Naval strategy
This ship reached a speed of 21 knots, one of the fastest at the time; this warship also had advancements in weaponry that no other nation's navy had at the time. With this, the arms race changed to which nation could build the most of those newly made warships. With these new, heavily armed ships the Allies had more opportunities for blockades in the various theaters of the war.

Warfare: The submarine, introduced in World War I, led to the development of new weapons and tactics. The Germans' fleet at the time was, in some people's opinion, the most advanced, and was constructed by Alfred Peter Friedrich von Tirpitz. The fleet consisted of the U-boat, and smaller class UB and UC boats.

Unrestricted warfare in WW1: Unrestricted Warfare was first introduced during World War I by the German navy. This strategy sought to sink vessels, particularly commercial shipping, without warning. This proved decisive in America's entry into the war through the famous sinking of the RMS Lusitania. The strategy provoked international controversy due to the risk posed to the commerce and citizenry of neutral states. Before its entry into the war, the United States lobbied Germany to curtail the use of unrestricted submarine warfare. While this caused Germany to reduce such operations for a time, the strategy was ultimately resumed in an attempt to impede food and munitions supplies to Britain. The resumption of this strategy led many countries to try to ban the subsequent use of unrestricted submarine warfare, though this met with failure by the outbreak of WWII.

Technological impact in WW1: 

Radio: Radio saw its first use in naval combat during the First World War. Early radio technology was not adopted universally at this point, as Morse code often proved more reliable than inconsistent or unclear radio signals. These two technologies were jointly used to communicate between ships, bases, and naval command. Improved radio technology greatly advanced naval intelligence and coordination by increasing communication speed, efficiency, and range.

World War 2: 

Submarine warfare: 

Unrestricted warfare in WW2: World War II saw broad use of unrestricted submarine warfare. This was especially notable in the Battle of the Atlantic, as Axis powers sought to restrict British and French contact with their colonial possessions and limit their involvement in the Pacific theater. After American entry in 1941, US forces targeted Axis commercial and military fleets across the Atlantic basin and in the Pacific War.

Carrier-based warfare: 

Technological impact in WW2: 

Radar: Approaching World War II, militaries gained new technological and strategic capabilities through the use of radar. Radar is used by navies to detect planes and ships that enter the nation's coastal zone and to detect objects that pass by vessels at sea. Navies could thus use radar to clearly detect where enemy ships were located before attacking, as well as knowing when enemies were approaching to attack their vessels in turn.

Radio: Radio continued to play a vital role in naval communication during the Second World War as it did in the First, the major difference being its widespread adoption by all combatants. Additionally, militaries used radio to communicate with the general public.

Modern: Increasingly naval strategy has been merged with general strategy involving land and air warfare.
Naval strategy constantly evolves as improved technologies become available.  During the Cold War, for example, the Soviet Navy shifted from a strategy of directly contending against NATO for control of the bluewater oceans to a concentrated defense of the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk bastions.
In 2007, the U.S. Navy joined with the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard to adopt a new maritime strategy called A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower that raised the notion of prevention of war to the same philosophical level as the conduct of war.  The strategy was presented by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and Commandant of the Coast Guard at the International Seapower Symposium in Newport, R.I.  The strategy recognized the economic links of the global system and how any disruption due to regional crises – man-made or natural – can adversely impact the U.S. economy and quality of life.  This new strategy charted a course for the three U.S. sea services to work collectively with each other and international partners to prevent these crises from occurring or reacting quickly should one occur to avoid negative impacts to the United States. Sometimes a military force is used as a preventative measure to avoid war, not cause it.

See also: Command of the sea
Military strategy
Strategy
Grand strategy
Operational mobility
Military doctrine
Principles of war
Military tactics
Naval tactics

References: Corbett, Julian S.,  Some Principles of Maritime Strategy.ISBN 1296071545
Mahan, A.T., The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783.
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower

Further reading: Adams,  John A. If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific War: An Analysis of World War II Naval Strategy (2008)  excerpt and text search
Dewan, Sandeep China's Maritime Ambitions and the PLA Navy Vij Books, ISBN 9789382573227
Hattendorf, John B. Naval Strategy and Policy in the Mediterranean: Past, Present and Future (2000)   excerpt and text search
Padfield, Peter,  'Maritime Supremacy and the Opening of the Western Mind: Naval Campaigns That Shaped the Modern World, 1588–1782  (1999) excerpt and text search;  Maritime Power and Struggle For Freedom: Naval Campaigns that Shaped the Modern World 1788–1851 (2005)
Paret, Peter, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (1986)
Rose, Lisle A. Power at Sea, Volume 1: The Age of Navalism, 1890–1918 (2006)  excerpt and text search vol 1;  Power at Sea, Volume 2: The Breaking Storm, 1919–1945 (2006) excerpt and text search vol 2; Power at Sea, Volume 3: A Violent Peace, 1946–2006 (2006) excerpt and text search vol 3
Shulman, Mark Russell. "The Influence of Mahan upon Sea Power." Reviews in American History 1991 19(4): 522–527. in Jstor