<sod>''Appearance and Reality'' comprises two volumes: "Appearance" and "Reality". Bradley argues in the first volume that most things, including objects and their qualities, time and space, causation, the self, and things-in-themselves, are appearances, while in the second volume he attempts to describe the reality these appearances misrepresent to us: the Absolute, a single cosmic experience of which people are components. Concepts such as objects provide a pragmatically useful way of thinking about the world. Being incoherent, such concepts cannot provide a finally satisfactory grasp of reality. For example, something in the Absolute corresponds to time, but it is so unlike time as ordinarily conceived that time as normally understood must be considered an illusion. However, reality (as predicate) is a matter of degree: concepts are true or false of reality (as thing) in different degrees. The concept of the Absolute is more adequate than that of time, but both are only ways of attempting to understand what the intellect cannot fully comprehend. Bradley tries to establish these conclusions by arguing that reality must have a unitary togetherness that cannot be captured by the ordinary conception of many distinct things in relation, and that all concrete reality must somehow be psychical in nature. Reality is one vast eternal self-experiencing many-in-one.<ref name="Sprigge" /><eod>
<sod>''Appearance and Reality'' comprises two volumes: "Appearance" and "Reality". Bradley argues in the first volume that most things, including objects and their qualities, time and space, causation, the self, and things-in-themselves, are appearances, while in the second volume he attempts to describe the reality these appearances misrepresent to us: the Absolute, a single cosmic experience of which people are components. Ordinary concepts provide a pragmatically useful way of thinking about the world, but being incoherent they cannot provide a satisfactory grasp of reality. For example, something in the Absolute corresponds to time, but it is so unlike time as ordinarily conceived that time as normally understood must be considered an illusion. However, reality (as predicate) is a matter of degree: concepts are true or false of reality (as thing) in different degrees. The concept of the Absolute is more adequate than that of time, but both are only ways of attempting to understand what the intellect cannot fully comprehend. Bradley tries to establish these conclusions by arguing that reality must have a unitary togetherness that cannot be captured by the ordinary conception of many distinct things in relation, and that all concrete reality must somehow be psychical in nature. Reality is one vast eternal self-experiencing many-in-one.<ref name="Sprigge" /><eod>