Empathetic perspective-taking is impaired in XXXX : evidence from a study of emotion attribution and theory of mind.

@entity1 @entity51 @entity161 @entity2438
INTRODUCTION: @entity161 and @entity2438 are clinically distinct yet both disorders are characterised by theory of mind (ToM) deficits. @entity2438 individuals fail to appreciate false beliefs, yet understand the causal connections between behavioural events and simple emotions. Findings of this type have promoted the view that @entity51 in @entity2438 reflect a domain-specific difficulty with appreciating the representational nature of epistemic mental states (i.e., beliefs and intentions and not emotions). This study examines whether the same holds true for @entity161 . METHODS: A picture-sequencing task assessed capacity to infer false beliefs in @entity1 with @entity161 and healthy controls. To assess emotion attribution, @entity1 were shown cartoon strips of events likely to elicit strong emotional reactions in story characters. Characters' faces were blanked out. @entity1 were instructed to think about how the characters would be feeling in order to match up the cards depicting facial affect appropriately. @entity1 later named emotions depicted in facial affect cards. RESULTS: @entity1 were as capable as controls of identifying cartoon facial expressions, yet had greater difficulties with: (a) attributing emotions based on circumstances; and (b) inferring false beliefs. CONCLUSIONS: @entity161 @entity1 , unlike @entity2438 individuals, suffer a domain-general difficulty with empathetic perspective-taking that affects equally their appreciation of other @entity1 's beliefs, percepts, and emotions.
