History of military logistics
While American Lend Lease aid to Australia was only 3.3% of aid to all countries, Australian Reverse Lend Lease represented 13.0% of aid to the United States. Bypassed Japanese forces in the South West Pacific Area were expected to "wither on the vine" and starve, but this did not occur; they cultivated gardens using local labour seeds and equipment imported by aircraft and submarines, which also brought in ordnance and medical supplies. They remained strong, well-organised and capable of offensive action. Australian forces conducted a series of offensives against them, which were targeted at their gardens and supplies.

Post-Second World War: Helicopters were used by the United States in the Korean War to deliver supplies. Although much slower than fixed-wing aircraft, they could move supplies rapidly over terrain that could deliver supplies in minutes to a forward area that could take hours to reach overland. While still affected by the weather, they could fly when other aircraft were grounded. They also became important for the rapid evacuation of casualties. They were used by the French in the First Indochina War, and the Algerian War, where they handled most of the tactical troop movement and casualty evacuation, and much of the logistical support.
In the Vietnam War, the U.S. Army operated a fleet of large Boeing CH-47 Chinook and Sikorsky CH-54 Tarhe helicopters. Using a technique whereby supplies in a cargo net were slung under a helicopter, a CH-47 could move a hundred tonnes of supplies within a 16-kilometre (10 mi) radius in a single day. These helicopters were also used to recover 10,000 crashed aircraft. Notably, in these conflicts victory did not always go to the side with the best logistics.
The war in Vietnam also saw the large-scale employment of containerisation. A standard steel container was designed called the Conex box that was capable of holding 4,100 kilograms (9,000 lb) and suitable for loading onto a semi-trailer or railway flat car. Eventually 150,000 of them were sent to Vietnam. The use of containers reduced port congestion and handling time, and saved money on packaging. There was less damage to cargo in transit and reduced loss through pilferage. The containers could be used in lieu of covered storage. The drawback of using containers was that they required special equipment to handle them. This became less of a problem as containerisation spread through the world, but in 1999 the International Force East Timor (INTERFET)  found that East Timor had no facilities for handling containers, and special container handling cranes had to be designed and manufactured in New Zealand.

The development of large cargo-carrying aircraft enhanced the ability of airlift to move personnel and supplies over long distances. It remains uneconomical compared with sealift, so sealift is still the preferred means of transport for cargo, particularly heavy and bulky items. Nonetheless, during the Yom Kippur War, as part of Operation Nickel Grass, American Lockheed C-141 Starlifter and Lockheed C-5 Galaxy aircraft delivered 22,683 tonnes (22,325 long tons) of supplies for Israeli forces including 29 tanks, although only four arrived before the ceasefire on 22 October 1973; just 39 per cent of the Nickel Grass materiel was delivered by then. Another 22,683 tonnes (22,325 long tons) was sent by sea, none of which arrived before the ceasefire.
During the initial stage of the Gulf War from 7 August to 8 November 1991, some 187,000 U.S. troops were deployed to Saudi Arabia, 99.22 per cent of them by air. Airlift also accounted for 15.3 per cent of the cargo, some 161,804 tonnes (178,358 short tons). The second phase of deployment, from 8 November 1991 to 16 January 1992, involved the movement of 391,604 troops by air, the majority of whom travelled on commercial flights, and 326,223 tonnes (359,599 short tons) of cargo, representing 14.5 per cent of the total. The seaports of Saudi Arabia were world class, much better than their counterparts in the United States, with 60 piers, of which the U.S. forces used 15. Sealift carried 85.5 per cent of the dry cargo and 1,869,990 tonnes (2,061,310 short tons) of petroleum products in this phase.

As the twentieth century drew to a close, the increasing complexity of new weapons systems became a concern. While new technologies were intended to make armies more lethal and less reliant on manpower, they did not always live up to their promise. In the 1982 Falklands War, the logistical implications of the Rapier missile launchers were not initially appreciated. Generally located on hilltops where there were no roads or tracks, they had to be sited by helicopter. If they had to be moved, whether yards or miles, another helicopter sortie was called for. They required fuel to keep their generators running, and their isolated sites required the full-time service of a Westland Sea King helicopter, itself a voracious consumer of fuel, to keep them going.
The increasing complexity of weapons and equipment saw the proportion of personnel devoted to logistics in the US Army rise from 39 per cent in the American Expeditionary Forces in the First World War to 45 per cent in the ETO in the Second World War, but declined to 42 per cent in the Korean War, and 35 per cent in the Vietnam War. Concerns about the low tooth-to-tail ratio saw a mandated ratio put in place, but the widespread use of civilian contractors saw the proportion of people devoted to logistical functions rise to 55 per cent in 2005 during the Iraq War.

Complex systems like the M1 Abrams tank require more knowledge and more skilled personnel to operate, maintain and repair, and resist easy modification. The M1 required three times the fuel of the older M60 tank, and 20 per cent more spare parts. When committed to action in the Gulf War, many Abrams tank crews exhausted their stock of spare parts, which could have become a serious problem had the fighting lasted more than 100 hours. On the other hand, 300,000 rounds of artillery, antiaircraft and tank ammunition were shipped only to be returned, largely owing to the greater lethality of modern weapons lowering ammunition consumption rates. The high fuel usage led to reconsideration of proposals to use a diesel engine instead.
The diversity of equipment and consequent large number of spare parts stocked by the NATO saw attempts at standardisation. By the 21st century, there were over 1,000 NATO standardization agreements, covering everything from ammunition calibres to rail gauges and the terminology that troops use to communicate with each other. The adoption of standardisation as policy promised benefits through reducing inventories, allowing alliance partners to draw on each other's stockpiles and repair services, reducing support overheads, and lower costs through consolidation of research and development and the economies of scale of larger production runs. Most countries had no choice, as they lacked the industry and technology to manufacture complex modern weapons systems. However the adoption of foreign weapons also meant the adoption of foreign tactics, and giving up the advantages of bespoke systems tailored to the nation's own, often unique, strategic environment.

The management of spare parts became a major concern. When items were produced, it was not known how many of each spare part would be needed. Failure to estimate correctly meant inventories of spare parts that were never needed and shortages of others. Keeping old equipment rather than buying new seemed a sensible option, and sometimes the only one, for many armies, but the cost of keeping old vehicles and equipment running could also become uneconomical if not prohibitive.
In the late 20th century, the number of natural disasters increased from 50 a year in 1960 to 350 a year in 2010. While not their primary role in most countries, national and international military forces were increasingly engaged in such activities since they possessed the manpower, equipment and organization to deal with them. Up to 80 per cent of the total spent on disaster relief activities involved logistics operations, of which more than 40 per cent was wasted through duplication, lack of time to carry out adequate planning, and other factors.

Although military logistics was an older discipline than its business counterpart, in the twenty-first century the adoption of new tools, techniques and technologies saw the latter overtake the former. Techniques were imported to military logistics that had been developed in the business world, such as just-in-time manufacturing. This greatly reduced the costs involved in storage and handling of items, but in the combat environment of the Iraq War, the drawbacks became all too clear when suppliers and transport resources could not respond to rapidly changing patterns of demand. Shortages developed, and units responded by reverting to traditional just-in-case logistics, stockpiling items that they thought they might need.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 encountered severe logistical difficulties due to poor planning, notably a failure to anticipate the degree of resistance that was actually encountered. The logistical resources required were not on hand even though the capability existed. As equipment broke down through use and battle damage, a shortage of spare parts developed, which was compounded by inadequate numbers of trained maintenance personnel. Although Russia was the world's second largest producer of armaments, its industrial base still struggled to replace materiel losses incurred in high-intensity combat.