Military strategy
Strategic Defense Initiative (also known as "Star Wars") during its 1980s development (Russian: стратегическая оборонная инициатива – СОИ) which became a core part of the strategic doctrine based on Defense containment.
The all-out nuclear World War III between NATO and the Warsaw Pact did not take place. The United States recently (April 2010) acknowledged a new approach to its nuclear policy which describes the weapons' purpose as "primarily" or "fundamentally" to deter or respond to a nuclear attack.

Post–Cold War: Strategy in the post Cold War is shaped by the global geopolitical situation: a number of potent powers in a multipolar array which has arguably come to be dominated by the hyperpower status of the United States, which increasingly relies on advanced technology to minimize casualties and to improve efficiency. The technological leaps brought by the Digital Revolution are essential for the U.S. strategy.
The gap in strategy today (from a Western viewpoint) lies in what Americans call "asymmetric warfare": the battle against guerrilla forces by conventional national armed forces. The classical strategic triumvirate of politics/military/populace is very weak against protracted warfare of paramilitary forces such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army, Hezbollah, ETA, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), and Al-Qaeda. The ability of conventional forces to deliver utility (effect) from their hugely powerful forces is largely nullified by the difficulties of distinguishing and separating combatants from the civilian populace in whose company they hide. The use of the military by the politicians to police areas seen as bases for these guerrillas leads to them becoming targets themselves which eventually undermines the support of the populace from whom they come and whose values they represent.
Parties to conflict which see themselves as vastly or temporarily inferior may adopt a strategy of "hunkering down" – witness Iraq in 1991 or Yugoslavia in 1999.
The primary effect of insurgent elements upon conventional force strategy is realized in the twofold exploitation of the inherent violence of military operations. Conventional armies face political attrition for each action they take. Insurgent forces can cause harm and create chaos (whereby the conventional army suffers a loss of confidence and esteem); or they can drive the conventional elements into an attack which further exacerbates the civilian condition.
The major militaries of today are largely set up to fight the "last war" (previous war) and hence have huge armoured and conventionally configured infantry formations backed up by air-forces and navies designed to support or prepare for these forces. Many are today deployed against guerrilla-style opponents where their strengths cannot be used to effect. The mass formations of industrial warfare are often seen as much less effective than the unconventional forces that modern militaries may also possess. The new opponents operate at a local level, whereas industrial armed forces work at a much higher "theatre" level. The nervous system of these new opponents is largely political rather than military-hierarchical and adapted to the local supporting populace who hide them. The centre provides the political idea and driving logic, perhaps with overall direction and some funding. Local groups decide their own plans, raise much of their own funding and may be more or less aligned to the centre's aims. Defeat of guerilla forces (when revealed) does not disable this type of organisation, many modern attack strategies will tend to increase the power of the group they intend to weaken. A new more political strategy is perhaps more appropriate here – with military backing. Such a strategy has been illustrated in the war against the IRA, though an adoption and codification are unclear.

Netwar: A main point in asymmetric warfare is the nature of paramilitary organizations such as Al-Qaeda which are involved in guerrilla military actions but which are not traditional organizations with a central authority defining their military and political strategies. Organizations such as Al-Qaeda may exist as a sparse network of groups lacking central coordination, making them more difficult to confront following standard strategic approaches. This new field of strategic thinking is tackled by what is now defined as netwar.

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Bibliography: Brands, Hal, ed. The New Makers of Modern Strategy: From the Ancient World to the Digital Age (2023) excerpt, 46 essays by experts on ideas of famous strategists; 1200 pp
Carpenter, Stanley D. M., Military Leadership in the British Civil Wars, 1642–1651: The Genius of This Age, Routledge, 2005.
Chaliand, Gérard, The Art of War in World History: From Antiquity to the Nuclear Age, University of California Press, 1994.
Gartner, Scott Sigmund, Strategic Assessment in War, Yale University Press, 1999.
Heuser, Beatrice, The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge University Press, 2010), ISBN 978-0-521-19968-1.
Matloff, Maurice, (ed.), American Military History: 1775–1902, volume 1, Combined Books, 1996.
May, Timothy. The Mongol Art of War: Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Military System. Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword, 2007. ISBN 978-1844154760.
Wilden, Anthony, Man and Woman, War and Peace: The Strategist's Companion, Routledge, 1987.

Further reading: The US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute publishes several dozen papers and books yearly focusing on current and future military strategy and policy, national security, and global and regional strategic issues. Most publications are relevant to the International strategic community, both academically and militarily. All are freely available to the public in PDF format. The organization was founded by General Dwight D. Eisenhower after World War II.
Black, Jeremy, Introduction to Global Military History: 1775 to the Present Day, Routledge Press, 2005.
D'Aguilar, G.C., Napoleon's Military Maxims, free ebook, Napoleon's Military Maxims.
Freedman, Lawrence. Strategy: A History (2013) excerpt
Holt, Thaddeus, The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War, Simon and Schuster, June, 2004, hardcover, 1184 pages, ISBN 0-7432-5042-7.
Tomes, Robert R., US Defense Strategy from Vietnam to Operation Iraqi Freedom: Military Innovation and the New American Way of War, 1973–2003, Routledge Press, 2007.