Hybrid warfare
Iranian Quds Force operatives acted as mentors and suppliers of advanced systems.
Hezbollah leveraged mass communication immediately distributing battlefield photos and videos dominating the perception battle throughout the conflict. Israel did not lose the war on the battlefield but lost the information battle, as the overwhelming perception  then of Israeli defeat.

2014 ISIL advance into Iraq: The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is a non-state actor that uses hybrid tactics against the conventional Iraqi military. ISIL has transitional aspirations and uses irregular and regular tactics and terrorism. In response, Iraq turned to hybrid tactics itself by using non-state and international actors to counter the ISIL advance. The United States was a hybrid participant and used a combination of traditional air power, advisers to Iraqi government troops, Kurdish peshmerga, sectarian militias; it also trained opposition forces within Syria. The hybrid war is a conflict with an interconnected group of state and non-state actors pursuing overlapping goals and a weak local state.

Russian activities in the 2010s: The Russian government's wide use in conflicts the Syrian Civil War and the Russo-Ukrainian War, of private military contractors such as those of the Wagner Group was in 2018 singled out by experts as a key part of Russia's strategy of hybrid warfare to advance its interests and obfuscating its involvement and role. Specifically, Russia employed a combination of traditional combat warfare, economic influence, cyber strategies, and disinformation attacks against Ukraine.
Regarding Russia, Jānis Bērziņš, the director of the Center for Security and Strategic Research, has widely published to argue that using the term "hybrid" to characterize the Russian strategy is misleading since Russia has its own definitions and concepts: "the word 'hybrid' is catchy since it can represent a mix of anything. However, its basic framework differs from the one developed by the Russians due to the former being a military concept and the result of American military thought. Moreover, the concept of New Generation Warfare includes conventional operations. In other words, Hybrid Warfare might be part of New Generation Warfare but cannot define it."
Michael Kofman, a senior research scientist at CNA and a fellow at the Wilson Center's Kennan Institute, noted in March 2018 that the West′s frequent references to hybrid warfare were in effect "an unintelligible Western reaction, after decades of wars of choice against paltry adversaries, to confrontation with another power that is capable across the full spectrum of conflict."
Russia's activities in the former Soviet states have been described as Hobbesian and redolent of Cold War thinking.
General Philip Breedlove, in a US Senate hearing in February 2016, claimed that Russia is using refugees to weaken Europe and is directing the influx of refugees to destabilize areas and regions in terms of economy and to create social unrest. On 10 February 2016, Finnish Defence Minister Jussi Niinistö told a meeting of NATO Defence Ministers that Finland expects Russia to open a second front, with as many as 1 million migrants possibly arriving over the Finnish-Russian border. A similar statement was made by Ilkka Kanerva, Finland's former foreign minister and now the chairman of the country's parliamentary Defense Committee.

United States on Russian activities: Moscow has accused Washington of conducting hybrid warfare against Russia during the colour revolutions. Its perception of being at war or in a permanent state of conflict with the US and its allies was furthered by the 2014 Maidan uprising in Ukraine.
Speaking at the Valdai Discussion Club in November 2014, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said:

It is an interesting term, but I would apply it above all to the United States and its war strategy – it is truly a hybrid war aimed not so much at defeating the enemy militarily as at changing the regimes in the states that pursue a policy Washington does not like. It is using financial and economic pressure, information attacks, using others on the perimeter of a corresponding state as proxies and of course information and ideological pressure through externally financed non-governmental organisations. Is it not a hybrid process and not what we call war?

Iranian activities in the 2010s: Iran's foreign policy exhibits characteristics associated with hybrid warfare. According to the BBC, "Iran, along with its Houthi allies [in Yemen], is conducting a classic war of the weak against the strong; a "hybrid conflict" as it is known in the strategic textbooks. It is borrowing many of the tactics from the Russian play-book – the use of deniability; proxies; cyber-operations and information warfare."

Iran perceptions of US: The US was accused in 2019 by Ali Shamkhani, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, of conducting hybrid warfare against Iran and other countries.

Saudi and Emirati activities in the 2010s: Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have been accused of conducting hybrid warfare against Qatar.

Chinese activities: China has been accused of conducting hybrid warfare against Taiwan and in the South China Sea.

Belarusian activities in 2021: Poland and the Baltic states have accused Belarus of conducting hybrid warfare against the European Union by organizing illegal border crossings with migrants into Latvia, Lithuania and Poland with the aim of destabilizing the 27-nation bloc.

See also: 

References: 

Further reading: Bond, Margaret S. (2007). Hybrid War: A New Paradigm for Stability Operations in Failing States (PDF). Carlisle Barracks, Pa: USAWC Strategy Research Project. U.S. Army War College. Archived (PDF) from the original on May 10, 2010.
Cuomo, Scott A.; Brian J. Donlon (2008). "Training a 'Hybrid' Warrior". Marine Corps Gazette. Archived from the original on 2010-10-17.
Fleming, Brian P. (2011). The Hybrid Threat Concept: Contemporary War, Military Planning and the Advent of Unrestricted Operational Art. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), U.S. Army Command & General Staff College.
Galeotti, Mark (5 March 2018). "I'm Sorry for Creating the 'Gerasimov Doctrine'". Foreign Policy. Slate Group. Retrieved 19 March 2022.
Galeotti, Mark (2018). "The mythical 'Gerasimov Doctrine' and the language of threat". Critical Studies on Security. 7 (2). Informa UK Limited: 157–161. doi:10.1080/21624887.2018.1441623. ISSN 2162-4887. OCLC 8319522816. S2CID 159811828.
Glenn, Russell W. "Thoughts on Hybrid Conflict" (PDF). Small Wars Journal.
Grant, Greg (May 1, 2008). Hybrid Wars. Government Executive. Archived from the original on 8 August 2010. Retrieved 7 October 2010.
Hoffman, Frank G. "Future Thoughts on Hybrid Threats" (PDF). Small Wars Journal.
Hoffman, Frank G. (March 2006). "How Marines are preparing for hybrid wars". Armed Forces Journal. Archived from the original on 2010-10-26. Retrieved 2010-09-17.
Hoffman, Frank G. (2009). Hybrid warfare and challenges (PDF). JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly. pp. 34–48. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2010-10-17. Retrieved 2010-09-17.
Hoffman, Frank G; Mattis, James N. (November 2005). Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars Proceedings (PDF). pp. 1–2. Retrieved July 11, 2017.
Killebrew, Robert (June 2008). "Good advice: Hybrid warfare demands an indirect approach". Armed Forces Journal. Archived from the original on 2010-10-17. Retrieved 2010-09-17.
Stowell, Joshua (April 15, 2018). "What is Hybrid Warfare?". Global Security Review. Retrieved 4 August 2018.
Vision-Alonzo, G. (2017). The Carrera Revolt and "Hybrid Warfare" in Nineteenth Century Central America. London: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-3-319-58340-2.
Mumford, A.; Carlucci, P. (2022). "Hybrid warfare: The continuation of ambiguity by other means". European Journal of International Security. 8 (2): 1–15. doi:10.1017/eis.2022.19. S2CID 249826788.

External links: 
U.S. GAO – Hybrid Warfare
MunichSecurityReport2015 section 3