<sod>In February 2016, Simon R. Blackburn and [[Matt Robshaw|Matthew J. B. Robshaw]] published a preprint containing a range of practical attacks against the draft ISO/IEC 29167-20 over-the-air protocol, including impersonation of a target tag with negligible amount of time and memory and full private key recovery requiring 2<sup>49</sup> time and 2<sup>48</sup> memory.<ref>{{cite paper |authors=Simon R. Blackburn, M.J.B. Robshaw|date=2016-02-02 |title=On the Security of the Algebraic Eraser Tag Authentication Protocol |url=https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/091.pdf }}</ref> Atkins and Goldfield responded that adding a [[Cryptographic hash function|hash]] or [[message authentication code]] to the draft protocol defeats these attacks.<ref>{{cite paper |authors=[[Derek Atkins]], [[Dorian Goldfeld]]|date=2016-02-25|title=Addressing the Algebraic Eraser Diffie--Hellman Over-the-Air Protocol |url=http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/205 }}</ref><eod>
<sod>In February 2016, Simon R. Blackburn and [[Matt Robshaw|Matthew J. B. Robshaw]] published a preprint containing a range of practical attacks against the draft ISO/IEC 29167-20 over-the-air protocol, including impersonation of a target tag with negligible amount of time and memory and full private key recovery requiring 2<sup>49</sup> time and 2<sup>48</sup> memory.<ref>{{cite paper |authors=Simon R. Blackburn, M.J.B. Robshaw|date=2016-02-02 |title=On the Security of the Algebraic Eraser Tag Authentication Protocol |url=https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/091.pdf }}</ref> Atkins and Goldfeld responded that adding a [[Cryptographic hash function|hash]] or [[message authentication code]] to the draft protocol defeats these attacks.<ref>{{cite paper |authors=[[Derek Atkins]], [[Dorian Goldfeld]]|date=2016-02-25|title=Addressing the Algebraic Eraser Diffie--Hellman Over-the-Air Protocol |url=http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/205 }}</ref><eod>