against Russian lines near the Don River was successful. British and American cavalry units also made similar cavalry charges during World War II. (See 26th Cavalry Regiment). The last successful cavalry charge of World War II was executed during the Battle of Schoenfeld on March 1, 1945. The Polish cavalry, fighting on the Soviet side, overwhelmed the German artillery position and allowed for infantry and tanks to charge into the city. The cavalry sustained only seven dead, while 26 Polish tankmen and 124 infantrymen as well as around 500 German soldiers were killed.) After World War II, the cavalry charge was clearly outdated and was no longer employed; this, however, did not stop modern troops from utilising horses for transport, and in countries with mounted police, similar (albeit unarmed) techniques to the cavalry charge are sometimes employed to fend off rioters and large crowds.

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Charge (warfare)

British and American cavalry units also made similar cavalry charges during World War II. (See 26th Cavalry Regiment). The last successful cavalry charge of World War II was executed during the Battle of Schoenfeld on March 1, 1945. The Polish cavalry, fighting on the Soviet side, overwhelmed the German artillery position and allowed for infantry and tanks to charge into the city. The cavalry sustained only seven dead, while 26 Polish tankmen and 124 infantrymen as well as around 500 German soldiers were killed.) After World War II, the cavalry charge was clearly outdated and was no longer employed; this, however, did not stop modern troops from utilising horses for transport, and in countries with mounted police, similar (albeit unarmed) techniques to the cavalry charge are sometimes employed to fend off rioters and large crowds. Twenty-first century: At the start of the war in Afghanistan by United States forces, there was a cavalry charge by a unit of Green Berets led by Captain Mark Nutsch, and their use of horses in the charge was made into a Hollywood movie, 12 Strong. Across from the site of the former World Trade Center (1973–2001) there is a monument to the 'horse soldiers' who took part in that daring cavalry charge. Age of firearms: In the age of firearms, the basic parameters are speed of advance against rate (or effectiveness) of fire. If the attackers advance at a more rapid rate than the defenders can kill or disable them then the attackers will reach the defenders (though not necessarily without being greatly weakened in numbers). There are many modifiers to this simple comparison – timing, covering fire, organization, formation and terrain, among others. A failed charge may leave the would-be attackers vulnerable to a counter-charge. There has been a constant rise in an army's rate of fire for the last 700 years or so, but while massed charges have been successfully broken they have also been victorious. It is only since the mid-19th century that straight charges have become less successful, especially since the introduction of the repeating rifles, machine guns, and breech-loading artillery. They are often still useful on a far smaller scale in confined areas where the enemy's firepower cannot be brought to bear. Bayonet charges are still seen in the early 20th century, but are often limited to use against adversaries with inferior firepowers, when ammunition supply is scarce, or simply as a form of suicide attack to inflict fear on the enemy. In modern times, melee charges are practically extinct outside of riot control and street fighting, with a few exceptions such as the bayonet charge at the Battle of Danny Boy, but military charging tactics mainly take place with armored fighting vehicles such as tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored cars. These ground combat vehicles can either advance directly with marching fire, or transport infantry attackers quickly into proximity with the target position in order to assault and capture it. Air assaults are also a frequently used tactic to insert special operation raids against high-value targets. Notable charges: Battle of the Golden Spurs (July 11, 1302): The French cavalry, consisting of many nobles, was defeated in battle by heavily armed Flemish militiamen on foot. The cavalry charge was cited to be rash and premature with the battlefield's many ditches and marshes blamed for the loss, and at a few points on the Flemish line the French horsemen did manage to break through before being surrounded and annihilated. However it also demonstrated that well-disciplined and heavily armed infantry could defeat cavalry charges, ending the perception that heavy cavalry was practically invincible against infantry. The Battle of the Golden Spurs had been seen as the first example of the gradual "Infantry Revolution" in Medieval warfare across Europe during the 14th century. Charge of the Light Brigade (October 25, 1854) at the Battle of Balaclava in the Crimean War. Due to faulty orders a tiny force of 670 British light cavalrymen charged an enemy force many times their size. They succeeded in breaking through as well as disengaging, but suffered extremely heavy casualties and achieved no important objectives. Extensively memorialised and the subject of several literary and cinematographic works. Pickett's Charge (July 3, 1863) at the Battle of Gettysburg in the American Civil War. A mass infantry assault on the Union lines repulsed with substantial loss. Pickett's Charge has become one of the central symbols of the literary and cultural movement known as the Lost Cause. Battle of Mars-la-Tour (August 16, 1870): "Von Bredow's Death Ride". Prussian heavy cavalry brigade overrun French infantry and artillery to reinforce left flank of Prussian Army, at the cost of half the brigade. One of the few notable examples of successful cavalry charges after the introduction of modern firearms. Its success won it renown among military historians, which created a myth to the effect that for some decades 'Bredow's achievement was the norm', that cavalry could still play a decisive role in battle in a modern war between equally equipped forces, and so cavalry units continued to be part of the armed forces of major European powers for the next half century. See also: Banzai charge Human wave attack Bayonet charge Highland charge References: Barker, Juliet (2009). Conquest: The English Kingdom of France (PDF). London: Little, Brown. ISBN 978-1-4087-0083-9. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2018-06-12.

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Chemical warfare

Definition: Chemical warfare is different from the use of conventional weapons or nuclear weapons because the destructive effects of chemical weapons are not primarily due to any explosive force. The offensive use of living organisms (such as anthrax) is considered biological warfare rather than chemical warfare; however, the use of nonliving toxic products produced by living organisms (e.g. toxins such as botulinum toxin, ricin, and saxitoxin) is considered chemical warfare under the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Under this convention, any toxic chemical, regardless of its origin, is considered a chemical weapon unless it is used for purposes that are not prohibited (an important legal definition known as the General Purpose Criterion). About 70 different chemicals have been used or were stockpiled as chemical warfare agents during the 20th century. The entire class, known as Lethal Unitary Chemical Agents and Munitions, has been scheduled for elimination by the CWC. Under the convention, chemicals that are toxic enough to be used as chemical weapons, or that may be used to manufacture such chemicals, are divided into three groups according to their purpose and treatment: Schedule 1 – Have few, if any, legitimate uses. These may only be produced or used for research, medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes (i.e. testing of chemical weapons sensors and protective clothing). Examples include nerve agents, ricin, lewisite and mustard gas. Any production over 100 grams (3.5 oz) must be reported to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and a country can have a stockpile of no more than one tonne of these chemicals. Schedule 2 – Have no large-scale industrial uses, but may have legitimate small-scale uses. Examples include dimethyl methylphosphonate, a precursor to sarin also used as a flame retardant, and thiodiglycol, a precursor chemical used in the manufacture of mustard gas but also widely used as a solvent in inks. Schedule 3 – Have legitimate large-scale industrial uses. Examples include phosgene and chloropicrin. Both have been used as chemical weapons but phosgene is an important precursor in the manufacture of plastics, and chloropicrin is used as a fumigant. The OPCW must be notified of, and may inspect, any plant producing more than 30 tons per year. Chemical weapons are divided into three categories: Category 1 – based on Schedule 1 substances Category 2 – based on non-Schedule 1 substances Category 3 – devices and equipment designed to use chemical weapons, without the substances themselves History: Simple chemical weapons were used sporadically throughout antiquity and into the Industrial Age. It was not until the 19th century that the modern conception of chemical warfare emerged, as various scientists and nations proposed the use of asphyxiating or poisonous gasses. Multiple international treaties were passed banning chemical weapons based upon the alarm of nations and scientists. This however did not prevent the extensive use of chemical weapons in World War I. The development of chlorine gas, among others, was used by both sides to try to break the stalemate of trench warfare. Though largely ineffective over the long run, it decidedly changed the nature of the war. In many cases the gasses used did not kill, but instead horribly maimed, injured, or disfigured casualties. Some 1.3 million gas casualties were recorded, which may have included up to 260,000 civilian casualties. The interwar years saw the occasional use of chemical weapons, mainly to put down rebellions. In Nazi Germany, much research went into developing new chemical weapons, such as potent nerve agents. However, chemical weapons saw little battlefield use in World War II. Both sides were prepared to use such weapons, but the Allied Powers never did, and the Axis used them only very sparingly. The reason for the lack of use by the Nazis, despite the considerable efforts that had gone into developing new varieties, might have been a lack of technical ability or fears that the Allies would retaliate with their own chemical weapons. Those fears were not unfounded: the Allies made comprehensive plans for defensive and retaliatory use of chemical weapons, and stockpiled large quantities. Japanese forces, as part of the Axis, used them more widely, though only against their Asian enemies, as they also feared that using it on Western powers would result in retaliation. Chemical weapons were frequently used against the Kuomintang and Chinese communist troops, the People's Liberation Army. However, the Nazis did extensively use poison gas against civilians, mostly the genocide of European Jews, in The Holocaust. Vast quantities of Zyklon B gas and carbon monoxide were used in the gas chambers of Nazi extermination camps, resulting in the overwhelming majority of some three million deaths. This remains the deadliest use of poison gas in history. The post-war era has seen limited, though devastating, use of chemical weapons. Some 100,000 Iranian troops were casualties of Iraqi chemical weapons during the Iran–Iraq War. Iraq used mustard gas and nerve agents against its own civilians in the 1988 Halabja chemical attack. The Cuban intervention in Angola saw limited use of organophosphates. Terrorist groups have also used chemical weapons, notably in the Tokyo subway sarin attack and the Matsumoto incident. See also chemical terrorism. In the 21st century, the Ba'athist regime in Syria has used chemical weapons against civilian populations, resulting in numerous deadly chemical attacks during the Syrian civil war. The Syrian government has used sarin, chlorine, and mustard gas in the Syrian civil war – mostly against civilians. Russia has used chemical weapons during its invasion of Ukraine. This has been done mainly by dropping a grenade with K-51 aerosol CS gas from an unmanned drone. Technology: Although crude chemical warfare has been employed in many parts of the world for thousands of years, "modern" chemical warfare began during World War I – see Chemical weapons in World War I. Initially, only well-known commercially available chemicals and their variants were used. These included chlorine and phosgene gas. The methods used to disperse these agents during battle were relatively unrefined and inefficient. Even so, casualties could be heavy, due to the mainly static troop positions which were characteristic features of trench warfare. Germany, the first side to employ chemical warfare on the battlefield, simply opened canisters of chlorine upwind of the opposing side and let the prevailing winds do the dissemination. Soon after, the French modified artillery munitions to contain phosgene – a much more effective method that became the principal means of delivery. Since the development of modern chemical warfare in World War I, nations have pursued research and development on chemical weapons that falls into four major categories: new and more deadly agents; more efficient methods of delivering agents to the target (dissemination); more reliable means of defense against chemical weapons; and more sensitive and accurate means of detecting chemical agents. Chemical warfare agents: The chemical used in warfare is called a chemical warfare agent (CWA). About 70 different chemicals have been used or stockpiled as chemical warfare agents during the 20th and 21st centuries. These agents may be in liquid, gas or solid form. Liquid agents that evaporate quickly are said to be volatile or have a high vapor pressure. Many chemical agents are volatile organic compounds so they can be dispersed over a large region quickly. The earliest target of chemical warfare agent research was not toxicity, but development of agents that can affect a target through the skin and clothing, rendering protective gas masks useless. In July 1917, the Germans employed sulfur mustard. Mustard agents easily penetrate leather and fabric to inflict painful burns on the skin. Chemical warfare agents are divided into lethal and incapacitating categories. A substance is classified as incapacitating if less than 1/100 of the lethal dose causes incapacitation, e.g., through nausea or visual problems. The distinction between lethal and incapacitating substances is not fixed, but relies on a statistical average called the LD50. Persistency: Chemical warfare agents can be classified according to their persistency, a measure of the length of time that a chemical agent remains effective after dissemination. Chemical agents are classified as persistent or nonpersistent. Agents classified as nonpersistent lose effectiveness after only a few minutes or hours or even only a few seconds. Purely gaseous agents such as chlorine are nonpersistent, as are highly volatile agents such as sarin. Tactically, nonpersistent agents are very useful against targets that are to be taken over and controlled very quickly. Apart from the agent used, the delivery mode is very important. To achieve a nonpersistent deployment, the agent is dispersed into very small droplets comparable with the mist produced by an aerosol can. In this form not only the gaseous part of the agent (around 50%) but also the fine aerosol can be inhaled or absorbed through pores in the skin. Modern doctrine requires very high concentrations almost instantly in order to be effective (one breath should contain a lethal dose of the agent). To achieve this, the primary weapons used would be rocket artillery or bombs and large ballistic missiles with cluster warheads. The contamination in the target area is only low or not existent and after four hours sarin or similar agents are not detectable anymore. By contrast, persistent agents tend to remain in the environment for as long as several weeks, complicating decontamination. Defense against persistent agents requires shielding for extended periods of time. Nonvolatile liquid agents, such as blister agents and the oily VX nerve agent, do not easily evaporate into a gas, and therefore present primarily a contact hazard.

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Chemical warfare

In this form not only the gaseous part of the agent (around 50%) but also the fine aerosol can be inhaled or absorbed through pores in the skin. Modern doctrine requires very high concentrations almost instantly in order to be effective (one breath should contain a lethal dose of the agent). To achieve this, the primary weapons used would be rocket artillery or bombs and large ballistic missiles with cluster warheads. The contamination in the target area is only low or not existent and after four hours sarin or similar agents are not detectable anymore. By contrast, persistent agents tend to remain in the environment for as long as several weeks, complicating decontamination. Defense against persistent agents requires shielding for extended periods of time. Nonvolatile liquid agents, such as blister agents and the oily VX nerve agent, do not easily evaporate into a gas, and therefore present primarily a contact hazard. The droplet size used for persistent delivery goes up to 1 mm increasing the falling speed and therefore about 80% of the deployed agent reaches the ground, resulting in heavy contamination. Deployment of persistent agents is intended to constrain enemy operations by denying access to contaminated areas. Possible targets include enemy flank positions (averting possible counterattacks), artillery regiments, command posts or supply lines. Because it is not necessary to deliver large quantities of the agent in a short period of time, a wide variety of weapons systems can be used. A special form of persistent agents are thickened agents. These comprise a common agent mixed with thickeners to provide gelatinous, sticky agents. Primary targets for this kind of use include airfields, due to the increased persistency and difficulty of decontaminating affected areas. Classes: Chemical weapons are agents that come in four categories: choking, blister, blood and nerve. The agents are organized into several categories according to the manner in which they affect the human body. The names and number of categories varies slightly from source to source, but in general, types of chemical warfare agents are as follows: There are other chemicals used militarily that are not scheduled by the CWC, and thus are not controlled under the CWC treaties. These include: Defoliants and herbicides that destroy vegetation, but are not immediately toxic or poisonous to human beings. Their use is classified as herbicidal warfare. Some batches of Agent Orange, for instance, used by the British during the Malayan Emergency and the United States during the Vietnam War, contained dioxins as manufacturing impurities. Dioxins, rather than Agent Orange itself, have long-term cancer effects and for causing genetic damage leading to serious birth defects. Incendiary or explosive chemicals (such as napalm, extensively used by the United States during the Korean War and the Vietnam War, or dynamite) because their destructive effects are primarily due to fire or explosive force, and not direct chemical action. Their use is classified as conventional warfare. Viruses, bacteria, or other organisms. Their use is classified as biological warfare. Toxins produced by living organisms are considered chemical weapons, although the boundary is blurry. Toxins are covered by the Biological Weapons Convention. Designations: Most chemical weapons are assigned a one- to three-letter "NATO weapon designation" in addition to, or in place of, a common name. Binary munitions, in which precursors for chemical warfare agents are automatically mixed in shell to produce the agent just prior to its use, are indicated by a "-2" following the agent's designation (for example, GB-2 and VX-2). Some examples are given below: Delivery: The most important factor in the effectiveness of chemical weapons is the efficiency of its delivery, or dissemination, to a target. The most common techniques include munitions (such as bombs, projectiles, warheads) that allow dissemination at a distance and spray tanks which disseminate from low-flying aircraft. Developments in the techniques of filling and storage of munitions have also been important. Although there have been many advances in chemical weapon delivery since World War I, it is still difficult to achieve effective dispersion. The dissemination is highly dependent on atmospheric conditions because many chemical agents act in gaseous form. Thus, weather observations and forecasting are essential to optimize weapon delivery and reduce the risk of injuring friendly forces. Dispersion: Dispersion is placing the chemical agent upon or adjacent to a target immediately before dissemination, so that the material is most efficiently used. Dispersion is the simplest technique of delivering an agent to its target. The most common techniques are munitions, bombs, projectiles, spray tanks and warheads. World War I saw the earliest implementation of this technique. The actual first chemical ammunition was the French 26 mm cartouche suffocante rifle grenade, fired from a flare carbine. It contained 35g of the tear-producer ethyl bromoacetate, and was used in autumn 1914 – with little effect on the Germans. The German military contrarily tried to increase the effect of 10.5 cm shrapnel shells by adding an irritant – dianisidine chlorosulfonate. Its use against the British at Neuve Chapelle in October 1914 went unnoticed by them. Hans Tappen, a chemist in the Heavy Artillery Department of the War Ministry, suggested to his brother, the Chief of the Operations Branch at German General Headquarters, the use of the tear-gases benzyl bromide or xylyl bromide. Shells were tested successfully at the Wahn artillery range near Cologne on January 9, 1915, and an order was placed for 15 cm howitzer shells, designated 'T-shells' after Tappen. A shortage of shells limited the first use against the Russians at the Battle of Bolimów on January 31, 1915; the liquid failed to vaporize in the cold weather, and again the experiment went unnoticed by the Allies. The first effective use were when the German forces at the Second Battle of Ypres simply opened cylinders of chlorine and allowed the wind to carry the gas across enemy lines. While simple, this technique had numerous disadvantages. Moving large numbers of heavy gas cylinders to the front-line positions from where the gas would be released was a lengthy and difficult logistical task. Stockpiles of cylinders had to be stored at the front line, posing a great risk if hit by artillery shells. Gas delivery depended greatly on wind speed and direction. If the wind was fickle, as at the Battle of Loos, the gas could blow back, causing friendly casualties. Gas clouds gave plenty of warning, allowing the enemy time to protect themselves, though many soldiers found the sight of a creeping gas cloud unnerving. This made the gas doubly effective, as, in addition to damaging the enemy physically, it also had a psychological effect on the intended victims. Another disadvantage was that gas clouds had limited penetration, capable only of affecting the front-line trenches before dissipating. Although it produced limited results in World War I, this technique shows how simple chemical weapon dissemination can be. Shortly after this "open canister" dissemination, French forces developed a technique for delivery of phosgene in a non-explosive artillery shell. This technique overcame many of the risks of dealing with gas in cylinders. First, gas shells were independent of the wind and increased the effective range of gas, making any target within reach of guns vulnerable. Second, gas shells could be delivered without warning, especially the clear, nearly odorless phosgene—there are numerous accounts of gas shells, landing with a "plop" rather than exploding, being initially dismissed as dud high explosive or shrapnel shells, giving the gas time to work before the soldiers were alerted and took precautions. The major drawback of artillery delivery was the difficulty of achieving a killing concentration. Each shell had a small gas payload and an area would have to be subjected to saturation bombardment to produce a cloud to match cylinder delivery. A British solution to the problem was the Livens Projector. This was effectively a large-bore mortar, dug into the ground that used the gas cylinders themselves as projectiles – firing a 14 kg cylinder up to 1500 m. This combined the gas volume of cylinders with the range of artillery. Over the years, there were some refinements in this technique. In the 1950s and early 1960s, chemical artillery rockets and cluster bombs contained a multitude of submunitions, so that a large number of small clouds of the chemical agent would form directly on the target. Thermal dissemination: Thermal dissemination is the use of explosives or pyrotechnics to deliver chemical agents. This technique, developed in the 1920s, was a major improvement over earlier dispersal techniques, in that it allowed significant quantities of an agent to be disseminated over a considerable distance. Thermal dissemination remains the principal method of disseminating chemical agents today. Most thermal dissemination devices consist of a bomb or projectile shell that contains a chemical agent and a central "burster" charge; when the burster detonates, the agent is expelled laterally. Thermal dissemination devices, though common, are not particularly efficient. First, a percentage of the agent is lost by incineration in the initial blast and by being forced onto the ground. Second, the sizes of the particles vary greatly because explosive dissemination produces a mixture of liquid droplets of variable and difficult to control sizes. The efficacy of thermal detonation is greatly limited by the flammability of some agents. For flammable aerosols, the cloud is sometimes totally or partially ignited by the disseminating explosion in a phenomenon called flashing. Explosively disseminated VX will ignite roughly one third of the time.

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Chemical warfare

Thermal dissemination remains the principal method of disseminating chemical agents today. Most thermal dissemination devices consist of a bomb or projectile shell that contains a chemical agent and a central "burster" charge; when the burster detonates, the agent is expelled laterally. Thermal dissemination devices, though common, are not particularly efficient. First, a percentage of the agent is lost by incineration in the initial blast and by being forced onto the ground. Second, the sizes of the particles vary greatly because explosive dissemination produces a mixture of liquid droplets of variable and difficult to control sizes. The efficacy of thermal detonation is greatly limited by the flammability of some agents. For flammable aerosols, the cloud is sometimes totally or partially ignited by the disseminating explosion in a phenomenon called flashing. Explosively disseminated VX will ignite roughly one third of the time. Despite a great deal of study, flashing is still not fully understood, and a solution to the problem would be a major technological advance. Despite the limitations of central bursters, most nations use this method in the early stages of chemical weapon development, in part because standard munitions can be adapted to carry the agents. Aerodynamic dissemination: Aerodynamic dissemination is the non-explosive delivery of a chemical agent from an aircraft, allowing aerodynamic stress to disseminate the agent. This technique is the most recent major development in chemical agent dissemination, originating in the mid-1960s. This technique eliminates many of the limitations of thermal dissemination by eliminating the flashing effect and theoretically allowing precise control of particle size. In actuality, the altitude of dissemination, wind direction and velocity, and the direction and velocity of the aircraft greatly influence particle size. There are other drawbacks as well; ideal deployment requires precise knowledge of aerodynamics and fluid dynamics, and because the agent must usually be dispersed within the boundary layer (less than 200–300 ft or 61–91 m above the ground), it puts pilots at risk. Significant research is still being applied toward this technique. For example, by modifying the properties of the liquid, its breakup when subjected to aerodynamic stress can be controlled and an idealized particle distribution achieved, even at supersonic speed. Additionally, advances in fluid dynamics, computer modeling, and weather forecasting allow an ideal direction, speed, and altitude to be calculated, such that warfare agent of a predetermined particle size can predictably and reliably hit a target. Protection against chemical warfare: Ideal protection begins with nonproliferation treaties such as the CWC, and detecting, very early, the signatures of someone building a chemical weapons capability. These include a wide range of intelligence disciplines, such as economic analysis of exports of dual-use chemicals and equipment, human intelligence (HUMINT) such as diplomatic, refugee, and agent reports; photography from satellites, aircraft and drones (IMINT); examination of captured equipment (TECHINT); communications intercepts (COMINT); and detection of chemical manufacturing and chemical agents themselves (MASINT). If all the preventive measures fail and there is a clear and present danger, then there is a need for detection of chemical attacks, collective protection, and decontamination. Since industrial accidents can cause dangerous chemical releases (e.g., the Bhopal disaster), these activities are things that civilian, as well as military, organizations must be prepared to carry out. In civilian situations in developed countries, these are duties of HAZMAT organizations, which most commonly are part of fire departments. Detection has been referred to above, as a technical MASINT discipline; specific military procedures, which are usually the model for civilian procedures, depend on the equipment, expertise, and personnel available. When chemical agents are detected, an alarm needs to sound, with specific warnings over emergency broadcasts and the like. There may be a warning to expect an attack. If, for example, the captain of a US Navy ship believes there is a serious threat of chemical, biological, or radiological attack, the crew may be ordered to set Circle William, which means closing all openings to outside air, running breathing air through filters, and possibly starting a system that continually washes down the exterior surfaces. Civilian authorities dealing with an attack or a toxic chemical accident will invoke the Incident Command System, or local equivalent, to coordinate defensive measures. Individual protection starts with a gas mask and, depending on the nature of the threat, through various levels of protective clothing up to a complete chemical-resistant suit with a self-contained air supply. The US military defines various levels of MOPP (mission-oriented protective posture) from mask to full chemical resistant suits; Hazmat suits are the civilian equivalent, but go farther to include a fully independent air supply, rather than the filters of a gas mask. Collective protection allows continued functioning of groups of people in buildings or shelters, the latter which may be fixed, mobile, or improvised. With ordinary buildings, this may be as basic as plastic sheeting and tape, although if the protection needs to be continued for any appreciable length of time, there will need to be an air supply, typically an enhanced gas mask. Decontamination: Decontamination varies with the particular chemical agent used. Some nonpersistent agents, including most pulmonary agents (chlorine, phosgene, and so on), blood gases, and nonpersistent nerve gases (e.g., GB), will dissipate from open areas, although powerful exhaust fans may be needed to clear out buildings where they have accumulated. In some cases, it might be necessary to neutralize them chemically, as with ammonia as a neutralizer for hydrogen cyanide or chlorine. Riot control agents such as CS will dissipate in an open area, but things contaminated with CS powder need to be aired out, washed by people wearing protective gear, or safely discarded. Mass decontamination is a less common requirement for people than equipment, since people may be immediately affected and treatment is the action required. It is a requirement when people have been contaminated with persistent agents. Treatment and decontamination may need to be simultaneous, with the medical personnel protecting themselves so they can function. There may need to be immediate intervention to prevent death, such as injection of atropine for nerve agents. Decontamination is especially important for people contaminated with persistent agents; many of the fatalities after the explosion of a WWII US ammunition ship carrying sulfur mustard, in the harbor of Bari, Italy, after a German bombing on December 2, 1943, came when rescue workers, not knowing of the contamination, bundled cold, wet seamen in tight-fitting blankets. For decontaminating equipment and buildings exposed to persistent agents, such as blister agents, VX or other agents made persistent by mixing with a thickener, special equipment and materials might be needed. Some type of neutralizing agent will be needed; e.g. in the form of a spraying device with neutralizing agents such as Chlorine, Fichlor, strong alkaline solutions or enzymes. In other cases, a specific chemical decontaminant will be required. Sociopolitical climate: There are many instances of the use of chemical weapons in battles documented in Greek and Roman historical texts; the earliest example was the deliberate poisoning of Kirrha's water supply with hellebore in the First Sacred War, Greece, about 590 BC. One of the earliest reactions to the use of chemical agents was from Rome. Struggling to defend themselves from the Roman legions, Germanic tribes poisoned the wells of their enemies, with Roman jurists having been recorded as declaring "armis bella non venenis geri", meaning "war is fought with weapons, not with poisons." Yet the Romans themselves resorted to poisoning wells of besieged cities in Anatolia in the 2nd century BCE. Before 1915 the use of poisonous chemicals in battle was typically the result of local initiative, and not the result of an active government chemical weapons program. There are many reports of the isolated use of chemical agents in individual battles or sieges, but there was no true tradition of their use outside of incendiaries and smoke. Despite this tendency, there have been several attempts to initiate large-scale implementation of poison gas in several wars, but with the notable exception of World War I, the responsible authorities generally rejected the proposals for ethical reasons or fears of retaliation. For example, in 1854 Lyon Playfair (later 1st Baron Playfair, GCB, PC, FRS (1818–1898), a British chemist, proposed using a cacodyl cyanide-filled artillery shell against enemy ships during the Crimean War. The British Ordnance Department rejected the proposal as "as bad a mode of warfare as poisoning the wells of the enemy." Efforts to eradicate chemical weapons: August 27, 1874: The Brussels Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War is signed, specifically forbidding the "employment of poison or poisoned weapons", although the treaty was not adopted by any nation whatsoever and it never went into effect. September 4, 1900: The First Hague Convention, which includes a declaration banning the "use of projectiles the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases," enters into force. January 26, 1910: The Second Hague Convention enters into force, prohibiting the use of "poison or poisoned weapons" in warfare. February 6, 1922: After World War I, the Washington Arms Conference Treaty prohibited the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases. It was signed by the United States, Britain, Japan, France, and Italy, but France objected to other provisions in the treaty and it never went into effect.

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Chemical warfare

Efforts to eradicate chemical weapons: August 27, 1874: The Brussels Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War is signed, specifically forbidding the "employment of poison or poisoned weapons", although the treaty was not adopted by any nation whatsoever and it never went into effect. September 4, 1900: The First Hague Convention, which includes a declaration banning the "use of projectiles the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases," enters into force. January 26, 1910: The Second Hague Convention enters into force, prohibiting the use of "poison or poisoned weapons" in warfare. February 6, 1922: After World War I, the Washington Arms Conference Treaty prohibited the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases. It was signed by the United States, Britain, Japan, France, and Italy, but France objected to other provisions in the treaty and it never went into effect. February 8, 1928: The Geneva Protocol enters into force, prohibiting the use of "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices" and "bacteriological methods of warfare". Chemical weapon proliferation: Despite numerous efforts to reduce or eliminate them, some nations continue to research and/or stockpile chemical warfare agents. In 1997, future US Vice President Dick Cheney opposed the signing ratification of a treaty banning the use of chemical weapons, a recently unearthed letter shows. In a letter dated April 8, 1997, then Halliburton-CEO Cheney told Sen. Jesse Helms, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that it would be a mistake for America to join the convention. "Those nations most likely to comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention are not likely to ever constitute a military threat to the United States. The governments we should be concerned about are likely to cheat on the CWC, even if they do participate," reads the letter, published by the Federation of American Scientists. The CWC was ratified by the Senate that same month. In the following years, Albania, Libya, Russia, the United States, and India declared over 71,000 metric tons of chemical weapon stockpiles, and destroyed a third of them. Under the terms of the agreement, the United States and Russia agreed to eliminate the rest of their supplies of chemical weapons by 2012, but ended up taking far longer to do so as shown in the previous and following section of this article. Chemical weapons destruction: India: In June 1997, India declared that it had a stockpile of 1044 tons of sulphur mustard in its possession. India's declaration of its stockpile came after its entry into the Chemical Weapons Convention, that created the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and on January 14, 1993, India became one of the original signatories to the Chemical Weapons Convention. By 2005, from among six nations that had declared their possession of chemical weapons, India was the only country to meet its deadline for chemical weapons destruction and for inspection of its facilities by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. By 2006, India had destroyed more than 75 percent of its chemical weapons and material stockpile and was granted an extension to complete a 100 percent destruction of its stocks by April 2009. On May 14, 2009, India informed the United Nations that it has completely destroyed its stockpile of chemical weapons. Iraq: The Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter, welcomed Iraq's decision to join the OPCW as a significant step to strengthening global and regional efforts to prevent the spread and use of chemical weapons. The OPCW announced "The government of Iraq has deposited its instrument of accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention with the Secretary General of the United Nations and within 30 days, on 12 February 2009, will become the 186th State Party to the Convention". Iraq has also declared stockpiles of chemical weapons, and because of their recent accession is the only State Party exempted from the destruction time-line. Japan: During the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) Japan stored chemical weapons on the territory of mainland China. The weapon stock mostly containing sulfur mustard-lewisite mixture. The weapons are classified as abandoned chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention, and from September 2010 Japan has started their destruction in Nanjing using mobile destruction facilities in order to do so. Russia: Russia signed into the Chemical Weapons Convention on January 13, 1993, and ratified it on November 5, 1995. Declaring an arsenal of 39,967 tons of chemical weapons in 1997, by far the largest arsenal, consisting of blister agents: Lewisite, Sulfur mustard, Lewisite-mustard mix, and nerve agents: Sarin, Soman, and VX. Russia met its treaty obligations by destroying 1 percent of its chemical agents by the 2002 deadline set out by the Chemical Weapons Convention, but requested an extension on the deadlines of 2004 and 2007 due to technical, financial, and environmental challenges of chemical disposal. Since, Russia has received help from other countries such as Canada which donated C$100,000, plus a further C$100,000 already donated, to the Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction Program. This money will be used to complete work at Shchuch'ye and support the construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility at Kizner (Russia), where the destruction of nearly 5,700 tons of nerve agent, stored in approximately 2 million artillery shells and munitions, will be undertaken. Canadian funds are also being used for the operation of a Green Cross Public Outreach Office, to keep the civilian population informed on the progress made in chemical weapons destruction activities. As of July 2011, Russia has destroyed 48 percent (18,241 tons) of its stockpile at destruction facilities located in Gorny (Saratov Oblast) and Kambarka (Udmurt Republic) – where operations have finished – and Schuch'ye (Kurgan Oblast), Maradykovsky (Kirov Oblast), Leonidovka (Penza Oblast) whilst installations are under construction in Pochep (Bryansk Oblast) and Kizner (Udmurt Republic). As August 2013, 76 percent (30,500 tons) were destroyed, and Russia leaves the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, which partially funded chemical weapons destruction. In September 2017, OPCW announced that Russia had destroyed its entire chemical weapons stockpile. United States: On November 25, 1969, President Richard Nixon unilaterally renounced the offensive use of biological and toxic weapons, but the U.S. continued to maintain an offensive chemical weapons program. From May 1964 to the early 1970s the U.S. participated in Operation CHASE, a United States Department of Defense program that aimed to dispose of chemical weapons by sinking ships laden with the weapons in the deep Atlantic. After the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, Operation Chase was scrapped and safer disposal methods for chemical weapons were researched, with the U.S. destroying several thousand tons of sulfur mustard by incineration at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, and nearly 4,200 tons of nerve agent by chemical neutralisation at Tooele Army Depot. The U.S. began stockpile reductions in the 1980s with the removal of outdated munitions and destroying its entire stock of 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate (BZ or Agent 15) at the beginning of 1988. In June 1990 the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System began destruction of chemical agents stored on the Johnston Atoll in the Pacific, seven years before the Chemical Weapons Treaty came into effect. In 1986 President Ronald Reagan made an agreement with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to remove the U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons from Germany. In 1990, as part of Operation Steel Box, two ships were loaded with over 100,000 shells containing Sarin and VX were taken from the U.S. Army weapons storage depots such as Miesau and then-classified FSTS (Forward Storage / Transportation Sites) and transported from Bremerhaven, Germany to Johnston Atoll in the Pacific, a 46-day nonstop journey. In the 1980s, Congress, at the urging of the Reagan administration, Congress provided funding for the manufacture of binary chemical weapons (sarin artillery shells) from 1987 until 1990, but this was halted after the U.S. and the Soviet Union entered into a bilateral agreement in June 1990. In the 1990 agreement, the U.S. and Soviet Union agreed to begin destroying their chemical weapons stockpiles before 1993 and to reduce them to no more than 5,000 agent tons each by the end of 2002. The agreement also provided for exchanges of data and inspections of sites to verify destruction. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S.'s Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program helped eliminate some of the chemical, biological and nuclear stockpiles of the former Soviet Union. The United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in 1980 led to the development of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), a multilateral treaty that prohibited the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons, and required the elimination of existing stockpiles.

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Chemical warfare

and the Soviet Union entered into a bilateral agreement in June 1990. In the 1990 agreement, the U.S. and Soviet Union agreed to begin destroying their chemical weapons stockpiles before 1993 and to reduce them to no more than 5,000 agent tons each by the end of 2002. The agreement also provided for exchanges of data and inspections of sites to verify destruction. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S.'s Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program helped eliminate some of the chemical, biological and nuclear stockpiles of the former Soviet Union. The United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in 1980 led to the development of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), a multilateral treaty that prohibited the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons, and required the elimination of existing stockpiles. The treaty expressly prohibited state parties from making reservations (unilateral caveats). During the Reagan administration and the George H. W. Bush administration, the U.S. participated in the negotiations toward the CWC. The CWC was concluded on September 3, 1992, and opened for signature on January 13, 1993. The U.S. became one of 87 original state parties to the CWC. President Bill Clinton submitted it to the U.S. Senate for ratification on November 23, 1993. Ratification was blocked in the Senate for years, largely as a result of opposition from Senator Jesse Helms, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. On April 24, 1997, the Senate gave its consent to ratification of the CWC by a 74–26 vote (satisfying the required two-thirds majority). The U.S. deposited its instrument of ratification at the United Nations on April 25, 1997, a few days before the CWC entered into force. The U.S. ratification allowed the U.S. to participate in the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the organization based in The Hague that oversees implementation of the CWC. Upon U.S. ratification of the CWC, the U.S. declared a total of 29,918 tons of chemical weapons, and committed to destroying all of the U.S.'s chemical weapons and bulk agent. The U.S. was one of eight states to declare a stockpile of chemical weapons and to commit to their safe elimination. The U.S. committed in the CWC to destroy its entire chemical arsenal within 10 years of the entry into force (i.e., by April 29, 2007), However, at a 2012 conference, the parties to the CWC parties agreed to extend the U.S. deadline to 2023. By 2012, stockpiles had been eliminated at seven of the U.S.'s nine chemical weapons depots and 89.75% of the 1997 stockpile was destroyed. The depots were the Aberdeen Chemical Agent Disposal Facility, Anniston Chemical Disposal Facility, Johnston Atoll, Newport Chemical Agent Disposal Facility, Pine Bluff Chemical Disposal Facility, Tooele Chemical Disposal Facility, Umatilla Chemical Disposal Facility, and Deseret Chemical Depot. The U.S. closed each site after the completion of stockpile destruction. In 2019, the U.S. began to eliminate its chemical-weapon stockpile at the last of the nine U.S. chemical weapons storage facilities: the Blue Grass Army Depot in Kentucky. By May 2021, the U.S. destroyed all of its Category 2 and Category 3 chemical weapons and 96.52% of its Category 1 chemical weapons. The U.S. is scheduled to complete the elimination of all its chemical weapons by the September 2023 deadline. In July 2023 OPCW confirmed the last chemical munition of the U.S., and that the last chemical weapon from the stockpiles declared by all States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention was verified as destroyed. The U.S. has maintained a "calculated ambiguity" policy that warns potential adversaries that a chemical or biological attack against the U.S. or its allies will prompt a "overwhelming and devastating" response. The policy deliberately leaves open the question of whether the U.S. would respond to a chemical attempt with nuclear retaliation. Commentators have noted that this policy gives policymakers more flexibility, at the possible cost of decreased strategic unpreparedness. Anti-agriculture: Herbicidal warfare: Although herbicidal warfare use chemical substances, its main purpose is to disrupt agricultural food production and/or to destroy plants which provide cover or concealment to the enemy. The use of herbicides by the U.S. military during the Vietnam War has left tangible, long-term impacts upon the Vietnamese people and U.S. veterans of the war. The government of Vietnam says that around 24% of the forests of Southern Vietnam were defoliated and up to four million people in Vietnam were exposed to Agent Orange. They state that as many as three million people have developed illness because of Agent Orange while the Red Cross of Vietnam estimates that up to one million people were disabled or have health problems associated with Agent Orange. The United States government has described these figures as unreliable. During the war, the U.S. fought the North Vietnamese and their allies in Laos and Cambodia, dropping large quantities of Agent Orange in each of those countries. According on one estimate, the U.S. dropped 475,500 US gallons (1,800,000 L) of Agent Orange in Laos and 40,900 US gallons (155,000 L) in Cambodia. Because Laos and Cambodia were officially neutral during the Vietnam War, the U.S. attempted to keep secret its military involvement in these countries. The U.S. has stated that Agent Orange was not widely used and therefore hasn't offered assistance to affected Cambodians or Laotians, and limits benefits American veterans and CIA personnel who were stationed there. Anti-livestock: During the Mau Mau Uprising in 1952, the poisonous latex of the African milk bush was used to kill cattle. See also: 1990 Chemical Weapons Accord Ali Hassan al-Majid Area denial weapon Chemical weapon designation Chemical weapons and the United Kingdom Gas chamber List of CBRN warfare forces List of chemical warfare agents List of highly toxic gases Ronald Maddison Psychochemical weapon Saint Julien Memorial Sardasht, West Azerbaijan, a town attacked with chemical weapons during the Iran–Iraq War Stink bomb United States Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense Notes: References: CBWInfo.com (2001). A Brief History of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Ancient Times to the 19th Century. Retrieved November 24, 2004. Chomsky, Noam (March 4, 2001). Prospects for Peace in the Middle East, page 2. Lecture. Cordette, Jessica, MPH(c) (2003). Chemical Weapons of Mass Destruction. Retrieved November 29, 2004. Croddy, Eric (2001), Chemical and Biological Warfare, Copernicus, ISBN 978-0-387-95076-1 Smart, Jeffery K., M.A. (1997). History of Biological and Chemical Warfare. Retrieved November 24, 2004. United States Senate, 103d Congress, 2d Session. (May 25, 1994). The Riegle Report. Retrieved November 6, 2004. Gerard J Fitzgerald. American Journal of Public Health. Washington: Apr 2008. Vol. 98, Iss. 4; p. 611 Гречко, А.А. (1976). Годы Войны. Военное Издательство Министерства Оборонны СССР.Москва. Further reading: Leo P. Brophy and George J. B. Fisher; The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War Office of the Chief of Military History, 1959; L. P. Brophy, W. D. Miles and C. C. Cochrane, The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field (1959); and B. E. Kleber and D. Birdsell, The Chemical Warfare Service in Combat (1966). official US history; Glenn Cross, Dirty War: Rhodesia and Chemical Biological Warfare, 1975–1980, Helion & Company, 2017 Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree; International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation 1991 L. F. Haber. The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War Oxford University Press: 1986 James W. Hammond Jr; Poison Gas: The Myths Versus Reality Greenwood Press, 1999 Jiri Janata, Role of Analytical Chemistry in Defense Strategies Against Chemical and Biological Attack, Annual Review of Analytical Chemistry, 2009 Ishmael Jones, The Human Factor: Inside the CIA's Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture, Encounter Books, New York 2008, revised 2010, ISBN 978-1-59403-382-7. WMD espionage.

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Chemical warfare

official US history; Glenn Cross, Dirty War: Rhodesia and Chemical Biological Warfare, 1975–1980, Helion & Company, 2017 Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree; International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation 1991 L. F. Haber. The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War Oxford University Press: 1986 James W. Hammond Jr; Poison Gas: The Myths Versus Reality Greenwood Press, 1999 Jiri Janata, Role of Analytical Chemistry in Defense Strategies Against Chemical and Biological Attack, Annual Review of Analytical Chemistry, 2009 Ishmael Jones, The Human Factor: Inside the CIA's Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture, Encounter Books, New York 2008, revised 2010, ISBN 978-1-59403-382-7. WMD espionage. Benoit Morel and Kyle Olson; Shadows and Substance: The Chemical Weapons Convention Westview Press, 1993 Adrienne Mayor, "Greek Fire, Poison Arrows & Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare in the Ancient World" Overlook-Duckworth, 2003, rev ed with new Introduction 2008 Geoff Plunkett, Chemical Warfare in Australia: Australia's Involvement In Chemical Warfare 1914 – Today, (2nd Edition), 2013.. Leech Cup Books. A volume in the Army Military History Series published in association with the Army History Unit. Jonathan B. Tucker. Chemical Warfare from World War I to Al-Qaeda (2006) External links: Official website of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Rule 74. The use of chemical weapons is prohibited. – section on chemical weapons from Customary IHL Database, an "updated version of the Study on customary international humanitarian law conducted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and originally published by Cambridge University Press." Chemical Warfare information page Archived November 13, 2012, at the Wayback Machine, from the Disaster Information Management Research Center of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services including links to relevant sources in the U.S. National Library of Medicine

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Children in the military

History: History is filled with children who have been trained and used for fighting, assigned to support roles such as porters or messengers, used as sex slaves, or recruited for tactical advantage as human shields or for political advantage in propaganda. In 1813 and 1814, for example, Napoleon conscripted many young French teenagers for his armies. Thousands of children participated on all sides of the First and Second World Wars. Children continued to be used throughout the 20th and early 21st century on every continent, with concentrations in parts of Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. Only since the turn of the millennium have international efforts begun to limit and reduce the military use of children. Current situation: State armed forces: The adoption in 2000 of the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OPAC) committed states who ratified it to "take all feasible measures" to ensure that no child takes a direct part in hostilities and to cease recruitment below the age of 16. As most states have now opted into OPAC, the global trend has been towards reserving military recruitment to adulthood, known as the Straight-18 standard. Nonetheless, as of 2018, children aged under 18 were still being recruited and trained for military purposes in 46 countries, which is approximately one quarter of all countries. Most of these states recruit from age 17, fewer than 20 recruit from age 16, and an unknown, smaller number, recruit younger children. As of 2022, the United Nations (UN) verified that nine state armed forces were using children in hostilities: Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Somalia, and South Sudan in Africa; Palestine, Syria and Yemen in Western Asia; Afghanistan in Central Asia; and Myanmar in South East Asia. The United Nations (UN) Committee on the Rights of the Child and others have called for an end to the recruitment of children by state armed forces, arguing that military training, the military environment, and a binding contract of service are not compatible with children's rights and jeopardize healthy development. Non-state armed groups: These include non-state armed paramilitary organisations such as militias, insurgents, terrorist organizations, guerrilla movements, armed liberation movements, and other types of quasi-military organisation. As of 2022, the UN identified 12 countries where children were widely used by such groups: Colombia in South America; Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan in Africa; Lebanon and Palestine in the Middle East; Syria and Yemen in Western Asia; Afghanistan in Central Asia; and Myanmar in South East Asia. Not all armed groups use children and approximately 60 have entered agreements to reduce or end the practice since 1999. For example, by 2017, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines had released nearly 2,000 children from its ranks, and in 2016, the FARC-EP guerrilla movement in Colombia agreed to stop recruiting children. Other countries have seen the reverse trend, particularly Afghanistan and Syria, where Islamist militants and groups opposing them have intensified their recruitment, training, and use of children. Global estimates: In 2003, one estimate calculated that child soldiers participated in about three-quarters of ongoing conflicts. In the same year, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) estimated that most of these children were aged over 15, although some were younger. Due to the widespread military use of children in areas where armed conflict and insecurity prevent access by UN officials and other observers, it is difficult to estimate how many children are affected. In 2003 UNICEF estimated that some 300,000 children are involved in more than 30 conflicts worldwide. In 2017, Child Soldiers International estimated that several tens of thousands of children, possibly more than 100,000, were in state and non-state military organisations around the world, and in 2018 the organisation reported that children were being used to participate in at least 18 armed conflicts. In 2023 the UN Secretary General report presented 7,622 verified cases of children being recruited and used in armed conflicts in 23 countries. More than 12,460 children formerly associated with armed forces or groups received protection or reintegration support during 2022. It is estimated that girl soldiers make between 10% and 30%, 6 and 50%, or over 40% of the child soldier population. Of the verified cases presented in the 2023 UN Secretary General report, girls make 12.3% of all child soldiers recruited or used by armed groups. Driving factors: Despite children's physical and psychological underdevelopment relative to adults, there are many reasons why state and non-state military organisations seek them out, and why children themselves are often drawn to join of their own volition. Psychological factors: Relative to adults, the neurological underdevelopment of children, including adolescent children, renders them more susceptible to recruitment and also more likely to make consequential decisions without due regard to the risks. With these susceptibilities in mind, military marketing to adolescents has been criticised in Germany, the UK, and the US for glamorizing military life while omitting the risks and the loss of fundamental rights. Research in the same three countries finds that recruiters disproportionately target children from poorer backgrounds. In the UK, for example, the army finds it easier to attract child recruits from age 16 than adults from age 18, particularly those from poorer backgrounds. Once recruited, children are easier than adults to indoctrinate and control, and are more motivated than adults to fight for non-monetary incentives such as religion, honour, prestige, revenge, and duty. Social factors: In many countries growing populations of young people relative to older generations have made children a cheap and accessible resource for military organisations. In a 2004 study of children in military organisations around the world, Rachel Brett and Irma Specht pointed to a complex of factors that incentivise children to join military organisations, particularly: Background poverty including a lack of civilian education or employment opportunities. The cultural normalization of war. Seeking new friends. Revenge (for example, after seeing friends and relatives killed). Expectations that a "warrior" role provides a rite of passage to maturity. The following testimony from a child recruited by the Cambodian armed forces in the 1990s is typical of many children's motivations for joining up: I joined because my parents lacked food and I had no school ... I was worried about mines but what can we do—it's an order [to go to the front line]. Once somebody stepped on a mine in front of me—he was wounded and died ... I was with the radio at the time, about 60 metres away. I was sitting in my hammock and saw him die ... I see young children in every unit ... I'm sure I'll be a soldier for at least a couple of more years. If I stop being a soldier, I won't have a job to do because I don't have any skills. I don't know what I'll do ... Military factors: Some leaders of armed groups have claimed that children, despite their underdevelopment, bring their own qualities as combatants to a fighting unit, often being remarkably fearless, agile and hardy. The global proliferation of light automatic weapons, which children can easily handle, has also made the use of children as direct combatants more viable. Impact on children: Armed conflict: Child soldiers who survive armed conflict face a markedly elevated risk of debilitating psychiatric illness, poor literacy and numeracy, and behavioural problems. Research in Palestine and Uganda, for example, has found that more than half of former child soldiers showed symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder and nearly nine in ten in Uganda screened positive for depressed mood. Researchers in Palestine also found that children exposed to high levels of violence in armed conflict were substantially more likely than other children to exhibit aggression and anti-social behaviour. The combined impact of these effects typically includes a high risk of poverty and lasting unemployment in adulthood. Detention: Further harm is caused when armed forces and groups detain child recruits. Children are often detained without sufficient food, medical care, or under other inhumane conditions, and some experience physical and sexual torture. Some are captured with their families, or detained due to one of their family members' activity. Lawyers and relatives are frequently banned from any court hearing. Military training: While the use of children in armed conflict has attracted most attention, other research has found that military settings present several serious risks before child recruits are deployed to war zones, particularly during training. Research from several countries finds that military enlistment, even before recruits are sent to war, is accompanied by a higher risk of attempted suicide in the US, higher risk of mental disorders in the US and the UK, higher risk of alcohol misuse and higher risk of violent behaviour, relative to recruits' pre-military experience. Military academics in the US have characterized military training as "intense indoctrination" in conditions of sustained stress, the primary purpose of which is to establish the unconditional and immediate obedience of recruits. The research literature has found that adolescents are more vulnerable than adults to a high-stress environment, particularly those from a background of childhood adversity. It finds in particular that the prolonged stressors of military training are likely to aggravate pre-existing mental health problems and hamper healthy neurological development. Military settings are characterized by elevated rates of bullying, particularly by instructors. In the UK between 2014 and 2020, for example, the army recorded 62 formal complaints of violence committed by staff against recruits at the military training centre for 16- and 17-year-old trainee soldiers, the Army Foundation College.

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Children in the military

Military academics in the US have characterized military training as "intense indoctrination" in conditions of sustained stress, the primary purpose of which is to establish the unconditional and immediate obedience of recruits. The research literature has found that adolescents are more vulnerable than adults to a high-stress environment, particularly those from a background of childhood adversity. It finds in particular that the prolonged stressors of military training are likely to aggravate pre-existing mental health problems and hamper healthy neurological development. Military settings are characterized by elevated rates of bullying, particularly by instructors. In the UK between 2014 and 2020, for example, the army recorded 62 formal complaints of violence committed by staff against recruits at the military training centre for 16- and 17-year-old trainee soldiers, the Army Foundation College. Joe Turton, who joined up aged 17 in 2014, recalls bullying by staff throughout his training. For example: The corporals come into the hangar where we sleep and they're wild-eyed, screaming, shoving people out. A massive sergeant lifts a recruit in the air and literally throws him into the wall. A corporal smacks me full-force around the head—I've got my helmet on but he hits me so hard that I'm knocked right over, I mean this man's about 40 and I'm maybe 17 by then. A bit later, we're crawling through mud and a corporal grabs me and drags me along the ground, half-way across a field. When he lets go I'm in that much pain that I'm whimpering on the ground. When the other corporal, the one who hit me, sees me crying on the ground, he just points at me and laughs.Elevated rates of sexual harassment are characteristic of military settings, including the training environment. Between 2015 and 2020, for example, girls aged 16 or 17 in the British armed forces were twice as likely as their same-age civilian peers to report rape or other sexual assault. International law: Recruitment and use of children: Definition of child: The Convention on the Rights of the Child defines a child as any person under the age of 18. The Paris Principles define a child associated with an armed force or group as: ...any person below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual purposes. The document is approved by the United Nations General Assembly. It does not only refer to a child who is taking or has taken a direct part in hostilities. Children aged under 15: The Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (1977, Art. 77.2), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2002) all forbid state armed forces and non-state armed groups from using children under the age of 15 directly in armed conflict (technically "hostilities"). This is now recognised as a war crime. Children aged under 18: Most states with armed forces are also bound by the higher standards of the widely ratified Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OPAC) (2000) and the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (1999), which forbid the compulsory recruitment of those under the age of 18. OPAC also requires governments that still recruit children (from age 16) to "take all feasible measures to ensure that persons below the age of 18 do not take a direct part in hostilities". In addition, OPAC forbids non-state armed groups from recruiting children under any circumstances, although the legal force of this is uncertain. The highest standard in the world is set by the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, which forbids state armed forces from recruiting children under the age of 18 under any circumstances. Most African states have ratified the Charter. Limitations and loopholes: None of the above treaties either explicitly forbids the indirect participation of children in "hostilities", or from contributing to a military operation in a stand-off position (i.e. away from hostilities). Standards for the release and reintegration of children: OPAC requires governments to demobilise children within their jurisdiction who have been recruited or used in hostilities and to provide assistance for their physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration. Under war, civil unrest, armed conflict and other emergency situations, children and youths are also offered protection under the United Nations Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict. To accommodate the proper disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former members of armed groups, the United Nations started the Integrated DDR Standards in 2006. War crimes: Opinion is currently divided over whether children should be prosecuted for war crimes. International law does not prohibit the prosecution of children who commit war crimes, but Article 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child limits the punishment that a child can receive: "Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offenses committed by persons below eighteen years of age." Example: Sierra Leone: In the wake of the Sierra Leonean Civil War, the UN mandated the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) to try former combatants aged 15 and older for breaches of humanitarian law, including war crimes. However, the Paris Principles state that children who participate in armed conflict should be regarded first as victims, even if they may also be perpetrators: ... [those] who are accused of crimes under international law allegedly committed while they were associated with armed forces or armed groups should be considered primarily as victims of offenses against international law; not only as perpetrators. They must be treated by international law in a framework of restorative justice and social rehabilitation, consistent with international law which offers children special protection through numerous agreements and principles. This principle was reflected in the Court's statute, which did not rule out prosecution but emphasised the need to rehabilitate and reintegrate former child soldiers. David Crane, the first Chief Prosecutor of the Sierra Leone tribunal, interpreted the statute in favour of prosecuting those who had recruited children, rather than the children themselves, no matter how heinous the crimes they had committed. Example: Omar Khadr: In the US, prosecutors charged Omar Khadr, a Canadian, for offences they alleged he committed in Afghanistan while under the age of 16 and fighting for the Taliban against US forces. These crimes carry a maximum penalty of life imprisonment under US law. In 2010, while under torture and duress, Khadr pleaded guilty to murder in violation of the laws of war, attempted murder in violation of the laws of war, conspiracy, two counts of providing material support for terrorism, and spying. The plea was offered as part of a plea bargain, which would see Khadr deported to Canada after one year of imprisonment to serve seven further years there. Omar Khadr remained in Guantanamo Bay and the Canadian government faced international criticism for delaying his repatriation. Khadr was eventually transferred to the Canadian prison system in September 2012 and was freed on bail by a judge in Alberta in May 2015. As of 2016, Khadr was appealing his US conviction as a war criminal. Before sentencing the Special Representative to the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict wrote to the US military commission at Guantanamo appealing unsuccessfully for Khadr's release into a rehabilitation program. In her letter she said that Khadr represented the "classic child soldier narrative: recruited by unscrupulous groups to undertake actions at the bidding of adults to fight battles they barely understand". The role of the United Nations: Background: Children's rights advocates were left frustrated after the final text of the convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) did not prohibit the military recruitment of all children under the age of 18, and they began to call for a new treaty to achieve this goal. As a consequence the newly formed Committee on the Rights of the Child made two recommendations: first, to request a major UN study into the impact of armed conflict on children; and second, to establish a working group of the UN Commission on Human Rights to negotiate a supplementary protocol to the convention. Both proposals were accepted. Responding to the committee on the Rights of the Child, the UN General Assembly acknowledged "the grievous deterioration in the situation of children in many parts of the world as a result of armed conflicts" and commissioned the human rights expert Graça Machel to conduct a major fact-finding study. Her report, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children (1996), was particularly concerned with the military use of younger children, which was killing, maiming, and psychiatrically injuring many thousands every year. It noted: Clearly one of the most urgent priorities is to remove everyone under 18 years of age from armed forces. Meanwhile, the UN Commission on Human Rights established a working group to negotiate a treaty to raise the legal standard. After a global campaign and complex negotiations, the new treaty was agreed in 2000 as the Optional Protocol to the convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. The treaty prohibited the direct participation of all children in armed conflict for the first time, while continuing to allow state armed forces (though not non-state armed groups) to recruit children from age 16. The protocol came into force on 12 February 2002. Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict: The Machel Report led to a new mandate for a Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict (SRSG-CAAC).

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Children in the military

It noted: Clearly one of the most urgent priorities is to remove everyone under 18 years of age from armed forces. Meanwhile, the UN Commission on Human Rights established a working group to negotiate a treaty to raise the legal standard. After a global campaign and complex negotiations, the new treaty was agreed in 2000 as the Optional Protocol to the convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. The treaty prohibited the direct participation of all children in armed conflict for the first time, while continuing to allow state armed forces (though not non-state armed groups) to recruit children from age 16. The protocol came into force on 12 February 2002. Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict: The Machel Report led to a new mandate for a Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict (SRSG-CAAC). Among the tasks of the SRSG is to draft the Secretary-General's annual report on children and armed conflict, which lists and describes the worst situations of child recruitment and use from around the world. Security Council: The United Nations Security Council convenes regularly to debate, receive reports, and pass resolutions under the heading "Children in armed conflict". The first resolution on the issue, Resolution 1261, was passed in 1999. In 2004 Resolution 1539 was passed unanimously, condemning the use of child soldiers and mandating the UN Secretary-General to establish a means of tracking and reporting on the practice, known as the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism. United Nations Secretary-General: The Secretary-General publishes an annual report on children and armed conflict. As of 2017, his report identified 14 countries where children were widely used by armed groups during 2016 (Afghanistan, Colombia, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen) and six countries where state armed forces were using children in hostilities (Afghanistan, Myanmar, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Syria). Children in the military today—by region and country: This section covers the use of children for military purposes today. For historical cases, see History of children in the military. Africa: In 2003, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that up to half of children involved with state armed forces and non-state armed groups worldwide were in Africa. In 2004, Child Soldiers International estimated that 100,000 children were being used in state and non-state armed forces on the continent; and in 2008 an estimate put the total at 120,000 children, or 40 percent of the global total. The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990), which most African states have ratified, prohibits all military recruitment of children aged under 18. Nonetheless, according to the UN, in 2016 children were being used by armed groups in seven African countries (Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan) and by state armed forces in three (Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan). International efforts to reduce the number of children in military organisations in Africa began with the Cape Town Principles and Best Practices, developed in 1997. The Principles proposed that African governments commit to OPAC, which was being negotiated at the time, and raise the minimum age for military recruitment from 15 to 18. The Principles also defined a child soldier to include any person under the age of 18 who is "part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or group in any capacity ... including girls recruited for sexual purposes ..." In 2007, the Free Children from War conference in Paris produced the Paris Principles, which refined and updated the Cape Town Principles, applied them globally, and outlined a practical approach to reintegrating current child soldiers. Central African Republic: The use of children by armed groups in the Central African Republic has historically been common. Between 2012 and 2015 as many as 10,000 children were used by armed groups in the nationwide armed conflict and as of 2024 the problem persists nationwide with a most likely greater amount fighting now. The mainly Muslim Séléka coalition of armed groups and the predominantly Christian Anti-balaka militias have both used children in this way; some are as young as eight. In May 2015 at the Forum de Bangui (a meeting of government, parliament, armed groups, civil society, and religious leaders), a number of armed groups agreed to demobilize thousands of children. In 2016 a measure of stability returned to the Central African Republic and, according to the United Nations, 2,691 boys and 1,206 girls were officially separated from armed groups. Despite this, the recruitment and use of children for military purposes increased by approximately 50 percent over that year, mostly attributed to the Lord's Resistance Army. Democratic Republic of the Congo: Thousands of children serve in the military of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and various rebel militias. It has been estimated that more than 30,000 children were fighting with various parties to the conflict at the height of the Second Congo War. It was claimed in the film Kony 2012 that the Lord's Resistance Army recruited this number. Currently, the DRC has one of the highest proportions of child soldiers in the world. The international court has passed judgment on these practices during the war. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, one of the warlords in the DRC, has been sentenced to 14 years in prison because of his role in the recruitment of child soldiers between 2002 and 2003. Lubanga directed the Union of Congolese Patriots and its armed wing Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of Congo. The children were forced to fight in the armed conflict in Ituri. Egypt: The minimum age to join the Egyptian military is 16. (CIA World Factsheet 2024) Sao Tome and Principe: In the islands state of São Tomé and Príncipe, the minimum age for voluntary military service is 17 years old. (CIA World Factsheet 2024). Somalia: A report published by the Child Soldiers International in 2004 estimated that 200,000 children had been recruited into the country's militias against their will since 1991. In 2017 UN Secretary-General António Guterres commented on a UN report which estimated that over 50 percent of Al-Shabaab's membership in the country was under the age of 18, with some as young as nine being sent to fight. The report verified that 6,163 children had been recruited in Somalia between 1 April 2010 and 31 July 2016, of which 230 were girls. Al-Shabaab accounted for seventy percent of this recruitment, and the Somali National Army was also recruiting children. Sudan: In 2004 approximately 17,000 children were being used by the state armed forces and non-state armed groups. As many as 5,000 children were part of the main armed opposition group at the time, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Some former child soldiers were sentenced to death for crimes committed while they were soldiers. In 2006, children were also recruited from refugee camps in Chad, and thousands were used in the conflict in Darfur. In 2005 the government ratified the OPAC treaty and by 2008 the military use of children had reduced in the country, but both state armed forces and the SPLA continued to recruit and use them. The use of children has continued to diminish, but in 2017 the UN was still receiving reports of children as young as 12 in government forces. Uganda: "The LRA in Uganda became known mainly through the forced recruitment of thousands of children and adolescents who were trained as soldiers or forced to 'marry' members of the rebel group. Unlike all other, or earlier, rebel groups in Uganda, the LRA made the violent abduction or enslavement of children (preferably aged between twelve and fourteen) its main method of recruitment and concentrated its activities on attacking the civilian population." Zimbabwe: In 2003, the Guardian reported multiple human rights violations by the National Youth Service, a state-sponsored youth militia in Zimbabwe. Originally conceived as a patriotic youth organisation, it became a paramilitary group of youth aged between 10 and 30, and was used to suppress dissent in the country. The organisation was finally banned in January 2018. Americas: Barbados: Children can join the Barbados Army at 17 years and 9 months, with parental consent. (CIA Factsheet) Bolivia: In 2001 the government of Bolivia acknowledged that male children as young as 14 may have been forcibly conscripted into the armed forces during recruitment sweeps. About 40% of the Bolivian army was believed to be under the age of 18, with half of those below the age of 16. As of 2018, Bolivia invites children to begin their adult conscription early, from age 17. Brazil: In Brazil the local organized crime groups, such as Comando Vermelho, recruit children to sell drugs and commit homicides, as well as to fight with the police and other rival groups. Also the Brazilian militias recruit children to fight in the conflict against Comando Vermelho. Canada: In Canada, people may join the reserve component of the Canadian Forces at age 16 with parental permission, and the regular component at 17 years of age, also with parental permission. They may not volunteer for a tour of duty until reaching age 18.

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About 40% of the Bolivian army was believed to be under the age of 18, with half of those below the age of 16. As of 2018, Bolivia invites children to begin their adult conscription early, from age 17. Brazil: In Brazil the local organized crime groups, such as Comando Vermelho, recruit children to sell drugs and commit homicides, as well as to fight with the police and other rival groups. Also the Brazilian militias recruit children to fight in the conflict against Comando Vermelho. Canada: In Canada, people may join the reserve component of the Canadian Forces at age 16 with parental permission, and the regular component at 17 years of age, also with parental permission. They may not volunteer for a tour of duty until reaching age 18. Colombia: In the Colombian armed conflict, from the mid-1960s to present, one-fourth of non-state combatants have been and still are under 18 years old. In 2004 Colombia ranked fourth in the world for the greatest use of child soldiers. There are currently 11,000–14,000 children in armed groups in the country. In negotiations with the government, armed groups have offered to stop the recruitment of minors as a bargaining chip, but they have not honoured these offers. Bjørkhaug argues that most child soldiers were recruited through some combination of voluntary participation and coercion. In 1998 a Human Rights Watch press release indicated that 30 percent of some guerrilla units were made up of children and up to 85 percent of some of the militias, which are considered to serve as a "training ground for future guerrilla fighters", had child soldiers In the same press release it was estimated that some of the government-linked paramilitary units consisted of up to 50 percent children, including some as young as eight years old. In 2005 an estimated 11,000 children were involved with left- or right-wing paramilitaries in Colombia. "Approximately 80 percent of child combatants in Colombia belong to one of the two left-wing guerrilla groups, the FARC or ELN. The remainder fight in paramilitary ranks, predominately the AUC." According to P. W. Singer the FARC attack on the Guatape hydroelectric facility in 1998 involved militants as young as eight years old and a 2001 FARC training video depicted boys as young as 11 working with missiles. The group has also taken in children from Venezuela, Panama, and Ecuador. The Colombian government's security forces do not officially recruit children as the legal age for both compulsory and voluntary recruitment has been set at 18. However, students were allowed to enroll as cadets in military secondary schools and 16- or 17-year-olds could enter air force or national army training programs, respectively. In addition, captured enemy child combatants were employed by the Colombian military for intelligence gathering purposes in potential violation of legal prohibitions. The demobilization efforts targeted toward the FARC in 2016–2017 have provided hope that the conflict will come to an end, limiting the number of children involved in violence. However, other armed groups have yet to be demobilized, and conflict is not yet resolved. Cuba: In Cuba, compulsory military service for both boys and girls starts at age 17. Male teenagers are allowed to join the Territorial Troops Militia prior to their compulsory service. Guatemala: Children can join the military at 17 in Guatemala. (CIA World Factbook - 2024). Haiti: In Haiti an unknown number of children participate in various loosely organised armed groups that are engaged in political violence. Mexico: In Mexico an unknown number of children are used by criminal organizations like the Gulf Cartel in the Mexican drug war to fight the government and the other rival cartels. Also the Grupos de autodefensa comunitaria recruited some children to defend their villages from the violence of the local crime groups, one of the self-defense groups that recruit soldier children is Coordinadora Regional de Autoridades Comunitarias-Pueblos Fundadores (CRAC-PF) to fight with Los Ardillos, a criminal group split from the Beltrán Leyva Cartel. The battles between CRAC-PF and Los Ardillos caused 53 deaths. Paraguay: The government of Paraguay accused the guerrilla groups EPP and the ACA of recruit child soldiers to fight the government in the ongoing insurgency in the northeastern part of the country. United States: In the United States 17-year-olds may join the armed forces with the written agreement of parents. As of 2015 approximately 16,000 17-year-olds were being enlisted annually. The US Army describes outreach to schools as the 'cornerstone' of its approach to recruitment, and the No Child Left Behind Act gives recruiters the legal right of access to all school students' contact details. Children's rights bodies have criticized the US' reliance on children to staff its armed forces. The committee on the Rights of the Child has recommended that the US raise the minimum age of enlistment to 18. In negotiations on the OPAC treaty during the 1990s the US joined the UK in strongly opposing a global minimum enlistment age of 18. As a consequence the treaty specified a minimum age of 16. The US ratified the treaty in 2002 (but as of 2018 U.S. ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child has not happened). Per OPAC, US military personnel are normally prohibited from direct participation in hostilities until the age of 18. Still, they are eligible for 'forward deployment', which means that they may be posted to a combat zone to perform support tasks. The committee on the Rights of the Child has called on the US to change this policy and ensure that no minor can be deployed to a forward operating area in a combat zone. In 2003 and 2004 approximately 60 underage personnel were deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq in error. The Department of Defense subsequently stated that "the situations were immediately rectified and action taken to prevent recurrence." In 2008 President George W. Bush signed the Child Soldiers Protection Act into law. The law criminalizes leading a military force which recruits child soldiers. It also prohibits arms sales to countries where children are used for military purposes. The law's definition of child soldiers includes "any person under 18 years of age who takes a direct part in hostilities as a member of governmental armed forces." Waivers from the act were issued by both the Obama and Trump administrations. Asia: In 2004 the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (now Child Soldiers International) reported that in Asia thousands of children are involved in fighting forces in active conflict and ceasefire situations in Afghanistan, Myanmar, Indonesia, Laos, Philippines, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Government refusal of access to conflict zones has made it impossible to document the numbers involved. In 2004 Myanmar was unique in the region as the only country where government armed forces forcibly recruited and used children between the ages of 12 and 16. Johnny and Luther Htoo, twin brothers who jointly led the God's Army guerrilla group, were estimated to have been around ten years old when they began leading the group in 1997. Afghanistan: Militias recruited thousands of child soldiers during the Afghan civil war over three decades. Many are still fighting now for the Taliban. Some of those taken from Islamic religious schools or madrassas, are used as suicide bombers and gunmen. A propaganda video of boys marching in camouflage uniform and using slogans of martyrdom was issued in 2009 by the Afghan Taliban's leadership. This included a eulogy to a 14-year-old Taliban fighter who allegedly killed an American soldier. Azerbaijan: Children can volunteer for military service at 17, with compulsory military service, for men, at 18. Bangladesh: Children can join the Army at 16. (CIA Factbook 2024) Burma/Myanmar: The State Peace and Development Council has asserted that all of its soldiers volunteered and that all of those accepted are 18 or over. According to Human Rights Watch as many as 70,000 boys serve in Burma/Myanmar's national army, the Tatmadaw, with children as young as 11 being forcibly recruited off the streets. Desertion, the group reported, leads to punishments of three to five years in prison or even execution. The group has also stated that about 5,000–7,000 children serve with a range of different armed ethnic opposition groups, most notably in the United Wa State Army. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon released a report in June 2009 mentioning "grave violations" against children in the country by both the rebels and the government. The administration announced on 4 August that they would send a team into Burma/Myanmar to press for more action. India: The minimum age to join the Indian Army is 17 and a half. Iran: Current Iranian law officially prohibits the recruitment of those under 16. During the Iran–Iraq War, male children were drafted into the Basij army where, according to critics of the Iranian government, they "were sent to the front as waves of human shields". Other sources have estimated the total number of all Iranian casualties to be in the 200,000–600,000 range. One source estimates that 3% of the Iran–Iraq War's casualties were under the age of 14. There were male Iranian children who left school and participated in the Iran–Iraq War without the knowledge of their parents, including Mohammad Hossein Fahmideh.

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The administration announced on 4 August that they would send a team into Burma/Myanmar to press for more action. India: The minimum age to join the Indian Army is 17 and a half. Iran: Current Iranian law officially prohibits the recruitment of those under 16. During the Iran–Iraq War, male children were drafted into the Basij army where, according to critics of the Iranian government, they "were sent to the front as waves of human shields". Other sources have estimated the total number of all Iranian casualties to be in the 200,000–600,000 range. One source estimates that 3% of the Iran–Iraq War's casualties were under the age of 14. There were male Iranian children who left school and participated in the Iran–Iraq War without the knowledge of their parents, including Mohammad Hossein Fahmideh. Iraqi officers claimed that they sometimes captured Iranian child soldiers as young as eight years old. As of 2018 the Iranian government has been recruiting children from Iran and Afghanistan to fight in the Syrian Civil War on the side of forces loyal to the Assad government. Israel: Children can volunteer for military service at 17 in Israel. (CIA World Factbook - 2024) Jordan: Children can volunteer for military service at 17 in Jordan. (CIA World Factbook - 2024) Lebanon: Many different sides in the Lebanese Civil War used child soldiers. A May 2008 Child Soldiers International report stated that Hezbollah trains children for military services. In 2017, the UN reported that armed groups, suspected to be Islamist militants, were recruiting children in the country. Nepal: An estimated 6,000–9,000 children serve in the Communist Party of Nepal forces. As of 2010, child soldiers of the CPN have since been demobilized. Pakistan: Children can join the Pakistan Army at 16. (CIA Factbook 2024) Palestine: William O'Brien, a professor of Georgetown University, wrote about the active participation of Palestinian children in the First Intifada: "It appears that a substantial number, if not the majority, of troops of the intifada are young people, including elementary schoolchildren. They are engaged in throwing stones and Molotov cocktails and other forms of violence." Arab journalist Huda Al-Hussein wrote in a London Arab newspaper on 27 October 2000: While UN organizations save child-soldiers, especially in Africa, from the control of militia leaders who hurl them into the furnace of gang-fighting, some Palestinian leaders... consciously issue orders for the purpose of ending their childhood, even if it means their last breath. In 2002 a report by Jihad Shomaly for the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (now Child Soldiers International) said that, "while there are reports of children participating in hostilities, there is no evidence of systematic recruitment by armed groups". In 2004, however, the organisation reported that there were at least nine documented suicide attacks involving Palestinian minors between October 2000 and March 2004, stating: There was no evidence of systematic recruitment of children by Palestinian armed groups. However, children are used as messengers and couriers, and in some cases as fighters and suicide bombers in attacks on Israeli soldiers and civilians. All the main political groups involve children in this way, including Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. In May 2008 a Child Soldiers International report highlighted Hamas and Islamic Jihad for having "used children in military attacks and training" in its Iranian section. On 23 May 2005 Amnesty International reiterated its calls to Palestinian armed groups to put an immediate end to the use of children in armed activities: "Palestinian armed groups must not use children under any circumstances to carry out armed attacks or to transport weapons or other material." There is mounting evidence that Hamas and PIJ operate "summer camps" specifically dedicated to train children to be soldiers, and on occasion uses them for illegal military operations. Philippines: Islamist and communist armed groups fighting the government have routinely relied on child recruits. In 2001 Human Rights Watch reported that an estimated 13 percent of the 10,000 soldiers in the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were children, and that some paramilitary forces linked to the government were also using children. In 2016 the MILF allowed 1,869 children to leave and committed not to recruit children any more. In the same year, however, the UN reported that other armed groups in the Philippines continue to recruit children, mainly between the ages of 13 and 17. Sri Lanka: Militant use of children in Sri Lanka has been an internationally recognized problem since the inception of the Sri Lankan civil war in 1983. The primary recruiters of children are the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Syria: During the ongoing Syrian Civil War children have joined groups opposed to Bashar al Assad. In 2012 the UN received allegations of rebels using child soldiers, but said they were unable to verify these. In June 2014 a United Nations report said that the opposition had recruited children in military and support roles. While there seemed to be no policy of doing so, the report said, there were no age verification procedures. Human Rights Watch reported in 2014 that rebel factions have been using children in support and combatant roles, ranging from treating the wounded on battlefields, ferrying ammunition and other supplies to frontlines while fighting raged, to acting as snipers. The Turkish government linked think tank SETA withdrew a report detailing the composition of the Syrian National Army as it revealed the use of child soldiers. The Syrian National Army is currently funded by Turkey, who signed the optional protocol to the convention on the rights of the child on the involvement of children in armed conflict 8 September 2000. It was reported that Turkey has deployed child soldiers in the Syrian National Army to Libya according to a report by Al-Monitor, citing sources on the ground. In July 2021, the United States of America added Turkey to the list of countries that implicated in the use of child soldiers, because it used them in Syria and Libya. The 2023 Trafficking in Persons Report mentioned that factions of the Turkish backed Syrian National Army recruited and used Syrian children as child soldiers in Libya. The 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices mentioned the recruitment and use of child soldiers from Turkish-supported forces in Syria. The 2021, 2022 and 2023 Trafficking in Persons Reports mentioned that Turkey provided support to armed groups in Syria which recruit and use child soldiers. Kurdish forces have also been accused of using this tactic. In 2015 Human Rights Watch claimed that 59 children, 10 of them under 15 years old, were recruited by or volunteered for the YPG or YPJ since July 2014 when the Kurdish militia leaders signed a Deed of Commitment with Geneva Call. President Assad passed a law in 2013 prohibiting the use of child soldiers (anyone under 18), the breaking of which is punishable by 10–20 years of 'penal labour.' Whether or not the law is actually enforced on government's forces has not been confirmed, and there have been allegations of children being recruited to fight for the Syrian government against rebel forces. Iranian government is recruiting children from Iran and Afghanistan to fight in the Syrian Civil War on the side of the government forces loyal to Assad. Turkey (PKK): During the Kurdish–Turkish conflict, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) has actively recruited and kidnapped children. The organization has been accused of abducting more than 2,000 children by Turkish Security Forces. The independent reports by the Human Rights Watch (HRW), the United Nations (UN) and the Amnesty International have confirmed the recruitment and use of child soldiers by the organization and its armed wings since the 90's. In 2001, it was reported that the recruitment of the children by the organization has been systematic. Several reports have reported about the organization's battalion, called Tabura Zaroken Sehit Agit, which has been formed mainly for the recruitment of children. It was also reported that the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) had recruited children. According to the Turkish Security Forces, the PKK has abducted more than 983 children aged between 12 and 17. More than 400 children have fled from the organization and surrendered to the security forces. The United Nations Children's Fund report, published in 2010, saw the recruitment of the children by the PKK concerning and dangerous. In 2016, the Human Rights Watch, accused the PKK of committing war crimes by recruiting child soldiers in the Shingal region of Iraq and in neighboring countries. Throughout the Syrian Civil War multiple media outlets including Human Rights Watch have confirmed that the YPG, an organization linked to the PKK, has been recruiting and deploying child soldiers. Despite a claim by the group that it would stop using children, which has been violation of international law, the group has continued the recruitment and use of children. In 2018, the annual UN report on children in armed conflict found 224 cases of child recruitment by the People's Defense Units and its women's unit in 2017, an almost fivefold increase from the 2016. Seventy-two of the children, nearly one-third, were girls. The group was also reported to had abducted children to enlist them. Yemen: U.N. Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict Radhika Coomaraswamy stated in January 2010 that "large numbers" of teenage boys are being recruited in Yemeni tribal fighting.

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Throughout the Syrian Civil War multiple media outlets including Human Rights Watch have confirmed that the YPG, an organization linked to the PKK, has been recruiting and deploying child soldiers. Despite a claim by the group that it would stop using children, which has been violation of international law, the group has continued the recruitment and use of children. In 2018, the annual UN report on children in armed conflict found 224 cases of child recruitment by the People's Defense Units and its women's unit in 2017, an almost fivefold increase from the 2016. Seventy-two of the children, nearly one-third, were girls. The group was also reported to had abducted children to enlist them. Yemen: U.N. Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict Radhika Coomaraswamy stated in January 2010 that "large numbers" of teenage boys are being recruited in Yemeni tribal fighting. NGO activist Abdul-Rahman al-Marwani has estimated that as many as 500–600 children are either killed or wounded through tribal combat every year in Yemen. Saudi Arabia hired child soldiers from Sudan (especially from Darfur), and Yemen to fight against Houthis during the Yemeni Civil War (2015–present). British SAS special forces are allegedly involved in training child soldiers in Yemen. Reportedly at least 40% of soldiers fighting for the Saudi-led coalition are children. Saudi Arabia is also hiring Yemeni child soldiers to guard Saudi border against Houthis. In June 2019, Mike Pompeo, the US Secretary of State, blocked the inclusion of Saudi Arabia on the US list of countries that recruit child soldiers, dismissing his experts' findings that a Saudi-led coalition has been using children in Yemen's civil war. Male Children can volunteer for military service at 17 in Saudi Arabia. (CIA World Factbook - 2024) Europe: According to Child Soldiers International the trend in Europe has been towards recruiting only adults from age 18; most states only allow adult recruitment, and as of 2016 no armed groups were known to be using children. As of 2018 one country, the United Kingdom, was enlisting children from age 16, and five were enlisting from age 17 (Austria, Cyprus, France, Germany, and Netherlands). Of these, the UK recruits children in the greatest numbers; in 2016, approximately a quarter of new recruits to the British army were aged under 18. All European states have ratified the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, and so child recruits are not typically used in hostilities until they reach adulthood. Children were used as combatants in the First Chechen War during the 1990s. Austria: Austria invites male children to begin their adult compulsory military service one year early, at age 17, with the consent of their parents. Belarus: AT 17 children can join the military higher education instatutes where they are classified as military personnel. (CIA Factbook 2024) Cyprus: Cyprus invites children to begin their adult compulsory military service two years early, at age 16, with the consent of their parents. France: France enlists military personnel from age 17 and 6 months, and students for military technical school from age 16; 3% of its armed forces' intake is aged under 18. Germany: Germany enlists military personnel from age 17; in 2015 6% of its armed forces' intake was aged under 18. Italy: Children can join the Italian military at age 17. (CIA Factbook 2024) Netherlands: The Netherlands enlists military personnel from age 17; in 2014 5% of its armed forces' intake was aged under 18. Norway: Male children can volunteer to join at 17. (CIA Factbook 2024) Ukraine: During the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine in 2014 Justice for Peace at Donbas documented 41 verified individual cases of child recruitment into armed formations. Of those 37 concerned the participation of children in armed formations on territory occupied by Russia and 4 on territory controlled by Ukraine. There were 31 further reports of child recruitment which could not be verified. Of the 37 verified cases on territory controlled by Russia, 33 were boys and 4 were girls; 57% were aged 16–17, 35% were under 15, and age could not be determined in 8% of cases. In December 2022, Andrii Yusov, a representative of Ukraine's Defence Intelligence, stated 17-year-olds have been drafted by the Russian military in occupied territories. United Kingdom: The British armed forces enlist personnel from age 16 and accept applications from children aged 15 years, 7 months. Parental consent is required prior to enlistment. As of 2022, 23% of enlistees to the British armed forces were aged under 18. Most child recruits were enlisted for the army, where 30% of the intake in the year 2021-2022 was aged under 18; more new soldiers were 16 than any other age. Army recruits aged between 16 and 17.5 train initially at the Army Foundation College, a military training centre dedicated to the age group. As of 2021, the centre is graded 'outstanding' for welfare by the education inspectorate Ofsted, although multiple allegations of abuse at the centre, some proven, are on the army's record. In 2021, nine investigations were opened into sexual offences against 22 girls at the centre; in one investigation, three of the suspected perpetrators were members of staff. The revelations were the subject of a Vice News report in July 2022. As per the OPAC, the UK does not normally send child recruits to participate in hostilities, although it does not rule out doing so. The UK inadvertently deployed 22 personnel aged under 18 to Iraq and Afghanistan between 2003 and 2010. The committee on the Rights of the Child has urged the UK to alter its policy so as to ensure that children cannot take part in hostilities under any circumstances. In negotiations on the OPAC during the 1990s the UK joined the US in opposing a global minimum enlistment age of 18. Children's rights bodies have criticised the UK's continuing reliance on children to staff its armed forces. Oceania: Australia: The Australian Defence Force allows personnel to enlist with parental consent from the age of 16. Personnel under the age of 18 cannot be deployed overseas or used in direct combat except in extreme circumstances where it is not possible to evacuate them. New Zealand: As of 2018, the minimum age for joining the New Zealand Defence Force was 17. Movement to end military use of children: The military use of children has been common throughout history; only in recent decades has the practice met with informed criticism and concerted efforts to end it. Progress has been slow, partly because many armed forces have relied on children to fill their ranks, and partly because the behaviour of non-state armed groups is difficult to influence. Recent history: 1970s–1980s: International efforts to limit children's participation in armed conflict began with the Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, adopted in 1977 (Art. 77.2). The new Protocols prohibited the military recruitment of children aged under 15, but continued to allow state armed forces and non-state armed groups to recruit children from age 15 and use them in warfare. Efforts were renewed during negotiations on the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), when Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) campaigned for the new treaty to outlaw child recruitment entirely. Some states, whose armed forces relied on recruiting below the age of 18, resisted this, so the final treaty text of 1989 only reflected the existing legal standard: the prohibition of the direct participation of children aged under 15 in hostilities. 1990s: In the 1990s NGOs established the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (now Child Soldiers International) to work with sympathetic governments on a campaign for a new treaty to correct the deficiencies they saw in the CRC. After a global campaign lasting six years, the treaty was adopted in 2000 as the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OPAC). The treaty prohibits child conscription, ensures that military recruits are no younger than 16, and forbids the use of child recruits in hostilities. The treaty also forbids non-state armed groups from recruiting anyone under the age of 18 for any purpose. Although most states negotiating OPAC supported a ban on recruiting children, some states, led by the US in alliance with the UK, objected to this. As such, the treaty does not ban the recruitment of children aged 16 or 17, although it allows states to bind themselves to a higher standard in law. 2000s–present: After the adoption of the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, a campaign for global ratification made swift progress. As of 2018 OPAC had been ratified by 167 states. The campaign also successfully encouraged many states not to recruit children at all. In 2001 83 states only allowed adult enlistment. By 2016 this had increased to 126, which is 71 percent of countries with armed forces. Approximately 60 non-state armed groups have also entered agreements to stop or scale back their use of children, often brokered by the UN or the NGO Geneva Call.

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As such, the treaty does not ban the recruitment of children aged 16 or 17, although it allows states to bind themselves to a higher standard in law. 2000s–present: After the adoption of the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, a campaign for global ratification made swift progress. As of 2018 OPAC had been ratified by 167 states. The campaign also successfully encouraged many states not to recruit children at all. In 2001 83 states only allowed adult enlistment. By 2016 this had increased to 126, which is 71 percent of countries with armed forces. Approximately 60 non-state armed groups have also entered agreements to stop or scale back their use of children, often brokered by the UN or the NGO Geneva Call. Child Soldiers International reports that the success of the OPAC treaty, combined with the gradual decline in child recruitment by state armed forces, has led to a reduction of children in military organisations worldwide. As of 2018 the recruitment and use of children remains widespread. In particular, militant Islamist organisations such as ISIS and Boko Haram, as well as armed groups fighting them, have used children extensively. In addition, the three most populous states – China, India and the United States – still allow their armed forces to enlist children aged 16 or 17, as do five of the Group of Seven countries: Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, again. Events: Red Hand Day (also known as the International Day Against the Use of Child Soldiers) on 12 February is an annual commemoration day to draw public attention to the practice of using children as soldiers in wars and armed conflicts. The date reflects the entry into force of the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. Countering the militarisation of childhood: Many states which do not allow their armed forces to recruit children have continued to draw criticism for marketing military life to children through the education system, in civic spaces and in popular entertainment such as films and videogames. Some commentators have argued that this marketing to children is manipulative and part of a military recruitment process and should therefore be evaluated ethically as such. This principle has led some groups to campaign for relations between military organisations and young people to be regulated, on the grounds of children's rights and public health. Examples are the Countering the Militarization of Youth programme of War Resisters' International, the Stop Recruiting Kids campaign in the US, and the Military Out of Schools campaign in the UK. Similar concerns have been raised in Germany and Israel. Rehabilitation and reintegration of child soldiers: Child Soldiers International defines reintegration as: "The process through which children formerly associated with armed forces/groups are supported to return to civilian life and play a valued role in their families and communities" Programs that aim to rehabilitate and reintegrate child soldiers, such as those sponsored by UNICEF, often emphasise three components: family reunification/community network, psychological support, and education/economic opportunity. These efforts take a minimum commitment of 3 to 5 years in order for programs to be successfully implemented. Generally, reintegration efforts seek to return children to a safe environment, to create a sense of forgiveness on the behalf of the child's family and community through religious and cultural ceremonies and rituals, and encourage the reunification of the child with his or her family. Reintegration efforts can become challenging when the child in question has committed war crimes because in these cases stigma and resentment within the community can be exacerbated. In situations such as these, it is important that the child's needs are balanced with a sense of community justice. These situations should be addressed immediately because if not, many children face the threat of re-enlistment. There are also two areas of reintegration that warrant special consideration: female child soldiers and drug use among child soldiers. Child soldiers under the influence of drugs or who have contracted sexually transmitted diseases require additional programmes specific to their needs. See also: General: History of children in the military Children in emergencies and conflicts Children's rights Child slavery Child labour Stress in early childhood Well-known cases of children used for military purposes: Grace Akallo, Ugandan Loung Ung, Cambodian Ishmael Beah, Sierra Leonean Calvin Graham, American Hagdobyeong, Korean Himeyuri students, Japanese Mohammad Hossein Fahmideh, Iranian Omar Khadr, Canadian Luftwaffenhelfer, German Lwów Eaglets, Polish Dominic Ongwen, Ugandan Returned: Child Soldiers of Nepal's Maoist Army (documentary film) Campaigns and campaigners to end the use of children in the military: Child Soldiers International Els de Temmerman Graça Machel Romeo Dallaire War Resisters International (Countering Militarization of Youth programme) Red Hand Day Related crimes against children: Trafficking of children Related international law and standards: Convention on the Rights of the Child Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention International humanitarian law United Nations Security Council Resolution 1998 Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict Free Children from War conference, which established the Paris Principles Documentary film: Kony 2012, documentary film La vita non perde valore (Life does not lose its value), documentary film Further reading: Vautravers, A. J. (2009). Why Child Soldiers are Such a Complex Issue. Refugee Survey Quarterly, 27(4), 96–107. doi:10.1093/rsq/hdp002 Humphreys, Jessica Dee (2015). Child Soldier: When Boys and Girls Are Used in War. Toronto: Kids Can Press ISBN 978-1-77138-126-0 International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) & The Global Center on Cooperative Security (September 2017). "Correcting the Course: Juvenile Justice Principles for Children Convicted of Violent Extremism Offenses", ICCT & GCCS, 1–12. Correcting the Course: Advancing Juvenile Justice Principles for Children Convicted of Violent Extremist Offenses Dr U C Jha (2018), "Child Soldiers – Practice, Law and Remedies". Vij Books India Pvt Ltd ISBN 9789386457523 Artur Bogner, Gabriele Rosenthal (2020): Child Soldiers in Context. Biographies, Familial and Collective Trajectories in Northern Uganda. Göttingen: University Press. Child Soldiers in Context References: External links: Advocacy and campaigns: Human Rights Watch, "Child Soldiers" UNICEF, "Child Soldiers" War Child Watchlist Reference: Child soldiers worldwide: Child Soldiers International, historical reports: Child Soldiers Global Report: 2001 Child Soldiers Global Report: 2004 Louder than words: 2012 Testimony and reportage: "Girl Soldiers – The cost of survival in Northern Uganda Archived 23 May 2012 at the Wayback Machine", womennewsnetwork.net. "Invisible Children—The Tragedy in Uganda, Every Child Ministries", ecmafrica.org "Children of Karamoja" (Uganda), forlife-worldwide.com "Involvement of children in armed formations during the military conflict in Donbas" Archived 11 February 2017 at the Wayback Machine (Ukraine), jfp.org.ua "Sex slavery awaits Ugandan schoolgirls", BBC News "Ugandan army recruiting children", BBC News "Criticism of British child soldier recruitment", BBC News "Armies of girls caught up in conflict", The Guardian "The Child Soldiers of Staten Island", Mother Jones International institutions: International Committee of the Red Cross, "Children in war" Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict International Labour Organization, "Child labour and armed conflict" Other: Podcast on child soldiers in the Middle East

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Circumvallation

Antiquity: Thucydides notes the role circumvallation played in the Sicilian Expedition and in the Spartan siege of Plataea during the initial stages of the Peloponnesian War in 429 BC. Julius Caesar in his Commentaries on the Gallic War describes his textbook use of the circumvallation to defeat the Gauls under their chieftain, Vercingetorix, at the Siege of Alesia in September 52 BC. During the Siege of Jerusalem, Titus and his Roman legions built a circumvallation, cutting down all trees within fifteen kilometres (9 miles). Middle Ages: Another example from the pre-modern period is the Siege of Constantinople (717–718). The caliph of the Umayyad Empire took advantage of the violent anarchy in the Byzantine Empire to prepare a huge host, comprising more than 100,000 troops and 1,800 ships, to take them to the Byzantine capital, Constantinople. Upon arriving outside the city's Theodosian walls, the Arab army had some knowledge that Emperor Leo III the Isaurian had allied with Bulgaria under Khan Tervel, and so, in preparation for the Bulgarian army, built a set of stone walls against the city and against the countryside, with the Arab camp in between. King Pepin the Short of Francia built a number of fortified camps during his Siege of Bourbon (761) to surround the town completely. He built a complete set of lines of circumvallation and contravallation during the Siege of Bourges (762). Modern era: The basic objectives and tactics of a military investment have remained the same in the modern era. During the Second World War, there were many sieges and many investments. One of the best-known sieges of the war, which demonstrated the tactical use of investment, was the Siege of Stalingrad. During the first half of the siege, the Germans were unable to fully encircle the city and so the Soviets got men and supplies in across the Volga River. During the second half of the battle, the complete investment of Stalingrad by the Soviets, including airspace, which prevented the construction by the Germans of an adequately large airbridge, eventually forced the starving Germans in the city to surrender. In modern times, investments and sieges of cities are often combined with intensive shelling, air strikes and extensive use of land and/or sea mines. See also: Encirclement List of established military terms References: Sources: Petersen, Leif Inge Ree (2013). Siege Warfare and Military Organization in the Successor States (400–800 AD): Byzantium, the West and Islam. Leiden: Brill. ISBN 978-90-04-25199-1.

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Class conflict

Usage: When Marxists speak of class struggle, they define a class primarily in economic terms, i.e., by its relationship to the means of production. When anarchists like Bakunin speak of class struggle, they have a broader definition of "social class" which encompasses "notions of domination and privilege" in the political and cultural spheres as well as the economic. Bakunin believed the successful struggle of the dominated classes would achieve a revolution to depose the ruling elites and create a stateless or libertarian socialism, and that a prerequisite for successful revolution is class solidarity. Marx's theory of history asserts that in the history of economic systems such as capitalism and feudalism, class struggle is "the central fact of social evolution." Indeed, the first sentence of Chapter 1 of the Communist Manifesto reads: "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles." Marxists view the struggle's resolution in favor of the working class to be inevitable under plutocratic capitalism. Oligarchs versus commoners in Ancient Greece: Where societies are socially divided based on status, wealth, or control of social production and distribution, class structures arise and are thus coeval with civilization itself. The rise of class structures eventually leads to class conflict. It is a pattern that has repeated since at least European classical antiquity as illustrated in the Conflict of the Orders and the slave revolt led by Spartacus. Thucydides: In his History, Thucydides describes a civil war in the city of Corcyra between the pro-Athens party of the common people and their pro-Corinth oligarchic opposition. Near the climax of the struggle, "the oligarchs in full rout, fearing that the victorious commons might assault and carry the arsenal and put them to the sword, fired the houses round the market-place and the lodging-houses, in order to bar their advance." The historian Tacitus would later recount a similar class conflict in the city of Seleucia, in which disharmony between the oligarchs and the commoners would typically lead to each side calling on outside help to defeat the other. Thucydides believed that "as long as poverty gives men the courage of necessity, [...] so long will the impulse never be wanting to drive men into danger." Aristotle: In the Politics, Aristotle describes the basic dimensions of class conflict: "Again, because the rich are generally few in number, while the poor are many, they appear to be antagonistic, and as the one or the other prevails they form the government.". Aristotle also commented that "poverty is the parent of revolution", but did not consider poverty to be the only cause of revolution. In a society where property is distributed equally throughout the community, "the nobles will be dissatisfied, because they think themselves worthy of more than an equal share of honors; and this is often found to be a cause of sedition and revolution." Moreover, Aristotle said that it was wrong for the poor to seize the wealth of the rich and divide it among themselves, but he said that it is wrong for the rich to impoverish the multitude. Moreover, Aristotle further discussed a middle way, between laxity and cruelty, in the treatment of slaves by their masters, averring that "if not kept in hand, [slaves] are insolent, and think that they are as good as their masters, and, if harshly treated, they hate and conspire against them." Socrates: Socrates was the first Greek philosopher to describe class conflict. In the Republic, by Plato, Socrates said that "any city, however small, is in fact divided into two, one the city of the poor, the other [the city] of the rich; these [cities] are at war with one another." Socrates disapproved of oligarchies, in which members of a small class of wealthy property owners take positions of political power in order to dominate the large social class of impoverished commoners; and used the analogy of a maritime pilot, who, like the power-holder in a polis, ought to be chosen for political office for his skill, not for the amount of property he owns. Plutarch: The historian Plutarch recounts how the Greek people participated in the class conflict between the aristocrats and the common folk. Financially oppressed by their indebtedness to the aristocrats, the mass of Athenians chose Solon to be the lawgiver to lead them to freedom from their creditors. The philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel said that Solon's constitution of the Athenian popular assembly created a political sphere that balanced the competing socio-economic interests of the social classes of Athens: The wealthy aristocratic party of the plain The poor common party of the mountains The moderate party of the coast Participating in a war among the social classes of Ancient Greece was a dangerous political endeavour. In his book Parallel Lives, Plutarch wrote of two Spartan kings, Agis and Cleomenes, who "being desirous to raise the people, and to restore the noble and just form of government, now long fallen into disuse, [they] incurred the hatred of the rich and powerful, who could not endure to be deprived of the selfish enjoyment to which they were accustomed." Patricians versus plebeians in Ancient Rome: It was similarly difficult for the Romans to maintain peace between the upper class, the patricians, and the lower class, the plebs. French Enlightenment philosopher Montesquieu notes that this conflict intensified after the overthrow of the Roman monarchy. In The Spirit of Laws he lists the four main grievances of the plebs, which were rectified in the years following the deposition of King Tarquin: The patricians had much too easy access to positions of public service. The constitution granted the consuls far too much power. The plebs were constantly verbally slighted. The plebs had too little power in their assemblies. Camillus: The Senate had the ability to give a magistrate the power of dictatorship, meaning he could bypass public law in the pursuit of a prescribed mandate. Montesquieu explains that the purpose of this institution was to tilt the balance of power in favour of the patricians. However, in an attempt to resolve a conflict between the patricians and the plebs, the dictator Camillus used his power of dictatorship to coerce the Senate into giving the plebs the right to choose one of the two consuls. Marius: Tacitus believed that the increase in Roman power spurred the patricians to expand their power over more and more cities. This process, he felt, exacerbated pre-existing class tensions with the plebs, and eventually culminated in a civil war between the patrician Sulla and the populist reformer Marius. Marius had taken the step of enlisting capite censi, the very lowest class of citizens, into the army, for the first time allowing non-land owners into the legions. Tiberius Gracchus: Of all the notable figures discussed by Plutarch and Tacitus, agrarian reformer Tiberius Gracchus may have most challenged the upper classes and most championed the cause of the lower classes. In a speech to the common soldiery, he decried their lowly conditions: "The savage beasts," said he, "in Italy, have their particular dens, they have their places of repose and refuge; but the men who bear arms, and expose their lives for the safety of their country, enjoy in the meantime nothing more in it but the air and light; and having no houses or settlements of their own, are constrained to wander from place to place with their wives and children." Following this observation, he remarked that these men "fought indeed and were slain, but it was to maintain the luxury and the wealth of other men." Cicero believed that Tiberius Gracchus's reforming efforts saved Rome from tyranny, arguing: Tiberius Gracchus (says Cicero) caused the free-men to be admitted into the tribes, not by the force of his eloquence, but by a word, by a gesture; which had he not effected, the republic, whose drooping head we are at present scarce able to uphold, would not even exist. Tiberius Gracchus weakened the power of the Senate by changing the law so that judges were chosen from the ranks of the knights, instead of their social superiors in the senatorial class. Julius Caesar: Contrary to Shakespeare's depiction of Julius Caesar in the tragedy Julius Caesar, historian Michael Parenti has argued that Caesar was a populist, not a tyrant. In 2003 The New Press published Parenti's The Assassination of Julius Caesar: A People's History of Ancient Rome. Publishers Weekly said "Parenti [...] narrates a provocative history of the late republic in Rome (100–33 BC) to demonstrate that Caesar's death was the culmination of growing class conflict, economic disparity and political corruption." Kirkus Reviews wrote: "Populist historian Parenti... views ancient Rome's most famous assassination not as a tyrannicide but as a sanguinary scene in the never-ending drama of class warfare." Coriolanus: The patrician Coriolanus, whose life William Shakespeare would later depict in the tragic play Coriolanus, fought on the other side of the class war, for the patricians and against the plebs. When grain arrived to relieve a serious shortage in the city of Rome, the plebs made it known that they felt it ought to be divided amongst them as a gift, but Coriolanus stood up in the Senate against this idea on the grounds that it would empower the plebs at the expense of the patricians.

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Kirkus Reviews wrote: "Populist historian Parenti... views ancient Rome's most famous assassination not as a tyrannicide but as a sanguinary scene in the never-ending drama of class warfare." Coriolanus: The patrician Coriolanus, whose life William Shakespeare would later depict in the tragic play Coriolanus, fought on the other side of the class war, for the patricians and against the plebs. When grain arrived to relieve a serious shortage in the city of Rome, the plebs made it known that they felt it ought to be divided amongst them as a gift, but Coriolanus stood up in the Senate against this idea on the grounds that it would empower the plebs at the expense of the patricians. This decision would eventually contribute to Coriolanus's undoing when he was impeached following a trial by the tribunes of the plebs. Montesquieu recounts how Coriolanus castigated the tribunes for trying a patrician, when in his mind no one but a consul had that right, although a law had been passed stipulating that all appeals affecting the life of a citizen had to be brought before the plebs. In the first scene of Shakespeare's Coriolanus, a crowd of angry plebs gathers in Rome to denounce Coriolanus as the "chief enemy to the people" and "a very dog to the commonalty" while the leader of the mob speaks out against the patricians thusly: They ne'er cared for us yet: suffer us to famish, and their store-houses crammed with grain; make edicts for usury, to support usurers; repeal daily any wholesome act established against the rich, and provide more piercing statutes daily, to chain up and restrain the poor. If the wars eat us not up, they will; and there's all the love they bear us. Landlessness and debt: Enlightenment-era historian Edward Gibbon might have agreed with this narrative of Roman class conflict. In the third volume of The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, he relates the origins of the struggle:[T]he plebeians of Rome [...] had been oppressed from the earliest times by the weight of debt and usury; and the husbandman, during the term of his military service, was obliged to abandon the cultivation of his farm. The lands of Italy which had been originally divided among the families of free and indigent proprietors, were insensibly purchased or usurped by the avarice of the nobles; and in the age which preceded the fall of the republic, it was computed that only two thousand citizens were possessed of an independent substance. Hegel similarly states that the 'severity of the patricians their creditors, the debts due to whom they had to discharge by slave-work, drove the plebs to revolts.' Gibbon also explains how Augustus facilitated this class conflict by pacifying the plebs with actual bread and circuses. The economist Adam Smith noted that the poor freeman's lack of land provided a major impetus for Roman colonisation, as a way to relieve class tensions at home between the rich and the landless poor. Hegel described the same phenomenon happening in the impetus to Greek colonisation. Enlightenment era: Writing in pre-capitalist Europe, the Swiss philosophe Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Federalist statesman James Madison across the Atlantic Ocean made significant remarks on the dynamics of class struggle. Later, German idealist Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel would also contribute his perspective to the discussion around class conflict between employers and employees. Jean-Jacques Rousseau: It was with bitter sarcasm that Rousseau outlined the class conflict prevailing in his day between masters and their workmen: You have need of me, because I am rich and you are poor. We will therefore come to an agreement. I will permit you to have the honour of serving me, on condition that you bestow on me the little you have left, in return for the pains I shall take to command you. Rousseau argued that the most important task of any government is to fight in class warfare on the side of workmen against their masters, who he said engage in exploitation under the pretence of serving society. Specifically, he believed that governments should actively intervene in the economy to abolish poverty and prevent the accrual of too much wealth in the hands of too few men. Thomas Jefferson: Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826) led the U.S. as president from 1801 to 1809 and is considered one of America's Founding Fathers. Regarding the interaction between social classes, he wrote: I am convinced that those societies (as the Indians) which live without government enjoy in their general mass an infinitely greater degree of happiness than those who live under the European governments. Among the former, public opinion is in the place of law, & restrains morals as powerfully as laws ever did anywhere. Among the latter, under pretence of governing they have divided their nations into two classes, wolves & sheep. I do not exaggerate. This is a true picture of Europe. Cherish therefore the spirit of our people, and keep alive their attention. Do not be too severe upon their errors, but reclaim them by enlightening them. If once they become inattentive to the public affairs, you & I, & Congress & Assemblies, judges & governors shall all become wolves. It seems to be the law of our general nature, in spite of individual exceptions; and experience declares that man is the only animal which devours his own kind, for I can apply no milder term to the governments of Europe, and to the general prey of the rich on the poor. James Madison: In his Federalist No. 10, James Madison revealed an emphatic concern with the conflict between rich and poor, commenting that "the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination." He welcomed class-based factions into political life as a necessary result of political liberty, stating that the most important task of government was to manage and adjust for 'the spirit of party'. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: In his Philosophy of Right, Hegel expressed concern that the standard of living of the poor might drop so far as to make it even easier for the rich to amass even more wealth. Hegel believed that, especially in a liberal country such as contemporary England, the poorest will politicise their situation, channelling their frustrations against the rich:Against nature man can claim no right, but once society is established, poverty immediately takes the form of a wrong done to one class by another. Capitalist societies: Class conflict is most commonly described as occurring within capitalist societies. The conflict manifests itself as clashes between the capitalist class and working class, and takes the form of disputes over hours of work, amount paid in wages, division of profits, culture in the workplace, cost of consumer goods, cost of rent, control over parliament or government bureaucracy, and economic inequality. Even a seemingly benign humanitarian program such as government-provided disaster relief can exacerbate class conflict if the relief is seen as being unequally distributed depending on the recipient's class. Adam Smith: Inequality in the distribution of wealth: Like Rousseau, the classical liberal Adam Smith believed that the amassing of property in the hands of a minority naturally resulted in a disharmonious state of affairs. He said that "avarice and ambition in the rich, in the poor the hatred of labour and the love of present ease and enjoyment, are the passions which prompt to invade property", requiring a government to protect property rights:Wherever there is a great property, there is great inequality. For one very rich man, there must be at least five hundred poor, and the affluence of the few supposes the indigence of the many. The affluence of the rich excites the indignation of the poor, who are often both driven by want, and prompted by envy to invade his possessions. It is only under the shelter of the civil magistrate, that the owner of that valuable property, which is acquired by the labour of many years, or perhaps of many successive generations, can sleep a single night in security. He is at all times surrounded by unknown enemies, whom, though he never provoked, he can never appease, and from whose injustice he can be protected only by the powerful arm of the civil magistrate, continually held up to chastise it.Writing The Wealth of Nations, Smith's concern was the welfare of the ordinary workers who make up society and provide for it:No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members are poor and miserable. It is but equity, besides, that they who feed, clothe, and lodge the whole body of the people, should have such a share of the produce of their own labour as to be themselves tolerably well fed, clothed, and lodged. Regarding the extravagant consumption of the aristocracy, he remarked that:All for ourselves, and nothing for other people, seems, in every age of the world, to have been the vile maxim of the masters of mankind.

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He is at all times surrounded by unknown enemies, whom, though he never provoked, he can never appease, and from whose injustice he can be protected only by the powerful arm of the civil magistrate, continually held up to chastise it.Writing The Wealth of Nations, Smith's concern was the welfare of the ordinary workers who make up society and provide for it:No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members are poor and miserable. It is but equity, besides, that they who feed, clothe, and lodge the whole body of the people, should have such a share of the produce of their own labour as to be themselves tolerably well fed, clothed, and lodged. Regarding the extravagant consumption of the aristocracy, he remarked that:All for ourselves, and nothing for other people, seems, in every age of the world, to have been the vile maxim of the masters of mankind. Violence against commoners by feudal lords: In the third book of The Wealth of Nations, Smith explains that in the medieval period, after the fall of the Roman Empire, governments were unable to protect commoners, and their property, from the "violence of the great lords":In order to understand this, it must be remembered, that, in those days, the sovereign of perhaps no country in Europe was able to protect, through the whole extent of his dominions, the weaker part of his subjects from the oppression of the great lords. Those whom the law could not protect, and who were not strong enough to defend themselves, were obliged either to have recourse to the protection of some great lord, and in order to obtain it, to become either his slaves or vassals; or to enter into a league of mutual defence for the common protection of one another. The inhabitants of cities and burghs, considered as single individuals, had no power to defend themselves; but by entering into a league of mutual defence with their neighbours, they were capable of making no contemptible resistance.Residents of the cities were able to establish their freedom and security of property long before those of the country, which enabled a gradual increase in their prosperity:Order and good government, and along with them the liberty and security of individuals, were in this manner established in cities, at a time when the occupiers of land in the country, were exposed to every sort of violence. But men in this defenceless state naturally content themselves with their necessary subsistence; because, to acquire more, might only tempt the injustice of their oppressors. On the contrary, when they are secure of enjoying the fruits of their industry, they naturally exert it to better their condition, and to acquire not only the necessaries, but the conveniencies and elegancies of life. Distribution of incomes into wages, profit and rent: In Book I Chapter 6, Smith explained how income is distributed between workers and their employers:The value which the workmen add to the materials, therefore, resolves itself in this case into two parts, of which the one pays their wages, the other the profits of their employer upon the whole stock of materials and wages which he advanced. He could have no interest to employ them, unless he expected from the sale of their work something more than what was sufficient to replace his stock to him; and he could have no interest to employ a great stock rather than a small one, unless his profits were to bear some proportion to the extent of his stock.Smith said that while a worker is paid wages in proportion to their "dexterity and ingenuity", as well as for "superior hardship and superior skill", this is not the case for the profit of their employers: The profits of stock [capital], it may perhaps be thought, are only a different name for the wages of a particular sort of labour, the labour of inspection and direction. They are, however, altogether different, are regulated by quite different principles, and bear no proportion to the quantity, the hardship, or the ingenuity of this supposed labour of inspection and direction.He added that the work of management is often performed by other employees, rather than the business owner themselves:In many great works, almost the whole labour of this kind is committed to some principal clerk. His wages properly express the value of this labour of inspection and direction. Though in settling them some regard is had commonly, not only to his labour and skill, but to the trust which is reposed in him, yet they never bear any regular proportion to the capital of which he oversees the management; and the owner of this capital, though he is thus discharged of almost all labour, still expects that his profit should bear a regular proportion to his capital.In Chapter 9, Smith notes that: "The increase of stock, which raises wages, tends to lower profit. When the stocks of many rich merchants are turned into the same trade, their mutual competition naturally tends to lower its profit". He says that "high profits tend much more to raise the price of work than high wages", because "the rise of wages operates in the same manner as simple interest", while "the rise of profit operates like compound interest". He concludes the chapter:Our merchants and master manufacturers complain much of the bad effects of high wages in raising the price [of commodities], and thereby lessening the sale of their goods, both at home and abroad. They say nothing concerning the bad effects of high profits; they are silent with regard to the pernicious effects of their own gains; they complain only of those of other people. Wage negotiations and trade unions: Concerning wages, he explained the conflicting class interests between the owners of capital and workers, who he said were often compelled to form trade unions for fear of suffering starvation wages, as follows:What are the common wages of labour, depends everywhere upon the contract usually made between those two parties, whose interests are by no means the same. The workmen desire to get as much, the masters to give as little, as possible. The former are disposed to combine in order to raise, the latter in order to lower, the wages of labour. It is not, however, difficult to foresee which of the two parties must, upon all ordinary occasions, have the advantage in the dispute, and force the other into a compliance with their terms. The masters, being fewer in number, can combine much more easily: and the law, besides, authorises, or at least does not prohibit, their combinations, while it prohibits those of the workmen. We have no acts of parliament against combining to lower the price of work, but many against combining to raise it. Smith was aware of the main advantage of employers over workers, in addition to state protection:In all such disputes, the masters can hold out much longer. A landlord, a farmer, a master manufacturer, or merchant, though they did not employ a single workman, could generally live a year or two upon the stocks, which they have already acquired. Many workmen could not subsist a week, few could subsist a month, and scarce any a year, without employment. In the long run, the workman may be as necessary to his master as his master is to him; but the necessity is not so immediate. Conflict between classes: Smith observed that, outside of colonies where land is cheap and labour expensive, both the masters who subsist by profit and the masters who subsist by rents will work in tandem to subjugate the class of workmen, who subsist by wages. Moreover, he warned against blindly legislating in favour of the class of merchants and manufacturers who subsist by profit, since, as he said, their intention is to gain as large a share of their respective markets as possible, which naturally results in monopoly prices or close to them, a situation harmful to the other social classes. In the conclusion of the first book of The Wealth of Nations, Smith assessed the knowledge and interests of capitalists in comparison to that of the landed aristocracy:Merchants and master manufacturers are, in this order [those who live by profit], the two classes of people who commonly employ the largest capitals, and who by their wealth draw to themselves the greatest share of the public consideration. As during their whole lives they are engaged in plans and projects, they have frequently more acuteness of understanding than the greater part of country gentlemen. As their thoughts, however, are commonly exercised rather about the interest of their own particular branch of business than about that of the society, their judgment, even when given with the greatest candour (which it has not been upon every occasion), is much more to be depended upon with regard to the former of those two objects, than with regard to the latter. Their superiority over the country gentleman is, not so much in their knowledge of the public interest, as in their having a better knowledge of their own interest than he has of his. It is by this superior knowledge of their own interest that they have frequently imposed upon his generosity, and persuaded him to give up both his own interest and that of the public, from a very simple but honest conviction, that their interest, and not his, was the interest of the public.In the final words of the first book, he suggested how the public should consider the political agenda of this class:The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this order, ought always to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having been long and carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention. It comes from an order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public, who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it.

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It is by this superior knowledge of their own interest that they have frequently imposed upon his generosity, and persuaded him to give up both his own interest and that of the public, from a very simple but honest conviction, that their interest, and not his, was the interest of the public.In the final words of the first book, he suggested how the public should consider the political agenda of this class:The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this order, ought always to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having been long and carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention. It comes from an order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public, who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it. Karl Marx: Karl Marx (1818–1883) was a German born philosopher who lived the majority of his adult life in London, England. In The Communist Manifesto, Karl Marx argued that a class is formed due to changes in the mode of production. Members of a class may become aware of their position within it, achieving what is known as class consciousness. For the working classes this happens when their members become aware of their exploitation at the hands of the ruling class. According to Marx, the working class then takes action against the ruling class, and vice versa. What Marx points out is that members of each of the two main classes have interests in common. These class or collective interests are in conflict with those of the other class as a whole. This in turn leads to conflict between individual members of different classes. Marxist analysis of society identifies two main social groups: Labour (the proletariat or workers) includes anyone who earns their livelihood by selling their labor power and being paid a wage or salary for their labor time. They have little choice but to work for capital, since they typically have no independent way to survive. Capital (the bourgeoisie or capitalists) includes anyone who gets their income not from labor as much as from the surplus value they appropriate from the workers who create wealth. The income of the capitalists, therefore, is based on their exploitation of the workers (proletariat). Not all class struggle is radical, violent or aggressive, as in the case of strikes, lockouts and workplace sabotage. Class antagonism can also surface in minor acts of pilferage, low worker morale, and individual worker resistance to petty authority and hoarding of information. On the employers' side, lobbying for anti-union laws and against minimum wage increases, and hiring union-busting legal firms are expressions of class antagonism. On a larger scale, workers engage in class struggle when they agitate for systemic change via socialist or populist parties. But not every instance of class struggle from below constitutes a grave threat to capitalism, or even to the authority of an individual capitalist. A narrow struggle for higher wages by a small sector of the working class, what is often called "economism", hardly threatens the status quo. In fact, by applying the craft-union tactics of excluding other workers from skilled trades, an economistic struggle may even weaken the working class as a whole by dividing it. Class struggle becomes more important in the historical process as it becomes more general, as industries are organized rather than crafts, as workers' class consciousness rises, and as they self-organize away from political parties. Marx referred to this as the progress of the proletariat from being a class "in itself", a position in the social structure, to being one "for itself", an active and conscious force that could change the world. Marx focuses on the capital industrialist society as the source of social stratification, which ultimately results in class conflict. He states that capitalism creates a division between classes which can most clearly be seen in factories. The proletariat is separated from the bourgeoisie because production becomes a social enterprise. Contributing to their separation is the technology that is in factories. Technological advances de-skill and alienate workers as they are no longer viewed as having a specialized skill. Another effect of technology is a homogenous workforce that can be easily replaceable. Marx believed that this class conflict would result in the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and that the private property would be communally owned. The mode of production would remain, but communal ownership would eliminate class conflict. Even after a revolution, the two classes would struggle, but eventually the struggle would recede and the classes dissolve. As class boundaries broke down, the state apparatus would wither away. According to Marx, the main task of any state apparatus is to uphold the power of the ruling class; but without any classes there would be no need for a state. That would lead to the classless, stateless communist society. John Stuart Mill: Adam Smith was not the only classical liberal political economist concerned with class conflict. In his Considerations on Representative Government, John Stuart Mill observed the complete marginalisation of workmen's voices in Parliament, rhetorically asking whether its members ever empathise with the position of workmen, instead of siding entirely with their masters, on issues such as the right to go on strike. Later in the book, he argues that an important function of truly representative government is to provide a relatively equal balance of power between workmen and masters, in order to prevent threats to the good of the whole of society. During Mill's discussion of the merits of progressive taxation in his essay Utilitarianism, he notes as an aside the power of the rich as independent of state support:People feel obliged to argue that the State does more for the rich than for the poor, as a justification for its taking more [in taxation] from them: though this is in reality not true, for the rich would be far better able to protect themselves, in the absence of law or government, than the poor, and indeed would probably be successful in converting the poor into their slaves. Max Weber: Max Weber (1864–1920) agreed with the fundamental ideas of Karl Marx about the economy causing class conflict, but claimed that class conflict can also stem from prestige and power. Weber argued that classes come from the different property locations. Different locations can largely affect one's class by their education and the people they associate with. He also stated that prestige results in different status groupings. This prestige is based upon the social status of one's parents. Prestige is an attributed value and many times cannot be changed. Weber stated that power differences led to the formation of political parties. Weber disagreed with Marx about the formation of classes. While Marx believed that groups are similar due to their economic status, Weber argued that classes are largely formed by social status. Weber did not believe that communities are formed by economic standing, but by similar social prestige. Weber did recognize that there is a relationship between social status, social prestige and classes. Charles Comte and Charles Dunoyer: Charles Comte and Charles Dunoyer argued that class struggle came from factions that managed to gain control of the state power. The ruling class are the groups that seize the power of the state to carry out their political agenda, the ruled are then taxed and regulated by the state for the benefit of the ruling classes. Through taxation, state power, subsidies, tax codes, laws, and privileges the state creates class conflict by giving preferential treatment to some at the expense of others by force. In the free market, by contrast, exchanges are not carried out by force but by the non-aggression principle of cooperation in a win-win scenario. Other perspectives: One of the first writers to comment on class struggle in the modern sense of the term was the French revolutionary François Boissel. Other class struggle commentators include Henri de Saint-Simon, Augustin Thierry, François Guizot, François-Auguste Mignet and Adolphe Thiers. The Physiocrats, David Ricardo, and after Marx, Henry George noted the inelastic supply of land and argued that this created certain privileges (economic rent) for landowners. According to the historian Arnold J. Toynbee, stratification along lines of class appears only within civilizations, and furthermore only appears during the process of a civilization's decline while not characterizing the growth phase of a civilization. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, in What is Property? (1840) states that "certain classes do not relish investigation into the pretended titles to property, and its fabulous and perhaps scandalous history." While Proudhon saw the solution as the lower classes forming an alternative, solidarity economy centered on cooperatives and self-managed workplaces, which would slowly undermine and replace capitalist class society, the anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, while influenced by Proudhon, insisted that a massive class struggle by the working class, peasantry and poor was essential to the creation of libertarian socialism. This would require a final showdown in the form of a social revolution. One of the earliest analyses of the development of class as the development of conflicts between emergent classes is available in Peter Kropotkin's Mutual Aid. In this work, Kropotkin analyzes the disposal of goods after death in pre-class or hunter-gatherer societies, and how inheritance produces early class divisions and conflict. Fascists have often opposed 'horizontal' class struggle in favour of vertical national struggle and instead have attempted to appeal to the working class while promising to preserve the existing social classes and have proposed an alternative concept known as class collaboration. Twentieth and twenty-first centuries: Soviet Union and similar societies: A variety of thinkers, mostly Trotskyist and anarchist, argue that class conflict existed in Soviet-style societies.

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Class conflict

This would require a final showdown in the form of a social revolution. One of the earliest analyses of the development of class as the development of conflicts between emergent classes is available in Peter Kropotkin's Mutual Aid. In this work, Kropotkin analyzes the disposal of goods after death in pre-class or hunter-gatherer societies, and how inheritance produces early class divisions and conflict. Fascists have often opposed 'horizontal' class struggle in favour of vertical national struggle and instead have attempted to appeal to the working class while promising to preserve the existing social classes and have proposed an alternative concept known as class collaboration. Twentieth and twenty-first centuries: Soviet Union and similar societies: A variety of thinkers, mostly Trotskyist and anarchist, argue that class conflict existed in Soviet-style societies. Their arguments describe as a class the bureaucratic stratum formed by the ruling political party (known as the nomenklatura in the Soviet Union), sometimes termed a "new class", that controls and guides the means of production. This ruling class is viewed to be in opposition to the remainder of society, generally considered the proletariat. This type of system is referred by them as state socialism, state capitalism, bureaucratic collectivism or new class societies. Marxism was already a powerful ideological power in Russia before the Soviet Union was created in 1917, since a Marxist group known as the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party existed. This party soon divided into two main factions; the Bolsheviks, who were led by Vladimir Lenin, and the Mensheviks, who were led by Julius Martov. However, many Marxists argue that unlike in capitalism, the Soviet elites did not own the means of production, or generate surplus value for their personal wealth as the generated profit from the economy was equally distributed into Soviet society. Even some Trotskyists like Ernest Mandel criticized the concept of a new ruling class as an oxymoron, saying: "The hypothesis of the bureaucracy's being a new ruling class leads to the conclusion that, for the first time in history, we are confronted with a 'ruling class' which does not exist as a class before it actually rules." United States: Class conflict was present in the earliest days of the U.S. with the struggles between slaveowners and slaves. Since the abolition of slavery, class conflict is more often noted in labor-management disputes. As far back as 1933, representative Edward Hamilton of the Airline Pilot's Association used the term "class warfare" to describe airline management's opposition at the National Labor Board hearings in October of that year. Apart from day-to-day forms of class conflict, there are also periods of crisis or revolution when class conflict takes on a violent nature and involves repression, assault, restriction of civil liberties, and assassinations or death squads. The investor, billionaire, and philanthropist Warren Buffett, one of the wealthiest people in the world, voiced in 2005 and once more in 2006 his view that his class, the "rich class", is waging class warfare on the rest of society. In 2005 Buffet said to CNN: "It's class warfare, my class is winning, but they shouldn't be." In a November 2006 interview in The New York Times, Buffett stated that "[t]here’s class warfare all right, but it’s my class, the rich class, that’s making war, and we’re winning." Noam Chomsky, American linguist, philosopher, and political activist, has spoken out on the topic of class conflict in the United States: Well, there’s always a class war going on. The United States, to an unusual extent, is a business-run society, more so than others. The business classes are very class-conscious – they’re constantly fighting a bitter class war to improve their power and diminish opposition. Occasionally this is recognized... The enormous benefits given to the very wealthy, the privileges for the very wealthy here, are way beyond those of other comparable societies and are part of the ongoing class war. Take a look at CEO salaries.... Post-financial crisis: Class conflict intensified in the period after the 2007/8 financial crisis, which led to a global wave of anti-austerity protests, including the Greek and Spanish Indignados movements and later the Occupy movement, whose slogan was "We are the 99%", signalling a more expansive class antagonist against the financial elite than that of the classical Marxist proletariat. In the speech "The Great American Class War" (2013), the journalist Bill Moyers asserted the existence of social-class conflict between democracy and plutocracy in the U.S. Chris Hedges wrote a column for Truthdig called "Let's Get This Class War Started", which was a play on Pink's song "Let's Get This Party Started." In a 2022 piece "America's New Class War", Hedges argues that increased class struggle and strikes by organized workers, often in defiance of union leadership, is the "one last hope for the United States." Historian Steve Fraser, author of The Age of Acquiescence: The Life and Death of American Resistance to Organized Wealth and Power, asserted in 2014 that class conflict is an inevitability if current political and economic conditions continue, noting that "people are increasingly fed up [...] their voices are not being heard. And I think that can only go on for so long without there being more and more outbreaks of what used to be called class struggle, class warfare." Arab Spring: Often seen as part of the same "movement of squares" as the Indignado and Occupy movements, the Arab Spring was a wave of social protests starting in 2011. Numerous factors have culminated in the Arab Spring, including rejection of dictatorship or absolute monarchy, human rights violations, government corruption (demonstrated by Wikileaks diplomatic cables), economic decline, unemployment, extreme poverty, and a number of demographic structural factors, such as a large percentage of educated but dissatisfied youth within the population. but class conflict is also a key factor. The catalysts for the revolts in all Northern African and Persian Gulf countries have been the concentration of wealth in the hands of autocrats in power for decades, insufficient transparency of its redistribution, corruption, and especially the refusal of the youth to accept the status quo. Relationship to race: Some historical tendencies of Orthodox Marxism reject racism, sexism, etc. as struggles that essentially distract from class struggle, the real conflict. These divisions within the class prevent the purported antagonists from acting in their common class interest. However, many Marxist internationalists and anti-colonial revolutionaries believe that sex, race and class are bound up together. Within Marxist scholarship there is an ongoing debate about these topics. According to Michel Foucault, in the 19th century, the essentialist notion of the "race" was incorporated by racists, biologists, and eugenicists, who gave it the modern sense of "biological race" which was then integrated into "state racism". On the other hand, Foucault claims that when Marxists developed their concept of "class struggle", they were partly inspired by the older, non-biological notions of the "race" and the "race struggle". Quoting a non-existent 1882 letter from Marx to Friedrich Engels during a lecture, Foucault erroneously claimed Marx wrote: "You know very well where we found our idea of class struggle; we found it in the work of the French historians who talked about the race struggle." For Foucault, the theme of social war provides the overriding principle that connects class and race struggle. Moses Hess, an important theoretician and labor Zionist of the early socialist movement, in his "Epilogue" to "Rome and Jerusalem" argued that "the race struggle is primary, the class struggle secondary. [...] With the cessation of race antagonism, the class struggle will also come to a standstill. The equalization of all classes of society will necessarily follow the emancipation of all the races, for it will ultimately become a scientific question of social economics." W. E. B. Du Bois theorized that the intersectional paradigms of race, class, and nation might explain certain aspects of black political economy. Patricia Hill Collins writes: "Du Bois saw race, class, and nation not primarily as personal identity categories but as social hierarchies that shaped African-American access to status, poverty, and power.": 44  In modern times, emerging schools of thought in the U.S. and other countries hold the opposite to be true. They argue that the race struggle is less important, because the primary struggle is that of class since labor of all races face the same problems and injustices. Chronology: Nationalist movements are not included. See also: Class collaboration Class consciousness Classism Critique of political economy Criticism of capitalism Critique of work Economic stratification Master-slave dialectic References: Further reading: Abidor, Mitchell, ed. (2016). Death to Bourgeois Society: The Propagandists of the Deed. PM Press. ISBN 978-1629631127. Adamic, Louis (1934). Dynamite: The Story of Class Violence in America (Revised ed.). Antell, Gerson; Harris, Walter (2007). Economics For Everybody. Amsco School Publications. ISBN 978-1-56765-640-4. Dahrendorf, Ralf (1959). Class & Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford University Press. ISBN 0804705615.

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Class conflict

Chronology: Nationalist movements are not included. See also: Class collaboration Class consciousness Classism Critique of political economy Criticism of capitalism Critique of work Economic stratification Master-slave dialectic References: Further reading: Abidor, Mitchell, ed. (2016). Death to Bourgeois Society: The Propagandists of the Deed. PM Press. ISBN 978-1629631127. Adamic, Louis (1934). Dynamite: The Story of Class Violence in America (Revised ed.). Antell, Gerson; Harris, Walter (2007). Economics For Everybody. Amsco School Publications. ISBN 978-1-56765-640-4. Dahrendorf, Ralf (1959). Class & Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford University Press. ISBN 0804705615. (also available in hardback as ISBN 0804705607, 1131155734). Faux, Jeff (2006). The Global Class War: How America's Bipartisan Elite Lost Our Future and What It Will Take to Win It Back. John Wiley and Sons. ISBN 978-0471697619. Klein, Matthew C.; Pettis, Michael (2020). Trade Wars Are Class Wars: How Rising Inequality Distorts the Global Economy and Threatens International Peace. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0300244175. Li Yi (2005). The Structure and Evolution of Chinese Social Stratification. University Press of America. ISBN 978-0-7618-3331-4. Maavak, Mathew (December 2012). "Class Warfare, Anarchy and the Future Society" (PDF). Journal of Futures Studies. 17 (2): 15–36. SSRN 2226762. Ness, Immanuel, ed. (2009). The International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest: 1500 to the Present. Malden, MA: Wiley & Sons. Ness, Immanuel (2014). New Forms of Worker Organization: The Syndicalist and Autonomist Restoration of Class-Struggle Unionism. PM Press. ISBN 978-1604869569. Archived from the original on 29 March 2019. Retrieved 2 August 2018. Tranjan, Ricardo (2023). The Tenant Class. Between the Lines. ISBN 978-1771136228. Vasudevan, Ramaa (2019). "The Global Class War". Catalyst. 3 (1): 110–139. Zeilig, Leo, ed. (2002). Class Struggle and Resistance in Africa. New Clarion Press. External links: 2008-2010 Study: CEOs Who Fired Most Workers Earned Highest Pay – video report by Democracy Now! How a Real Class War, Like with Guns, Could Actually Happen. Vice, 26 November 2018.

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Close air support

History: World War I: The use of aircraft in the close air support of ground forces dates back to World War I, the first conflict to make significant military use of aerial forces. Air warfare, and indeed aviation itself, was still in its infancy – and the direct effect of rifle caliber machine guns and light bombs of World War I aircraft was very limited compared with the power of (for instance) an average fighter bomber of World War II, but CAS aircraft were still able to achieve a powerful psychological impact. The aircraft was a visible and personal enemy – unlike artillery – presenting a personal threat to enemy troops, while providing friendly forces assurance that their superiors were concerned about their situation. The most successful attacks of 1917–1918 had included planning for co-ordination between aerial and ground units, although it was relatively difficult at this early date to co-ordinate these attacks due to the primitive nature of air-to-ground radio communication. Though most air-power proponents sought independence from ground commanders and hence pushed the importance of interdiction and strategic bombing, they nonetheless recognized the need for close air support. From the commencement of hostilities in 1914, aviators engaged in sporadic and spontaneous attacks on ground forces, but it was not until 1916 that an air support doctrine was elaborated and dedicated fighters for the job were put into service. By that point, the startling and demoralizing effect that attack from the air could have on the troops in the trenches had been made clear. At the Battle of the Somme, 18 British armed reconnaissance planes strafed the enemy trenches after conducting surveillance operations. The success of this improvised assault spurred innovation on both sides. In 1917, following the Second Battle of the Aisne, the British debuted the first ground-attack aircraft, a modified F.E 2b fighter carrying 20 lb (9.1 kg) bombs and mounted machine-guns. After exhausting their ammunition, the planes returned to base for refueling and rearming before returning to the battle-zone. Other modified planes used in this role were the Airco DH.5 and Sopwith Camel – the latter was particularly successful in this role. Aircraft support was first integrated into a battle plan on a large scale at the 1917 Battle of Cambrai, where a significantly larger number of tanks were deployed than previously. By that time, effective anti-aircraft tactics were being used by the enemy infantry and pilot casualties were high, although air support was later judged as having been of a critical importance in places where the infantry had got pinned down. At this time, British doctrine came to recognize two forms of air support; trench strafing (the modern-day doctrine of CAS), and ground strafing (the modern-day doctrine of air interdiction) – attacking tactical ground targets away from the land battle. As well as strafing with machine-guns, planes engaged in such operations were commonly modified with bomb racks; the plane would fly in very low to the ground and release the bombs just above the trenches. The Germans were also quick to adopt this new form of warfare and were able to deploy aircraft in a similar capacity at Cambrai. While the British used single-seater planes, the Germans preferred the use of heavier two-seaters with an additional machine gunner in the aft cockpit. The Germans adopted the powerful Hannover CL.II and built the first purpose-built ground attack aircraft, the Junkers J.I. During the 1918 German spring offensive, the Germans employed 30 squadrons, or Schlasta, of ground attack fighters and were able to achieve some initial tactical success. The British later deployed the Sopwith Salamander as a specialized ground attack aircraft, although it was too late to see much action. During the Sinai and Palestine Campaign of 1918, CAS aircraft functioned as an important factor in ultimate victory. After the British achieved air superiority over the German aircraft sent to aid the Ottoman Turks, squadrons of S.E 5a's and D.H. 4s were sent on wide-ranging attacks against German and Turkish positions near the Jordan river. Combined with a ground assault led by General Edmund Allenby, three Turkish armies soon collapsed into a full rout. In the words of the attacking squadron's official report: No 1 Squadron made six heavy raids during the day, dropped three tons of bombs and fired nearly 24,000 machine gun rounds. Inter-war period: The close air support doctrine was further developed in the interwar period. Most theorists advocated the adaptation of fighters or light bombers into the role. During this period, airpower advocates crystallized their views on the role of air-power in warfare. Aviators and ground officers developed largely opposing views on the importance of CAS, views that would frame institutional battles for CAS in the 20th century. The inter-war period saw the use of CAS in a number of conflicts, including the Polish–Soviet War, the Spanish Civil War, the Iraqi revolt of 1920 and the Gran Chaco War. The British used air power to great effect in various colonial hotspots in the Middle East and North Africa during the immediate postwar period. The newly formed Royal Air force (RAF) contributed to the defeat of the Afghan military during the Third Anglo-Afghan War by harassing Afghani troops and breaking up their formations. Z Force, an RAF air squadron, was also used to support ground operations during the Somaliland campaign, in which the Darawiish king Diiriye Guure's insurgency was defeated. Following from these successes, the decision was made to create a unified RAF Iraq Command to use air power as a more cost-effective way of controlling large areas than the use of conventional land forces. It was effectively used to suppress the Great Iraqi Revolution of 1920 and various other tribal revolts. During the Spanish Civil War German volunteer aviators of the Condor Legion on the Nationalist side, despite little official support from their government, developed close air support tactics that proved highly influential for subsequent Luftwaffe doctrine. U.S. Marine Corps Aviation was used as an intervention force in support of U.S. Marine Corps ground forces during the Banana Wars, in places such as Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua. Marine Aviators experimented with air-ground tactics and in Haiti and Nicaragua they adopted the tactic of dive bombing. The observers and participants of these wars would base their CAS strategies on their experience of the conflict. Aviators, who wanted institutional independence from the Army, pushed for a view of air-power centered around interdiction, which would relieve them of the necessity of integrating with ground forces and allow them to operate as an independent military arm. They saw close air support as both the most difficult and most inefficient use of aerial assets. Close air support was the most difficult mission, requiring identifying and distinguishing between friendly and hostile units. At the same time, targets engaged in combat are dispersed and concealed, reducing the effectiveness of air attacks. They also argued that the CAS mission merely duplicated the abilities of artillery, whereas interdiction provided a unique capability. Ground officers contended there was rarely sufficient artillery available, and the flexibility of aircraft would be ideal for massing firepower at critical points, while producing a greater psychological effect on friendly and hostile forces alike. Moreover, unlike massive, indiscriminate artillery strikes, small aerial bombs would not render ground untrafficable, slowing attacking friendly forces. Although the prevailing view in official circles was largely indifferent to CAS during the interwar period, its importance was expounded upon by military theorists, such as J. F. C. Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart. Hart, who was an advocate of what later came to be known as 'Blitzkrieg' tactics, thought that the speed of armoured tanks would render conventional artillery incapable of providing support fire. Instead he proposed that: actual 'offensive' support must come from an even more mobile artillery moving alongside. For this purpose the close co-operation of low-flying aircraft ... is essential World War II: Luftwaffe: As a continental power intent on offensive operations, Germany could not ignore the need for aerial support of ground operations. Though the Luftwaffe, like its counterparts, tended to focus on strategic bombing, it was unique in its willingness to commit forces to CAS. Unlike the Allies, the Germans were not able to develop powerful strategic bombing capabilities, which implied industrial developments they were forbidden to take according to the Treaty of Versailles. In joint exercises with Sweden in 1934, the Germans were first exposed to dive-bombing, which permitted greater accuracy while making attack aircraft more difficult to track by antiaircraft gunners. As a result, Ernst Udet, chief of the Luftwaffe's development, initiated procurement of close support dive bombers on the model of the U.S. Navy's Curtiss Helldiver, resulting in the Henschel Hs 123, which was later replaced by the famous Junkers Ju 87 Stuka. Experience in the Spanish Civil War lead to the creation of five ground-attack groups in 1938, four of which would be equipped with Stukas. The Luftwaffe matched its material acquisitions with advances in the air-ground coordination. General Wolfram von Richthofen organized a limited number of air liaison detachments that were attached to ground units of the main effort. These detachments existed to pass requests from the ground to the air, and receive reconnaissance reports, but they were not trained to guide aircraft onto targets. These preparations did not prove fruitful in the invasion of Poland, where the Luftwaffe focused on interdiction and dedicated few assets to close air support.