Cavalry tactics
One of the cavalry tactics employed in such encounters was the caracole,  developed in the mid-16th century in an attempt to integrate gunpowder weapons into cavalry tactics. Equipped with one or two wheellock pistols, cavalrymen would advance on their target at less than a gallop. As each rank came into range, the soldiers would turn away, discharge their pistols at the target, retire to reload and then repeat the manoeuvre. Early on, they had an advantage in firepower, but infantry firepower eventually increased. With the invention of the bayonet, the pike screen against charges could also be turned into a rank of firing soldiers. This tactic was accompanied by the increasing popularity of the German reiters in European armies from about 1540, or similar equipped, but usually more lightly armoured hakkapeliitta. Their main weapons were two or more pistols and a sword; initially,  most wore three-quarters armour, though as time passed this was reduced to a helmet and a cuirass over a leather coat; sometimes they also carried a long cavalry firearm known as an arquebus or a carbine (although this type of horsemen soon became regarded as a separate class of cavalry – the arquebusier or, in Britain, harquebusier).
Modern historians regard the caracole as a tactical system that ultimately proved ineffective.  It sacrificed the cavalry advantages of speed and mobility, while also leaving mounted soldiers at a disadvantage to massed infantry equipped with heavier and longer-ranged weapons. The caracole gave way to close artillery support (see Horse artillery), deployed to break up the infantry formations and force the foot soldiers to scatter, so that the cavalry would regain their advantage in close-quarters combat. Contemporary writers did not seem to have used the term "caracole" in its modern sense; John Cruso, for example, explained it as a manoeuvre whereby a formation of cuirassiers would receive the enemy's charge by splitting apart to either side, and then charging back into the flanks of the overextended enemy.
Some historians associate the demise of the caracole with the name of Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden (1594–1632). He regarded the technique as fairly inefficient and forbade the cavalry regiments in Swedish employment from using it.  However, he was definitely not the first military commander to dismiss the caracole; François de la Noue, in his account of his service under Henry IV of France, mentioned that the pistol-armed Protestant cavalry used their weapons much like very long swords or lances, charging fiercely against the enemy formation before discharging the pistols at point-blank range (or even laying the pistol's muzzle directly against the opponent's armour before firing).  There is reason to believe that the Sweders were influenced by Henry IV's ideas, whether directly or through Dutch mediation – especially by the agency of Swedish officers who served in the Low Countries (Eighty Years' War), such as Jacob De la Gardie.

Infantry countertactics: Against light cavalry with bows and javelins
It was impossible for infantry to engage light cavalry with bows and javelins in close combat on ground that did not seriously hinder cavalry movement. The only resort for engagement were missile weapons in ranged combat. In this case both cavalry and infantry fought only in a missile exchange. While the infantry can be considered static in comparison to the cavalry, their own protection, the damage their missiles would cause and the hit rate were important.
For example, in the prelude to the Battle of Mohi, crossbowmen protected by pavises sniped at the Mongol light cavalry, resulting in a tactical defeat of this Mongol unit, although the Mongols did go on to win the overall battle.
The defence of such ranged combat units was important, for cavalry could always switch roles and engage the ranged combat infantry (often lightly armored skirmishers) in close combat.
Against heavy cavalry with lances
The longbow and the crossbow were able to counter the dominance of mounted knights on the battlefield. Although knights of the Middle Ages often fought on foot or at least avoided futile frontal attacks, it happened several times that knightly armies led charges in obeyance to their warrior ideal only to meet with disaster. At Crécy (1346) and Poitiers (1356), the French knights suffered heavy casualties against the Welsh and English longbowmen. The ability to keep several arrows in the air at any given time was an important advantage of the medieval archer. Thus, while a cavalry charge followed a strict pattern of acceleration (400 m (1,300 ft) in 2 minutes, gallop at the last 150 m (490 ft)) from a distance beyond effective missile range, once they came within range they could be met with a hail of arrows that could severely injure both horse and rider alike. However, unsupported light infantry and archers would not be able to cause enough casualties to a cavalry force, if it were charging across suitable terrain, to tip the odds in their favour in the following melee. Thus, it was always advisable for missile troops to fight on terrain disadvantageous to cavalry charges, and with supporting heavy infantry close by.
The long spears (pikes) of the Scots and Swiss were an excellent defensive weapon against cavalry. The warriors stood in tight formations like an ancient phalanx, the end of their pikes embedded in the ground, presenting a massive spiked wall. In battle against the Scots, the English knights proved to be as narrow-minded as their French counterparts, employing the classic cavalry charge despite the new challenge of the Scottish pike. In the battles of Stirling Bridge (1297) and Bannockburn (1314) they were defeated by the Scots. While the English imitated this tactic successfully against the French, the Swiss perfected it. Despite longer lances for the knights, this formation was now almost impenetrable. Pikemen with polearms remained an important part of armies throughout the Thirty Years' War. Later tactics used against this formation included caracole maneuvers with ranged weapons. However, a well-trained cavalry force could outflank a force of enemy pikemen on even terrain and triumph. The most elite knights, with the best armour, immense prowess and extremely-well trained horses, could charge pike formations and still, even if only scarcely, hold their own, sometimes even triumphing; however, the cost to raise and maintain such troops was enormous and impractical when considering alternative options to the head-on charge.
Lancers needed firm even ground and ample unobstructed space for a cavalry charge to be effective. Opponents could limit avenues for such charges by deploying their forces near rivers, marshes, woodlands, or other types of rough terrain. The later Roman generals were able to defeat the Parthian Cataphracts by securing their flanks. The Scots did this at Bannockburn and Stirling, and in nearly all their guerilla fighting against the English, as did the Welsh to a great extent. The Swiss defeated the Austrian knights at the Battle of Morgarten (1315) by attacking the knightly army in a narrow place between an acclivity and a swamp. The peasants of Dithmarschen faced in 1500, at Hemmingstedt, the army of the Danish king. They opened the dykes and flooded the country. If the terrain was not well suited for a cavalry attack, knights often fought on foot and used their lances as pikes.

New tactics of light cavalry and mounted infantry: With increasing firepower and no sufficient protection, the role of cavalry on the battlefield was slowly reduced. Light cavalry with firearms could return fire, but the aim from a moving platform was not as good as for infantry. So most important for cavalry was the ability to quickly attack enemy cavalry or scattered infantry with lances and sabres. Speed reduced the time vulnerable to gunfire, but still closed formations became impossible to defeat. This tactic was a striking surprise of Mongolian light cavalry in the battle of the Kalka River. The alternative was to use them as dragoons, reaching their positions quickly, dismounting, and fighting like infantry, often with projectile weapons. Such a way of fighting had started in Europe at least in the mid-13th century with mounted longbow and crossbow archers, but was also employed by the Mongols with their Buryatian longbows.

Cavalry in modern warfare: Cavalry is featured in modern warfare with cavalrymen retaining the light cavalry missions, albeit the missions of reconnaissance and security remain the same. Heavy cavalry, as such, has its role of shock effect fulfilled by tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles.

Land cavalry: Since the early 20th century, the use of horses and other animals for frontline cavalry has been largely supplanted by infantry fighting vehicles and armored cars. The first regular cavalry unit to mechanize was the 11th Hussars of the British Army, switching from horses to armored cars in 1928. Since then, many cavalry units have mechanized and switched to armored vehicles and armed helicopters, with horses only being used for ceremonial purposes, if not phased out of service entirely. However, some modern units, such as the Indian Army's 61st Cavalry and some People's Liberation Army's border units in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, continue to use horses on deployments.
Examples of modern military vehicles built specifically for the cavalry role include the M3 Bradley CFV and the M113 ACAV.

Air cavalry: Air cavalry, originally sky cavalry is a United States Army term that refers to helicopter-equipped units that perform reconnaissance, screening, security, and economy-of-force missions.