Kidney Sales and Market Regulation: A Reply to Semrau.
Luke Semrau argues that the documented harms of existing organ markets do not undermine the case for establishing regulated systems of paid kidney donation. He offers two arguments in support of this conclusion. First, Semrau argues that the harms of kidney selling are straightforwardly amenable to regulatory solution. Second, Semrau argues that even in existing black markets, sellers would likely have experienced greater harm if the option of selling a kidney were not available. This commentary challenges both of Semrau's claims. I argue that there is no reason to believe that kidney sellers benefit from the current black market trade in organs, and highlight a number of potential issues regarding the effectiveness and feasibility of Semrau's proposed market regulations.
['Koplin|Julian J|JJ|']
D003132:Commerce D006801:Humans D007668:Kidney D019520:Living Donors D010686:Philosophy, Medical D009927:Tissue and Organ Procurement
regulation harm burden of proof kidney markets organ transplantation