Vertical envelopment
By the time the war in Algeria had ended, eight officers and 23 non-commissioned officers from ALAT had died in the course of their duties.

Vietnam War: U.S. Army CH-21 helicopter transports arrived in South Vietnam on 11 December 1961. Air assault operations using Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troops began 12 days later in Operation Chopper. These were very successful at first but the Viet Cong (VC) began developing counter helicopter techniques, and at the Battle of Ap Bac in January 1963, 13 of 15 helicopters were hit and four shot down. The Army began adding machine guns and rockets to their smaller helicopters and developed the first purpose built gunship with the M-6E3 armament system.
U.S. Marine helicopter squadrons began four-month rotations through Vietnam as part of Operation SHUFLY on 15 April 1962. Six days later, they performed the first helicopter assault using U.S. Marine helicopters and ARVN troops. After April 1963, as losses began to mount, U.S. Army UH-1 Huey gunships escorted the Marine transports. The VC again used effective counter landing techniques and in Operation Sure Wind 202 on 27 April 1964, 17 of 21 helicopters were hit and three shot down.
The 2nd Battalion 3rd Marines made a night helicopter assault in the Elephant Valley south of Da Nang on 13 August 1965 shortly after Marine ground troops arrived in country. HMM-361 commanded by LtCol Tom Ross. On 17 August 1965 in Operation Starlite the 2nd Battalion 4th Marines landed in three helicopter landing zones (LZs) west of the 1st VC Regiment in the Van Tuong village complex, 12 miles (19 km) south of Chu Lai, while the 3rd Battalion 3rd Marines used seaborne landing craft on the beaches to the east. The transport helicopters were 24 UH-34s from HMM-361, HMM-261 and HMM-161 in relief, escorted by Marine and Army Hueys from VMO-2 and VMO-6 led by Maj Donald G. Radcliff, US Army who was killed in action. VC losses were 614 killed, Marine losses were 45 KIA and 203 WIA.
The need for a new type of unit became apparent to the Tactical Mobility Requirements Board (normally referred to as the Howze Board) of the U.S. Army in 1962. The Board met at a difficult time; the bulk of the military hierarchy were focused primarily on the Soviet threat to Western Europe, and perceived as requiring heavy, conventional units. The creation of new, light airmobile units could only occur at the expense of heavier units. At the same time, the incoming Kennedy administration was placing a much greater emphasis on the need to fight 'small wars', or counter-insurgencies, and was strongly supportive of officers such as General Howze who were embracing new technologies. The Board concluded that a new form of unit would be required, and commissioned tests – but justified these at the time on the need to fight a conventional war in Europe.
Initially a new experimental unit was formed at Fort Benning, Georgia, the 11th Air Assault Division on 11 February 1963, combining light infantry with integral helicopter transport and air support. Opinions vary as to the level of support for the concept within the Army; some have argued that the initial tests against the context of conventional warfare did not prove promising, and, despite opposition from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it was primarily the Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara who pushed through the changes in 1965, drawing on support from within the Pentagon which had now begun to establish a counter-insurgency doctrine that would require just such a unit. Others have put more weight on the support of newly appointed senior Army commanders, including the new Chief of Staff General Wheeler, in driving through the changes. Nonetheless, the 11th Air Assault Division assets were merged with the co-located 2nd Infantry Division and reflagged as the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), continuing the tradition of the 1st Cavalry Division. Within several months it was sent to Vietnam and the concept of air mobility became bound up with the challenges of that campaign, especially its varied terrain – the jungles, mountains, and rivers which complicated ground movement.
The first unit of the new division to see major combat was the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, led by Lieutenant Colonel Harold G. Moore. The 7th Cavalry was the same regiment that Custer had commanded at the ill-fated Battle of the Little Bighorn. On November 14, 1965, Moore led his troops in the first large unit engagement of the Vietnam War, which took place near the Chu Pong massif near the Vietnam-Cambodia border. It is known today as the Battle of Ia Drang Valley, and is considered to be the first large scale helicopter air assault.

This battalion (vice "squadron," which would have been its nomenclature had it actually been a cavalry organization) gave common currency, albeit incorrectly, to the U.S. term "Air Cavalry." However, 1-7 Cav was in actuality an infantry formation carrying a "Cavalry" designation purely for purposes of lineage and heraldry. (True air cavalry organizations are/were helicopter-mounted reconnaissance units.) Light infantry-centric organizations (battalions, brigades, or divisions) that are trained, organized, and equipped to operate with organic (i.e., owned by the joint parent headquarters of both the light infantry organization and the supporting aviation organization) are classified as "Air Assault," previously designated as "Airmobile."
The Vietnam-era 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was not an "air cavalry" division, per se, although it did contain air cavalry squadrons. The division was a new concept that probably was more akin to a modern version of "mounted rifles," owing to its helicopter "mounts," and, as did 1-7 Cav discussed above, carried the "Cavalry" designation primarily for purposes of lineage and heraldry, and not because of its then current mission or organizational structure.
On a practical level, virtually any light infantry formation can instantly become "airmobile" simply by dividing the assault elements into "chalks" (aircraft load designations pertaining to order of loading and type of aircraft), embarking them on the aircraft, transporting them to the objective/assembly area, and inserting/disembarking them into a landing zone, etc. However, true "air assault" organizations are specialized light infantry (much like airborne troops), who are trained, organized, and equipped specifically to perform the complex, rapid, and dynamic tasks inherent in air assault vice simply being transported by aircraft. Perhaps a rough comparison can be made between "motorized" and "mechanized" infantry. Any light infantry unit can be transported by truck (viz., "motorized"), however, "mechanized" infantry are specifically trained, organized, and equipped to conduct operations in close-coordination with tanks.

Southern African wars: The armed forces of Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa widely conducted airmobile warfare operations in Southern Africa, during the Portuguese Colonial War (1961–1974), the Rhodesian Bush War (1964–1979) and the South African Border War (1966–1990). The airmobile warfare was part of the counter-insurgency actions made by the forces of the three countries against guerrilla forces in Angola, Portuguese Guinea, Rhodesia, Mozambique and South-West Africa.
The airmobile warfare tactics used by Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa had many similar characteristics. The air forces of the three countries also used the same types of helicopters (mainly Alouette III and later, regarding Portugal and South Africa, SA 330 Puma), and there were military cooperation agreements and sharing of experience between the three powers, including the secret Alcora Exercise.
Portuguese, Rhodesian and South African airmobile tactics often involved air assaults done by small units of special forces or light infantry, transported in four or five Alouette III helicopters. Assaults were often supported by an Alouette III armed with a side-mounted 20 mm MG 151 autocannon. This helicopter was nicknamed Helicanhão (heli-cannon) by the Portuguese and K-Car by the Rhodesians. Variants of the air mobile warfare tactics used in Africa included the Rhodesian Fireforce and the Portuguese heliborne-horseborne forces cooperation.

Bangladesh Liberation War (1971): Meghna Heli Bridge was an aerial operation of Indian and Bangladeshi allied forces during the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971. It took place on 9 December, when the Indian Air Force airlifted the Mukti Bahini and the IV Corps of the Indian Army from Brahmanbaria to Raipura in Narsingdi over the River Meghna, bypassing the destroyed Meghna Bridge and Pakistani defences in Ashuganj.

Post Cold War: In the United States Army, the air assault mission is the primary role of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). This unit is a division-sized helicopter-borne fighting force. 101st Airborne Division soldiers attend the Sabalauski Air Assault School.