text:
TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001)
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed: November 13th, 2001
Precedential Status: Precedential
Citations: 534 U.S. 19, 122 S. Ct. 441, 151 L. Ed. 2d 339, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 10306
Docket Number: 00-1045
Supreme Court Database ID: 2001-002
Author: Ruth Bader Ginsburg

534 U.S. 19 (2001)
TRW INC.
v.
ANDREWS

No. 00-1045.
United States Supreme Court.

Argued October 9, 2001.
Decided November 13, 2001.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
*21 *21 Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 35.

Glen D. Nager argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Daniel H. Bromberg.

*22 Andrew Ryan Henderson argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Carlyle W. Hall, Jr., and Gerald L. Sauer.

Kent L. Jones argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. On the brief were Acting Solicitor General Underwood, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Edward C. DuMont, John D. Graubert, John F. Daly, and Lawrence DeMille-Wagman.[*]

Justice Ginsburg, delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns the running of the two-year statute of limitations governing suits based on the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA or Act), as added, 84 Stat. 1127, and amended, 15 U.S. C. § 1681 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V).[1] The time prescription appears in § 1681p, which sets out a general rule and an exception. Generally, an action to enforce any liability created by the Act may be brought "within two years from the date on which the liability arises." The exception covers willful misrepresentation of "any information required under [the Act] to be disclosed to [the plaintiff]": When such a representation is material to a claim under the Act, suit may be brought "within two years after [the plaintiff's] discovery . . . of the misrepresentation."

Section 1681p's exception is not involved in this case; the complaint does not allege misrepresentation of information that the FCRA "require[s] . . . to be disclosed to [the plaintiff]." Plaintiff-respondent Adelaide Andrews nevertheless contends, and the Ninth Circuit held, that § 1681p's generally applicable two-year limitation commenced to run on *23 Andrews' claims only upon her discovery of defendantpetitioner TRW Inc.'s alleged violations of the Act.

We hold that a discovery rule does not govern § 1681p. That section explicitly delineates the exceptional case in which discovery triggers the two-year limitation. We are not at liberty to make Congress' explicit exception the general rule as well.

I

A

Congress enacted the FCRA in 1970 to promote efficiency in the Nation's banking system and to protect consumer privacy. See 15 U.S. C. § 1681(a) (1994 ed.). As relevant here, the Act seeks to accomplish those goals by requiring credit reporting agencies to maintain "reasonable procedures" designed "to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information" contained in credit reports, § 1681e(b), and to "limit the furnishing of [such reports] to" certain statutorily enumerated purposes, § 1681e(a); 15 U.S. C. § 1681b (1994 ed. and Supp. V). The Act creates a private right of action allowing injured consumers to recover "any actual damages" caused by negligent violations and both actual and punitive damages for willful noncompliance. See 15 U.S. C. §§ 1681n, 1681o (1994 ed.).[2]

B

The facts of this case are for the most part undisputed. On June 17, 1993, Adelaide Andrews visited a radiologist's office in Santa Monica, California. She filled out a new patient form listing certain basic information, including her name, birth date, and Social Security number. Andrews handed the form to the office receptionist, one Andrea Andrews (the Impostor), who copied the information and thereafter moved to Las Vegas, Nevada. Once there, the Impostor *24 attempted on numerous occasions to open credit accounts using Andrews' Social Security number and her own last name and address.

On four of those occasions, the company from which the Impostor sought credit requested a report from TRW. Each time, TRW's computers registered a match between Andrews' Social Security number, last name, and first initial and therefore responded by furnishing her file. TRW thus disclosed Andrews' credit history at the Impostor's request to a bank on July 25, 1994; to a cable television company on September 27, 1994; to a department store on October 28, 1994; and to another credit provider on January 3, 1995. All recipients but the cable company rejected the Impostor's applications for credit.

Andrews did not learn of these disclosures until May 31, 1995, when she sought to refinance her home mortgage and in the process received a copy of her credit report reflecting the Impostor's activity. Andrews concedes that TRW promptly corrected her file upon learning of its mistake. She alleges, however, that the blemishes on her report not only caused her inconvenience and emotional distress, they also forced her to abandon her refinancing efforts and settle for an alternative line of credit on less favorable terms.

On October 21, 1996, almost 17 months after she discovered the Impostor's fraudulent conduct and more than two years after TRW's first two disclosures, Andrews filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Her complaint stated two categories of FCRA claims against TRW, only the first of which is relevant here.[3] See App. 15-17. Those claims alleged that TRW's *25 four disclosures of her information in response to the Impostor's credit applications were improper because TRW failed to verify, predisclosure, that Adelaide Andrews of Santa Monica initiated the requests or was otherwise involved in the underlying transactions. Andrews asserted that by processing requests that matched her profile on Social Security number, last name, and first initial but did not correspond on other key identifiers, notably birth date, address, and first name, TRW had facilitated the Impostor's identity theft. According to Andrews, TRW's verification failure constituted a willful violation of § 1681e(a), which requires credit reporting agencies to maintain "reasonable procedures" to avoid improper disclosures. She sought injunctive relief, punitive damages, and compensation for the "expenditure of time and money, commercial impairment, inconvenience, embarrassment, humiliation and emotional distress" that TRW had allegedly inflicted upon her. App. 15-16.

TRW moved for partial summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that the FCRA's statute of limitations had expired on Andrews' claims based on the July 25 and September 27, 1994, disclosures because both occurred more than two years before she brought suit. Andrews countered that her claims as to all four disclosures were timely because the limitations period did not commence until May 31, 1995, the date she learned of TRW's alleged wrongdoing. The District Court, agreeing with TRW that § 1681p does not incorporate a general discovery rule, held that relief stemming from the July and September 1994 disclosures was time barred. Andrews *26 v. Trans Union Corp., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1066-1067 (CD Cal. 1998).[4]

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed this ruling, applying what it considered to be the "general federal rule . . . that a federal statute of limitations begins to run when a party knows or has reason to know that she was injured." 225 F.3d 1063, 1066 (2000). The court rejected the District Court's conclusion that the text of § 1681p, and in particular the limited exception set forth in that section, precluded judicial attribution of such a rule to the FCRA. "[U]nless Congress has expressly legislated otherwise," the Ninth Circuit declared, "the equitable doctrine of discovery is read into every federal statute of limitations." Id., at 1067 (internal quotation marks omitted). Finding no such express directive, the Court of Appeals held that "none of [Andrews'] injuries were stale when suit was brought." Id., at 1066. Accordingly, the court reinstated Andrews' improper disclosure claims and remanded them for trial.

In holding that § 1681p incorporates a general discovery rule, the Ninth Circuit parted company with four other Circuits; those courts have concluded that a discovery exception other than the one Congress expressed may not be read into the Act. See Clark v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co.,  54 F.3d 669 (CA10 1995); Rylewicz v. Beaton Servs., Ltd.,  888 F.2d 1175 (CA7 1989); Houghton v. Insurance Crime Prevention Institute, 795 F.2d 322 (CA3 1986); Clay v. Equifax, Inc., 762 F.2d 952 (CA11 1985). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 532 U.S. 902 (2001), and now reverse.

*27 II

The Court of Appeals rested its decision on the premise that all federal statutes of limitations, regardless of context, incorporate a general discovery rule "unless Congress has expressly legislated otherwise." 225 F. 3d, at 1067. To the extent such a presumption exists, a matter this case does not oblige us to decide, the Ninth Circuit conspicuously overstated its scope and force.

The Appeals Court principally relied on our decision in Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946). See 225 F. 3d, at 1067. In that case, we instructed with particularity that "where a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered." Holmberg, 327 U. S., at 397 (internal quotation marks omitted). Holmberg thus stands for the proposition that equity tolls the statute of limitations in cases of fraud or concealment; it does not establish a general presumption applicable across all contexts. The only other cases in which we have recognized a prevailing discovery rule, moreover, were decided in two contexts, latent disease and medical malpractice, "where the cry for [such a] rule is loudest," Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000). See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979); Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949).

We have also observed that lower federal courts "generally apply a discovery accrual rule when a statute is silent on the issue." Rotella, 528 U. S., at 555; see also Klehr v. A. O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 191 (1997) (citing Connors v. Hallmark & Son Coal Co., 935 F.2d 336, 342 (CADC 1991), for the proposition that "federal courts generally apply [a] discovery accrual rule when [the] statute does not call for a different rule"). But we have not adopted that position as our own. And, beyond doubt, we have never endorsed the Ninth Circuit's view that Congress can convey its refusal to adopt a discovery rule only by explicit command, rather than *28 by implication from the structure or text of the particular statute.

The Ninth Circuit thus erred in holding that a generally applied discovery rule controls this case. The FCRA does not govern an area of the law that cries out for application of a discovery rule, nor is the statute "silent on the issue" of when the statute of limitations begins to run. Section 1681p addresses that precise question; the provision reads:

"An action to enforce any liability created under [the Act] may be brought . . . within two years from the date on which the liability arises, except that where a defendant has materially and willfully misrepresented any information required under [the Act] to be disclosed to an individual and the information so misrepresented is material to the establishment of the defendant's liability to that individual under [the Act], the action may be brought at any time within two years after discovery by the individual of the misrepresentation."
We conclude that the text and structure of § 1681p evince Congress' intent to preclude judicial implication of a discovery rule.

"Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent." Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616— 617 (1980). Congress provided in the FCRA that the twoyear statute of limitations runs from "the date on which the liability arises," subject to a single exception for cases involving a defendant's willful misrepresentation of material information. § 1681p. The most natural reading of § 1681p is that Congress implicitly excluded a general discovery rule by explicitly including a more limited one. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) ("Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.") . We would distort § 1681p's text by converting *29 the exception into the rule. Cf. United States v. Brockamp,  519 U.S. 347, 352 (1997) ("explicit listing of exceptions" to running of limitations period considered indicative of Congress' intent to preclude "courts [from] read[ing] other unmentioned, open-ended, `equitable' exceptions into the statute").

At least equally telling, incorporating a general discovery rule into § 1681p would not merely supplement the explicit exception contrary to Congress' apparent intent; it would in practical effect render that exception entirely superfluous in all but the most unusual circumstances. A consumer will generally not discover the tortious conduct alleged here— the improper disclosure of her credit history to a potential user—until she requests her file from a credit reporting agency. If the agency responds by concealing the offending disclosure, both a generally applicable discovery rule and the misrepresentation exception would operate to toll the statute of limitations until the concealment is revealed. Once triggered, the statute of limitations would run under either for two years from the discovery date. In this paradigmatic setting, then, the misrepresentation exception would have no work to do.

Both Andrews and the Government, appearing as amicus in her support, attempt to generate some role for the express exception independent of that filled by a general discovery rule. They conceive of the exception as a codification of the judge-made doctrine of equitable estoppel, which, they argue, operates only after the discovery rule has triggered the limitations period, preventing a defendant from benefiting from its misrepresentation by tolling that period until the concealment is uncovered.

To illustrate this supposed separate application, Andrews and the Government frame the following scenario: A credit reporting agency injures a consumer by disclosing her file for an improper purpose. The consumer has no reason to suspect the violation until a year later, when she applies for *30 and is denied credit as a result of the agency's wrongdoing. At that point, the Government asserts, "the consumer would presumably be put on inquiry notice of the violation, and the discovery rule would start the running of the normal limitation period." Brief for United States et al. as Amici Curiae 22 (emphasis deleted); see Tr. of Oral Arg. 35-36 (argument in accord by Andrews' counsel). Some days or months later, the consumer follows up on her suspicions by requesting a copy of her credit report, to which the agency responds by concealing the initial improper disclosure. According to Andrews and the Government, the misrepresentation exception would then operate to toll the already-commenced limitations period until the agency reveals its wrongdoing.

We reject this argument for several reasons. As an initial matter, we are not persuaded by this effort to distinguish the practical function of a discovery rule and the express exception, because we doubt that the supporting scenario is likely to occur outside the realm of theory. The fatal weakness in the narrative is its assumption that a consumer would be charged with constructive notice of an improper disclosure upon denial of a credit application. If the consumer habitually paid her bills on time, the denial might well lead her to suspect a prior credit agency error. But the credit denial would place her on "inquiry notice," and the discovery rule would trigger the limitations period at that point, only if a reasonable person in her position would have learned of the injury in the exercise of due diligence. See Stone v. Williams, 970 F.2d 1043, 1049 (CA2 1992) ("The duty of inquiry having arisen, plaintiff is charged with whatever knowledge an inquiry would have revealed."); 2 C. Corman, Limitation of Actions § 11.1.6, p. 164 (1991) ("It is obviously unreasonable to charge the plaintiff with failure to search for the missing element of the cause of action if such element would not have been revealed by such search.").

In the usual circumstance, the plaintiff will gain knowledge of her injury from the credit reporting agency. The *31 scenario put forth by Andrews and the Government, however, requires the assumption that, even if the consumer exercised reasonable diligence by requesting her credit report without delay, she would not in fact learn of the disclosure because the credit reporting agency would conceal it. The uncovering of that concealment would remain the triggering event for both the discovery rule and the express exception. In this scenario, as in the paradigmatic one, the misrepresentation exception would be superfluous.

In any event, both Andrews and the Government concede that the independent function one could attribute to the express exception would arise only in "rare and egregious case[s]." Brief for Respondent 32-33; see Brief for United States et al. as Amici Curiae 24 (implied discovery rule would apply in "vast majority" of cases). The result is that a rule nowhere contained in the text of § 1681p would do the bulk of that provision's work, while a proviso accounting for more than half of that text would lie dormant in all but the most unlikely situations.

It is "a cardinal principle of statutory construction" that "a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant." Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-539 (1955) ("It is our duty `to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.' " (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883))). "[W]ere we to adopt [Andrews'] construction of the statute," the express exception would be rendered "insignificant, if not wholly superfluous." Duncan, 533 U. S., at 174. We are "reluctant to treat statutory terms as surplusage in any setting," ibid. (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted), and we decline to do so here.[5]

*32 Andrews advances two additional arguments in defense of the decision below, neither of which we find convincing. She contends, first, that the words "date on which the liability arises"—the phrase Congress used to frame the general rule in § 1681p—"literally expres[s]" a discovery rule because liability does not "arise" until it "present[s] itself" or comes to the attention of the potential plaintiff. Brief for Respondent 13. The dictionary definition of the word "arise" does not compel such a reading; to the contrary, it can be used to support either party's position. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 117 (1966) (arise defined as "to come into being"; "to come about"; or "to become apparent in such a way as to demand attention"); Black's Law Dictionary 138 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) ("to come into being or notice"). And TRW offers a strong argument that we have in fact construed that word to imply the result Andrews seeks to avoid. See Brief for Petitioner 16-20 (citing, inter alia, McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25 (1951) (statute of limitations triggered on date "cause of action arises" incorporates injury-occurrence rule)). On balance, we conclude, the phrase "liability arises" is not particularly instructive, much less dispositive of this case.

Similarly unhelpful, in our view, is Andrews' reliance on the legislative history of § 1681p. She observes that early versions of that provision, introduced in both the House and Senate, keyed the start of the limitations period to "the date of the occurrence of the violation." S. 823, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., § 618 (1969); H. R. 16340, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., § 27 (1970); H. R. 14765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., § 617 (1969). From the disappearance of that language in the final version of § 1681p, Andrews infers a congressional intent to reject the rule that the deleted words would have plainly established.

*33 As TRW notes, however, Congress also heard testimony urging it to enact a statute of limitations that runs from "the date on which the violation is discovered" but declined to do so. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 188 (1970). In addition, the very change to § 1681p's language on which Andrews relies could be read to refute her position. The misrepresentation exception was added at the same time Congress changed the language "date of the occurrence of the violation" to "liability arises." Compare S. 823, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., § 618 (1969); H. R. 16340, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., § 27 (1970); H. R. 14765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., § 617 (1969), with H. R. Rep. No. 91-1587, p. 22 (1970). We doubt that Congress, when it inserted a carefully worded exception to the main rule, intended simultaneously to create a general discovery rule that would render that exception superfluous. In sum, the evidence of the early incarnations of § 1681p, like the "liability arises" language on which Congress ultimately settled, fails to convince us that Congress intended sub silentio to adopt a general discovery rule in addition to the limited one it expressly provided.

III

In this Court, Andrews for the first time presents an alternative argument based on the "liability arises" language of § 1681p. Brief for Respondent 22-25. She contends that even if § 1681p does not incorporate a discovery rule, "liability" under the FCRA does not necessarily "arise" when a violation of the Act occurs. Noting that the FCRA's substantive provisions tie "liability" to the presence of "actual damages," §§ 1681n, 1681o , and that "arise" means at least "to come into existence," Andrews concludes that "liability arises" only when actual damages materialize. Not until then, she maintains, will all the essential elements of a claim coalesce: "duty, breach, causation, and injury. " Brief for Respondent 23; see Hyde v. Hibernia Nat. Bank, 861 F. 2d *34 446, 449 (CA5 1988) ("The requirement that a consumer sustain some injury in order to establish a cause of action suggests that the statute should be triggered when the agency issues an erroneous report to an institution with which the consumer is dealing.").

Accordingly, Andrews asserts, her claims are timely: The disputed "liability" for actual damages did not "arise" until May 1995, when she suffered the emotional distress, missed opportunities, and inconvenience cataloged in her complaint; prior to that time, "she had no FCRA claim to bring," Brief for Respondent 24 (emphasis deleted). Cf. Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 200-201 (1997) (rejecting construction of statute under which limitations period would begin running before cause of action existed in favor of "standard rule" that the period does not commence earlier than the date "the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief").[6]

We do not reach this issue because it was not raised or briefed below. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 18-19. We note, however, that the Ninth Circuit has not embraced Andrews' alternative argument, see 225 F. 3d, at 1066 ("Liability *35 under the [Act] arises when a consumer reporting agency fails to comply with § 1681e."), and the Government does not join her in advancing it here.

Further, we doubt that the argument, even if valid, would aid Andrews in this case. Her claims alleged willful violations of § 1681e(a) and are thus governed by § 1681n. At the time of the events in question, that provision stated: "Any consumer reporting agency . . . which willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposed under [the Act] with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount equal to the sum of . . . any actual damages" and "such amount of punitive damages as the court may allow." 15 U.S. C. § 1681n (1994 ed.). Punitive damages, which Andrews sought in this case, could presumably be awarded at the moment of TRW's alleged wrongdoing, even if "actual damages" did not accrue at that time. On Andrews' theory, then, at least some of the liability she sought to enforce arose when the violations occurred, and the limitations period therefore began to run at that point.

* * *

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in the judgment.

As the Court notes, ante, at 26, 27, the Court of Appeals based its decision on what it called the "general federal rule . . . that a federal statute of limitations begins to run when a party knows or has reason to know that she was injured," 225 F.3d 1063, 1066 (CA9 2000). The Court declines to say whether that expression of the governing general rule is correct. See ante, at 27 ("To the extent such a *36 presumption exists, a matter this case does not oblige us to decide . . ."). There is in my view little doubt that it is not, and our reluctance to say so today is inexplicable, given that we held, a mere four years ago, that a statute of limitations which says the period runs from "the date on which the cause of action arose," 29 U.S. C. § 1451(f)(1) (1994 ed.), "incorporates the standard rule that the limitations period commences when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action," Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997) (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted).[1]

*37 Bay Area Laundry quoted approvingly our statement in Clark v. Iowa City, 20 Wall. 583, 589 (1875), that "[a]ll statutes of limitation begin to run when the right of action is complete . . . ." This is unquestionably the traditional rule: Absent other indication, a statute of limitations begins to run at the time the plaintiff "has the right to apply to the court for relief . . . ." 1 H. Wood, Limitation of Actions § 122a, p. 684 (4th ed. 1916). "That a person entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right to sue, or of the facts out of which his right arises, does not postpone the period of limitation." 2 id., § 276c(1), at 1411.

The injury-discovery rule applied by the Court of Appeals is bad wine of recent vintage. Other than our recognition of the historical exception for suits based on fraud, e. g., Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342, 347-350 (1875), we have deviated from the traditional rule and imputed an injury-discovery rule to Congress on only one occasion. Urie v. Thompson,  337 U.S. 163, 169-171 (1949).[2] We did so there because we could not imagine that legislation as "humane" as the Federal Employers' Liability Act would bar recovery for latent medical injuries. Id., at 170. We repeated this sentiment in Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000), saying that the "cry for a discovery rule is loudest" in the context of medical-malpractice suits; and we repeat it again today with the assertion that the present case does not involve "an area *38 of the law that cries out for application of a discovery rule," ante, at 28. These cries, however, are properly directed not to us, but to Congress, whose job it is to decide how "humane" legislation should be—or (to put the point less tendentiously) to strike the balance between remediation of all injuries and a policy of repose. See Amy v. Watertown (No. 2),  130 U.S. 320, 323-324 (1889) ("[T]he cases in which [the statute of limitations may be suspended by causes not mentioned in the statute itself] are very limited in character, and are to be admitted with great caution; otherwise the court would make the law instead of administering it").

Congress has been operating against the background rule recognized in Bay Area Laundry for a very long time. When it has wanted us to apply a different rule, such as the injury-discovery rule, it has said so. See, e. g., 18 U.S. C. § 1030(g) (1994 ed., Supp. V).[3] See also, e. g., 15 U.S. C. § 77m (1994 ed., Supp. V);[4] 42 U.S. C. § 9612(d)(2) (1994 ed.).[5] To apply a new background rule to previously enacted legislation would reverse prior congressional judgments; and to display uncertainty regarding the current background rule makes all unspecifying new legislation a roll of the dice. Today's opinion, in clarifying the meaning of 15 U.S. C. § 1681p, casts the meaning of innumerable other limitation periods in doubt.

*39 Because there is nothing in this statute to contradict the rule that a statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action is complete, I concur in the judgment of the Court.

NOTES

[*] Richard J. Rubin, Joanne S. Faulkner, Willard P. Ogburn, Deborah M. Zuckerman, Stacy J. Canan, and Michael R. Schuster filed a brief for the National Association of Consumer Advocates et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.

[1] Congress has revised the FCRA extensively since the events at issue, but has not altered the provisions material to this case.

[2] Under 1996 amendments to § 1681n, a plaintiff may also recover statutory damages of between $100 and $1,000 for willful violations. See 15 U.S. C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. V).

[3] The second alleged that TRW had collected information about the Impostor's activities and inaccurately attributed that activity to Andrews, in violation of its obligation under § 1681e(b) to "follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom [a] report relates." A jury resolved this claim in favor of TRW.

The complaint also stated FCRA claims against Trans Union Corporation, another credit reporting agency involved in the Impostor's conduct. In addition, Andrews brought a state-law claim against each defendant. The resolution of these claims is not at issue here.

[4] The District Court also granted summary judgment to TRW on the two remaining improper disclosure claims, reasoning that TRW maintained adequate procedures and that the disputed disclosures had been made for a permissible purpose as defined by § 1681b. See Andrews v. Trans Union Corp., 7 F. Supp. 2d, at 1068-1071. The Ninth Circuit reversed that ruling. 225 F.3d 1063, 1067-1068 (2000). Such questions, the Appeals Court held, "needed determination by a jury not a judge." Id., at 1068.

[5] Similarly, even if we agreed that the discovery and equitable estoppel doctrines could comfortably coexist in this setting, we would reject the contention that we are therefore free to incorporate both into the FCRA. As we have explained, see supra, at 28-29, we read Congress' codification of one judge-made doctrine not as a license toimply others, but rather as an intentional rejection of those it did not codify.

[6] The opinion concurring in the judgment rips Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997),from its berth, see post, at 36, 38; we here set the record straight. The question presented in Bay Area Laundry was whether a statute of limitations could commence to run on one day while the right to sue ripened on a later day. We answered that question, and only that question, "no," unless the statute indicates otherwise. See 522 U. S.,at 200-201. Continuing on beyond the place where the concurrence in the judgment leaves off, we clarified:

"Unless Congress has told us otherwise in the legislation at issue, a cause of action does not become `complete and present' for limitations purposes until the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.See Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 267 (1993) ("While it is theoretically possible for a statute to create a cause of action that accrues at one time for the purpose of calculating when the statute of limitations begins to run, but at another time for the purpose of bringing suit,we will not infer such an odd result in the absence of any such indication in the statute.")." Id., at 201.

[1] This analysis does not, as the Court asserts, ante, at 34, n. 6, "ri[p] Bay Area Laundry . . . from its berth." The question presented on which certiorari was granted in the case was not, as the Court now recharacterizes it, the generalized inquiry "whether a statute of limitations could commence to run on one day while the right to sue ripened on a later day," ibid., but rather (as set forth in somewhat abbreviated form in petitioner Bay Area Laundry's merits brief) the much more precise question, "When does the statute of limitations begin to run on an action under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act, 29 U.S. C. § 1381 et seq., to collect overdue employer withdrawal liability payments?" Brief for Petitioner, O. T. 1997, No. 96-370, p. i. (Framing of the question in respondent Ferbar Corporation's merits brief was virtually identical.) The Court's Bay Area Laundry opinion introduced its discussion of the merits as follows:

"[T]he Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with an earlier decision of the District of Columbia Circuit [which] held that the statute of limitations . . . runs from the date the employer misses a scheduled payment, not from the date of complete withdrawal. . . . The Third and Seventh Circuits have also held that the statute of limitations runs from the failure to make a payment . . . . We granted certiorari . . . to resolve these conflicts." 522 U. S., at 200.

The Court's assertion that we did not answer the question presented, and did not resolve the conflicts—held only that the Ninth Circuit was wrong to say that the limitations period commenced before there was a right of action, and not that the other Circuits were right to say that the period commenced upon the failure to make a payment—is as erroneous as it is implausible. Bay Area Laundry held that the cause of action arose when "the employer violated an obligation owed the plan," id., at 202, because "the standard rule" is that the period begins to run when the plaintiff has a "complete and present cause of action," id., at 201 (internal quotation marks omitted).

[2] As the Court accurately notes, ante, at 27, in one other case we simply observed (without endorsement) that several Courts of Appeals had substituted injury-discovery for the traditional rule in medical-malpractice actions under the Federal Tort Claims Act, see United States v. Kubrick,  444 U.S. 111, 120, and n. 7 (1979), and in two other cases observed (without endorsement) that lower federal courts "generally apply" an injurydiscovery rule, see Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000); Klehr v. A. O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 191 (1997).

[3] "No action may be brought under this subsection unless such action is begun within 2 years of the date of the act complained of or the date of the discovery of the damage."

[4] "No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under section 77k or 77l (a)(2) of this title unless brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence, or, if the action is to enforce a liability created under section 77l (a)(1) of this title, unless brought within one year after the violation upon which it is based."

[5] "No claim may be presented under this section . . . unless the claim is presented within 3 years after . .. [t]he date of the discovery of the loss and its connection with the release in question."

text: TRW

text: Inc

text: v

text: Andrews

text: U

text: S

text: Supreme

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text: of

text: the

text: United

text: States

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text: U

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text: NINTH

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text: FCRA

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text: defendantpetitioner

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text: Congress

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text: well

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text: Congress

text: enacted

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text: FCRA

text: in

text: to

text: promote

text: efficiency

text: in

text: the

text: Nation

text: s

text: banking

text: system

text: and

text: to

text: protect

text: consumer

text: privacy

text: See

text: U

text: S

text: C

text: a

text: ed

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text: relevant

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text: the

text: Act

text: seeks

text: to

text: accomplish

text: those

text: goals

text: by

text: requiring

text: credit

text: reporting

text: agencies

text: to

text: maintain

text: reasonable

text: procedures

text: designed

text: to

text: assure

text: maximum

text: possible

text: accuracy

text: of

text: the

text: information

text: contained

text: in

text: credit

text: reports

text: e

text: b

text: and

text: to

text: limit

text: the

text: furnishing

text: of

text: such

text: reports

text: to

text: certain

text: statutorily

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text: a

text: U

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text: Supp

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text: The

text: Act

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text: private

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text: action

text: allowing

text: injured

text: consumers

text: to

text: recover

text: any

text: actual

text: damages

text: caused

text: by

text: negligent

text: violations

text: and

text: both

text: actual

text: and

text: punitive

text: damages

text: for

text: willful

text: noncompliance

text: See

text: U

text: S

text: C

text: n

text: o

text: ed

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text: The

text: facts

text: of

text: this

text: case

text: are

text: for

text: the

text: most

text: part

text: undisputed

text: On

text: June

text: Adelaide

text: Andrews

text: visited

text: a

text: radiologist

text: s

text: office

text: in

text: Santa

text: Monica

text: California

text: She

text: filled

text: out

text: a

text: new

text: patient

text: form

text: listing

text: certain

text: basic

text: information

text: including

text: her

text: name

text: birth

text: date

text: and

text: Social

text: Security

text: number

text: Andrews

text: handed

text: the

text: form

text: to

text: the

text: office

text: receptionist

text: one

text: Andrea

text: Andrews

text: the

text: Impostor

text: who

text: copied

text: the

text: information

text: and

text: thereafter

text: moved

text: to

text: Las

text: Vegas

text: Nevada

text: Once

text: there

text: the

text: Impostor

text: attempted

text: on

text: numerous

text: occasions

text: to

text: open

text: credit

text: accounts

text: using

text: Andrews

text: Social

text: Security

text: number

text: and

text: her

text: own

text: last

text: name

text: and

text: address

text: On

text: four

text: of

text: those

text: occasions

text: the

text: company

text: from

text: which

text: the

text: Impostor

text: sought

text: credit

text: requested

text: a

text: report

text: from

text: TRW

text: Each

text: time

text: TRW

text: s

text: computers

text: registered

text: a

text: match

text: between

text: Andrews

text: Social

text: Security

text: number

text: last

text: name

text: and

text: first

text: initial

text: and

text: therefore

text: responded

text: by

text: furnishing

text: her

text: file

text: TRW

text: thus

text: disclosed

text: Andrews

text: credit

text: history

text: at

text: the

text: Impostor

text: s

text: request

text: to

text: a

text: bank

text: on

text: July

text: to

text: a

text: cable

text: television

text: company

text: on

text: September

text: to

text: a

text: department

text: store

text: on

text: October

text: and

text: to

text: another

text: credit

text: provider

text: on

text: January

text: All

text: recipients

text: but

text: the

text: cable

text: company

text: rejected

text: the

text: Impostor

text: s

text: applications

text: for

text: credit

text: Andrews

text: did

text: not

text: learn

text: of

text: these

text: disclosures

text: until

text: May

text: when

text: she

text: sought

text: to

text: refinance

text: her

text: home

text: mortgage

text: and

text: in

text: the

text: process

text: received

text: a

text: copy

text: of

text: her

text: credit

text: report

text: reflecting

text: the

text: Impostor

text: s

text: activity

text: Andrews

text: concedes

text: that

text: TRW

text: promptly

text: corrected

text: her

text: file

text: upon

text: learning

text: of

text: its

text: mistake

text: She

text: alleges

text: however

text: that

text: the

text: blemishes

text: on

text: her

text: report

text: not

text: only

text: caused

text: her

text: inconvenience

text: and

text: emotional

text: distress

text: they

text: also

text: forced

text: her

text: to

text: abandon

text: her

text: refinancing

text: efforts

text: and

text: settle

text: for

text: an

text: alternative

text: line

text: of

text: credit

text: on

text: less

text: favorable

text: terms

text: On

text: October

text: almost

text: months

text: after

text: she

text: discovered

text: the

text: Impostor

text: s

text: fraudulent

text: conduct

text: and

text: more

text: than

text: two

text: years

text: after

text: TRW

text: s

text: first

text: two

text: disclosures

text: Andrews

text: filed

text: suit

text: in

text: the

text: United

text: States

text: District

text: Court

text: for

text: the

text: Central

text: District

text: of

text: California

text: Her

text: complaint

text: stated

text: two

text: categories

text: of

text: FCRA

text: claims

text: against

text: TRW

text: only

text: the

text: first

text: of

text: which

text: is

text: relevant

text: here

text: See

text: App

text: Those

text: claims

text: alleged

text: that

text: TRW

text: s

text: four

text: disclosures

text: of

text: her

text: information

text: in

text: response

text: to

text: the

text: Impostor

text: s

text: credit

text: applications

text: were

text: improper

text: because

text: TRW

text: failed

text: to

text: verify

text: predisclosure

text: that

text: Adelaide

text: Andrews

text: of

text: Santa

text: Monica

text: initiated

text: the

text: requests

text: or

text: was

text: otherwise

text: involved

text: in

text: the

text: underlying

text: transactions

text: Andrews

text: asserted

text: that

text: by

text: processing

text: requests

text: that

text: matched

text: her

text: profile

text: on

text: Social

text: Security

text: number

text: last

text: name

text: and

text: first

text: initial

text: but

text: did

text: not

text: correspond

text: on

text: other

text: key

text: identifiers

text: notably

text: birth

text: date

text: address

text: and

text: first

text: name

text: TRW

text: had

text: facilitated

text: the

text: Impostor

text: s

text: identity

text: theft

text: According

text: to

text: Andrews

text: TRW

text: s

text: verification

text: failure

text: constituted

text: a

text: willful

text: violation

text: of

text: e

text: a

text: which

text: requires

text: credit

text: reporting

text: agencies

text: to

text: maintain

text: reasonable

text: procedures

text: to

text: avoid

text: improper

text: disclosures

text: She

text: sought

text: injunctive

text: relief

text: punitive

text: damages

text: and

text: compensation

text: for

text: the

text: expenditure

text: of

text: time

text: and

text: money

text: commercial

text: impairment

text: inconvenience

text: embarrassment

text: humiliation

text: and

text: emotional

text: distress

text: that

text: TRW

text: had

text: allegedly

text: inflicted

text: upon

text: her

text: App

text: TRW

text: moved

text: for

text: partial

text: summary

text: judgment

text: arguing

text: inter

text: alia

text: that

text: the

text: FCRA

text: s

text: statute

text: of

text: limitations

text: had

text: expired

text: on

text: Andrews

text: claims

text: based

text: on

text: the

text: July

text: and

text: September

text: disclosures

text: because

text: both

text: occurred

text: more

text: than

text: two

text: years

text: before

text: she

text: brought

text: suit

text: Andrews

text: countered

text: that

text: her

text: claims

text: as

text: to

text: all

text: four

text: disclosures

text: were

text: timely

text: because

text: the

text: limitations

text: period

text: did

text: not

text: commence

text: until

text: May

text: the

text: date

text: she

text: learned

text: of

text: TRW

text: s

text: alleged

text: wrongdoing

text: The

text: District

text: Court

text: agreeing

text: with

text: TRW

text: that

text: p

text: does

text: not

text: incorporate

text: a

text: general

text: discovery

text: rule

text: held

text: that

text: relief

text: stemming

text: from

text: the

text: July

text: and

text: September

text: disclosures

text: was

text: time

text: barred

text: Andrews

text: v

text: Trans

text: Union

text: Corp

text: F

text: Supp

text: d

text: CD

text: Cal

text: The

text: Court

text: of

text: Appeals

text: for

text: the

text: Ninth

text: Circuit

text: reversed

text: this

text: ruling

text: applying

text: what

text: it

text: considered

text: to

text: be

text: the

text: general

text: federal

text: rule

text: that

text: a

text: federal

text: statute

text: of

text: limitations

text: begins

text: to

text: run

text: when

text: a

text: party

text: knows

text: or

text: has

text: reason

text: to

text: know

text: that

text: she

text: was

text: injured

text: F

text: d

text: The

text: court

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text: District

text: Court

text: s

text: conclusion

text: that

text: the

text: text

text: of

text: p

text: and

text: in

text: particular

text: the

text: limited

text: exception

text: set

text: forth

text: in

text: that

text: section

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text: attribution

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text: such

text: a

text: rule

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text: the

text: FCRA

text: U

text: nless

text: Congress

text: has

text: expressly

text: legislated

text: otherwise

text: the

text: Ninth

text: Circuit

text: declared

text: the

text: equitable

text: doctrine

text: of

text: discovery

text: is

text: read

text: into

text: every

text: federal

text: statute

text: of

text: limitations

text: Id

text: at

text: internal

text: quotation

text: marks

text: omitted

text: Finding

text: no

text: such

text: express

text: directive

text: the

text: Court

text: of

text: Appeals

text: held

text: that

text: of

text: Andrews

text: injuries

text: were

text: stale

text: when

text: suit

text: was

text: brought

text: Id

text: at

text: Accordingly

text: the

text: court

text: reinstated

text: Andrews

text: improper

text: disclosure

text: claims

text: and

text: remanded

text: them

text: for

text: trial

text: In

text: holding

text: that

text: p

text: incorporates

text: a

text: general

text: discovery

text: rule

text: the

text: Ninth

text: Circuit

text: parted

text: company

text: with

text: four

text: other

text: Circuits

text: those

text: courts

text: have

text: concluded

text: that

text: a

text: discovery

text: exception

text: other

text: than

text: the

text: one

text: Congress

text: expressed

text: may

text: not

text: be

text: read

text: into

text: the

text: Act

text: See

text: Clark

text: v

text: State

text: Farm

text: Fire

text: Casualty

text: Ins

text: Co

text: F

text: d

text: CA

text: Rylewicz

text: v

text: Beaton

text: Servs

text: Ltd

text: F

text: d

text: CA

text: Houghton

text: v

text: Insurance

text: Crime

text: Prevention

text: Institute

text: F

text: d

text: CA

text: Clay

text: v

text: Equifax

text: Inc

text: F

text: d

text: CA

text: We

text: granted

text: certiorari

text: to

text: resolve

text: this

text: conflict

text: U

text: S

text: and

text: now

text: reverse

text: II

text: The

text: Court

text: of

text: Appeals

text: rested

text: its

text: decision

text: on

text: the

text: premise

text: that

text: all

text: federal

text: statutes

text: of

text: limitations

text: regardless

text: of

text: context

text: incorporate

text: a

text: general

text: discovery

text: rule

text: unless

text: Congress

text: has

text: expressly

text: legislated

text: otherwise

text: F

text: d

text: at

text: To

text: the

text: extent

text: such

text: a

text: presumption

text: exists

text: a

text: matter

text: this

text: case

text: does

text: not

text: oblige

text: us

text: to

text: decide

text: the

text: Ninth

text: Circuit

text: conspicuously

text: overstated

text: its

text: scope

text: and

text: force

text: The

text: Appeals

text: Court

text: principally

text: relied

text: on

text: our

text: decision

text: in

text: Holmberg

text: v

text: Armbrecht

text: U

text: S

text: See

text: F

text: d

text: at

text: In

text: that

text: case

text: we

text: instructed

text: with

text: particularity

text: that

text: where

text: a

text: plaintiff

text: has

text: been

text: injured

text: by

text: fraud

text: and

text: remains

text: in

text: ignorance

text: of

text: it

text: without

text: any

text: fault

text: or

text: want

text: of

text: diligence

text: or

text: care

text: on

text: his

text: part

text: the

text: bar

text: of

text: the

text: statute

text: does

text: not

text: begin

text: to

text: run

text: until

text: the

text: fraud

text: is

text: discovered

text: Holmberg

text: U

text: S

text: at

text: internal

text: quotation

text: marks

text: omitted

text: Holmberg

text: thus

text: stands

text: for

text: the

text: proposition

text: that

text: equity

text: tolls

text: the

text: statute

text: of

text: limitations

text: in

text: cases

text: of

text: fraud

text: or

text: concealment

text: it

text: does

text: not

text: establish

text: a

text: general

text: presumption

text: applicable

text: across

text: all

text: contexts

text: The

text: only

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text: cases

text: in

text: which

text: we

text: have

text: recognized

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text: prevailing

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text: two

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text: disease

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text: medical

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text: the

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text: rule

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text: Ninth

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text: view

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text: refusal

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text: adopt

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text: discovery

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text: Ninth

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text: Act

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text: be

text: brought

text: within

text: two

text: years

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text: the

text: date

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text: which

text: the

text: liability

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text: that

text: where

text: a

text: defendant

text: has

text: materially

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text: willfully

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text: information

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text: the

text: Act

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text: be

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text: individual

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text: defendant

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text: liability

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text: individual

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text: Act

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text: action

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text: be

text: brought

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text: any

text: time

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text: exceptions

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text: consumer

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text: tortious

text: conduct

text: alleged

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text: the

text: improper

text: disclosure

text: of

text: her

text: credit

text: history

text: to

text: a

text: potential

text: user

text: until

text: she

text: requests

text: her

text: file

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text: a

text: credit

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text: the

text: agency

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text: concealing

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text: offending

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text: discovery

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text: the

text: misrepresentation

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text: operate

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text: toll

text: the

text: statute

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text: limitations

text: until

text: the

text: concealment

text: is

text: revealed

text: Once

text: triggered

text: the

text: statute

text: of

text: limitations

text: would

text: run

text: under

text: either

text: for

text: two

text: years

text: from

text: the

text: discovery

text: date

text: In

text: this

text: paradigmatic

text: setting

text: then

text: the

text: misrepresentation

text: exception

text: would

text: have

text: no

text: work

text: to

text: do

text: Both

text: Andrews

text: and

text: the

text: Government

text: appearing

text: as

text: amicus

text: in

text: her

text: support

text: attempt

text: to

text: generate

text: some

text: role

text: for

text: the

text: express

text: exception

text: independent

text: of

text: that

text: filled

text: by

text: a

text: general

text: discovery

text: rule

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text: conceive

text: of

text: the

text: exception

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text: a

text: codification

text: of

text: the

text: judge

text: made

text: doctrine

text: of

text: equitable

text: estoppel

text: which

text: they

text: argue

text: operates

text: only

text: after

text: the

text: discovery

text: rule

text: has

text: triggered

text: the

text: limitations

text: period

text: preventing

text: a

text: defendant

text: from

text: benefiting

text: from

text: its

text: misrepresentation

text: by

text: tolling

text: that

text: period

text: until

text: the

text: concealment

text: is

text: uncovered

text: To

text: illustrate

text: this

text: supposed

text: separate

text: application

text: Andrews

text: and

text: the

text: Government

text: frame

text: the

text: following

text: scenario

text: A

text: credit

text: reporting

text: agency

text: injures

text: a

text: consumer

text: by

text: disclosing

text: her

text: file

text: for

text: an

text: improper

text: purpose

text: The

text: consumer

text: has

text: no

text: reason

text: to

text: suspect

text: the

text: violation

text: until

text: a

text: year

text: later

text: when

text: she

text: applies

text: for

text: and

text: is

text: denied

text: credit

text: as

text: a

text: result

text: of

text: the

text: agency

text: s

text: wrongdoing

text: At

text: that

text: point

text: the

text: Government

text: asserts

text: the

text: consumer

text: would

text: presumably

text: be

text: put

text: on

text: inquiry

text: notice

text: of

text: the

text: violation

text: and

text: the

text: discovery

text: rule

text: would

text: start

text: the

text: running

text: of

text: the

text: normal

text: limitation

text: period

text: Brief

text: for

text: United

text: States

text: et

text: al

text: as

text: Amici

text: Curiae

text: emphasis

text: deleted

text: see

text: Tr

text: of

text: Oral

text: Arg

text: argument

text: in

text: accord

text: by

text: Andrews

text: counsel

text: Some

text: days

text: or

text: months

text: later

text: the

text: consumer

text: follows

text: up

text: on

text: her

text: suspicions

text: by

text: requesting

text: a

text: copy

text: of

text: her

text: credit

text: report

text: to

text: which

text: the

text: agency

text: responds

text: by

text: concealing

text: the

text: initial

text: improper

text: disclosure

text: According

text: to

text: Andrews

text: and

text: the

text: Government

text: the

text: misrepresentation

text: exception

text: would

text: then

text: operate

text: to

text: toll

text: the

text: already

text: commenced

text: limitations

text: period

text: until

text: the

text: agency

text: reveals

text: its

text: wrongdoing

text: We

text: reject

text: this

text: argument

text: for

text: several

text: reasons

text: As

text: an

text: initial

text: matter

text: we

text: are

text: not

text: persuaded

text: by

text: this

text: effort

text: to

text: distinguish

text: the

text: practical

text: function

text: of

text: a

text: discovery

text: rule

text: and

text: the

text: express

text: exception

text: because

text: we

text: doubt

text: that

text: the

text: supporting

text: scenario

text: is

text: likely

text: to

text: occur

text: outside

text: the

text: realm

text: of

text: theory

text: The

text: fatal

text: weakness

text: in

text: the

text: narrative

text: is

text: its

text: assumption

text: that

text: a

text: consumer

text: would

text: be

text: charged

text: with

text: constructive

text: notice

text: of

text: an

text: improper

text: disclosure

text: upon

text: denial

text: of

text: a

text: credit

text: application

text: If

text: the

text: consumer

text: habitually

text: paid

text: her

text: bills

text: on

text: time

text: the

text: denial

text: might

text: well

text: lead

text: her

text: to

text: suspect

text: a

text: prior

text: credit

text: agency

text: error

text: But

text: the

text: credit

text: denial

text: would

text: place

text: her

text: on

text: inquiry

text: notice

text: and

text: the

text: discovery

text: rule

text: would

text: trigger

text: the

text: limitations

text: period

text: at

text: that

text: point

text: only

text: if

text: a

text: reasonable

text: person

text: in

text: her

text: position

text: would

text: have

text: learned

text: of

text: the

text: injury

text: in

text: the

text: exercise

text: of

text: due

text: diligence

text: See

text: Stone

text: v

text: Williams

text: F

text: d

text: CA

text: The

text: duty

text: of

text: inquiry

text: having

text: arisen

text: plaintiff

text: is

text: charged

text: with

text: whatever

text: knowledge

text: an

text: inquiry

text: would

text: have

text: revealed

text: C

text: Corman

text: Limitation

text: of

text: Actions

text: p

text: It

text: is

text: obviously

text: unreasonable

text: to

text: charge

text: the

text: plaintiff

text: with

text: failure

text: to

text: search

text: for

text: the

text: missing

text: element

text: of

text: the

text: cause

text: of

text: action

text: if

text: such

text: element

text: would

text: not

text: have

text: been

text: revealed

text: by

text: such

text: search

text: In

text: the

text: usual

text: circumstance

text: the

text: plaintiff

text: will

text: gain

text: knowledge

text: of

text: her

text: injury

text: from

text: the

text: credit

text: reporting

text: agency

text: The

text: scenario

text: put

text: forth

text: by

text: Andrews

text: and

text: the

text: Government

text: however

text: requires

text: the

text: assumption

text: that

text: even

text: if

text: the

text: consumer

text: exercised

text: reasonable

text: diligence

text: by

text: requesting

text: her

text: credit

text: report

text: without

text: delay

text: she

text: would

text: not

text: in

text: fact

text: learn

text: of

text: the

text: disclosure

text: because

text: the

text: credit

text: reporting

text: agency

text: would

text: conceal

text: it

text: The

text: uncovering

text: of

text: that

text: concealment

text: would

text: remain

text: the

text: triggering

text: event

text: for

text: both

text: the

text: discovery

text: rule

text: and

text: the

text: express

text: exception

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text: this

text: scenario

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text: in

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text: paradigmatic

text: one

text: the

text: misrepresentation

text: exception

text: would

text: be

text: superfluous

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text: any

text: event

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text: the

text: Government

text: concede

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text: the

text: independent

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text: could

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text: express

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text: Respondent

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text: implied

text: discovery

text: rule

text: would

text: apply

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text: vast

text: majority

text: of

text: cases

text: The

text: result

text: is

text: that

text: a

text: rule

text: nowhere

text: contained

text: in

text: the

text: text

text: of

text: p

text: would

text: do

text: the

text: bulk

text: of

text: that

text: provision

text: s

text: work

text: while

text: a

text: proviso

text: accounting

text: for

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text: half

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text: text

text: would

text: lie

text: dormant

text: in

text: all

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text: the

text: most

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text: is

text: a

text: cardinal

text: principle

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text: statutory

text: construction

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text: a

text: statute

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text: upon

text: the

text: whole

text: to

text: be

text: so

text: construed

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text: if

text: it

text: can

text: be

text: prevented

text: no

text: clause

text: sentence

text: or

text: word

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text: be

text: superfluous

text: void

text: or

text: insignificant

text: Duncan

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text: Walker

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text: marks

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text: United

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text: our

text: duty

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text: give

text: effect

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text: we

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text: the

text: decision

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text: contends

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text: words

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text: the

text: liability

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text: phrase

text: Congress

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text: general

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text: discovery

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text: liability

text: does

text: not

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text: it

text: present

text: s

text: itself

text: or

text: comes

text: to

text: the

text: attention

text: of

text: the

text: potential

text: plaintiff

text: Brief

text: for

text: Respondent

text: The

text: dictionary

text: definition

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text: the

text: word

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text: does

text: not

text: compel

text: such

text: a

text: reading

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text: the

text: contrary

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text: can

text: be

text: used

text: to

text: support

text: either

text: party

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text: position

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text: Webster

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text: International

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text: arise

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text: to

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text: s

text: Law

text: Dictionary

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text: come

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text: TRW

text: offers

text: a

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text: have

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text: introduced

text: in

text: both

text: the

text: House

text: and

text: Senate

text: keyed

text: the

text: start

text: of

text: the

text: limitations

text: period

text: to

text: the

text: date

text: of

text: the

text: occurrence

text: of

text: the

text: violation

text: S

text: st

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text: st

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text: H

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text: language

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text: Andrews

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text: congressional

text: intent

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text: reject

text: the

text: rule

text: that

text: the

text: deleted

text: words

text: would

text: have

text: plainly

text: established

text: As

text: TRW

text: notes

text: however

text: Congress

text: also

text: heard

text: testimony

text: urging

text: it

text: to

text: enact

text: a

text: statute

text: of

text: limitations

text: that

text: runs

text: from

text: the

text: date

text: on

text: which

text: the

text: violation

text: is

text: discovered

text: but

text: declined

text: to

text: do

text: so

text: Hearings

text: before

text: the

text: Subcommittee

text: on

text: Consumer

text: Affairs

text: of

text: the

text: House

text: Committee

text: on

text: Banking

text: and

text: Currency

text: st

text: Cong

text: d

text: Sess

text: In

text: addition

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text: very

text: change

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text: p

text: s

text: language

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text: which

text: Andrews

text: relies

text: could

text: be

text: read

text: to

text: refute

text: her

text: position

text: The

text: misrepresentation

text: exception

text: was

text: added

text: at

text: the

text: same

text: time

text: Congress

text: changed

text: the

text: language

text: date

text: of

text: the

text: occurrence

text: of

text: the

text: violation

text: to

text: liability

text: arises

text: Compare

text: S

text: st

text: Cong

text: st

text: Sess

text: H

text: R

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text: d

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text: st

text: Sess

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text: H

text: R

text: Rep

text: No

text: p

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text: doubt

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text: Congress

text: when

text: it

text: inserted

text: a

text: carefully

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text: exception

text: to

text: the

text: main

text: rule

text: intended

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text: to

text: create

text: a

text: general

text: discovery

text: rule

text: that

text: would

text: render

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text: exception

text: superfluous

text: In

text: sum

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text: evidence

text: of

text: the

text: early

text: incarnations

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text: like

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text: liability

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text: on

text: which

text: Congress

text: ultimately

text: settled

text: fails

text: to

text: convince

text: us

text: that

text: Congress

text: intended

text: sub

text: silentio

text: to

text: adopt

text: a

text: general

text: discovery

text: rule

text: in

text: addition

text: to

text: the

text: limited

text: one

text: it

text: expressly

text: provided

text: III

text: In

text: this

text: Court

text: Andrews

text: for

text: the

text: first

text: time

text: presents

text: an

text: alternative

text: argument

text: based

text: on

text: the

text: liability

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text: language

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text: p

text: Brief

text: for

text: Respondent

text: She

text: contends

text: that

text: even

text: if

text: p

text: does

text: not

text: incorporate

text: a

text: discovery

text: rule

text: liability

text: under

text: the

text: FCRA

text: does

text: not

text: necessarily

text: arise

text: when

text: a

text: violation

text: of

text: the

text: Act

text: occurs

text: Noting

text: that

text: the

text: FCRA

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text: substantive

text: provisions

text: tie

text: liability

text: to

text: the

text: presence

text: of

text: actual

text: damages

text: n

text: o

text: and

text: that

text: arise

text: means

text: at

text: least

text: to

text: come

text: into

text: existence

text: Andrews

text: concludes

text: that

text: liability

text: arises

text: only

text: when

text: actual

text: damages

text: materialize

text: Not

text: until

text: then

text: she

text: maintains

text: will

text: all

text: the

text: essential

text: elements

text: of

text: a

text: claim

text: coalesce

text: duty

text: breach

text: causation

text: and

text: injury

text: Brief

text: for

text: Respondent

text: see

text: Hyde

text: v

text: Hibernia

text: Nat

text: Bank

text: F

text: d

text: CA

text: The

text: requirement

text: that

text: a

text: consumer

text: sustain

text: some

text: injury

text: in

text: order

text: to

text: establish

text: a

text: cause

text: of

text: action

text: suggests

text: that

text: the

text: statute

text: should

text: be

text: triggered

text: when

text: the

text: agency

text: issues

text: an

text: erroneous

text: report

text: to

text: an

text: institution

text: with

text: which

text: the

text: consumer

text: is

text: dealing

text: Accordingly

text: Andrews

text: asserts

text: her

text: claims

text: are

text: timely

text: The

text: disputed

text: liability

text: for

text: actual

text: damages

text: did

text: not

text: arise

text: until

text: May

text: when

text: she

text: suffered

text: the

text: emotional

text: distress

text: missed

text: opportunities

text: and

text: inconvenience

text: cataloged

text: in

text: her

text: complaint

text: prior

text: to

text: that

text: time

text: she

text: had

text: no

text: FCRA

text: claim

text: to

text: bring

text: Brief

text: for

text: Respondent

text: emphasis

text: deleted

text: Cf

text: Bay

text: Area

text: Laundry

text: and

text: Dry

text: Cleaning

text: Pension

text: Trust

text: Fund

text: v

text: Ferbar

text: Corp

text: of

text: Cal

text: U

text: S

text: rejecting

text: construction

text: of

text: statute

text: under

text: which

text: limitations

text: period

text: would

text: begin

text: running

text: before

text: cause

text: of

text: action

text: existed

text: in

text: favor

text: of

text: standard

text: rule

text: that

text: the

text: period

text: does

text: not

text: commence

text: earlier

text: than

text: the

text: date

text: the

text: plaintiff

text: can

text: file

text: suit

text: and

text: obtain

text: relief

text: We

text: do

text: not

text: reach

text: this

text: issue

text: because

text: it

text: was

text: not

text: raised

text: or

text: briefed

text: below

text: See

text: Reply

text: Brief

text: for

text: Petitioner

text: We

text: note

text: however

text: that

text: the

text: Ninth

text: Circuit

text: has

text: not

text: embraced

text: Andrews

text: alternative

text: argument

text: see

text: F

text: d

text: at

text: Liability

text: under

text: the

text: Act

text: arises

text: when

text: a

text: consumer

text: reporting

text: agency

text: fails

text: to

text: comply

text: with

text: e

text: and

text: the

text: Government

text: does

text: not

text: join

text: her

text: in

text: advancing

text: it

text: here

text: Further

text: we

text: doubt

text: that

text: the

text: argument

text: even

text: if

text: valid

text: would

text: aid

text: Andrews

text: in

text: this

text: case

text: Her

text: claims

text: alleged

text: willful

text: violations

text: of

text: e

text: a

text: and

text: are

text: thus

text: governed

text: by

text: n

text: At

text: the

text: time

text: of

text: the

text: events

text: in

text: question

text: that

text: provision

text: stated

text: Any

text: consumer

text: reporting

text: agency

text: which

text: willfully

text: fails

text: to

text: comply

text: with

text: any

text: requirement

text: imposed

text: under

text: the

text: Act

text: with

text: respect

text: to

text: any

text: consumer

text: is

text: liable

text: to

text: that

text: consumer

text: in

text: an

text: amount

text: equal

text: to

text: the

text: sum

text: of

text: any

text: actual

text: damages

text: and

text: such

text: amount

text: of

text: punitive

text: damages

text: as

text: the

text: court

text: may

text: allow

text: U

text: S

text: C

text: n

text: ed

text: Punitive

text: damages

text: which

text: Andrews

text: sought

text: in

text: this

text: case

text: could

text: presumably

text: be

text: awarded

text: at

text: the

text: moment

text: of

text: TRW

text: s

text: alleged

text: wrongdoing

text: even

text: if

text: actual

text: damages

text: did

text: not

text: accrue

text: at

text: that

text: time

text: On

text: Andrews

text: theory

text: then

text: at

text: least

text: some

text: of

text: the

text: liability

text: she

text: sought

text: to

text: enforce

text: arose

text: when

text: the

text: violations

text: occurred

text: and

text: the

text: limitations

text: period

text: therefore

text: began

text: to

text: run

text: at

text: that

text: point

text: For

text: the

text: reasons

text: stated

text: the

text: judgment

text: of

text: the

text: Court

text: of

text: Appeals

text: for

text: the

text: Ninth

text: Circuit

text: is

text: reversed

text: and

text: the

text: case

text: is

text: remanded

text: for

text: further

text: proceedings

text: consistent

text: with

text: this

text: opinion

text: It

text: is

text: so

text: ordered

text: Justice

text: Scalia

text: with

text: whom

text: Justice

text: Thomas

text: joins

text: concurring

text: in

text: the

text: judgment

text: As

text: the

text: Court

text: notes

text: ante

text: at

text: the

text: Court

text: of

text: Appeals

text: based

text: its

text: decision

text: on

text: what

text: it

text: called

text: the

text: general

text: federal

text: rule

text: that

text: a

text: federal

text: statute

text: of

text: limitations

text: begins

text: to

text: run

text: when

text: a

text: party

text: knows

text: or

text: has

text: reason

text: to

text: know

text: that

text: she

text: was

text: injured

text: F

text: d

text: CA

text: The

text: Court

text: declines

text: to

text: say

text: whether

text: that

text: expression

text: of

text: the

text: governing

text: general

text: rule

text: is

text: correct

text: See

text: ante

text: at

text: To

text: the

text: extent

text: such

text: a

text: presumption

text: exists

text: a

text: matter

text: this

text: case

text: does

text: not

text: oblige

text: us

text: to

text: decide

text: There

text: is

text: in

text: my

text: view

text: little

text: doubt

text: that

text: it

text: is

text: not

text: and

text: our

text: reluctance

text: to

text: say

text: so

text: today

text: is

text: inexplicable

text: given

text: that

text: we

text: held

text: a

text: mere

text: four

text: years

text: ago

text: that

text: a

text: statute

text: of

text: limitations

text: which

text: says

text: the

text: period

text: runs

text: from

text: the

text: date

text: on

text: which

text: the

text: cause

text: of

text: action

text: arose

text: U

text: S

text: C

text: f

text: ed

text: incorporates

text: the

text: standard

text: rule

text: that

text: the

text: limitations

text: period

text: commences

text: when

text: the

text: plaintiff

text: has

text: a

text: complete

text: and

text: present

text: cause

text: of

text: action

text: Bay

text: Area

text: Laundry

text: and

text: Dry

text: Cleaning

text: Pension

text: Trust

text: Fund

text: v

text: Ferbar

text: Corp

text: of

text: Cal

text: U

text: S

text: emphasis

text: added

text: and

text: internal

text: quotation

text: marks

text: omitted

text: Bay

text: Area

text: Laundry

text: quoted

text: approvingly

text: our

text: statement

text: in

text: Clark

text: v

text: Iowa

text: City

text: Wall

text: that

text: a

text: ll

text: statutes

text: of

text: limitation

text: begin

text: to

text: run

text: when

text: the

text: right

text: of

text: action

text: is

text: complete

text: This

text: is

text: unquestionably

text: the

text: traditional

text: rule

text: Absent

text: other

text: indication

text: a

text: statute

text: of

text: limitations

text: begins

text: to

text: run

text: at

text: the

text: time

text: the

text: plaintiff

text: has

text: the

text: right

text: to

text: apply

text: to

text: the

text: court

text: for

text: relief

text: H

text: Wood

text: Limitation

text: of

text: Actions

text: a

text: p

text: th

text: ed

text: That

text: a

text: person

text: entitled

text: to

text: an

text: action

text: has

text: no

text: knowledge

text: of

text: his

text: right

text: to

text: sue

text: or

text: of

text: the

text: facts

text: out

text: of

text: which

text: his

text: right

text: arises

text: does

text: not

text: postpone

text: the

text: period

text: of

text: limitation

text: id

text: c

text: at

text: The

text: injury

text: discovery

text: rule

text: applied

text: by

text: the

text: Court

text: of

text: Appeals

text: is

text: bad

text: wine

text: of

text: recent

text: vintage

text: Other

text: than

text: our

text: recognition

text: of

text: the

text: historical

text: exception

text: for

text: suits

text: based

text: on

text: fraud

text: e

text: g

text: Bailey

text: v

text: Glover

text: Wall

text: we

text: have

text: deviated

text: from

text: the

text: traditional

text: rule

text: and

text: imputed

text: an

text: injury

text: discovery

text: rule

text: to

text: Congress

text: on

text: only

text: one

text: occasion

text: Urie

text: v

text: Thompson

text: U

text: S

text: We

text: did

text: so

text: there

text: because

text: we

text: could

text: not

text: imagine

text: that

text: legislation

text: as

text: humane

text: as

text: the

text: Federal

text: Employers

text: Liability

text: Act

text: would

text: bar

text: recovery

text: for

text: latent

text: medical

text: injuries

text: Id

text: at

text: We

text: repeated

text: this

text: sentiment

text: in

text: Rotella

text: v

text: Wood

text: U

text: S

text: saying

text: that

text: the

text: cry

text: for

text: a

text: discovery

text: rule

text: is

text: loudest

text: in

text: the

text: context

text: of

text: medical

text: malpractice

text: suits

text: and

text: we

text: repeat

text: it

text: again

text: today

text: with

text: the

text: assertion

text: that

text: the

text: present

text: case

text: does

text: not

text: involve

text: an

text: area

text: of

text: the

text: law

text: that

text: cries

text: out

text: for

text: application

text: of

text: a

text: discovery

text: rule

text: ante

text: at

text: These

text: cries

text: however

text: are

text: properly

text: directed

text: not

text: to

text: us

text: but

text: to

text: Congress

text: whose

text: job

text: it

text: is

text: to

text: decide

text: how

text: humane

text: legislation

text: should

text: be

text: or

text: to

text: put

text: the

text: point

text: less

text: tendentiously

text: to

text: strike

text: the

text: balance

text: between

text: remediation

text: of

text: all

text: injuries

text: and

text: a

text: policy

text: of

text: repose

text: See

text: Amy

text: v

text: Watertown

text: No

text: U

text: S

text: T

text: he

text: cases

text: in

text: which

text: the

text: statute

text: of

text: limitations

text: may

text: be

text: suspended

text: by

text: causes

text: not

text: mentioned

text: in

text: the

text: statute

text: itself

text: are

text: very

text: limited

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text: character

text: and

text: are

text: to

text: be

text: admitted

text: with

text: great

text: caution

text: otherwise

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text: court

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text: make

text: the

text: law

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text: of

text: administering

text: it

text: Congress

text: has

text: been

text: operating

text: against

text: the

text: background

text: rule

text: recognized

text: in

text: Bay

text: Area

text: Laundry

text: for

text: a

text: very

text: long

text: time

text: When

text: it

text: has

text: wanted

text: us

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text: apply

text: a

text: different

text: rule

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text: as

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text: injury

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text: rule

text: it

text: has

text: said

text: so

text: See

text: e

text: g

text: U

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text: V

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text: also

text: e

text: g

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text: V

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text: apply

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text: new

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text: rule

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text: previously

text: enacted

text: legislation

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text: and

text: to

text: display

text: uncertainty

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text: the

text: current

text: background

text: rule

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text: all

text: unspecifying

text: new

text: legislation

text: a

text: roll

text: of

text: the

text: dice

text: Today

text: s

text: opinion

text: in

text: clarifying

text: the

text: meaning

text: of

text: U

text: S

text: C

text: p

text: casts

text: the

text: meaning

text: of

text: innumerable

text: other

text: limitation

text: periods

text: in

text: doubt

text: Because

text: there

text: is

text: nothing

text: in

text: this

text: statute

text: to

text: contradict

text: the

text: rule

text: that

text: a

text: statute

text: of

text: limitations

text: begins

text: to

text: run

text: when

text: the

text: cause

text: of

text: action

text: is

text: complete

text: I

text: concur

text: in

text: the

text: judgment

text: of

text: the

text: Court

text: NOTES

text: Richard

text: J

text: Rubin

text: Joanne

text: S

text: Faulkner

text: Willard

text: P

text: Ogburn

text: Deborah

text: M

text: Zuckerman

text: Stacy

text: J

text: Canan

text: and

text: Michael

text: R

text: Schuster

text: filed

text: a

text: brief

text: for

text: the

text: National

text: Association

text: of

text: Consumer

text: Advocates

text: et

text: al

text: as

text: amici

text: curiae

text: urging

text: affirmance

text: Congress

text: has

text: revised

text: the

text: FCRA

text: extensively

text: since

text: the

text: events

text: at

text: issue

text: but

text: has

text: not

text: altered

text: the

text: provisions

text: material

text: to

text: this

text: case

text: Under

text: amendments

text: to

text: n

text: a

text: plaintiff

text: may

text: also

text: recover

text: statutory

text: damages

text: of

text: between

text: and

text: for

text: willful

text: violations

text: See

text: U

text: S

text: C

text: n

text: a

text: A

text: ed

text: Supp

text: V

text: The

text: second

text: alleged

text: that

text: TRW

text: had

text: collected

text: information

text: about

text: the

text: Impostor

text: s

text: activities

text: and

text: inaccurately

text: attributed

text: that

text: activity

text: to

text: Andrews

text: in

text: violation

text: of

text: its

text: obligation

text: under

text: e

text: b

text: to

text: follow

text: reasonable

text: procedures

text: to

text: assure

text: maximum

text: possible

text: accuracy

text: of

text: the

text: information

text: concerning

text: the

text: individual

text: about

text: whom

text: a

text: report

text: relates

text: A

text: jury

text: resolved

text: this

text: claim

text: in

text: favor

text: of

text: TRW

text: The

text: complaint

text: also

text: stated

text: FCRA

text: claims

text: against

text: Trans

text: Union

text: Corporation

text: another

text: credit

text: reporting

text: agency

text: involved

text: in

text: the

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text: conflicts

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text: Ninth

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text: cause

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text: obligation

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text: because

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text: standard

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text: run

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text: plaintiff

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text: internal

text: quotation

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text: the

text: Court

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text: traditional

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text: medical

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text: Federal

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text: United

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text: date

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text: act

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text: or

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text: date

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text: discovery

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text: action

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text: enforce

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text: k

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text: discovery

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text: omission

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text: discovery

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text: release

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text: question