Pitched battle
There was a general increase in the size of pitched battles during this period as states grew and could wield larger standing armies using improved logistics. Firearms were introduced in Europe during the 16th century and revolutionised pitched battles because of their devastating effect when fired in sequence. Despite this, early firearms were inaccurate and slow to fire meaning that they were most effectively deployed in smaller, mobile blocks of infantry who would fire a mass of projectiles at an enemy. Because these weapons were unreliable, these troops were supported by other groups of infantry, especially when confronted with enemy cavalry. In 16th century Italy, pike and shot infantry would have interweaving ranks of musket and pike armed soldiers to provide mobile cavalry protection. Furthermore, during this period artillery would evolve from basic stone throwers to barrelled cannons capable of mobility and more effective siege warfare.

Battle of Nagashino: The battle of Nagashino was a pitched battle fought between the combined forces of Oda and Tokugawa clans against Takeda clan on 28 June 1575 during the Sengoku period in Japan. The battle occurred as Oda Nobunaga led 38,000 men to relieve Tokugawa forces besieged by Takeda Katsuyori at Nagashino Castle.  This battle represents an example of a siege that develops into a pitched battle upon the arrival of new forces. Key to Oda success during the battle was the deployment of 10,000 Ashigaru arquebusiers. Firearms has been introduced to Japan by European traders as early as 1543 and had been adopted quickly. Nagashino was one of the earliest examples of their effective tactical deployment. Before the battle, Nobunaga had positioned his arquebusiers in formations to be protected from enemy cavalry by supporting Ashigaru spearmen. The Takeda strategy was to utilise their superior cavalry force and make the Oda infantry flee with concentrated charges. This was unsuccessful as Oda spearmen worked in tandem with the arquebusiers who fired organised volleys in ranks of three to repel Takeda cavalry charges and achieve victory in the battle.

Late Modern era: Firearms and artillery dominated pitched battles during the late modern period as technological improvements such as rifling improved the reliability and accuracy of the weapons. The efficacy of firearms increased dramatically during the 18th century with the introduction of rifling for enhanced range and accuracy, cartridge ammunition and magazines. As a result, most armies during this period would strictly deploy firearm infantry. Notable exceptions to this would be in colonial Africa where native armies would still employ close quarter fighting to some success, such as at the battle of Isandlwana in 1879 between the Zulu Empire and the British. The mobility and accuracy of artillery was also improved with rifling and sophisticated reload mechanisms and would be utilised to great effect alongside infantry throughout the 19th century. Furthermore, cavalry would continue to be an effective force for pitched battles during this period as they were implemented to harass infantry formations and artillery positions. These tactics would remain in warfare until developments in technology would make pitched battles less effective towards the end of the 19th century.

Battle of Isandlwana: The Battle of Isandlwana was fought between the Zulu Empire and the British Empire on 22 January 1879. This pitched battle saw the implementation of superior tactics to overwhelm a technologically superior force. The Zulu army usually deployed in its well known "buffalo horns" formation. The attack layout was composed of three elements:

the "horns" or flanking right and left wing elements to encircle and pin the enemy. Usually these were the greener troops.
the "chest" or central main force which delivered the coup de grace. The prime fighters made up the composition of the main force.
the "loins" or reserves used to exploit success or reinforce elsewhere.
The Zulu forces were generally grouped into 3 levels: regiments; corps of several regiments; and "armies" or bigger formations. With enough manpower, these could be marshaled and maneuvered in the Western equivalent of divisional strength. Coordination of tactical movements was supplied by the indunas who used hand signals and messengers. Generally before deploying for combat, the regiments were made to squat in a semicircle. This semi-circular squat served to align all echelons towards the coming pitched battle, while the commanders made final assignments and adjustments. While formidable in action, the Zulu arrangements for a pitched struggle could be predictable, as they usually used the same 3-part layout in their operations.

At Isandlwana, Zulu forces first lured the British into splitting their strength by diversionary actions around Magogo Hills and Mangeni Falls, and then moved to take advantage of this British error in a careful approach march, using dispersed units that hid the full strength of the army. As one historian notes:

Meanwhile, the joint Zulu commanders, who had indeed been considering a flank march to Chelmsford's east to join with Matshana and cut the British column off from Natal, decided instead to take advantage of the general's division of forces. They detached men to reinforce Matshana, but on the same evening of 21 January and during the next they transferred the main army across the British front to the deep shelter of the Ngwebeni valley. This was truly a masterful manoeuvre. The amabutho moved rapidly in small units, mainly concealed from the Isandlwana camp nine miles away by the Nyoni Heights. The British mounted patrols that sighted some of the apparently isolated Zulu units had no inkling an entire army was on the move.
The total Zulu host was then concentrated in a deep ravine near the enemy position, pre-positioned for their classic "buffalo horns" pitched attack, but in accordance with tradition, waiting until the omens were good for an assault. Discovered by a British cavalry patrol, the entire Impi sprang up as one man, and launched their attack from some 4 miles away. The advance was met by withering British rifle, rocket and artillery fire that made part of the advance falter. The British however had divided their forces- fooled in part by preliminary Zulu feints- and other errors, such as failure to base the camp on a strong central wagon or laager fortification for example also contributed to fatal weaknesses in the British defences. When pressure by the maneuvering Zulu formations caused the crumbling of the redcoat line, the Zulu prongs surged through and around the gaps, annihilating the camp's defenders. The liquidation of almost 1,000 European troops with modern arms by the African spearmen sparked disbelief and uproar in Britain. Aside from the losses of British regulars, and the supporting native levies, the Zulu impi killed more British officers at Isandlwana than Napoleon killed at Waterloo.

World Wars: Towards the late 19th century and into the World Wars of the 20th century, pitched battles decreased in frequency because of the increasing size of armies and developments in weapons technology. Larger armies meant that combat could not be resolved in single events and the introduction of the machine gun, advanced artillery, and barbed wire by the First World War meant that deploying infantry in large moveable blocks was ineffective as they could be easily made immobile and destroyed. Barbed wire alone brought an end to the deployment of cavalry as they would be rendered immobile and made easy targets. Developments in tactics would emphasise fortified positions in trenches and would result in battles that would take months and be determined by attrition and supply rather than tactics and mobility. The introduction of mechanised armour and aircraft in the late First World War meant that trench warfare would be less effective as trenches could be outmanoeuvred and surrounded. This was demonstrated clearly during the early stages of The Second World War during the German Blitzkrieg in France. Tactics in the Second World War developed to focus on mobile groups of infantry who would work in tandem with armour, aircraft and artillery to out manoeuvre and surround enemy positions. This would generally result in many smaller skirmishes along a wide battle front rather than localised pitched battles. However, during the war, there would be several important battles that would employ pitched battle tactics at a larger scale.

Battle of Caen: During the Normandy landings under Operation Overlord, the Allies engaged in a pitched battle on a massive scale to defeat German resistance. When the Allies landed at Normandy, the pitched battle strategy used by the commander of the British land forces, general Bernard Montgomery, was to confront German armoured units with constant harassment from British armies on the eastern flank of the beachhead. The role of the British forces would be to act as a great shield for the Allied landing, constantly sucking the German armour on to that shield on the left (east), and constantly grinding it down with punishing blows from artillery, tanks and Allied aircraft. As the shield held the Germans, the Americans were to push in the west on the right of the Allied line, breaking through the German defences. The British role in the strategy would thus not be a glamorous one, but a brutal battle in a punishing cauldron of attrition, in and around the key city of Caen.