Grand strategy
Failed states, in this view, are sources of instability; rogue states can sponsor terrorism, acquire weapons of mass destruction, and behave unpredictably; illiberal peer competitors would compete directly with the United States and "would complicate the spread of liberal institutions and the construction of liberal states." Support for liberal hegemonic strategies among major thinkers in both political parties helps explain the broad elite support for the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 2011 intervention in Libya, even though U.S. military involvement in those conflicts had been initiated by presidents of different parties. The chief difference on foreign policy between Republican and Democratic proponents of liberal hegemony, according to Posen, is on support for international institutions as a means to achieving hegemony.

Restraint: Proponents of a grand strategy of restraint call for the United States to significantly reduce its overseas security commitments and largely avoid involvement in conflicts abroad. America would take advantage of what Posen calls a "remarkably good" strategic position: "[The United States] is rich, distant from other great powers, and defended by a powerful nuclear deterrent. Other great powers are at present weaker than the United States, close to one another, and face the same pressures to defend themselves as does the United States." Proponents of strategic restraint argue, consistent with the realist tradition, that states are self-interested and accordingly will look out for their own interests and balance against aggressors; however, when possible, states prefer to "free ride" or "cheap ride," passing the buck to other states to bear the cost of balancing. Restraint proponents also emphasize the deterrent power of nuclear weapons, which tremendously raise the stakes of confrontations between great powers, breeding caution, rather than rewarding aggression. Restraint advocates see nationalism as a powerful force, one that makes states even more resistant to outside conquest and thus makes the international system more stable. Restraint proponents also argue, drawing on thinkers like the Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz, that military force is a blunt, expensive, and unpredictable instrument, and that it accordingly should only be used rarely, for clear goals.
Restraint is distinct from isolationism: isolationists favor restricting trade and immigration and tend to believe that events in the outside world have little impact within the United States. As already noted, it is sometimes confused with non-interventionism. Restraint, however, sees economic dynamism as a key source of national power and accordingly tends to argue for a relatively open trade system. Some restrainers call for supporting this trade system via significant naval patrols; others suggest that the international economy is resilient against disruptions and, with rare exceptions, does not require a powerful state to guarantee the security of global trade.

Offshore balancing: In offshore balancing, the United States would refrain from significant involvement in security affairs overseas except to prevent a state from establishing hegemony in what offshore balancers identify as the world's three key strategic regions: Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf. This strategy advocates a significantly reduced overseas presence compared to liberal hegemony, but argues that intervention is necessary in more circumstances than restraint. Offshore balancing is associated with offensive realist theories of state behavior: it believes that conquest can often enable states to gain power, and thus that a hegemon in regions with large economies, high populations, or critical resources could quickly become a global menace to U.S. national interests.

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Sources: Heuser, Beatrice (2010). The Evolution of Strategy. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511762895. ISBN 978-0-521-19968-1.
Kennedy, Paul M. (1991). Grand Strategies in War and Peace. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-05666-2.
Posen, Barry R. (2014). Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-7086-8.
Platias, Athanassios; Koliopoulos, Constantinos (2017). Thucydides on Strategy: Grand Strategies in the Peloponnesian War and Their Relevance Today. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-754805-9.

Further reading: Gaddis, John Lewis (2018). On Grand Strategy. United States: Penguin Press. ISBN 978-1594203510.
Art, Robert J (2004). A Grand Strategy for America. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-8957-0.
Biddle, Stephen. American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment Archived 2018-04-26 at the Wayback Machine. April 2005
Clausewitz, Carl von. On War
Liddell Hart, B. H. Strategy. London:Faber, 1967 (2nd rev. ed.)
Luttwak, E. The Grand strategy of the Roman Empire
Papasotiriou, Harry. Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire
Borgwardt, Elizabeth; Nichols, Christopher Mcknight; Preston, Andrew, eds. (2021). Rethinking American Grand Strategy. doi:10.1093/oso/9780190695668.001.0001. ISBN 978-0-19-069566-8.