text:
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed: March 18th, 1963
Precedential Status: Precedential
Citations: 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799, 1963 U.S. LEXIS 1942
Docket Number: 155
Supreme Court Database ID: 1962-058
Author: Hugo Lafayette Black

372 U.S. 335 (1963)
GIDEON
v.
WAINWRIGHT, CORRECTIONS DIRECTOR.

No. 155.
Supreme Court of United States.

Argued January 15, 1963.
Decided March 18, 1963.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA.
Abe Fortas, by appointment of the Court, 370 U.S. 932, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Abe Krash and Ralph Temple.

Bruce R. Jacob, Assistant Attorney General of Florida, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Richard W. Ervin, Attorney General, and A. G. Spicola, Jr., Assistant Attorney General.

J. Lee Rankin, by special leave of Court, argued the cause for the American Civil Liberties Union et al., as amici curiae, urging reversal. With him on the brief were Norman Dorsen, John Dwight Evans, Jr., Melvin L. Wulf, Richard J. Medalie, Howard W. Dixon and Richard Yale Feder.

George D. Mentz, Assistant Attorney General of Alabama, argued the cause for the State of Alabama, as *336 amicus curiae, urging affirmance. With him on the brief were MacDonald Gallion, Attorney General of Alabama, T. W. Bruton, Attorney General of North Carolina, and Ralph Moody, Assistant Attorney General of North Carolina.

A brief for the state governments of twenty-two States and Commonwealths, as amici curiae, urging reversal, was filed by Edward J. McCormack, Jr., Attorney General of Massachusetts, Walter F. Mondale, Attorney General of Minnesota, Duke W. Dunbar, Attorney General of Colorado, Albert L. Coles, Attorney General of Connecticut, Eugene Cook, Attorney General of Georgia, Shiro Kashiwa, Attorney General of Hawaii, Frank Benson, Attorney General of Idaho, William G. Clark, Attorney General of Illinois, Evan L. Hultman, Attorney General of Iowa, John B. Breckinridge, Attorney General of Kentucky, Frank E. Hancock, Attorney General of Maine, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Thomas F. Eagleton, Attorney General of Missouri, Charles E. Springer, Attorney General of Nevada, Mark McElroy, Attorney General of Ohio, Leslie R. Burgum, Attorney General of North Dakota, Robert Y. Thornton, Attorney General of Oregon, J. Joseph Nugent, Attorney General of Rhode Island, A. C. Miller, Attorney General of South Dakota, John J. O'Connell, Attorney General of Washington, C. Donald Robertson, Attorney General of West Virginia, and George N. Hayes, Attorney General of Alaska.

Robert Y. Thornton, Attorney General of Oregon, and Harold W. Adams, Assistant Attorney General, filed a separate brief for the State of Oregon, as amicus curiae.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner was charged in a Florida state court with having broken and entered a poolroom with intent to commit a misdemeanor. This offense is a felony under *337 Florida law. Appearing in court without funds and without a lawyer, petitioner asked the court to appoint counsel for him, whereupon the following colloquy took place:

"The COURT: Mr. Gideon, I am sorry, but I cannot appoint Counsel to represent you in this case. Under the laws of the State of Florida, the only time the Court can appoint Counsel to represent a Defendant is when that person is charged with a capital offense. I am sorry, but I will have to deny your request to appoint Counsel to defend you in this case.
"The DEFENDANT: The United States Supreme Court says I am entitled to be represented by Counsel."
Put to trial before a jury, Gideon conducted his defense about as well as could be expected from a layman. He made an opening statement to the jury, cross-examined the State's witnesses, presented witnesses in his own defense, declined to testify himself, and made a short argument "emphasizing his innocence to the charge contained in the Information filed in this case." The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and petitioner was sentenced to serve five years in the state prison. Later, petitioner filed in the Florida Supreme Court this habeas corpus petition attacking his conviction and sentence on the ground that the trial court's refusal to appoint counsel for him denied him rights "guaranteed by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights by the United States Government."[1] Treating the petition for habeas corpus as properly before it, the State Supreme Court, "upon consideration thereof" but without an opinion, denied all relief. Since 1942, when Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, was decided by a divided *338 Court, the problem of a defendant's federal constitutional right to counsel in a state court has been a continuing source of controversy and litigation in both state and federal courts.[2] To give this problem another review here, we granted certiorari.  370 U.S. 908. Since Gideon was proceeding in forma pauperis, we appointed counsel to represent him and requested both sides to discuss in their briefs and oral arguments the following: "Should this Court's holding in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, be reconsidered?"

I.

The facts upon which Betts claimed that he had been unconstitutionally denied the right to have counsel appointed to assist him are strikingly like the facts upon which Gideon here bases his federal constitutional claim. Betts was indicated for robbery in a Maryland state court. On arraignment, he told the trial judge of his lack of funds to hire a lawyer and asked the court to appoint one for him. Betts was advised that it was not the practice in that county to appoint counsel for indigent defendants except in murder and rape cases. He then pleaded not guilty, had witnesses summoned, cross-examined the State's witnesses, examined his own, and chose not to testify himself. He was found guilty by the judge, sitting without a jury, and sentenced to eight years in prison. *339 Like Gideon, Betts sought release by habeas corpus, alleging that he had been denied the right to assistance of counsel in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Betts was denied any relief, and on review this Court affirmed. It was held that a refusal to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant charged with a felony did not necessarily violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which for reasons given the Court deemed to be the only applicable federal constitutional provision. The Court said:

"Asserted denial [of due process] is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the light of other considerations, fall short of such denial." 316 U. S., at 462.
Treating due process as "a concept less rigid and more fluid than those envisaged in other specific and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights," the Court held that refusal to appoint counsel under the particular facts and circumstances in the Betts case was not so "offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness" as to amount to a denial of due process. Since the facts and circumstances of the two cases are so nearly indistinguishable, we think the Betts v. Brady holding if left standing would require us to reject Gideon's claim that the Constitution guarantees him the assistance of counsel. Upon full reconsideration we conclude that Betts v. Brady should be overruled.

II.

The Sixth Amendment provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." We have construed *340 this to mean that in federal courts counsel must be provided for defendants unable to employ counsel unless the right is competently and intelligently waived.[3] Betts argued that this right is extended to indigent defendants in state courts by the Fourteenth Amendment. In response the Court stated that, while the Sixth Amendment laid down "no rule for the conduct of the States, the question recurs whether the constraint laid by the Amendment upon the national courts expresses a rule so fundamental and essential to a fair trial, and so, to due process of law, that it is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment." 316 U. S., at 465. In order to decide whether the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is of this fundamental nature, the Court in Betts set out and considered "[r]elevant data on the subject . . . afforded by constitutional and statutory provisions subsisting in the colonies and the States prior to the inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the national Constitution, and in the constitutional, legislative, and judicial history of the States to the present date." 316 U. S., at 465. On the basis of this historical data the Court concluded that "appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial." 316 U. S., at 471. It was for this reason the Betts Court refused to accept the contention that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel for indigent federal defendants was extended to or, in the words of that Court, "made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment." Plainly, had the Court concluded that appointment of counsel for an indigent criminal defendant was "a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial." it would have held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires appointment of counsel in a state court, just as the Sixth Amendment requires in a federal court.

*341 We think the Court in Betts had ample precedent for acknowledging that those guarantees of the Bill of Rights which are fundamental safeguards of liberty immune from federal abridgment are equally protected against state invasion by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This same principle was recognized, explained, and applied in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), a case upholding the right of counsel, where the Court held that despite sweeping language to the contrary in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), the Fourteenth Amendment "embraced" those " `fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions,' " even though they had been "specifically dealt with in another part of the federal Constitution." 287 U. S., at 67. In many cases other than Powell and Betts, this Court has looked to the fundamental nature of original Bill of Rights guarantees to decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment makes them obligatory on the States. Explicitly recognized to be of this "fundamental nature" and therefore made immune from state invasion by the Fourteenth, or some part of it, are the First Amendment's freedoms of speech, press, religion, assembly, association, and petition for redress of grievances.[4] For the same reason, though not always in precisely the same terminology, the Court has made obligatory on the States the Fifth Amendment's command that *342 private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation,[5] the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures,[6] and the Eighth's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.[7] On the other hand, this Court in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), refused to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment made the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment obligatory on the States. In so refusing, however, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Cardozo, was careful to emphasize that "immunities that are valid as against the federal government by force of the specific pledges of particular amendments have been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the states" and that guarantees "in their origin . . . effective against the federal government alone" had by prior cases "been taken over from the earlier articles of the federal bill of rights and brought within the Fourteenth Amendment by a process of absorption." 302 U. S., at 324-325, 326.

We accept Betts v. Brady's assumption, based as it was on our prior cases, that a provision of the Bill of Rights which is "fundamental and essential to a fair trial" is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. We think the Court in Betts was wrong, however, in concluding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is not one of these fundamental rights. Ten years before Betts v. Brady, this Court, after full consideration of all the historical data examined in Betts, had unequivocally declared that "the right to the aid of *343 counsel is of this fundamental character." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932). While the Court at the close of its Powell opinion did by its language, as this Court frequently does, limit its holding to the particular facts and circumstances of that case, its conclusions about the fundamental nature of the right to counsel are unmistakable. Several years later, in 1936, the Court reemphasized what it had said about the fundamental nature of the right to counsel in this language:

"We concluded that certain fundamental rights, safeguarded by the first eight amendments against federal action, were also safeguarded against state action by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and among them the fundamental right of the accused to the aid of counsel in a criminal prosecution." Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-244 (1936).
And again in 1938 this Court said:

"[The assistance of counsel] is one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty.. . . The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not `still be done.' " Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938). To the same effect, see Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940), and Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941).
In light of these and many other prior decisions of this Court, it is not surprising that the Betts Court, when faced with the contention that "one charged with crime, who is unable to obtain counsel, must be furnished counsel by the State," conceded that "[e]xpressions in the opinions of this court lend color to the argument . . . ." 316 U. S., at 462-463. The fact is that in deciding as it did— that "appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, *344 essential to a fair trial"—the Court in Betts v. Brady made an abrupt break with its own well-considered precedents. In returning to these old precedents, sounder we believe than the new, we but restore constitutional principles established to achieve a fair system of justice. Not only these precedents but also reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth. Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the public's interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him. A defendant's need for a lawyer is nowhere better stated than in the moving words of Mr. Justice Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama:

"The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be *345 heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence." 287 U. S., at 68-69.
The Court in Betts v. Brady departed from the sound wisdom upon which the Court's holding in Powell v. Alabama rested. Florida, supported by two other States, has asked that Betts v. Brady be left intact. Twenty-two States, as friends of the Court, argue that Betts was "an anachronism when handed down" and that it should now be overruled. We agree.

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Supreme Court of Florida for further action not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS.

While I join the opinion of the Court, a brief historical résumé of the relation between the Bill of Rights and the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment seems pertinent. Since the adoption of that Amendment, ten Justices have felt that it protects from infringement by the States the privileges, protections, and safeguards granted by the Bill of Rights.

*346 Justice Field, the first Justice Harlan, and probably Justice Brewer, took that position in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 362-363, 370-371, as did Justices BLACK, DOUGLAS, Murphy and Rutledge in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72, 124. And see Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 515-522 (dissenting opinion). That view was also expressed by Justice Bradley and Swayne in the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 118-119, 122, and seemingly was accepted by Justice Clifford when he dissented with Justice Field in Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92.[1] Unfortunately it has never commanded a Court. Yet, happily, all constitutional questions are always open. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64. And what we do today does not foreclose the matter.

My Brother HARLAN is of the view that a guarantee of the Bill of Rights that is made applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment is a lesser version of that same guarantee as applied to the Federal Government.[2] Mr. Justice Jackson shared that view.[3]*347 But that view has not prevailed[4] and rights protected against state invasion by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are not watered-down versions of what the Bill of Rights guarantees.

MR. JUSTICE CLARK, concurring in the result.

In Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948), this Court found no special circumstances requiring the appointment of counsel but stated that "if these charges had been capital charges, the court would have been required, both by the state statute and the decisions of this Court interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, to take some such steps." Id., at 674. Prior to that case I find no language in any cases in this Court indicating that appointment of counsel in all capital cases was required by the Fourteenth Amendment.[1] At the next Term of the Court Mr. Justice Reed revealed that the Court was divided as to noncapital cases but that "the due process clause . . . requires counsel for all persons charged with serious crimes . . . ." Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 (1948). Finally, in Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), we said that "[w]hen one pleads to a capital charge without benefit of counsel, we do not stop to determine whether prejudice resulted." Id., at 55.

*348 That the Sixth Amendment requires appointment of counsel in "all criminal prosecutions" is clear, both from the language of the Amendment and from this Court's interpretation. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). It is equally clear from the above cases, all decided after Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), that the Fourteenth Amendment requires such appointment in all prosecutions for capital crimes. The Court's decision today, then, does no more than erase a distinction which has no basis in logic and an increasingly eroded basis in authority. In Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960), we specifically rejected any constitutional distinction between capital and noncapital offenses as regards congressional power to provide for court-martial trials of civilian dependents of armed forces personnel. Having previously held that civilian dependents could not constitutionally be deprived of the protections of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments in capital cases, Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), we held that the same result must follow in noncapital cases. Indeed, our opinion there foreshadowed the decision today,[2] as we noted that:

"Obviously Fourteenth Amendment cases dealing with state action have no application here, but if *349 they did, we believe that to deprive civilian dependents of the safeguards of a jury trial here . . . would be as invalid under those cases as it would be in cases of a capital nature." 361 U. S., at 246-247.
I must conclude here, as in Kinsella, supra, that the Constitution makes no distinction between capital and noncapital cases. The Fourteenth Amendment requires due process of law for the deprival of "liberty" just as for deprival of "life," and there cannot constitutionally be a difference in the quality of the process based merely upon a supposed difference in the sanction involved. How can the Fourteenth Amendment tolerate a procedure which it condemns in capital cases on the ground that deprival of liberty may be less onerous than deprival of life—a value judgment not universally accepted[3]—or that only the latter deprival is irrevocable? I can find no acceptable rationalization for such a result, and I therefore concur in the judgment of the Court.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring.

I agree that Betts v. Brady should be overruled, but consider it entitled to a more respectful burial than has been accorded, at least on the part of those of us who were not on the Court when that case was decided.

I cannot subscribe to the view that Betts v. Brady represented "an abrupt break with its own well-considered precedents." Ante, p. 344. In 1932, in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, a capital case, this Court declared that under the particular facts there presented—"the ignorance and illiteracy of the defendants, their youth, the circumstances of public hostility . . . and above all that they stood in deadly peril of their lives" (287 U. S., at 71)—the state court had a duty to assign counsel for *350 the trial as a necessary requisite of due process of law. It is evident that these limiting facts were not added to the opinion as an afterthought; they were repeatedly emphasized, see 287 U. S., at 52, 57-58, 71, and were clearly regarded as important to the result.

Thus when this Court, a decade later, decided Betts v. Brady, it did no more than to admit of the possible existence of special circumstances in noncapital as well as capital trials, while at the same time insisting that such circumstances be shown in order to establish a denial of due process. The right to appointed counsel had been recognized as being considerably broader in federal prosecutions, see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, but to have imposed these requirements on the States would indeed have been "an abrupt break" with the almost immediate past. The declaration that the right to appointed counsel in state prosecutions, as established in Powell v. Alabama, was not limited to capital cases was in truth not a departure from, but an extension of, existing precedent.

The principles declared in Powell and in Betts, however, have had a troubled journey throughout the years that have followed first the one case and then the other. Even by the time of the Betts decision, dictum in at least one of the Court's opinions had indicated that there was an absolute right to the services of counsel in the trial of state capital cases.[1] Such dicta continued to appear in subsequent decisions,[2] and any lingering doubts were finally eliminated by the holding of Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52.

In noncapital cases, the "special circumstances" rule has continued to exist in form while its substance has been substantially and steadily eroded. In the first decade after Betts, there were cases in which the Court *351 found special circumstances to be lacking, but usually by a sharply divided vote.[3] However, no such decision has been cited to us, and I have found none, after Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660, decided in 1950. At the same time, there have been not a few cases in which special circumstances were found in little or nothing more than the "complexity" of the legal questions presented, although those questions were often of only routine difficulty.[4] The Court has come to recognize, in other words, that the mere existence of a serious criminal charge constituted in itself special circumstances requiring the services of counsel at trial. In truth the Betts v. Brady rule is no longer a reality.

This evolution, however, appears not to have been fully recognized by many state courts, in this instance charged with the front-line responsibility for the enforcement of constitutional rights.[5] To continue a rule which is honored by this Court only with lip service is not a healthy thing and in the long run will do disservice to the federal system.

The special circumstances rule has been formally abandoned in capital cases, and the time has now come when it should be similarly abandoned in noncapital cases, at least as to offenses which, as the one involved here, carry the possibility of a substantial prison sentence. (Whether the rule should extend to all criminal cases need not now be decided.) This indeed does no more than to make explicit something that has long since been foreshadowed in our decisions.

*352 In agreeing with the Court that the right to counsel in a case such as this should now be expressly recognized as a fundamental right embraced in the Fourteenth Amendment, I wish to make a further observation. When we hold a right or immunity, valid against the Federal Government, to be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"[6] and thus valid against the States, I do not read our past decisions to suggest that by so holding, we automatically carry over an entire body of federal law and apply it in full sweep to the States. Any such concept would disregard the frequently wide disparity between the legitimate interests of the States and of the Federal Government, the divergent problems that they face, and the significantly different consequences of their actions. Cf. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 496-508 (separate opinion of this writer). In what is done today I do not understand the Court to depart from the principles laid down in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, or to embrace the concept that the Fourteenth Amendment "incorporates" the Sixth Amendment as such.

On these premises I join in the judgment of the Court.

NOTES

[1] Later in the petition for habeas corpus, signed and apparently prepared by petitioner himself, he stated, "I, Clarence Earl Gideon, claim that I was denied the rights of the 4th, 5th and 14th amendments of the Bill of Rights."

[2] Of the many such cases to reach this Court, recent examples are Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962); Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697 (1960); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957). Illustrative cases in the state courts are Artrip v. State, 136 So. 2d 574 (Ct. App. Ala. 1962); Shaffer v. Warden, 211 Md. 635, 126 A.2d 573 (1956). For examples of commentary, see Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8 De Paul L. Rev. 213 (1959); Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1962); The Right to Counsel, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 693 (1961).

[3] Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).

[4] E. g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (speech and press); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) (speech and press); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 321 (1958) (speech); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936) (press); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (religion); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (assembly); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486, 488 (1960) (association); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296 (1961) (association); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (speech, assembly, petition for redress of grievances).

[5] E. g., Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-241 (1897); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 522-526 (1898).

[6] E. g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).

[7] Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).

[1] Justices Bradley, Swayne and Field emphasized that the first eight Amendments granted citizens of the United States certain privileges and immunities that were protected from abridgment by the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Slaughter-House Cases, supra, at 118-119; O'Neil v. Vermont, supra, at 363. Justices Harlan and Brewer accepted the same theory in the O'Neil case (see id., at 370-371), though Justice Harlan indicated that all "persons," not merely "citizens," were given this protection. Ibid. In Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 117, Justice Harlan's position was made clear:

"In my judgment, immunity from self-incrimination is protected against hostile state action, not only by . . . [the Privileges and Immunities Clause], but [also] by . . . [the Due Process Clause]."

Justice Brewer, in joining the opinion of the Court, abandoned the view that the entire Bill of Rights applies to the States in Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581.

[2] See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 501, 506; Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 169.

[3] Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 288. Cf. the opinions of Justices Holmes and Brandeis in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672, and Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372.

[4] The cases are collected by MR. JUSTICE BLACK in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 530. And see, Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 274-276.

[1] It might, however, be said that there is such an implication in Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940), a capital case in which counsel had been appointed but in which the petitioner claimed a denial of "effective" assistance. The Court in affirming noted that "[h]ad petitioner been denied any representation of counsel at all, such a clear violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of assistance of counsel would have required reversal of his conviction." Id., at 445. No "special circumstances" were recited by the Court, but in citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), as authority for its dictum it appears that the Court did not rely solely on the capital nature of the offense.

[2] Portents of today's decision may be found as well in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), and Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961). In Griffin, a noncapital case, we held that the petitioner's constitutional rights were violated by the State's procedure, which provided free transcripts for indigent defendants only in capital cases. In Ferguson we struck down a state practice denying the appellant the effective assistance of counsel, cautioning that "[o]ur decision does not turn on the facts that the appellant was tried for a capital offense and was represented by employed counsel. The command of the Fourteenth Amendment also applies in the case of an accused tried for a noncapital offense, or represented by appointed counsel." 365 U. S., at 596.

[3] See, e. g., Barzun, In Favor of Capital Punishment, 31 American Scholar 181, 188-189 (1962).

[1] Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 445.

[2] E. g., Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 674; Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441.

[3] E. g., Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134; Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640; Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728.

[4] E. g., Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471; Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697; Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443.

[5] See, e. g., Common wealth ex rel. Simon v. Maroney, 405 Pa. 562, 176 A.2d 94 (1961); Shaffer v. Warden, 211 Md. 635, 126 A.2d 573 (1956); Henderson v. Bannan, 256 F.2d 363 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1958).

[6] Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325.

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text: petitioner

text: With

text: him

text: on

text: the

text: brief

text: were

text: Abe

text: Krash

text: and

text: Ralph

text: Temple

text: Bruce

text: R

text: Jacob

text: Assistant

text: Attorney

text: General

text: of

text: Florida

text: argued

text: the

text: cause

text: for

text: respondent

text: With

text: him

text: on

text: the

text: brief

text: were

text: Richard

text: W

text: Ervin

text: Attorney

text: General

text: and

text: A

text: G

text: Spicola

text: Jr

text: Assistant

text: Attorney

text: General

text: J

text: Lee

text: Rankin

text: by

text: special

text: leave

text: of

text: Court

text: argued

text: the

text: cause

text: for

text: the

text: American

text: Civil

text: Liberties

text: Union

text: et

text: al

text: as

text: amici

text: curiae

text: urging

text: reversal

text: With

text: him

text: on

text: the

text: brief

text: were

text: Norman

text: Dorsen

text: John

text: Dwight

text: Evans

text: Jr

text: Melvin

text: L

text: Wulf

text: Richard

text: J

text: Medalie

text: Howard

text: W

text: Dixon

text: and

text: Richard

text: Yale

text: Feder

text: George

text: D

text: Mentz

text: Assistant

text: Attorney

text: General

text: of

text: Alabama

text: argued

text: the

text: cause

text: for

text: the

text: State

text: of

text: Alabama

text: as

text: amicus

text: curiae

text: urging

text: affirmance

text: With

text: him

text: on

text: the

text: brief

text: were

text: MacDonald

text: Gallion

text: Attorney

text: General

text: of

text: Alabama

text: T

text: W

text: Bruton

text: Attorney

text: General

text: of

text: North

text: Carolina

text: and

text: Ralph

text: Moody

text: Assistant

text: Attorney

text: General

text: of

text: North

text: Carolina

text: A

text: brief

text: for

text: the

text: state

text: governments

text: of

text: twenty

text: two

text: States

text: and

text: Commonwealths

text: as

text: amici

text: curiae

text: urging

text: reversal

text: was

text: filed

text: by

text: Edward

text: J

text: McCormack

text: Jr

text: Attorney

text: General

text: of

text: Massachusetts

text: Walter

text: F

text: Mondale

text: Attorney

text: General

text: of

text: Minnesota

text: Duke

text: W

text: Dunbar

text: Attorney

text: General

text: of

text: Colorado

text: Albert

text: L

text: Coles

text: Attorney

text: General

text: of

text: Connecticut

text: Eugene

text: Cook

text: Attorney

text: General

text: of

text: Georgia

text: Shiro

text: Kashiwa

text: Attorney

text: General

text: of

text: Hawaii

text: Frank

text: Benson

text: Attorney

text: General

text: of

text: Idaho

text: William

text: G

text: Clark

text: Attorney

text: General

text: of

text: Illinois

text: Evan

text: L

text: Hultman

text: Attorney

text: General

text: of

text: Iowa

text: John

text: B

text: Breckinridge

text: Attorney

text: General

text: of

text: Kentucky

text: Frank

text: E

text: Hancock

text: Attorney

text: General

text: of

text: Maine

text: Frank

text: J

text: Kelley

text: Attorney

text: General

text: of

text: Michigan

text: Thomas

text: F

text: Eagleton

text: Attorney

text: General

text: of

text: Missouri

text: Charles

text: E

text: Springer

text: Attorney

text: General

text: of

text: Nevada

text: Mark

text: McElroy

text: Attorney

text: General

text: of

text: Ohio

text: Leslie

text: R

text: Burgum

text: Attorney

text: General

text: of

text: North

text: Dakota

text: Robert

text: Y

text: Thornton

text: Attorney

text: General

text: of

text: Oregon

text: J

text: Joseph

text: Nugent

text: Attorney

text: General

text: of

text: Rhode

text: Island

text: A

text: C

text: Miller

text: Attorney

text: General

text: of

text: South

text: Dakota

text: John

text: J

text: O

text: Connell

text: Attorney

text: General

text: of

text: Washington

text: C

text: Donald

text: Robertson

text: Attorney

text: General

text: of

text: West

text: Virginia

text: and

text: George

text: N

text: Hayes

text: Attorney

text: General

text: of

text: Alaska

text: Robert

text: Y

text: Thornton

text: Attorney

text: General

text: of

text: Oregon

text: and

text: Harold

text: W

text: Adams

text: Assistant

text: Attorney

text: General

text: filed

text: a

text: separate

text: brief

text: for

text: the

text: State

text: of

text: Oregon

text: as

text: amicus

text: curiae

text: MR

text: JUSTICE

text: BLACK

text: delivered

text: the

text: opinion

text: of

text: the

text: Court

text: Petitioner

text: was

text: charged

text: in

text: a

text: Florida

text: state

text: court

text: with

text: having

text: broken

text: and

text: entered

text: a

text: poolroom

text: with

text: intent

text: to

text: commit

text: a

text: misdemeanor

text: This

text: offense

text: is

text: a

text: felony

text: under

text: Florida

text: law

text: Appearing

text: in

text: court

text: without

text: funds

text: and

text: without

text: a

text: lawyer

text: petitioner

text: asked

text: the

text: court

text: to

text: appoint

text: counsel

text: for

text: him

text: whereupon

text: the

text: following

text: colloquy

text: took

text: place

text: The

text: COURT

text: Mr

text: Gideon

text: I

text: am

text: sorry

text: but

text: I

text: cannot

text: appoint

text: Counsel

text: to

text: represent

text: you

text: in

text: this

text: case

text: Under

text: the

text: laws

text: of

text: the

text: State

text: of

text: Florida

text: the

text: only

text: time

text: the

text: Court

text: can

text: appoint

text: Counsel

text: to

text: represent

text: a

text: Defendant

text: is

text: when

text: that

text: person

text: is

text: charged

text: with

text: a

text: capital

text: offense

text: I

text: am

text: sorry

text: but

text: I

text: will

text: have

text: to

text: deny

text: your

text: request

text: to

text: appoint

text: Counsel

text: to

text: defend

text: you

text: in

text: this

text: case

text: The

text: DEFENDANT

text: The

text: United

text: States

text: Supreme

text: Court

text: says

text: I

text: am

text: entitled

text: to

text: be

text: represented

text: by

text: Counsel

text: Put

text: to

text: trial

text: before

text: a

text: jury

text: Gideon

text: conducted

text: his

text: defense

text: about

text: as

text: well

text: as

text: could

text: be

text: expected

text: from

text: a

text: layman

text: He

text: made

text: an

text: opening

text: statement

text: to

text: the

text: jury

text: cross

text: examined

text: the

text: State

text: s

text: witnesses

text: presented

text: witnesses

text: in

text: his

text: own

text: defense

text: declined

text: to

text: testify

text: himself

text: and

text: made

text: a

text: short

text: argument

text: emphasizing

text: his

text: innocence

text: to

text: the

text: charge

text: contained

text: in

text: the

text: Information

text: filed

text: in

text: this

text: case

text: The

text: jury

text: returned

text: a

text: verdict

text: of

text: guilty

text: and

text: petitioner

text: was

text: sentenced

text: to

text: serve

text: five

text: years

text: in

text: the

text: state

text: prison

text: Later

text: petitioner

text: filed

text: in

text: the

text: Florida

text: Supreme

text: Court

text: this

text: habeas

text: corpus

text: petition

text: attacking

text: his

text: conviction

text: and

text: sentence

text: on

text: the

text: ground

text: that

text: the

text: trial

text: court

text: s

text: refusal

text: to

text: appoint

text: counsel

text: for

text: him

text: denied

text: him

text: rights

text: guaranteed

text: by

text: the

text: Constitution

text: and

text: the

text: Bill

text: of

text: Rights

text: by

text: the

text: United

text: States

text: Government

text: Treating

text: the

text: petition

text: for

text: habeas

text: corpus

text: as

text: properly

text: before

text: it

text: the

text: State

text: Supreme

text: Court

text: upon

text: consideration

text: thereof

text: but

text: without

text: an

text: opinion

text: denied

text: all

text: relief

text: Since

text: when

text: Betts

text: v

text: Brady

text: U

text: S

text: was

text: decided

text: by

text: a

text: divided

text: Court

text: the

text: problem

text: of

text: a

text: defendant

text: s

text: federal

text: constitutional

text: right

text: to

text: counsel

text: in

text: a

text: state

text: court

text: has

text: been

text: a

text: continuing

text: source

text: of

text: controversy

text: and

text: litigation

text: in

text: both

text: state

text: and

text: federal

text: courts

text: To

text: give

text: this

text: problem

text: another

text: review

text: here

text: we

text: granted

text: certiorari

text: U

text: S

text: Since

text: Gideon

text: was

text: proceeding

text: in

text: forma

text: pauperis

text: we

text: appointed

text: counsel

text: to

text: represent

text: him

text: and

text: requested

text: both

text: sides

text: to

text: discuss

text: in

text: their

text: briefs

text: and

text: oral

text: arguments

text: the

text: following

text: Should

text: this

text: Court

text: s

text: holding

text: in

text: Betts

text: v

text: Brady

text: U

text: S

text: be

text: reconsidered

text: I

text: The

text: facts

text: upon

text: which

text: Betts

text: claimed

text: that

text: he

text: had

text: been

text: unconstitutionally

text: denied

text: the

text: right

text: to

text: have

text: counsel

text: appointed

text: to

text: assist

text: him

text: are

text: strikingly

text: like

text: the

text: facts

text: upon

text: which

text: Gideon

text: here

text: bases

text: his

text: federal

text: constitutional

text: claim

text: Betts

text: was

text: indicated

text: for

text: robbery

text: in

text: a

text: Maryland

text: state

text: court

text: On

text: arraignment

text: he

text: told

text: the

text: trial

text: judge

text: of

text: his

text: lack

text: of

text: funds

text: to

text: hire

text: a

text: lawyer

text: and

text: asked

text: the

text: court

text: to

text: appoint

text: one

text: for

text: him

text: Betts

text: was

text: advised

text: that

text: it

text: was

text: not

text: the

text: practice

text: in

text: that

text: county

text: to

text: appoint

text: counsel

text: for

text: indigent

text: defendants

text: except

text: in

text: murder

text: and

text: rape

text: cases

text: He

text: then

text: pleaded

text: not

text: guilty

text: had

text: witnesses

text: summoned

text: cross

text: examined

text: the

text: State

text: s

text: witnesses

text: examined

text: his

text: own

text: and

text: chose

text: not

text: to

text: testify

text: himself

text: He

text: was

text: found

text: guilty

text: by

text: the

text: judge

text: sitting

text: without

text: a

text: jury

text: and

text: sentenced

text: to

text: eight

text: years

text: in

text: prison

text: Like

text: Gideon

text: Betts

text: sought

text: release

text: by

text: habeas

text: corpus

text: alleging

text: that

text: he

text: had

text: been

text: denied

text: the

text: right

text: to

text: assistance

text: of

text: counsel

text: in

text: violation

text: of

text: the

text: Fourteenth

text: Amendment

text: Betts

text: was

text: denied

text: any

text: relief

text: and

text: on

text: review

text: this

text: Court

text: affirmed

text: It

text: was

text: held

text: that

text: a

text: refusal

text: to

text: appoint

text: counsel

text: for

text: an

text: indigent

text: defendant

text: charged

text: with

text: a

text: felony

text: did

text: not

text: necessarily

text: violate

text: the

text: Due

text: Process

text: Clause

text: of

text: the

text: Fourteenth

text: Amendment

text: which

text: for

text: reasons

text: given

text: the

text: Court

text: deemed

text: to

text: be

text: the

text: only

text: applicable

text: federal

text: constitutional

text: provision

text: The

text: Court

text: said

text: Asserted

text: denial

text: of

text: due

text: process

text: is

text: to

text: be

text: tested

text: by

text: an

text: appraisal

text: of

text: the

text: totality

text: of

text: facts

text: in

text: a

text: given

text: case

text: That

text: which

text: may

text: in

text: one

text: setting

text: constitute

text: a

text: denial

text: of

text: fundamental

text: fairness

text: shocking

text: to

text: the

text: universal

text: sense

text: of

text: justice

text: may

text: in

text: other

text: circumstances

text: and

text: in

text: the

text: light

text: of

text: other

text: considerations

text: fall

text: short

text: of

text: such

text: denial

text: U

text: S

text: at

text: Treating

text: due

text: process

text: as

text: a

text: concept

text: less

text: rigid

text: and

text: more

text: fluid

text: than

text: those

text: envisaged

text: in

text: other

text: specific

text: and

text: particular

text: provisions

text: of

text: the

text: Bill

text: of

text: Rights

text: the

text: Court

text: held

text: that

text: refusal

text: to

text: appoint

text: counsel

text: under

text: the

text: particular

text: facts

text: and

text: circumstances

text: in

text: the

text: Betts

text: case

text: was

text: not

text: so

text: offensive

text: to

text: the

text: common

text: and

text: fundamental

text: ideas

text: of

text: fairness

text: as

text: to

text: amount

text: to

text: a

text: denial

text: of

text: due

text: process

text: Since

text: the

text: facts

text: and

text: circumstances

text: of

text: the

text: two

text: cases

text: are

text: so

text: nearly

text: indistinguishable

text: we

text: think

text: the

text: Betts

text: v

text: Brady

text: holding

text: if

text: left

text: standing

text: would

text: require

text: us

text: to

text: reject

text: Gideon

text: s

text: claim

text: that

text: the

text: Constitution

text: guarantees

text: him

text: the

text: assistance

text: of

text: counsel

text: Upon

text: full

text: reconsideration

text: we

text: conclude

text: that

text: Betts

text: v

text: Brady

text: should

text: be

text: overruled

text: II

text: The

text: Sixth

text: Amendment

text: provides

text: In

text: all

text: criminal

text: prosecutions

text: the

text: accused

text: shall

text: enjoy

text: the

text: right

text: to

text: have

text: the

text: Assistance

text: of

text: Counsel

text: for

text: his

text: defence

text: We

text: have

text: construed

text: this

text: to

text: mean

text: that

text: in

text: federal

text: courts

text: counsel

text: must

text: be

text: provided

text: for

text: defendants

text: unable

text: to

text: employ

text: counsel

text: unless

text: the

text: right

text: is

text: competently

text: and

text: intelligently

text: waived

text: Betts

text: argued

text: that

text: this

text: right

text: is

text: extended

text: to

text: indigent

text: defendants

text: in

text: state

text: courts

text: by

text: the

text: Fourteenth

text: Amendment

text: In

text: response

text: the

text: Court

text: stated

text: that

text: while

text: the

text: Sixth

text: Amendment

text: laid

text: down

text: no

text: rule

text: for

text: the

text: conduct

text: of

text: the

text: States

text: the

text: question

text: recurs

text: whether

text: the

text: constraint

text: laid

text: by

text: the

text: Amendment

text: upon

text: the

text: national

text: courts

text: expresses

text: a

text: rule

text: so

text: fundamental

text: and

text: essential

text: to

text: a

text: fair

text: trial

text: and

text: so

text: to

text: due

text: process

text: of

text: law

text: that

text: it

text: is

text: made

text: obligatory

text: upon

text: the

text: States

text: by

text: the

text: Fourteenth

text: Amendment

text: U

text: S

text: at

text: In

text: order

text: to

text: decide

text: whether

text: the

text: Sixth

text: Amendment

text: s

text: guarantee

text: of

text: counsel

text: is

text: of

text: this

text: fundamental

text: nature

text: the

text: Court

text: in

text: Betts

text: set

text: out

text: and

text: considered

text: r

text: elevant

text: data

text: on

text: the

text: subject

text: afforded

text: by

text: constitutional

text: and

text: statutory

text: provisions

text: subsisting

text: in

text: the

text: colonies

text: and

text: the

text: States

text: prior

text: to

text: the

text: inclusion

text: of

text: the

text: Bill

text: of

text: Rights

text: in

text: the

text: national

text: Constitution

text: and

text: in

text: the

text: constitutional

text: legislative

text: and

text: judicial

text: history

text: of

text: the

text: States

text: to

text: the

text: present

text: date

text: U

text: S

text: at

text: On

text: the

text: basis

text: of

text: this

text: historical

text: data

text: the

text: Court

text: concluded

text: that

text: appointment

text: of

text: counsel

text: is

text: not

text: a

text: fundamental

text: right

text: essential

text: to

text: a

text: fair

text: trial

text: U

text: S

text: at

text: It

text: was

text: for

text: this

text: reason

text: the

text: Betts

text: Court

text: refused

text: to

text: accept

text: the

text: contention

text: that

text: the

text: Sixth

text: Amendment

text: s

text: guarantee

text: of

text: counsel

text: for

text: indigent

text: federal

text: defendants

text: was

text: extended

text: to

text: or

text: in

text: the

text: words

text: of

text: that

text: Court

text: made

text: obligatory

text: upon

text: the

text: States

text: by

text: the

text: Fourteenth

text: Amendment

text: Plainly

text: had

text: the

text: Court

text: concluded

text: that

text: appointment

text: of

text: counsel

text: for

text: an

text: indigent

text: criminal

text: defendant

text: was

text: a

text: fundamental

text: right

text: essential

text: to

text: a

text: fair

text: trial

text: it

text: would

text: have

text: held

text: that

text: the

text: Fourteenth

text: Amendment

text: requires

text: appointment

text: of

text: counsel

text: in

text: a

text: state

text: court

text: just

text: as

text: the

text: Sixth

text: Amendment

text: requires

text: in

text: a

text: federal

text: court

text: We

text: think

text: the

text: Court

text: in

text: Betts

text: had

text: ample

text: precedent

text: for

text: acknowledging

text: that

text: those

text: guarantees

text: of

text: the

text: Bill

text: of

text: Rights

text: which

text: are

text: fundamental

text: safeguards

text: of

text: liberty

text: immune

text: from

text: federal

text: abridgment

text: are

text: equally

text: protected

text: against

text: state

text: invasion

text: by

text: the

text: Due

text: Process

text: Clause

text: of

text: the

text: Fourteenth

text: Amendment

text: This

text: same

text: principle

text: was

text: recognized

text: explained

text: and

text: applied

text: in

text: Powell

text: v

text: Alabama

text: U

text: S

text: a

text: case

text: upholding

text: the

text: right

text: of

text: counsel

text: where

text: the

text: Court

text: held

text: that

text: despite

text: sweeping

text: language

text: to

text: the

text: contrary

text: in

text: Hurtado

text: v

text: California

text: U

text: S

text: the

text: Fourteenth

text: Amendment

text: embraced

text: those

text: fundamental

text: principles

text: of

text: liberty

text: and

text: justice

text: which

text: lie

text: at

text: the

text: base

text: of

text: all

text: our

text: civil

text: and

text: political

text: institutions

text: even

text: though

text: they

text: had

text: been

text: specifically

text: dealt

text: with

text: in

text: another

text: part

text: of

text: the

text: federal

text: Constitution

text: U

text: S

text: at

text: In

text: many

text: cases

text: other

text: than

text: Powell

text: and

text: Betts

text: this

text: Court

text: has

text: looked

text: to

text: the

text: fundamental

text: nature

text: of

text: original

text: Bill

text: of

text: Rights

text: guarantees

text: to

text: decide

text: whether

text: the

text: Fourteenth

text: Amendment

text: makes

text: them

text: obligatory

text: on

text: the

text: States

text: Explicitly

text: recognized

text: to

text: be

text: of

text: this

text: fundamental

text: nature

text: and

text: therefore

text: made

text: immune

text: from

text: state

text: invasion

text: by

text: the

text: Fourteenth

text: or

text: some

text: part

text: of

text: it

text: are

text: the

text: First

text: Amendment

text: s

text: freedoms

text: of

text: speech

text: press

text: religion

text: assembly

text: association

text: and

text: petition

text: for

text: redress

text: of

text: grievances

text: For

text: the

text: same

text: reason

text: though

text: not

text: always

text: in

text: precisely

text: the

text: same

text: terminology

text: the

text: Court

text: has

text: made

text: obligatory

text: on

text: the

text: States

text: the

text: Fifth

text: Amendment

text: s

text: command

text: that

text: private

text: property

text: shall

text: not

text: be

text: taken

text: for

text: public

text: use

text: without

text: just

text: compensation

text: the

text: Fourth

text: Amendment

text: s

text: prohibition

text: of

text: unreasonable

text: searches

text: and

text: seizures

text: and

text: the

text: Eighth

text: s

text: ban

text: on

text: cruel

text: and

text: unusual

text: punishment

text: On

text: the

text: other

text: hand

text: this

text: Court

text: in

text: Palko

text: v

text: Connecticut

text: U

text: S

text: refused

text: to

text: hold

text: that

text: the

text: Fourteenth

text: Amendment

text: made

text: the

text: double

text: jeopardy

text: provision

text: of

text: the

text: Fifth

text: Amendment

text: obligatory

text: on

text: the

text: States

text: In

text: so

text: refusing

text: however

text: the

text: Court

text: speaking

text: through

text: Mr

text: Justice

text: Cardozo

text: was

text: careful

text: to

text: emphasize

text: that

text: immunities

text: that

text: are

text: valid

text: as

text: against

text: the

text: federal

text: government

text: by

text: force

text: of

text: the

text: specific

text: pledges

text: of

text: particular

text: amendments

text: have

text: been

text: found

text: to

text: be

text: implicit

text: in

text: the

text: concept

text: of

text: ordered

text: liberty

text: and

text: thus

text: through

text: the

text: Fourteenth

text: Amendment

text: become

text: valid

text: as

text: against

text: the

text: states

text: and

text: that

text: guarantees

text: in

text: their

text: origin

text: effective

text: against

text: the

text: federal

text: government

text: alone

text: had

text: by

text: prior

text: cases

text: been

text: taken

text: over

text: from

text: the

text: earlier

text: articles

text: of

text: the

text: federal

text: bill

text: of

text: rights

text: and

text: brought

text: within

text: the

text: Fourteenth

text: Amendment

text: by

text: a

text: process

text: of

text: absorption

text: U

text: S

text: at

text: We

text: accept

text: Betts

text: v

text: Brady

text: s

text: assumption

text: based

text: as

text: it

text: was

text: on

text: our

text: prior

text: cases

text: that

text: a

text: provision

text: of

text: the

text: Bill

text: of

text: Rights

text: which

text: is

text: fundamental

text: and

text: essential

text: to

text: a

text: fair

text: trial

text: is

text: made

text: obligatory

text: upon

text: the

text: States

text: by

text: the

text: Fourteenth

text: Amendment

text: We

text: think

text: the

text: Court

text: in

text: Betts

text: was

text: wrong

text: however

text: in

text: concluding

text: that

text: the

text: Sixth

text: Amendment

text: s

text: guarantee

text: of

text: counsel

text: is

text: not

text: one

text: of

text: these

text: fundamental

text: rights

text: Ten

text: years

text: before

text: Betts

text: v

text: Brady

text: this

text: Court

text: after

text: full

text: consideration

text: of

text: all

text: the

text: historical

text: data

text: examined

text: in

text: Betts

text: had

text: unequivocally

text: declared

text: that

text: the

text: right

text: to

text: the

text: aid

text: of

text: counsel

text: is

text: of

text: this

text: fundamental

text: character

text: Powell

text: v

text: Alabama

text: U

text: S

text: While

text: the

text: Court

text: at

text: the

text: close

text: of

text: its

text: Powell

text: opinion

text: did

text: by

text: its

text: language

text: as

text: this

text: Court

text: frequently

text: does

text: limit

text: its

text: holding

text: to

text: the

text: particular

text: facts

text: and

text: circumstances

text: of

text: that

text: case

text: its

text: conclusions

text: about

text: the

text: fundamental

text: nature

text: of

text: the

text: right

text: to

text: counsel

text: are

text: unmistakable

text: Several

text: years

text: later

text: in

text: the

text: Court

text: reemphasized

text: what

text: it

text: had

text: said

text: about

text: the

text: fundamental

text: nature

text: of

text: the

text: right

text: to

text: counsel

text: in

text: this

text: language

text: We

text: concluded

text: that

text: certain

text: fundamental

text: rights

text: safeguarded

text: by

text: the

text: first

text: eight

text: amendments

text: against

text: federal

text: action

text: were

text: also

text: safeguarded

text: against

text: state

text: action

text: by

text: the

text: due

text: process

text: of

text: law

text: clause

text: of

text: the

text: Fourteenth

text: Amendment

text: and

text: among

text: them

text: the

text: fundamental

text: right

text: of

text: the

text: accused

text: to

text: the

text: aid

text: of

text: counsel

text: in

text: a

text: criminal

text: prosecution

text: Grosjean

text: v

text: American

text: Press

text: Co

text: U

text: S

text: And

text: again

text: in

text: this

text: Court

text: said

text: The

text: assistance

text: of

text: counsel

text: is

text: one

text: of

text: the

text: safeguards

text: of

text: the

text: Sixth

text: Amendment

text: deemed

text: necessary

text: to

text: insure

text: fundamental

text: human

text: rights

text: of

text: life

text: and

text: liberty

text: The

text: Sixth

text: Amendment

text: stands

text: as

text: a

text: constant

text: admonition

text: that

text: if

text: the

text: constitutional

text: safeguards

text: it

text: provides

text: be

text: lost

text: justice

text: will

text: not

text: still

text: be

text: done

text: Johnson

text: v

text: Zerbst

text: U

text: S

text: To

text: the

text: same

text: effect

text: see

text: Avery

text: v

text: Alabama

text: U

text: S

text: and

text: Smith

text: v

text: O

text: Grady

text: U

text: S

text: In

text: light

text: of

text: these

text: and

text: many

text: other

text: prior

text: decisions

text: of

text: this

text: Court

text: it

text: is

text: not

text: surprising

text: that

text: the

text: Betts

text: Court

text: when

text: faced

text: with

text: the

text: contention

text: that

text: one

text: charged

text: with

text: crime

text: who

text: is

text: unable

text: to

text: obtain

text: counsel

text: must

text: be

text: furnished

text: counsel

text: by

text: the

text: State

text: conceded

text: that

text: e

text: xpressions

text: in

text: the

text: opinions

text: of

text: this

text: court

text: lend

text: color

text: to

text: the

text: argument

text: U

text: S

text: at

text: The

text: fact

text: is

text: that

text: in

text: deciding

text: as

text: it

text: did

text: that

text: appointment

text: of

text: counsel

text: is

text: not

text: a

text: fundamental

text: right

text: essential

text: to

text: a

text: fair

text: trial

text: the

text: Court

text: in

text: Betts

text: v

text: Brady

text: made

text: an

text: abrupt

text: break

text: with

text: its

text: own

text: well

text: considered

text: precedents

text: In

text: returning

text: to

text: these

text: old

text: precedents

text: sounder

text: we

text: believe

text: than

text: the

text: new

text: we

text: but

text: restore

text: constitutional

text: principles

text: established

text: to

text: achieve

text: a

text: fair

text: system

text: of

text: justice

text: Not

text: only

text: these

text: precedents

text: but

text: also

text: reason

text: and

text: reflection

text: require

text: us

text: to

text: recognize

text: that

text: in

text: our

text: adversary

text: system

text: of

text: criminal

text: justice

text: any

text: person

text: haled

text: into

text: court

text: who

text: is

text: too

text: poor

text: to

text: hire

text: a

text: lawyer

text: cannot

text: be

text: assured

text: a

text: fair

text: trial

text: unless

text: counsel

text: is

text: provided

text: for

text: him

text: This

text: seems

text: to

text: us

text: to

text: be

text: an

text: obvious

text: truth

text: Governments

text: both

text: state

text: and

text: federal

text: quite

text: properly

text: spend

text: vast

text: sums

text: of

text: money

text: to

text: establish

text: machinery

text: to

text: try

text: defendants

text: accused

text: of

text: crime

text: Lawyers

text: to

text: prosecute

text: are

text: everywhere

text: deemed

text: essential

text: to

text: protect

text: the

text: public

text: s

text: interest

text: in

text: an

text: orderly

text: society

text: Similarly

text: there

text: are

text: few

text: defendants

text: charged

text: with

text: crime

text: few

text: indeed

text: who

text: fail

text: to

text: hire

text: the

text: best

text: lawyers

text: they

text: can

text: get

text: to

text: prepare

text: and

text: present

text: their

text: defenses

text: That

text: government

text: hires

text: lawyers

text: to

text: prosecute

text: and

text: defendants

text: who

text: have

text: the

text: money

text: hire

text: lawyers

text: to

text: defend

text: are

text: the

text: strongest

text: indications

text: of

text: the

text: widespread

text: belief

text: that

text: lawyers

text: in

text: criminal

text: courts

text: are

text: necessities

text: not

text: luxuries

text: The

text: right

text: of

text: one

text: charged

text: with

text: crime

text: to

text: counsel

text: may

text: not

text: be

text: deemed

text: fundamental

text: and

text: essential

text: to

text: fair

text: trials

text: in

text: some

text: countries

text: but

text: it

text: is

text: in

text: ours

text: From

text: the

text: very

text: beginning

text: our

text: state

text: and

text: national

text: constitutions

text: and

text: laws

text: have

text: laid

text: great

text: emphasis

text: on

text: procedural

text: and

text: substantive

text: safeguards

text: designed

text: to

text: assure

text: fair

text: trials

text: before

text: impartial

text: tribunals

text: in

text: which

text: every

text: defendant

text: stands

text: equal

text: before

text: the

text: law

text: This

text: noble

text: ideal

text: cannot

text: be

text: realized

text: if

text: the

text: poor

text: man

text: charged

text: with

text: crime

text: has

text: to

text: face

text: his

text: accusers

text: without

text: a

text: lawyer

text: to

text: assist

text: him

text: A

text: defendant

text: s

text: need

text: for

text: a

text: lawyer

text: is

text: nowhere

text: better

text: stated

text: than

text: in

text: the

text: moving

text: words

text: of

text: Mr

text: Justice

text: Sutherland

text: in

text: Powell

text: v

text: Alabama

text: The

text: right

text: to

text: be

text: heard

text: would

text: be

text: in

text: many

text: cases

text: of

text: little

text: avail

text: if

text: it

text: did

text: not

text: comprehend

text: the

text: right

text: to

text: be

text: heard

text: by

text: counsel

text: Even

text: the

text: intelligent

text: and

text: educated

text: layman

text: has

text: small

text: and

text: sometimes

text: no

text: skill

text: in

text: the

text: science

text: of

text: law

text: If

text: charged

text: with

text: crime

text: he

text: is

text: incapable

text: generally

text: of

text: determining

text: for

text: himself

text: whether

text: the

text: indictment

text: is

text: good

text: or

text: bad

text: He

text: is

text: unfamiliar

text: with

text: the

text: rules

text: of

text: evidence

text: Left

text: without

text: the

text: aid

text: of

text: counsel

text: he

text: may

text: be

text: put

text: on

text: trial

text: without

text: a

text: proper

text: charge

text: and

text: convicted

text: upon

text: incompetent

text: evidence

text: or

text: evidence

text: irrelevant

text: to

text: the

text: issue

text: or

text: otherwise

text: inadmissible

text: He

text: lacks

text: both

text: the

text: skill

text: and

text: knowledge

text: adequately

text: to

text: prepare

text: his

text: defense

text: even

text: though

text: he

text: have

text: a

text: perfect

text: one

text: He

text: requires

text: the

text: guiding

text: hand

text: of

text: counsel

text: at

text: every

text: step

text: in

text: the

text: proceedings

text: against

text: him

text: Without

text: it

text: though

text: he

text: be

text: not

text: guilty

text: he

text: faces

text: the

text: danger

text: of

text: conviction

text: because

text: he

text: does

text: not

text: know

text: how

text: to

text: establish

text: his

text: innocence

text: U

text: S

text: at

text: The

text: Court

text: in

text: Betts

text: v

text: Brady

text: departed

text: from

text: the

text: sound

text: wisdom

text: upon

text: which

text: the

text: Court

text: s

text: holding

text: in

text: Powell

text: v

text: Alabama

text: rested

text: Florida

text: supported

text: by

text: two

text: other

text: States

text: has

text: asked

text: that

text: Betts

text: v

text: Brady

text: be

text: left

text: intact

text: Twenty

text: two

text: States

text: as

text: friends

text: of

text: the

text: Court

text: argue

text: that

text: Betts

text: was

text: an

text: anachronism

text: when

text: handed

text: down

text: and

text: that

text: it

text: should

text: now

text: be

text: overruled

text: We

text: agree

text: The

text: judgment

text: is

text: reversed

text: and

text: the

text: cause

text: is

text: remanded

text: to

text: the

text: Supreme

text: Court

text: of

text: Florida

text: for

text: further

text: action

text: not

text: inconsistent

text: with

text: this

text: opinion

text: Reversed

text: MR

text: JUSTICE

text: DOUGLAS

text: While

text: I

text: join

text: the

text: opinion

text: of

text: the

text: Court

text: a

text: brief

text: historical

text: résumé

text: of

text: the

text: relation

text: between

text: the

text: Bill

text: of

text: Rights

text: and

text: the

text: first

text: section

text: of

text: the

text: Fourteenth

text: Amendment

text: seems

text: pertinent

text: Since

text: the

text: adoption

text: of

text: that

text: Amendment

text: ten

text: Justices

text: have

text: felt

text: that

text: it

text: protects

text: from

text: infringement

text: by

text: the

text: States

text: the

text: privileges

text: protections

text: and

text: safeguards

text: granted

text: by

text: the

text: Bill

text: of

text: Rights

text: Justice

text: Field

text: the

text: first

text: Justice

text: Harlan

text: and

text: probably

text: Justice

text: Brewer

text: took

text: that

text: position

text: in

text: O

text: Neil

text: v

text: Vermont

text: U

text: S

text: as

text: did

text: Justices

text: BLACK

text: DOUGLAS

text: Murphy

text: and

text: Rutledge

text: in

text: Adamson

text: v

text: California

text: U

text: S

text: And

text: see

text: Poe

text: v

text: Ullman

text: U

text: S

text: dissenting

text: opinion

text: That

text: view

text: was

text: also

text: expressed

text: by

text: Justice

text: Bradley

text: and

text: Swayne

text: in

text: the

text: Slaughter

text: House

text: Cases

text: Wall

text: and

text: seemingly

text: was

text: accepted

text: by

text: Justice

text: Clifford

text: when

text: he

text: dissented

text: with

text: Justice

text: Field

text: in

text: Walker

text: v

text: Sauvinet

text: U

text: S

text: Unfortunately

text: it

text: has

text: never

text: commanded

text: a

text: Court

text: Yet

text: happily

text: all

text: constitutional

text: questions

text: are

text: always

text: open

text: Erie

text: R

text: Co

text: v

text: Tompkins

text: U

text: S

text: And

text: what

text: we

text: do

text: today

text: does

text: not

text: foreclose

text: the

text: matter

text: My

text: Brother

text: HARLAN

text: is

text: of

text: the

text: view

text: that

text: a

text: guarantee

text: of

text: the

text: Bill

text: of

text: Rights

text: that

text: is

text: made

text: applicable

text: to

text: the

text: States

text: by

text: reason

text: of

text: the

text: Fourteenth

text: Amendment

text: is

text: a

text: lesser

text: version

text: of

text: that

text: same

text: guarantee

text: as

text: applied

text: to

text: the

text: Federal

text: Government

text: Mr

text: Justice

text: Jackson

text: shared

text: that

text: view

text: But

text: that

text: view

text: has

text: not

text: prevailed

text: and

text: rights

text: protected

text: against

text: state

text: invasion

text: by

text: the

text: Due

text: Process

text: Clause

text: of

text: the

text: Fourteenth

text: Amendment

text: are

text: not

text: watered

text: down

text: versions

text: of

text: what

text: the

text: Bill

text: of

text: Rights

text: guarantees

text: MR

text: JUSTICE

text: CLARK

text: concurring

text: in

text: the

text: result

text: In

text: Bute

text: v

text: Illinois

text: U

text: S

text: this

text: Court

text: found

text: no

text: special

text: circumstances

text: requiring

text: the

text: appointment

text: of

text: counsel

text: but

text: stated

text: that

text: if

text: these

text: charges

text: had

text: been

text: capital

text: charges

text: the

text: court

text: would

text: have

text: been

text: required

text: both

text: by

text: the

text: state

text: statute

text: and

text: the

text: decisions

text: of

text: this

text: Court

text: interpreting

text: the

text: Fourteenth

text: Amendment

text: to

text: take

text: some

text: such

text: steps

text: Id

text: at

text: Prior

text: to

text: that

text: case

text: I

text: find

text: no

text: language

text: in

text: any

text: cases

text: in

text: this

text: Court

text: indicating

text: that

text: appointment

text: of

text: counsel

text: in

text: all

text: capital

text: cases

text: was

text: required

text: by

text: the

text: Fourteenth

text: Amendment

text: At

text: the

text: next

text: Term

text: of

text: the

text: Court

text: Mr

text: Justice

text: Reed

text: revealed

text: that

text: the

text: Court

text: was

text: divided

text: as

text: to

text: noncapital

text: cases

text: but

text: that

text: the

text: due

text: process

text: clause

text: requires

text: counsel

text: for

text: all

text: persons

text: charged

text: with

text: serious

text: crimes

text: Uveges

text: v

text: Pennsylvania

text: U

text: S

text: Finally

text: in

text: Hamilton

text: v

text: Alabama

text: U

text: S

text: we

text: said

text: that

text: w

text: hen

text: one

text: pleads

text: to

text: a

text: capital

text: charge

text: without

text: benefit

text: of

text: counsel

text: we

text: do

text: not

text: stop

text: to

text: determine

text: whether

text: prejudice

text: resulted

text: Id

text: at

text: That

text: the

text: Sixth

text: Amendment

text: requires

text: appointment

text: of

text: counsel

text: in

text: all

text: criminal

text: prosecutions

text: is

text: clear

text: both

text: from

text: the

text: language

text: of

text: the

text: Amendment

text: and

text: from

text: this

text: Court

text: s

text: interpretation

text: See

text: Johnson

text: v

text: Zerbst

text: U

text: S

text: It

text: is

text: equally

text: clear

text: from

text: the

text: above

text: cases

text: all

text: decided

text: after

text: Betts

text: v

text: Brady

text: U

text: S

text: that

text: the

text: Fourteenth

text: Amendment

text: requires

text: such

text: appointment

text: in

text: all

text: prosecutions

text: for

text: capital

text: crimes

text: The

text: Court

text: s

text: decision

text: today

text: then

text: does

text: no

text: more

text: than

text: erase

text: a

text: distinction

text: which

text: has

text: no

text: basis

text: in

text: logic

text: and

text: an

text: increasingly

text: eroded

text: basis

text: in

text: authority

text: In

text: Kinsella

text: v

text: United

text: States

text: ex

text: rel

text: Singleton

text: U

text: S

text: we

text: specifically

text: rejected

text: any

text: constitutional

text: distinction

text: between

text: capital

text: and

text: noncapital

text: offenses

text: as

text: regards

text: congressional

text: power

text: to

text: provide

text: for

text: court

text: martial

text: trials

text: of

text: civilian

text: dependents

text: of

text: armed

text: forces

text: personnel

text: Having

text: previously

text: held

text: that

text: civilian

text: dependents

text: could

text: not

text: constitutionally

text: be

text: deprived

text: of

text: the

text: protections

text: of

text: Article

text: III

text: and

text: the

text: Fifth

text: and

text: Sixth

text: Amendments

text: in

text: capital

text: cases

text: Reid

text: v

text: Covert

text: U

text: S

text: we

text: held

text: that

text: the

text: same

text: result

text: must

text: follow

text: in

text: noncapital

text: cases

text: Indeed

text: our

text: opinion

text: there

text: foreshadowed

text: the

text: decision

text: today

text: as

text: we

text: noted

text: that

text: Obviously

text: Fourteenth

text: Amendment

text: cases

text: dealing

text: with

text: state

text: action

text: have

text: no

text: application

text: here

text: but

text: if

text: they

text: did

text: we

text: believe

text: that

text: to

text: deprive

text: civilian

text: dependents

text: of

text: the

text: safeguards

text: of

text: a

text: jury

text: trial

text: here

text: would

text: be

text: as

text: invalid

text: under

text: those

text: cases

text: as

text: it

text: would

text: be

text: in

text: cases

text: of

text: a

text: capital

text: nature

text: U

text: S

text: at

text: I

text: must

text: conclude

text: here

text: as

text: in

text: Kinsella

text: supra

text: that

text: the

text: Constitution

text: makes

text: no

text: distinction

text: between

text: capital

text: and

text: noncapital

text: cases

text: The

text: Fourteenth

text: Amendment

text: requires

text: due

text: process

text: of

text: law

text: for

text: the

text: deprival

text: of

text: liberty

text: just

text: as

text: for

text: deprival

text: of

text: life

text: and

text: there

text: cannot

text: constitutionally

text: be

text: a

text: difference

text: in

text: the

text: quality

text: of

text: the

text: process

text: based

text: merely

text: upon

text: a

text: supposed

text: difference

text: in

text: the

text: sanction

text: involved

text: How

text: can

text: the

text: Fourteenth

text: Amendment

text: tolerate

text: a

text: procedure

text: which

text: it

text: condemns

text: in

text: capital

text: cases

text: on

text: the

text: ground

text: that

text: deprival

text: of

text: liberty

text: may

text: be

text: less

text: onerous

text: than

text: deprival

text: of

text: life

text: a

text: value

text: judgment

text: not

text: universally

text: accepted

text: or

text: that

text: only

text: the

text: latter

text: deprival

text: is

text: irrevocable

text: I

text: can

text: find

text: no

text: acceptable

text: rationalization

text: for

text: such

text: a

text: result

text: and

text: I

text: therefore

text: concur

text: in

text: the

text: judgment

text: of

text: the

text: Court

text: MR

text: JUSTICE

text: HARLAN

text: concurring

text: I

text: agree

text: that

text: Betts

text: v

text: Brady

text: should

text: be

text: overruled

text: but

text: consider

text: it

text: entitled

text: to

text: a

text: more

text: respectful

text: burial

text: than

text: has

text: been

text: accorded

text: at

text: least

text: on

text: the

text: part

text: of

text: those

text: of

text: us

text: who

text: were

text: not

text: on

text: the

text: Court

text: when

text: that

text: case

text: was

text: decided

text: I

text: cannot

text: subscribe

text: to

text: the

text: view

text: that

text: Betts

text: v

text: Brady

text: represented

text: an

text: abrupt

text: break

text: with

text: its

text: own

text: well

text: considered

text: precedents

text: Ante

text: p

text: In

text: in

text: Powell

text: v

text: Alabama

text: U

text: S

text: a

text: capital

text: case

text: this

text: Court

text: declared

text: that

text: under

text: the

text: particular

text: facts

text: there

text: presented

text: the

text: ignorance

text: and

text: illiteracy

text: of

text: the

text: defendants

text: their

text: youth

text: the

text: circumstances

text: of

text: public

text: hostility

text: and

text: above

text: all

text: that

text: they

text: stood

text: in

text: deadly

text: peril

text: of

text: their

text: lives

text: U

text: S

text: at

text: the

text: state

text: court

text: had

text: a

text: duty

text: to

text: assign

text: counsel

text: for

text: the

text: trial

text: as

text: a

text: necessary

text: requisite

text: of

text: due

text: process

text: of

text: law

text: It

text: is

text: evident

text: that

text: these

text: limiting

text: facts

text: were

text: not

text: added

text: to

text: the

text: opinion

text: as

text: an

text: afterthought

text: they

text: were

text: repeatedly

text: emphasized

text: see

text: U

text: S

text: at

text: and

text: were

text: clearly

text: regarded

text: as

text: important

text: to

text: the

text: result

text: Thus

text: when

text: this

text: Court

text: a

text: decade

text: later

text: decided

text: Betts

text: v

text: Brady

text: it

text: did

text: no

text: more

text: than

text: to

text: admit

text: of

text: the

text: possible

text: existence

text: of

text: special

text: circumstances

text: in

text: noncapital

text: as

text: well

text: as

text: capital

text: trials

text: while

text: at

text: the

text: same

text: time

text: insisting

text: that

text: such

text: circumstances

text: be

text: shown

text: in

text: order

text: to

text: establish

text: a

text: denial

text: of

text: due

text: process

text: The

text: right

text: to

text: appointed

text: counsel

text: had

text: been

text: recognized

text: as

text: being

text: considerably

text: broader

text: in

text: federal

text: prosecutions

text: see

text: Johnson

text: v

text: Zerbst

text: U

text: S

text: but

text: to

text: have

text: imposed

text: these

text: requirements

text: on

text: the

text: States

text: would

text: indeed

text: have

text: been

text: an

text: abrupt

text: break

text: with

text: the

text: almost

text: immediate

text: past

text: The

text: declaration

text: that

text: the

text: right

text: to

text: appointed

text: counsel

text: in

text: state

text: prosecutions

text: as

text: established

text: in

text: Powell

text: v

text: Alabama

text: was

text: not

text: limited

text: to

text: capital

text: cases

text: was

text: in

text: truth

text: not

text: a

text: departure

text: from

text: but

text: an

text: extension

text: of

text: existing

text: precedent

text: The

text: principles

text: declared

text: in

text: Powell

text: and

text: in

text: Betts

text: however

text: have

text: had

text: a

text: troubled

text: journey

text: throughout

text: the

text: years

text: that

text: have

text: followed

text: first

text: the

text: one

text: case

text: and

text: then

text: the

text: other

text: Even

text: by

text: the

text: time

text: of

text: the

text: Betts

text: decision

text: dictum

text: in

text: at

text: least

text: one

text: of

text: the

text: Court

text: s

text: opinions

text: had

text: indicated

text: that

text: there

text: was

text: an

text: absolute

text: right

text: to

text: the

text: services

text: of

text: counsel

text: in

text: the

text: trial

text: of

text: state

text: capital

text: cases

text: Such

text: dicta

text: continued

text: to

text: appear

text: in

text: subsequent

text: decisions

text: and

text: any

text: lingering

text: doubts

text: were

text: finally

text: eliminated

text: by

text: the

text: holding

text: of

text: Hamilton

text: v

text: Alabama

text: U

text: S

text: In

text: noncapital

text: cases

text: the

text: special

text: circumstances

text: rule

text: has

text: continued

text: to

text: exist

text: in

text: form

text: while

text: its

text: substance

text: has

text: been

text: substantially

text: and

text: steadily

text: eroded

text: In

text: the

text: first

text: decade

text: after

text: Betts

text: there

text: were

text: cases

text: in

text: which

text: the

text: Court

text: found

text: special

text: circumstances

text: to

text: be

text: lacking

text: but

text: usually

text: by

text: a

text: sharply

text: divided

text: vote

text: However

text: no

text: such

text: decision

text: has

text: been

text: cited

text: to

text: us

text: and

text: I

text: have

text: found

text: after

text: Quicksall

text: v

text: Michigan

text: U

text: S

text: decided

text: in

text: At

text: the

text: same

text: time

text: there

text: have

text: been

text: not

text: a

text: few

text: cases

text: in

text: which

text: special

text: circumstances

text: were

text: found

text: in

text: little

text: or

text: nothing

text: more

text: than

text: the

text: complexity

text: of

text: the

text: legal

text: questions

text: presented

text: although

text: those

text: questions

text: were

text: often

text: of

text: only

text: routine

text: difficulty

text: The

text: Court

text: has

text: come

text: to

text: recognize

text: in

text: other

text: words

text: that

text: the

text: mere

text: existence

text: of

text: a

text: serious

text: criminal

text: charge

text: constituted

text: in

text: itself

text: special

text: circumstances

text: requiring

text: the

text: services

text: of

text: counsel

text: at

text: trial

text: In

text: truth

text: the

text: Betts

text: v

text: Brady

text: rule

text: is

text: no

text: longer

text: a

text: reality

text: This

text: evolution

text: however

text: appears

text: not

text: to

text: have

text: been

text: fully

text: recognized

text: by

text: many

text: state

text: courts

text: in

text: this

text: instance

text: charged

text: with

text: the

text: front

text: line

text: responsibility

text: for

text: the

text: enforcement

text: of

text: constitutional

text: rights

text: To

text: continue

text: a

text: rule

text: which

text: is

text: honored

text: by

text: this

text: Court

text: only

text: with

text: lip

text: service

text: is

text: not

text: a

text: healthy

text: thing

text: and

text: in

text: the

text: long

text: run

text: will

text: do

text: disservice

text: to

text: the

text: federal

text: system

text: The

text: special

text: circumstances

text: rule

text: has

text: been

text: formally

text: abandoned

text: in

text: capital

text: cases

text: and

text: the

text: time

text: has

text: now

text: come

text: when

text: it

text: should

text: be

text: similarly

text: abandoned

text: in

text: noncapital

text: cases

text: at

text: least

text: as

text: to

text: offenses

text: which

text: as

text: the

text: one

text: involved

text: here

text: carry

text: the

text: possibility

text: of

text: a

text: substantial

text: prison

text: sentence

text: Whether

text: the

text: rule

text: should

text: extend

text: to

text: all

text: criminal

text: cases

text: need

text: not

text: now

text: be

text: decided

text: This

text: indeed

text: does

text: no

text: more

text: than

text: to

text: make

text: explicit

text: something

text: that

text: has

text: long

text: since

text: been

text: foreshadowed

text: in

text: our

text: decisions

text: In

text: agreeing

text: with

text: the

text: Court

text: that

text: the

text: right

text: to

text: counsel

text: in

text: a

text: case

text: such

text: as

text: this

text: should

text: now

text: be

text: expressly

text: recognized

text: as

text: a

text: fundamental

text: right

text: embraced

text: in

text: the

text: Fourteenth

text: Amendment

text: I

text: wish

text: to

text: make

text: a

text: further

text: observation

text: When

text: we

text: hold

text: a

text: right

text: or

text: immunity

text: valid

text: against

text: the

text: Federal

text: Government

text: to

text: be

text: implicit

text: in

text: the

text: concept

text: of

text: ordered

text: liberty

text: and

text: thus

text: valid

text: against

text: the

text: States

text: I

text: do

text: not

text: read

text: our

text: past

text: decisions

text: to

text: suggest

text: that

text: by

text: so

text: holding

text: we

text: automatically

text: carry

text: over

text: an

text: entire

text: body

text: of

text: federal

text: law

text: and

text: apply

text: it

text: in

text: full

text: sweep

text: to

text: the

text: States

text: Any

text: such

text: concept

text: would

text: disregard

text: the

text: frequently

text: wide

text: disparity

text: between

text: the

text: legitimate

text: interests

text: of

text: the

text: States

text: and

text: of

text: the

text: Federal

text: Government

text: the

text: divergent

text: problems

text: that

text: they

text: face

text: and

text: the

text: significantly

text: different

text: consequences

text: of

text: their

text: actions

text: Cf

text: Roth

text: v

text: United

text: States

text: U

text: S

text: separate

text: opinion

text: of

text: this

text: writer

text: In

text: what

text: is

text: done

text: today

text: I

text: do

text: not

text: understand

text: the

text: Court

text: to

text: depart

text: from

text: the

text: principles

text: laid

text: down

text: in

text: Palko

text: v

text: Connecticut

text: U

text: S

text: or

text: to

text: embrace

text: the

text: concept

text: that

text: the

text: Fourteenth

text: Amendment

text: incorporates

text: the

text: Sixth

text: Amendment

text: as

text: such

text: On

text: these

text: premises

text: I

text: join

text: in

text: the

text: judgment

text: of

text: the

text: Court

text: NOTES

text: Later

text: in

text: the

text: petition

text: for

text: habeas

text: corpus

text: signed

text: and

text: apparently

text: prepared

text: by

text: petitioner

text: himself

text: he

text: stated

text: I

text: Clarence

text: Earl

text: Gideon

text: claim

text: that

text: I

text: was

text: denied

text: the

text: rights

text: of

text: the

text: th

text: th

text: and

text: th

text: amendments

text: of

text: the

text: Bill

text: of

text: Rights

text: Of

text: the

text: many

text: such

text: cases

text: to

text: reach

text: this

text: Court

text: recent

text: examples

text: are

text: Carnley

text: v

text: Cochran

text: U

text: S

text: Hudson

text: v

text: North

text: Carolina

text: U

text: S

text: Moore

text: v

text: Michigan

text: U

text: S

text: Illustrative

text: cases

text: in

text: the

text: state

text: courts

text: are

text: Artrip

text: v

text: State

text: So

text: d

text: Ct

text: App

text: Ala

text: Shaffer

text: v

text: Warden

text: Md

text: A

text: d

text: For

text: examples

text: of

text: commentary

text: see

text: Allen

text: The

text: Supreme

text: Court

text: Federalism

text: and

text: State

text: Systems

text: of

text: Criminal

text: Justice

text: De

text: Paul

text: L

text: Rev

text: Kamisar

text: The

text: Right

text: to

text: Counsel

text: and

text: the

text: Fourteenth

text: Amendment

text: A

text: Dialogue

text: on

text: The

text: Most

text: Pervasive

text: Right

text: of

text: an

text: Accused

text: U

text: of

text: Chi

text: L

text: Rev

text: The

text: Right

text: to

text: Counsel

text: Minn

text: L

text: Rev

text: Johnson

text: v

text: Zerbst

text: U

text: S

text: E

text: g

text: Gitlow

text: v

text: New

text: York

text: U

text: S

text: speech

text: and

text: press

text: Lovell

text: v

text: City

text: of

text: Griffin

text: U

text: S

text: speech

text: and

text: press

text: Staub

text: v

text: City

text: of

text: Baxley

text: U

text: S

text: speech

text: Grosjean

text: v

text: American

text: Press

text: Co

text: U

text: S

text: press

text: Cantwell

text: v

text: Connecticut

text: U

text: S

text: religion

text: De

text: Jonge

text: v

text: Oregon

text: U

text: S

text: assembly

text: Shelton

text: v

text: Tucker

text: U

text: S

text: association

text: Louisiana

text: ex

text: rel

text: Gremillion

text: v

text: NAACP

text: U

text: S

text: association

text: Edwards

text: v

text: South

text: Carolina

text: U

text: S

text: speech

text: assembly

text: petition

text: for

text: redress

text: of

text: grievances

text: E

text: g

text: Chicago

text: B

text: Q

text: R

text: Co

text: v

text: Chicago

text: U

text: S

text: Smyth

text: v

text: Ames

text: U

text: S

text: E

text: g

text: Wolf

text: v

text: Colorado

text: U

text: S

text: Elkins

text: v

text: United

text: States

text: U

text: S

text: Mapp

text: v

text: Ohio

text: U

text: S

text: Robinson

text: v

text: California

text: U

text: S

text: Justices

text: Bradley

text: Swayne

text: and

text: Field

text: emphasized

text: that

text: the

text: first

text: eight

text: Amendments

text: granted

text: citizens

text: of

text: the

text: United

text: States

text: certain

text: privileges

text: and

text: immunities

text: that

text: were

text: protected

text: from

text: abridgment

text: by

text: the

text: States

text: by

text: the

text: Fourteenth

text: Amendment

text: See

text: Slaughter

text: House

text: Cases

text: supra

text: at

text: O

text: Neil

text: v

text: Vermont

text: supra

text: at

text: Justices

text: Harlan

text: and

text: Brewer

text: accepted

text: the

text: same

text: theory

text: in

text: the

text: O

text: Neil

text: case

text: see

text: id

text: at

text: though

text: Justice

text: Harlan

text: indicated

text: that

text: all

text: persons

text: not

text: merely

text: citizens

text: were

text: given

text: this

text: protection

text: Ibid

text: In

text: Twining

text: v

text: New

text: Jersey

text: U

text: S

text: Justice

text: Harlan

text: s

text: position

text: was

text: made

text: clear

text: In

text: my

text: judgment

text: immunity

text: from

text: self

text: incrimination

text: is

text: protected

text: against

text: hostile

text: state

text: action

text: not

text: only

text: by

text: the

text: Privileges

text: and

text: Immunities

text: Clause

text: but

text: also

text: by

text: the

text: Due

text: Process

text: Clause

text: Justice

text: Brewer

text: in

text: joining

text: the

text: opinion

text: of

text: the

text: Court

text: abandoned

text: the

text: view

text: that

text: the

text: entire

text: Bill

text: of

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