<sod>In his [[theory of descriptions]], Russell held the view that most proper names in ordinary language are in fact "disguised [[definite description]]s". For example, 'Aristotle' can be understood as "The pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander," or by some other uniquely applying description. The theory of descriptions was conflated with Frege's theory of sense, and for most of the twentieth century this 'Frege-Russell' view was taken as something of an orthodoxy. However, [[Saul Kripke]] argued compellingly against descriptivism. According to Kripke,<ref>''Naming and Necessity'', Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980, 48-9</ref> proper names are [[rigid designator]]s which designate the same object in every possible world. Descriptions such as 'the President of the U.S. in 1970' do not designate the same in every possible world. For example, someone other than [[Richard Nixon]], e.g. [[Hubert Humphrey]], might have been the President in 1970. Hence a description (or cluster of descriptions) cannot be a rigid designator, and thus a proper name cannot ''mean'' the same as a description. <ref>''Naming and Necessity'' p.57</ref><eod>
<sod>In his [[theory of descriptions]], Russell held the view that most proper names in ordinary language are in fact "disguised [[definite description]]s". For example, 'Aristotle' can be understood as "The pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander," or by some other uniquely applying description. This is known as the [[descriptivist theory of names]]. Because Frege used definite descriptions in many of his examples, he is often taken to have endorsed the descriptivist theory. Thus Russell's theory of descriptions was conflated with Frege's theory of sense, and for most of the twentieth century this 'Frege-Russell' view was the orthodox view of proper name semantics. However, [[Saul Kripke]] argued compellingly against the descriptivist theory. According to Kripke,<ref>''Naming and Necessity'', Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980, 48-9</ref> proper names are [[rigid designator]]s which designate the same object in every possible world. Descriptions such as 'the President of the U.S. in 1970' do not designate the same in every possible world. For example, someone other than [[Richard Nixon]], e.g. [[Hubert Humphrey]], might have been the President in 1970. Hence a description (or cluster of descriptions) cannot be a rigid designator, and thus a proper name cannot ''mean'' the same as a description. <ref>''Naming and Necessity'' p.57</ref><eod>