<sod>When the editors of ''Geisteswissenschaften'' invited Scheler (about 1913/14) to write on the then developing philosophical method of [[Phenomenology (philosophy)|phenomenology]], Scheler indicated a reservation concerning the task because he could only report his own viewpoint on phenomenology and there was no "phenomenological school" defined by universally accepted theses.  There was only a circle of philosophers bound by a "common bearing and attitude toward philosophical problems."<ref name="Max Scheler 1973">Max Scheler, ''Selected Philosophical Essays'', "Phenomenology and the Theory of Cognition," trans. David Lachterman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 137.</ref>  Scheler never agreed with [[Husserl]] that phenomenology is a method in the strict sense, but rather "an attitude of spiritual seeing...something which otherwise remains hidden...."<ref name="Max Scheler 1973"/>  Calling phenomenology a method fails to take seriously the phenomenological domain of original experience: the givenness of phenomenological facts (essences or values as ''a priori'') "before they have been fixed by [[logic]],"<ref name="Max Scheler 1973"/> and prior to assuming a set of criteria or symbols, as is the case in the empirical and human sciences as well as other (modern) philosophies which tailor their methods to those of the sciences.<eod>
<sod>When the editors of ''Geisteswissenschaften'' invited Scheler (about 1913/14) to write on the then developing philosophical method of [[Phenomenology (philosophy)|phenomenology]], Scheler indicated a reservation concerning the task because he could only report his own viewpoint on phenomenology and there was no "phenomenological school" defined by universally accepted theses.  There was only a circle of philosophers bound by a "common bearing and attitude toward philosophical problems."<ref name="Max Scheler 1973">Max Scheler, ''Selected Philosophical Essogy and the Theory of Cognition," trans. David Lachterman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 137.</ref>  Scheler never agreed with [[Husserl]] that phenomenology is a method in the strict sense, but rather "an attitude of spiritual seeing...something which otherwise remains hidden...."<ref name="Max Scheler 1973"/>  Calling phenomenology a method fails to take seriously the phenomenological domain of original experience: the givenness of phenomenological facts (essences or values as ''a priori'') "before they have been fixed by [[logic]],"<ref name="Max Scheler 1973"/> and prior to assuming a set of criteria or symbols, as is the case in the empirical and human sciences as well as other (modern) .<eod>